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This dissertation offers collegiate literary instructors a theoretical foundation
and pedagogical method for teaching their students how to analyze aesthetic
affect: a theory and practice termed here “neo−appreciation pedagogy.” While
the dissertation outlines a general theory of literary reading, it only does so to
provide the basis for classroom methods that directly confront archaic, text−immanent
models of meaning production. While preserving much of the method and termi-
nology of the traditional literary classroom, neo−appreciation pedagogy offers
students an overt admission that literary study is at least partially a transmis-
sion of particular cultural biases; however, it also teaches them ways to critique
those cultural biases, beginning with their own responses to “great” literature.
In other words, neo−literary appreciation pedagogy seeks to teach students why
certain cultural artifacts have been valued in the past (particularly works which
they themselves typically do not value) by expanding their repertoire of reading
or “lectical” strategies.
In pursuit of this goal, this dissertation outlines a taxonomy of conventional
reading strategies simple enough to teach to undergraduate students. This
taxonomy is articulated into a heuristic − “the lectical triangle” − used to
teach students first how to analyze the lectical strategies they already use
then how to deploy those and other lectical strategies (with which they may
be less familiar) in increasingly sophisticated − i.e. academic − ways. Building
upon post−structuralist, linguistic theory and American Pragmatism in general
(along with significant elaboration s upon the work of Wolfgang Iser and Wayne
Booth in particular, lectical analysis helps students explore how different tex-
tual patterns can “invite” certain lectical responses and only “tolerate” or even
“resist” others while never requiring any particular response. Neo−appreciation
pedagogy, therefore, does not seek to reinforce conventional or canonical read-
ings of literary works, much less reproduce any particular aesthetic affect; in-
stead, it seeks to give students the tools to understand the lectical conventions
by which such works have been valued in the past, while giving them more lec-
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students.  This taxonomy is articulated into a heuristic - "the lectical triangle" -
used to teach students first how to analyze the lectical strategies they already
use then how to deploy those and other lectical strategies (with which they may
be less familiar) in increasingly sophisticated - i.e. academic - ways.  Building
upon post-structuralist, linguistic theory and American Pragmatism in general
(along with significant elaboration s upon the work of Wolfgang Iser and Wayne
Booth in particular), lectical analysis helps students explore how different textual
patterns can "invite" certain lectical responses and only "tolerate" or even
"resist" others while never requiring any particular response.  Neo-appreciation
pedagogy, therefore, does not seek to reinforce conventional or canonical
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them more lectical resources for readings they might perform in the future.
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Polemical Introduction:
 How I Stopped Worrying and Started Appreciating Literature Again
This story went over my head, I guess.  I don’t get the whole
“gender” thing.  Do you mean that the story is sexist?  I guess you
could say it means Alice is basically owned by her husband the jerk,
but I think its just a story.  Also I don’t get the ending.  I mean it
just stops – what happens?  Do they argue?  Do they become
friends?  I know I’m supposed to know but it just leaves me
hanging.
This is bullshit.  The Wasteland is more like a waste of time.  I could
write anything that came into my head too, would that make me a
great poet?  I don’t think so.  I hope this isn’t going to be on the
test cause I’m flunking if I have to say anything intelligent about
this.
Finally something I can relate to!  I was inchanted (sic) by Cather’s
story.  Rosicky was so real, everyone has known someone like him.
I felt like crying at the end, but good.  I hope we read more regular
stories like Cather – Yea!
In my opinion Hemingway is great.  It’s so realistic I forgot I was
doing homework.  I see what you mean about the way he narrates
the story and how that effects our point of view - is this what you
mean by narrative frame or is that something else.  I can’t tell what
Ernie wants us to think about the story but it doesn’t matter
because the characters are so cool.  Also I noticed how by going
back and forth in time he slowly builds what is going on till at the
end you are right there with him on the hunt.  I know about the
pressure to be a “real man” and it really happens when you are
hunting.   
Whatever this poem is supposed to be about, I don’t get it.  This is
why I suck at English.
The above excerpts culled from the reading journals of five of my
undergraduate literature students have at least one thing in common: the
writers know they are supposed to create an articulate response to a literary
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work but in varying degrees feel their responses are inadequate. Some (the first
and the last excerpts) are written in a resigned, even despairing voice; others
(“This is bullshit”) respond to the task with anger and contempt.  Those entries
that describe a positive reading experience do so with an admission that their
encounters with literature in a classroom setting are not always so pleasant;
although they sound excited about the reading assignment at hand, their tone is
still tentative, the comments of an outsider.  Notice even the most confident of
these writers (“Hemingway is great”) is acutely aware of his status as an
apprentice reader-critic and therefore writes in a voice that is overly qualified
(“In my opinion”) and deferential (“is this what you mean”).  So, even in their
own journals, where the only requirement was to write freely and openly about a
reading assignment, my students apparently felt self-conscious or, perhaps,
overly conscious that their “free” writing will be read by someone else, someone
who they feel is fluent in a dialect they can barely speak.     
Although undergraduate students are, in fact, the novices of academic
culture, Donald Bartholomae makes the trenchant assertion that their
development as scholarly writers depends on their ability to adopt the
authoritative voice of initiates of it (590). According to Bartholomae, the
student “has to appropriate (or be appropriated by) a specialized discourse, and
he has to do this as though he were easily and comfortably one with his
audience” (590).  In other words, they need not only to talk like us but also to
us as if they are our peers.  Bartholomae, therefore, would probably characterize
the different voices apparent in the above excerpts as being indicative of the
different stages of rhetorical development of the writers, although all of them
have yet to “appropriate” a place for themselves in academic literary discourse.  
It makes sense that a student’s development as a writer and a critical
thinker is closely correlated to his or her willingness and ability to pretend they
already have an authority they have only just begun to develop.  The best
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students, following this logic, are those who are most able to sustain the
pretense that they are active, committed participants in an ongoing scholarly
discussion of which they barely understand the most basic concepts.  From my
experience, if they can “act as if” they are scholars long enough, they will in fact
develop scholarly skills.  As I have pointed out to my students for years,
however, keeping up this pretense can be very tricky.  Some students
erroneously believe that they will get an  “A” by speaking up occasionally in
class and parroting literary jargon; after all, that strategy usually works pretty
well in high school.  Although some days I am indeed grateful to hear any  sound
from the peanut gallery, usually in the collegiate classroom we want more than
hollow participatory gestures from our students; we want them to think about
the literary works they read and then express those thoughts to a community of
fellow readers.  We don’t, however, want them to think in any old way; we want
them to think and express themselves like us, that is, like scholars.  
Many students, of course, do not want to think or be like us, and some –
“This is bullshit” – resent the implication that they should.  From their
perspective, English teachers are of that species of authority figures that are
not particularly respected but must be obeyed, like nightclub bouncers or airline
ticket agents.  Gratefully, some students do respect our profession and seem to
see us as role models; they like the way we think and would like to think that
way too.  Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between a student's
respect for our profession and his or her success in the classroom.  Even if their
analytical and compositional skills are substandard when they come to us, such
students tend to improve those skills quite rapidly, if for no other reason than
they actively seek and receive feedback about their work.  Most literary
instructors, in fact, have to take measures to prevent class time from devolving
into an enjoyable but exclusionary seminar of three or four participants and
thirty to forty spectators.  This correlation between identity and performance
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suggests a pedagogical goal; if being able to imagine themselves the peers of
their instructors will help them be better students, maybe we should make
creative self-visualization (or even self-creative visualization) a part of our
curriculum so our undergrads can release their inner English teachers.  In other
words, if we are indeed trying to teach them to think and write like us, as it
seems, it makes sense that it would further that project to teach them how to
like us, or at least how to respect us and by extension our discipline.
I am only half joking here.  If our undergraduate students do, in fact, have
to appropriate or be appropriated by the discourse of literary studies as
Bartholomae suggests, then it follows that project should include some sort of
“ethical” indoctrination; that is, to be successful some of our students need to
be taught how to adopt a certain type of ethos, at least in their classroom
writing.  Needless to say, overt indoctrination of any kind is frowned upon in
scholarly culture these days, which is not to say that indoctrination does not
happen.  If Bartholomae is correct, undergraduate students must have a
scholarly ethos to be successful in college - whether we try to teach one or not
- which explains why so often literature classes become polarized into those who
“get it” and those who don’t, those who walk into the first class with a clue and
those that walk out of the final exam without one.
The classroom dynamic described above is typical in any academic
discipline that includes the transmission of cultural value as part of its
curriculum.  In such courses some students will seem to “get it” intuitively quite
simply because they have already got it; to some extent they already value the
cultural artifact, whether it is a poem, a building, a piece of legislation, a
symphonic movement, or a scholarly tradition.  Although few undergraduate
literature courses will list “understanding the importance of literary study” as a
course requirement, certainly having that understanding is one of the core
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pedagogical goals of the literary classroom.  It is not by accident that
introductory literary courses used to be called “Appreciation” courses;
introductory courses were and still are designed at least in part to raise the
value of great literature (as defined by the individual instructor) in the student’s
estimation.  One of the problems with teaching students to “appreciate”
literature, of course, is that in recent years the project of teaching the cultural
heritage – and therefore the prejudices - of a certain (ruling) class has come
under heavy fire.  The heated debate surrounding the socio-political
ramifications of teaching a(ny) canon continues without any definitive or even
partial consensus in sight.  Given this situation, how do we justify to our
students an activity about which we as a discipline express much ambivalence?
This problem is compounded by the fact that the value of reading literature
cannot be transmitted directly because it is based in an experience, an
experience we can describe only in the abstract.  We can point our students
toward valuable reading experiences but we can’t make them have one.  To
whatever extent they do not understand the value of reading a particular work
or even a whole genre of literature, our students do not know why literary study
is worth pursuing.  
Similarly, we can list out what we give our students (i.e. the subject
matter presented in the classroom), but what they supposedly receive by
completing a literature course is an abstract faculty, a set of cognitive tools
forged in our classrooms but intended for a lifetime of use.  For instance, we
offer students information about the original historical/political/cultural milieu of
literary texts, the biographies of authors, philological data, literary terminology,
genre criteria, and the heritage of critical commentary surrounding a given work
– all in the hopes that such information will give them a better understanding of
the works at hand and literature in general.  Simply knowing such data, of
course, is not valuable in its own right (unless one plans to be a Jeopardy
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contestant).  Sure, they get tested on their ability to remember the definition of
“allegory” or whether Naturalism has anything to do with Romanticism, but only
in the hopes that knowing those “facts” will give them a richer context within
which they might develop a more sophisticated, scholarly – i.e. better –
understanding of literary works.  In addition, we might require our students to
learn various critical and rhetorical theories, interpretive heuristics, the
conventions of scholarly composition, and “close” reading techniques, but we do
so only in the hope they will understand the range of what is “logical” or
“acceptable” commentary in academic discourse and therefore be able to write
in that dialect upon command.  Again, learning Freytag’s Pyramid or the M.L.A.
guidelines for a works cited page is important only if those concepts are used
skillfully within a scholarly commentary.  However, both the memorization of
such data and the commentary itself are only the observable symptoms of the
actual pedagogical object of a literary course: the ability to understand and write
about literature in an academic way.  Since we are unable to transmit this ability
directly, we hope our students will develop it through exposure to various
artifacts of literary culture – artifacts of which we are but one type.  
The fact that we teach abstract, cognitive skills is not a pedagogical
problem in itself; that students learn how to write interpretive essays that are
logical, unified, and stylistically appropriate is proof that these skills exist and
can be developed by conventional classroom methods.  The problem is that
since these skills can not be articulated - we can not say exactly what they are -
they tend to be mystified by teachers and students alike.  As with other
abstract, cognitive processes like “faith,” “confidence,” or “love,” this
mystification tends to divide groups of people into those that have “got it” and
those that do not.  In the classroom, this often leads to feelings of inadequacy,
frustration, and confusion for the “have-nots”; they struggle to grasp concepts
that seem beyond them (because they are not yet inside them), or they dismiss
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the entire project and pull a “C” by memorizing those “facts” that can be
articulated about literature.
I believe negotiating some sort of practical solution to such problems is a
prerequisite for being an effective teacher of literature.  Although there are
many ways to design a syllabus, the best teaching plan, to my mind, is one that
consciously aligns its what (material) and how (method) with a coherent
explanation of why literature should be taught in the first place, that is, why
students should be motivated to study it.  However, the why of literary
pedagogy can only be established according to some system of values.  That is
to say, before one can decide responsibly which material and method best
serves students, the individual teacher needs to decide why and in what context
the study of literature is valuable, why it is of use to students who all too often
are convinced of its uselessness.  Few literary scholars these days will openly
subscribe to overtly prescriptive value systems, but fewer still will admit our
discipline is utterly valueless.  Clearly a transaction occurs in the classroom; a
service is offered, purchased, and delivered.  But what can the consumer expect
to receive for their (parents’) money?  How does analyzing and writing about
literature improve ones lifestyle?
As suggested above, the most common justifications given for the study
of literature are: (1) literature is an important and pervasive cultural artifact
that should be carefully analyzed and (2) to do so develops ones critical skills.
Both of these are variations of the more general, time-honored justification for
the Liberal Arts as a whole: i.e. it is valuable to have a thorough, analytical
understanding of human culture because it will make you “well-rounded,” or
some such.  Additionally, there is a vague sense that being “well-rounded”
improves ones chances in the job market - the number one reason young people
tell themselves (or at least their elders) why they go to college.  Although most
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students will buy this general justification for the liberal arts, many have great
difficulty seeing how studying literature in particular will give them a better
understanding of human culture as they know it quite simply because much of
the literature read in the college classroom is not immediately accessible to
them.  They fail to see the practical value of fully engaging such works,
particularly because to do so often requires great effort and/or resources which
they do not have.  Since our students often do not experience “classroom”
literature as being important or even relevant to their world, and since “critical
skills” can be honed in any of the liberal arts, getting a decent grade becomes
their sole motivation for completing the requirements of a literature course.
Certainly getting good grades is an honorable priority for students in any course
of study, but merely giving students credit toward their degrees cannot be a
valid justification for offering a course of study.  We need, therefore, to clarify
and make explicit to our students the value we receive from the study of
literature and how that value is translated into course materials.  We already
implicitly impose a system of values upon our students; I merely suggest that
they will be more effective students if they accept or at least understand why
we think literary study is of practical value in the first place.   
 As pointed out above, some students arrive in our classrooms motivated
to embrace our subject matter because they already believe literary study is
valuable, even fun.  Invariably this belief comes from previous, positive
experiences with the Fine Arts, in or out of the classroom.  Such students are
motivated to study literature for another, less officially authorized reason than
the first two listed above.  They want to study literature because they believe it
can be pleasurable to do so.  In this respect, of course, they resemble those of
us who study and teach literature for a living.  People join this profession at
least in part because they love the experience of reading literature and their
lives have been profoundly enriched by those experiences.  I do not use the
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word “love” lightly here.  Love denotes a relationship, an ongoing, intimate
engagement with the beloved.  Love can be experienced as pleasure, but also
often induces pain, despair, longing, and confusion. Love can not be objectively
explained; it must be experienced.  Love also connotes a commitment; true
lovers will go to great lengths for their beloved, persevering through Herculean
tasks to consummate their affection.  Moreover, love, like virtue, is its own
reward.  Although being in love may be difficult and strenuous, the attendant
experience of loving is powerful enough to sustain the lover through a lifetime of
facing challenge after challenge.  We love to read literature.  Our best students
like it a lot.  Most of our students, however, can’t figure out what we see in it.
Since they do not love it, they do not understand why analyzing it is worthwhile.
The above scenario suggests we have inverted the relationship between
the cultural value and the emotional/affective value of literature.  The official
justification for our discipline is its importance as a cultural artifact, but
literature is a cultural artifact worthy of serious academic study primarily
because of the affective potential of reading it.  If literature did not have a
unique potential to move us, to encourage us, to make us feel the full range of
human experience, it would be studied seriously only along with other elements
of pop culture, like advertising jingles and comic books.  However, literary
scholars and totalitarian despots alike have always recognized that reading
literature can change a person on deep, emotional, even spiritual, levels and
therefore is a powerful and potentially revolutionary social force.  Without these
types of experiences with reading we wouldn’t be standing up at our podiums
professing our love of literature to our students, albeit all too often indirectly.
Furthermore, our students know we love literature, even if we try to keep our
feelings about it tucked away, in the closet as it were.  To elide the emotional
power of literary reading in our undergraduate curriculum, therefore, is not only
counter-productive, it is dishonest.
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Whereas “being an important cultural artifact” and developing ones
“critical skills” are time-honored reasons for the serious academic study of a
given cultural object, merely having the potential for inducing pleasure usually is
not.  Perhaps this explains why literature courses most often do not officially
address the affective value of literature.  After all, we don’t analyze roller-
coasters or ice-cream bars.  We may study alcoholism as a pervasive aspect of
human culture, but we don’t scrutinize the variety of ways to serve whiskey to
determine which is the most pleasurable – unless we are trying to get licensed
as a mixologist.  Moreover, all courses of study induce pleasure to some extent
or, rather, to some people.  Aristotle even identifies the event of “learning” as
being inherently pleasurable to humans: "learning things gives great pleasure not
only to philosophers but also in the same way to all other men, though they
share this pleasure only to a small degree" (Poetics 4:4).  However, Aristotle
distinguishes between the type of learning achieved through exposure to art and
other types of learning.  While most types of learning are exercises of reason,
learning from art is an emotional exercise.  Art purifies us by releasing our untidy
and potentially dangerous emotions, a process that teaches us things even while
it “moves” our soul toward the ideal state of pure reason (11:1).  Further,
Aristotle claims that the purpose of a given work of literature is to elicit "its own
peculiar form of pleasure" (23:2).  For Aristotle, then, the chief justification for
analyzing a literary work is to determine what its “particular form of pleasure” is
and how effective that work is at inducing it.
Needless to say, currently popular theories of literature and language
have progressed way beyond the Aristotelian impulse to categorize the
phenomena surrounding literature as if they were stable, material objects one
could analyze reliably.  For Aristotle and over two millennia of cultural critics,
textuality itself was not a theoretical problem to be overcome but a thing that
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could be objectively described, like a sub-species of parrot or a category of
social justice.  However, for the last two centuries all academic disciplines have
had to develop a theoretical superstructure to account not only for the problem
of textuality but the related problematics surrounding the (un)reliable analysis of
human perception.  The good news and the bad news about this change in
academic culture is that the theoretical descriptions of our subject matter have
become increasingly rigorous and complex.  On the one hand, our current
formulations of the cultural dynamic surrounding literature are far less naïve
than were the essentialist formulations of Aristotle and his direct descendants.
This, of course, is good.  On the other hand, our current formulations are so
elaborated and complex that it is virtually impossible to teach them to
undergraduates within the bounds of a literature survey course.  This is not so
good, because we owe our students a clear account of the relationship between
what they study in the literature classroom and our reasons why their efforts
there are valuable.  Within the current academic climate, however, questions of
value inevitably engage questions of theory; hence, the act of choosing course
material and how that material will be taught is tantamount to taking a
theoretical stance.  My point here is not that the literary classroom should be
overtly “theoretical,” only that there is no such thing as “atheoretical”
pedagogy.
It seems to me it follows we should make more explicit - both to
our students and ourselves - the theoretical assumptions and value systems
implied by the conventional methods typically employed in literary pedagogy.
While the conventional methods we use to teach undergraduates do explicitly
address the cultural importance of literature (theory/value #1) and do promote
the development of critical skills in general (theory/value #2) they generally do
not explicitly address or analyze the affective dimension of reading literature.
This is not to say, however, that the affective dimension of literature is not very
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much a part of literature courses. Assertions of the affective value of literature
such as “interpretation is fun,” “poetry is beautiful” or “Moby Dick is a great
novel" usually are not explicitly presented as course materials (although they
could be), but certainly they are indirectly transmitted by our delivery of other,
more explicit course materials. For instance, giving reading assignments to
students is an effective way to teach them information about the cultural
context of a given work (an explicit course material) but it also teaches them a
literary canon.  The texts we assign become concrete examples for our students
of the types of texts we believe are appropriate for serious literary study, even
in courses specifically designed to problematize the practice of literary
canonization. Whatever texts an instructor assigns will also teach theoretical and
generic biases - often ones that the instructor might not even hold.   
Canonization and theoretical biases are also taught by lecturing, but
through additional means than employed by reading assignments.  Obviously
enough, a verbally delivered text, whether it is utterly extemporaneous or read
verbatim from notes, includes significantly more affective information than a
written text.  Body language, verbal inflection and emphasis, even the lack of
emphasis teaches students what their instructors think and feel about the
material at hand.  Whether instructors display engagement or detachment,
playfulness or seriousness, the non-verbal messages they send students during a
lecture amounts to a model of what a literary scholar is like.  From this
projection students extrapolate not only our particular attitudes toward
literature in general but a sense of what kind of behaviors might be expected of
them.  Furthermore, the affective clues we project during lectures teach
students how we think one should feel about literature, or at least the literature
in front of them.  This phenomenon, of course, occurs in all disciplines; it is not
unusual for a student to pick a major and subsequently a career based upon the
ethos presented by a single teacher.  The fact that we teach abstract, cognitive
13
skills in literature courses, however, makes students hypersensitive to our
biases, especially those students who are having a hard time “getting it.”  They
are anxious to know “what the teacher wants”; unfortunately, visual and aural
clues are easily misunderstood.
Another core classroom strategy is dialectical discussion.  Although
lectures often turn into dialectical discussions, and vice versa, there are some
fundamental differences between the two methods.  Whether they occur during
class-time or office hours, dialectical exchanges give instructors the opportunity
to observe their students’ developing understandings of the class materials.
Instructors can then use this information to reiterate or rephrase the material in
ways which better target the specific difficulties their students are
encountering.  Dialectical discussion, therefore, reinforces those pedagogical
objects which can be taught effectively by reading assignments and lecturing
(contextual data), but also is quite effective at narrowing and concretizing
articulations about those pedagogical objects which can not be articulated
clearly, only developed.  In addition, by employing the method of dialectical
discussion, instructors dramatize a number of general ideas and attitudes
regarding literary studies, such as “responses to literature are to be discussed
and shared,” and that “interpretations can vary but all must be supported to be
considered ‘valid’ academically.”  By responding critically to their own critical
responses, we also teach them that not all interpretive statements are equally
“valid” in a literature class.  
This last point indicates another important function of dialectical
discussion; it tends to reinforce the lines of authority within the classroom.
Dialectical discussions inevitably demonstrate that the instructor has “mastered”
the material at hand, if for no other reason than for the fact that the instructor
is the one who determines what constitutes mastery.  As in a lecture, during
dialectical discussions instructors present non-verbal cues to the class which can
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cement their authority through an authoritative style but with the additional
affect that their statements and comments are spontaneous responses to the
material at hand and, hopefully, are more skillfully delivered than the students’
spontaneous responses.  The authority of those students who ”get it” is also
reinforced; we praise their interpretive gestures and are visibly grateful for their
participation in the class.  Our public expressions of approval distinguish such
students from the rest of the class, operating as badges of rank; in effect, we
identify certain students as role models through our own affective behavior.
Similarly, the feedback we give our students on their written work provides them
a model for the relationship between a writer and an editor.  For instance, if our
comments are dismissive (“delete this redundancy”) rather than explanatory
(“can you condense this passage? It seems repetitive”), or pronounce
judgments (“this is circular logic”) rather than ask questions (“what is the
difference between ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ in this paragraph?”), then we project an
authoritarian editorial ethos.  Since literary students are often required to
perform editorial tasks, it is reasonable to assume that how we respond to their
papers will affect how they respond to their own and their peers’ work.  All this
information about how one becomes an “authority” in literary studies is, of
course, instrumental to a student’s development according to Bartholomae’s
notions about “appropriating” an authoritative, academic voice.
There is no question, then, whether or not we will to some extent teach
our students how we feel about reading literature; we can not help but project
our idiosyncratic responses to the literary works before the class along with the
implication that some responses are more “literary” than others.  Furthermore,
to whatever extent we pretend we are “objective” about reading literature, we
renounce one of the deepest and most obvious reasons for teaching or studying
it.  To do so is unethical in the sense that it is a denial of our identity as
professional academics.  Despite theoretical or ethical ambivalence we may have
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about it, we are in the business of transmitting - and hopefully critiquing -
cultural tradition.  Although we do not require students to accept the aesthetic
and ethical prejudices of academic, literary culture to succeed in literature
courses, clearly students who identify with or “appropriate” a place for
themselves within that culture have a leg up on those who do not.  To make the
distinction between merely teaching students about a cultural artifact rather
than how to enjoy it smacks a bit of equivocation; we want them to engage
intellectually and emotionally with the works they read because otherwise they
can not understand their value, and they miss out on what literature has to
offer.  If the motivation and payoff for engaged reading is some sort of pleasure,
it follows that part of what we are up to in the literature classroom is teaching
them how to feel good about the literature we decide they should read.
So, we try to teach our students to like the literature that we love.  It
sounds so hegemonic, so Matthew Arnold when you say it out loud.  It also
sounds archaic, a throw-back to the Aristotelian aesthetic tradition that seeks to
recognize great works of art by categorizing the attributes of sublimity; one
studies literature, according to this tradition, in order to more easily access the
experience of reading it.  In the past, of course, the pleasure of reading
literature has been institutionalized as the “appreciation” of literature.  Until
recently, courses in the appreciation of literature were common on college
campuses; the ostensible goal of such curricula was to teach students the value
of - presumably - great works of literature.  Even today at the University of
Texas (hardly an academic backwater) the official departmental title of the
American Literature survey course is “Masterworks of American Literature,” a
title which takes for granted that some literary artifacts are better, more
masterful than others.  Even though individual instructors are given the right to
establish their own canon implied by the works they assign, the concept of
canonization is assumed to be valid, in fact, a definitive element of the course’s
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logic.  No amount of verbal qualification can erase the implied canonization of
whatever works appear on a given syllabus, any more than a jury can really
ignore damning evidence just because the judge tells them to do so.
Traditionally, the translation of literary theory into classroom practice was
elegantly simple and direct in literary appreciation courses, if naïve; teach
students THE criteria for masterful literature by revealing them in THE
Masterworks of literature so that when we send the new initiates forth into the
world they will be able to recognize great art wherever they encounter it.   Such
pedagogical theory exploits at least two senses of the word  “appreciation”;
literary appreciation is both the action of recognizing value in literature (thereby
raising its value) and the feeling associated with reading a masterful literary
artifact, presumably something like the feeling of deep gratitude for a precious
gift.  Both these events are intended products of a traditional appreciation
course, but the skill which students would leave the classroom with - hopefully -
is the skill of recognition: not of knowing what you like already, but knowing
what you should like as an educated reader.
The above discussion suggests that the conventional methods still
employed in most literature courses imply theoretical assumptions which most
teachers do not directly endorse.  Specifically, typical literary pedagogy
continues to teach ideas associated with the supposedly archaic tradition of
literary appreciation; our journals indicate we have advanced beyond those
notions but our syllabi imply we still believe them.  Clearly, “appreciation” as
described above is a discredited form of teaching literary heritage, and rightly
so, in that it is blind to the tacit, culturally contingent prejudices which valorize
any “Masterwork” and thereby promote hegemony.  What is objectionable about
such practices, presumably, is not the principle of evaluation per se (after all,
condemnations of hegemonic practices are themselves evaluative and operate
according to an implicit normative system) but the absolutist nature of
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traditional aesthetic criteria - the Rules of Art delivered as universal imperatives.
Although few scholars these days will claim there is anything universal or
imperative about individual interpretations of literature, it is not therefore self-
evidently true that all attempts to discuss how literature can be “appreciated”
are necessarily naive, misguided, or unethical simply because previous attempts
to do so were.  Neither are normative nor evaluative gestures inherently
hegemonic, although they are always culturally situated, always made from a
particular (although likely very complex) cultural orientation.  Our current
classroom methods, however, teach students that some works – and readers –
are better than others while as a discipline most of us give at least lip service to
some form of anti-foundationalist cultural theory.  No wonder our students are
confused; we consistently send them double-messages.
If teachers and readers would stop evaluating the literary works they read
then perhaps it would make sense for us to eliminate the last traces of the
appreciation tradition in literary pedagogy, as some current trends in critical
theory suggest is proper.  However, to do so would be impossible, simply
because it would run contrary to the experience of reading literature.  Readers
evaluate the literary works they read; this fact should be analyzed to the best of
our collective ability as a ubiquitous phenomenon associated with our subject
matter.  Certainly literature instructors – not to mention literary critics - should
do everything they can in their classes to make the hegemonic power of
literature available for analysis, but doing so will not eliminate or even
significantly undercut the practice of evaluating literature, nor should it.  Once
again, literature is an important cultural artifact precisely because we feel
strongly about it; an analysis of the process by which our feelings are translated
into systems of value, therefore, should be one of the central pedagogical
objects of our discipline.
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Unfortunately, the first step of such an analysis would be to admit that
literary readings – particularly our own - are always completed at least in part
according to the type of prescriptive value systems which are problematized
(and often vilified) by the current theoretical wisdom of our own discipline.  To
do so causes a number of pedagogical problems.  Just for starters, offering
students a thorough explanation of cultural subjectivity is tantamount to
renouncing all claims to objectivity, a rhetorical commodity that is much valued
in academia at large and hence by students.  It is one thing to argue for the
inherent subjectivity of interpretive acts from and within the context of
professional literary scholarship; to do so is not only acceptable these days, it is
fashionable.  It is quite another thing, however, to take direct responsibility for
our biases as biases within the classroom: a venue where we are supposed to
wield some authority.  Students come to us for knowledge, and expect us to
have some form of mastery of our subject.  Most undergraduate students
believe that there are, in fact, universal Laws of Art, laws they assume we will
teach them in a sixteen-week survey course.  We should not be surprised, then,
if they feel bewilderment (“I don’t get it”) or frustration (“This is bullshit”) when
we tell them that there is no such thing as mastery, only conventionalized,
class-based biases - and now you must learn them.  Furthermore, anti-
foundationalist cultural theory undercuts the entire tradition of cultural
transmission.  By telling our students that there are no universal criteria for
literary excellence we teach them that literary studies is not a “legitimate”
academic discipline as they know it; unless, of course, we simultaneously offer
them some other value to attach to the study of literature.
I am proposing here a reassessment of literary “appreciation” as a valid
pedagogical goal; this goal can and should be pursued by methods that at least
take into consideration those advances in literary theory that unofficially
banished “appreciation” from the collegiate classroom in the first place.
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Reinstating some sort of “appreciation” component to literary curriculum could
better align our classroom methods (how we teach) with currently marginalized
elements of (what we teach) and motivations for (why we teach) literary study.
In other words, an updated form of appreciation pedagogy could clarify both the
focus and the value of literary studies for our students by making more overt
those currently covert class materials.   This would all be easier, of course, if one
could just return to some prelapsarian state of grace where students could
develop a love for the beautiful simply by being exposed to beautiful things.
However, since the “osmosis” theory of liberal arts has pretty much been
rejected, appreciation pedagogy needs a thorough overhaul.
It should be clear by now that what I have been calling “appreciation”
pedagogy bears a distinct resemblance to traditional normative aesthetics, that
tradition which starts with Aristotle and stretches through Longinus, Pope,
Coleridge, Arnold and Eliot towards its ostensible terminus in critics like
Auerbach, Nabokov and beyond.  I purposefully use the term “appreciation,”
however, to focus more closely on particular issues in pedagogical methodology
as opposed to the wider and significantly more abstract horizon of topics that
might be engaged by the word “aesthetics.”  In effect, I am subsuming
“appreciation” under the rubric of aesthetics in the attempt to maintain at least
a nominal distinction between larger questions of aesthetic theory and specific
pedagogical practices which might be reflected by them.  This is not to say that
I believe that theory and practice can really be separated; as detailed above, this
project is founded on the assumption that they are inextricably linked and that
the only responsible classroom method is one which directly delivers them
together, as a system.  Thoroughly engaging the multifarious and ongoing
debates that could be said to relate to “aesthetics,” however, is beyond the
scope of this essay; i.e. a reconsideration of how one might discuss the affective
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and evaluative elements of reading literature in an undergraduate literature
survey course.
To begin an overhaul of appreciation pedagogy we first need to identify
more specifically what the horizon of that field has been in the past so as to
separate the baby from the bathwater. As outlined above, traditional aesthetic
theory was reflected in appreciation pedagogy by directly linking the
development of literary “feeling” to an enrichment of the student’s
understanding of the elements of great literature.  The basic methodology was
exposure (under duress) to canonical works combined with a (simplistic)
descriptive poetics: a methodology which reflects traditional notions of text
immanent literary value.  As antiquated as such notions may seem, clearly they
haven’t disappeared altogether.  Max Baym’s discussion of aesthetics, for
instance, begins by fusing literature and experience into the event of literary
“contemplation.”  Baym - writing in 1973, one of the most recent, unrepentant
old-school literary aesthetes I could find - defines the general horizon of literary
aesthetics thusly: “[aesthetics] is occupied with literature as an energizing
principle of contemplation whose objects are desire, love, birth, pain,
wonderment, ambition, fulfillment, frustration, hope, despair, good and evil,
beauty and ugliness, the cosmic and tragic, the true and false--life and death”
(294).  Aesthetics is further articulated by Baym as the study of “the
discrimination of literary excellence in terms of the power of evocation,” a
discrimination which is identified primarily through the correlation of textual
passages with the literary “feeling” of a reader (294).  Literary “feeling” seems
to be a cognitive faculty (universal? instinctual? learned?) that is either evoked
or employed (depending upon how you look at it) during readings of literature.
Further, reading is “ontological” for Baym in the sense that during a literary
experience “subject and object are melted down in one phenomenal stream of
transcendence, and the ontological gap is closed” (297).  Out of this process a
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new thing – a reading – is actualized, brought into being.  Making some sense of
this “phenomenological stream of transcendence” is the task Baym sets out for
aesthetics.
As easy as it is to spot Baym’s equivocations from our current height of
critical rigor, at least he does not flinch from making a direct albeit abstract
statement of what he thinks is and is not within the horizon of aesthetics.
According to Baym, a literary aesthete studies literary artifacts in their capacity
as stimuli for the “contemplation” of human existence.  Although being able to
describe literary artifacts clearly is important to the practice of aesthetics, Baym
delegates the study of literary artifacts as artifacts to “poetics.”  The fact that
aesthetics and poetics have been thoroughly conflated since the 1950’s is one
of the great errors of literary scholarship in Baym’s opinion (290).  Similarly
Baym prises apart aesthetics from literary “criticism” by insisting that aesthetics
focuses on the “feelings” stimulated by literature rather than interpretations of
any given work; hence, aesthetics is more of a “sentiology” than a semiology.
Moreover, while literary “feeling” is associated with “the discrimination of literary
excellence,” they are by no means the same thing.  Baym seems interested in
value judgments, but less for the purpose of judging literary works than because
they are products of “feelings” which are themselves products of the closing of
the “ontological gap” between literary artifact and human “reality,” between
what we know to be real (“I am reading a book entitled Madame Bovary”) and
what we feel to be real (“Poor Charles...”).  As vague and equivocal as they may
seem, these distinctions indicate aesthetics is concerned primarily with the
cognitive and experiential phenomena attendant to literary reading, and as such
have as much in common with disciplines such as philosophy and psychology as
with a poetics or any description of literature as a textual or cultural artifact.
There is no doubt, however, much of Baym’s theoretical foundation must
be scrapped as rigorous theory on the grounds that it is based upon evidence
22
beyond reliable substantiation; argumentum ad ignorantiam may be a time-
honored ploy of political oratory, but in general it is considered a fallacy in
academic debates.  Since Kant, at least, claims based upon the direct (self)
analysis of (our own) cognitive processes have been deeply problematized;
clearly, Baym’s definition of aesthetics (and his application of it elsewhere) is
rife with such claims.  Virtually every assertion he makes raises questions we
could answer only by going “behind our thoughts”: what exactly is this cognitive
faculty he calls “literary feeling”?  Where is it located?  Next door to our
“intuition” or our “imagination”?  Is “contemplation” a conscious process
embraced or a feeling experienced?  Is “contemplation” always valuable, or only
when it is of a certain type or degree?  Do certain texts “energize” certain kinds
or degrees of contemplation, and if so, where is that “energy” stored?  As a
textual latency?  As a potential in the individual reader’s capacity for “literary
feeling”?  Does everyone have the same capacity for literary feeling, or do some
of us constitutionally have more feeling than most?  Does a “phenomenal stream
of transcendence” leave a stain, and if so can you get it out of cotton blends?  
Baym doesn’t answer such questions or even seem to recognize that his
definition of aesthetics begs them.  In short, Baym’s formulations do not meet
the current criteria for responsible theoretical prose.  
However, if one regards Baym’s comments about aesthetics in a more
pedagogical context, as a general model or representation of the relationship
between a literary work and its reader, one can not help noticing a number of
parallels between it and the broad goals I outlined above for a revamped
“appreciation” pedagogy.  Although I have used Baym as an example of the
traditional aesthete (a move which is perhaps unfair both to Baym and
aesthetics at large), much of his description of literary reading is not only
plausible, it is “factual” (if by “facts” we mean assertions that can be thoroughly
substantiated by material evidence).  Taking him strictly at his word, he does
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not assume, as did Aristotle, Longinus, etc., that literary meaning immanates
from literary texts.  Note that for him aesthetics is “the study of the
discrimination of literary excellence,” a study that does not necessarily include a
set of universal norms.  Neither does “the study of” discrimination necessarily
pursue the ultimate goal of discriminating between “good” and “bad” literary
works.  Baym very well may believe in the Universal Rules of Art (it is hard to tell
exactly what he means due to his habit of writing in gross abstractions), but his
program does not logically depend upon that belief.  Proposing to study
literature in its capacity as a stimulus for “contemplation” and “discrimination”
only presupposes: (1) literature is available for sensual consumption, whereby
(2) people contemplate a range of human experiences and (3) “discriminate” or
evaluate the literary text at hand.  One could quibble about the vagueness of
the word “contemplation” in this context, but if the word is revised to one that
is more neutral, “cognition” or “ideation” for instance, his claim is not a claim at
all but an articulation of what must be true.  There is no doubt that literary texts
are perceived or read on a regular basis.  There is no doubt that such
perceptions stimulate cognitive events of some sort.  Although the nature of
those events can not be reliably determined, that they occur is easily evidenced,
at least as well as anything can be evidenced in the social sciences.  Similarly,
there is no doubt that readers evaluate literary works.  Wayne Booth, to give
one example among many, has argued in detail that the consumption of
literature requires an evaluative response from the reader (82ff).  
Baym’s definition of aesthetics, then, could be read as a basic – and
provisional - phenomenological model of what always happens when people read
literature; as far as it goes, it is indeed a “factual” account in this respect.  But
it can go no further as it is.  Although many others have argued that reading
literature can be a transcendental experience and/or that it is an ontological
event, Baym’s musings about how “the phenomenal stream of transcendence” is
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able to “close the ontological gap” read more like an encomium to literary
experience than a serious theoretical gesture, though the vocabulary is drawn
from the philosophical lexicon.  The fact that Baym falls short here is therefore
perhaps excusable, or, rather, is further evidence that his version of how the
“ontological gap” is bridged is not a serious philosophical inquiry at all, but
something else. 1
It should go without saying that what is at stake in Baym’s description of
literary reading is very different than what Heidegger or even Stanley Fish put at
stake in theirs.  Unlike those scholars, Baym does not attempt, much less claim,
to detail the actual phenomenal architecture of reading literature.  He attempts,
rather, to offer an accurate if very basic representation of the context within
which literary reading takes place, but only in order to set the stage for his
larger project of teaching a general heritage of aesthetics in America.  In other
words, his compositional motivation is pedagogical rather than theoretical.  It
follows that his model of reading should not be evaluated as a theory (though it
may dress like one and speak with a theoretical accent) but as a teaching
heuristic, a way to frame literary experience for his readers.  
It should also go without saying that there is a big difference between the
criteria for writing effective literary or philosophical theories and those for
developing effective pedagogical strategies for undergraduate literature courses.
It should, but I am afraid that the stringency of contemporary literary theory and
criticism has made many literature teachers acutely conscious of the theoretical
and ethical ramifications of their curriculum, almost to the point of paranoia.  No
one wants to look naïve or perpetuate false and therefore potentially harmful
ideas (especially in front of undergraduate students).  However, the complexity
                                                 
1 Dabney Townsend's The Phenomenology of Literature is one example of a "serious" philosophical inquiry
into literary meaning production.  Although Townsend's work is interesting and thorough, I class it along
with other theoretical gestures that lay beyond the reach of most undergraduate students.
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of contemporary literary theory simply can not be done justice in the
undergraduate classroom.  At one point Baym addresses the fear of appearing
naïve: “Anyone who feels he must formulate a rigorous definition of beauty
before he is free to respond to works of art will be in the pitiable state of the
man looking on while others feast” (viii).  I would offer that such a state is
doubly pitiful for teachers of undergraduate courses because in that context the
interpretive anorexia of one can lead to the starvation of twenty or thirty.  Not
that we should be unconscious much less reckless about the theoretical
ramifications of what and how we teach our courses.  On the contrary, I have
already stressed the importance of integrating literary theory and literary
pedagogy for our undergraduate students.  However, since their audience and
goals are different, the standard for excellence or at least competency in a
classroom should be different than those for a scholarly journal.
If one allows such distinctions between theory and pedagogy, there are
quite a few elements of traditional normative aesthetics which could be brought
to the task of updating literary “appreciation” curricula.   As in Baym’s
formulation of literary aesthetics, "neo-appreciation" curriculum should include
the study of conventional methods of experiencing and thereby evaluating
literature.  Baym, however, only marks the furthest boundaries of reading as
experience; to be useful, a neo-literary appreciation curriculum would have to be
more specific about how people create powerful readings out of literary
textuality.  Although the actual course materials and/or requirements might
change very little from what is typical now, such a shift in the vocabulary would
imply a very different pedagogical object than is currently the norm; simply put,
this shift identifies the object of literary study as a cognitive event instigated by
the words on the page.  By contrast, giving students information solely about a
work’s cultural context implies that meaning is “contained” in the text and can
be accessed by any reader who has mastered its original social milieu.  To take
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one example, such teaching methods imply that one must first understand
Victorian gender stereotypes to understand fully the relationship between
Heathcliff and Cathy or the shock value of Song of Myself.  Although such an
understanding very well may enrich ones understanding of Bronte or Whitman’s
work, there is nothing to say that two readers equally aware of nineteenth
century gender politics would necessarily read or value them identically.  In fact,
one would be astonished if after offering such data to a class all of ones
students fell into a lockstep approach to any literary text.  Once again, literary
works are such powerful cultural artifacts precisely because they cannot be so
easily controlled, because they are so susceptible to the idiosyncratic
interpretations of individual readers.  Adding a neo-appreciation component to
an undergraduate literature class dramatizes for students that the meaning of
literature is not simply contained by the text, the cultural context, or the reader,
but is a product of the interaction of those three indices.   
Neo-appreciation pedagogy, therefore, should be founded on the
assertion that there is a substantive difference between defining “the beautiful”
or "the valuable" and identifying those texts which people consistently claim are
beautiful or valuable.  The former amounts to a theory of cultural value while the
latter is a presentation of demonstrable fact.  Since students generally believe
that cultural value is fixed when they first come to us, it is our duty to teach
them the fact that value is created by readers within a complex socio-political
milieu along with an account of how it is created, particularly when they do not
already have the resources to understand why many "canonical" works are
worth the paper they are printed on.   
This lack of distinction between "theory" and "fact" and how they relate
to the (currently marginalized) teaching of literary value is evident in the
debates surrounding canonization.  Although students seem to accept “the
canon” as the appropriate material for study in a literature class, it is rarely
27
invoked these days by a professional scholar without some ambivalence; even
those teachers most loyal to a canon must by now have considered the
possibility that a fixed cultural program might not serve all of our students all of
the time.  Since the debate rages on, it seems no one seriously doubts that
there is in fact a list of literary works that are considered better than others.
This list may be huge and always in flux, but it is not infinite, nor would it be
impossible to compile it.  Though one might plausibly argue for a more restricted
description of it, “the canon” at its broadest could be defined, identified, and
indexed as those literary works which are currently being discussed and/or
taught in an academic setting.  One should note, however, that one could
compile this list, even post a canon du jour on the M.L.A. website, and yet be no
closer to a definitive theoretical assertion of what we should do about it or even
the more basic question of how it is developed.  Certainly those questions have
been addressed at length in critical journals, but without a simple method for
providing demonstrative examples, the presentation of canon formation theory
in the classroom is typically too abstract to be of any real use to most our
students.  If we really want them to understand how literary value is created and
to be able to apply that understanding to any literary work, then we need to
teach our students a simple analytical method for doing so.  
So, neo-literary appreciation curriculum needs to maintain a balance
between the theoretical assertion of cultural subjectivity and the practical
analysis of literary experience - between the “openness” of textuality with the
"closure" of reading - in a way that is comprehensible to the average
undergraduate.  This is a tall order, one that is not easily filled without
mystifying either "openness" or "closure."  Baym, for example, describes
“closure” as a fundamental part of reading, even its chief purpose, with his
assertion that during a literary experience “subject and object are melted down
in one phenomenal stream of transcendence, and the ontological gap is closed.”
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Baym's phrase provides us an excellent example of one way literary experience
can be mystified.  By describing the act of reading with vague abstractions, the
relationship between texts, readers, and the culture in which they are both
imbedded is not explained so much as re-named.  Reading becomes
"transcendence."  Such mystifications send students the message that we don’t
have to understand (much less explain) how texts with indeterminate meaning
and value are (presto chango) transformed into readings where meaning is
stabilized and value is attributed.  Such events passeth all understanding; the
text works in mysterious ways.  
Needless to say, many analyses of textual "openness" also mystify
readers even when their expressed purpose is to de-mystify traditional methods
of literary interpretation and valuation.  Take, for example, this short passage
from Paul de Man's "The Epistemology of Metaphor":
Being and identity are the result of a resemblance which is not in
things but posited by an act of the mind which, as such, can only
be verbal.  And since to be verbal, in this context, means to allow
substitutions based on illusory resemblances (the determining
illusion being that of a shared negativity), then mind, or subject, is
the central metaphor, the metaphor of metaphors.  The power of
tropes… is here condensed in the key metaphor of the subject as
mind.  (45)
This passage comes at the end of a detailed deconstructive analysis of how "the
metaphor of metaphors" is used by Locke and Condillac to "objectify" cognitive
material; the next section of de Man's essay takes on Kant.  De Man's analysis is
very thorough and, to my mind, persuasive although the intricacies of his
rhetoric demand a level of sophistication and perseverance that can be
fatiguing.  I choose the above as my example, however, because it is a relatively
clear and direct statement of one of his key theoretical assertions: the
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"tropological" nature of philosophy and, by extension, reality.  The fact remains,
however, that after taking apart the tropological mystifications of others, de
Man is obliged to articulate some of his own.  In short, in this passage and
elsewhere he replaces the totalizing narrative of objective reference with the
totalizing narrative of "tropology."  This substitution is not a flaw nor is it
accidental; it is a conscious dramatization of his assertion that there is no
"outside" to language, that - as he says regarding Condillac - all philosophy is
"the telling of a tale" (44).  But precisely because it is a tale, de Man's story
about language must end; scholarly convention dictates that analyses are
followed by conclusions, and de Man's text is most definitely offered as the work
of a scholar.  He must bring his essay to a close without contradicting his main
claim that language is self-referential, so - like many anti-foundationalists - he
dramatizes that thesis with a grand gesture of circular reasoning.  Thought is
language is trope is thought.  His work, therefore, is rigorously and overtly
tautological but not duplicitous.  
De Man's compositional double-bind is not unique to him nor is his
solution to it.  Deconstructive analysis and theory almost requires some sort of
overt performance of linguistic play to avoid hypocrisy, although not all
performative gestures are deconstructive.  While a thorough metacriticism of
"performative" analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I hope I will be
allowed this general observation; it is often difficult to read.  From graphical
experimentations (the [un]bare-Abel licht Ness of being) to polysemous
coinages ("différance") to overtly self-referential gestures ("The Epistemology
of Metaphor"), "performative" analyses tend to employ strategies which direct
attention upon the inadequacy of traditional critical discourse.  Even those who
have the knowledge and training to meet such challenges often find the process
confusing and grueling.  Performative essays impede clear and simple
determinations of meaning because they are designed to do so.  Furthermore,
30
the sheer bulk of scholarship typically relevant to such essays requires that they
employ critical shorthand in the form of specialized jargon.  Terms like "aporia,"
"différance," and "alterity" have a particular critical history with which most
literary instructors are acquainted but only some have thoroughly consumed.  It
is no wonder that many literary instructors opt not to put forth the effort
required to read performative analyses thoroughly; confronted with such
theoretical and stylistic difficulties, they choose to invest their time and energy
elsewhere in the discipline.  This is how I mean gestures of "openness" often
"mystify" readers; regardless of authorial intentions to the contrary, the
ultimate meaning of such texts often lies beyond the grasp of their readers.  As
such it cannot be confirmed or denied, only accepted on faith, rejected out of
principle, or simply ignored.
Undergraduate students, of course, tend to see performative gestures as
being the worst kind of nonsense, even in the watered down version they might
receive second hand through their instructors.  Not only do they not understand
the language on the line level, but they are also typically resistant to even the
most general assertions of linguistic indeterminacy.  As noted above, students
come to us for the "facts" about literature so they can master them well enough
to get an "A."  Although it is our job to correct such misconceptions about
literary study and theory, we can not repeat the arguments of theorists like de
Man in the classroom because we do not have the time, even if our students
would sit still long enough to understand them.  
Since gestures of closure tend to mystify textuality and gestures of
openness tend to mystify students, it is no wonder our attempts to address
such problematics in the classroom are sometimes tentative or covert.
However, the hesitancy to articulate something concrete about the dynamic
between received culture, readers, and texts perpetuates the cultural hegemony
it presumably is meant to forestall.  Furthermore, without a method for
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analyzing this dynamic, after a course is over our students have no way to apply
what little we are able to teach them about it in our lectures.  They get class
notes but no skills.  Even if our attempts to describe literary reading can never
be “objective” or even do more than figuratively represent how readers “close”
texts, such reductive representations will at least focus direct attention on the
fact that literary meaning and value is crafted, not discovered, unearthed,
unlocked, or revealed.  Further, if we are forced to use analogies to explain the
relationship between text, culture, and reader, as de Man and many others
maintain, at least we should use analogies that don’t violate those few things we
actually know about that complex and dynamic relationship.
Since we are unable to examine cognitive processes directly and rigorous
logical analysis is too complex (not to mention indeterminate), it indeed seems
analogy is the only mode of representation appropriate for crafting the type of
classroom method I propose above.  Analogical reasoning, of course, has a long
history in Western critical theory; the excerpt from de Man's "Epistemology of
Metaphor" above is just one of many critiques of the ongoing "story" of
metaphysics.  As evidenced by de Man and others, current anti-foundationalist
thought hinges on the assertion that reality is linguistic in nature: i.e. the world
is text.  Although anti-foundationalist critiques since Pyrrus have been dedicated
to the demystification of this key analogy between writing and reality, they have
also always been delivered within it.  That there is no "outside" from which to
approach the analogical relationship between language and reality is precisely
the point of such critiques.  As de Man says above, reality "is not in things," it
must be "posited" by the mind of the individual and takes the form of narrative.
Such notions are substantiated by a whole string of analogies: the phenomenal
world is thought; thought is language; language is writing.  Out of such analogies
anti-foundationalist critiques offer analyses of how language is pervasively
reified into representations of "reality."  
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I propose a more limited and qualified analogy: the act of reading
literature is like written or spoken "readings" of literature.  By radicalizing this
play in the word “reading,” I identify common "reading-act" strategies as they
appear in the reports or "reading-texts" of other literary commentators.  In
other words, I analyze the value and meaning a given writer/reader attributes to
a given literary text (a reading-text) as a representation of the product of his or
her reading-act (what I'll call below an "aesthetic object"); subsequently, I use
that analysis to speculate which reading strategies he or she applied to the text
to create that product.  These speculations will have to be deduced from
commonly held assumptions about what reading-acts are and how they are
performed.  To perform these analyses, therefore, I will outline a taxonomy of
common reading strategies drawn from both critical theory, literary tradition,
and personal observation.      
No doubt, there are significant differences between "reading-acts" and
"reading-texts," but since there seems to be no other logical alternative to some
such analogy, I submit it is better to try to minimize and interrogate the
problems it creates than to continue to avoid questions of literary value in the
classroom.  I will discuss the problems with this founding analogy between
reading-acts and reading-texts at greater length below; at this point I will merely
note that the "real" analytical objects of this study are reading-texts -
provisionally defined as written, verbal, or ideational representations of an
"aesthetic object."  
In subsequent chapters I will detail a classroom method founded on the
above analogical formulation, one that is offered not as the way to approach
neo-appreciation in a literature course but as a demonstration of how such
pedagogical goals might be addressed more directly than they typically are.  As
the title of this introduction suggests, I am acutely aware that this dissertation
owes much to both the neo-Aristotelian impulse of critics like Northrup Frye and
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the radical subjectivism of critics like Stanley Fish, neither of whom, I'm afraid,
would wholly approve of my efforts here.  Frye would reject what I have been
calling neo-appreciation as "yet another document in the history of taste," and
Fish would likely denounce it as yet another reification of contingent cultural
values or, more likely, that I am merely asserting my right to advance my
interests in a particular "interpretive community": the community of literary
instructors and critics.  Although I hate to be at odds with my progenitors, I
assume I am not the only one with this particular oedipal conflict.  If we are to
continue studying literature as a valid "academic" subject, we must do so within
the bounds of some sort of analytical framework that accounts for the pervasive
and ubiquitous phenomena surrounding literature.  In his "Polemical Introduction"
to The Anatomy of Criticism, Frye makes a similar call to arms, asserting that
the "schematization" of our discipline is unavoidable if we are to advance
beyond the realm of "psuedo-science" (15ff).  Although Frye's Anatomy is
tattooed with all kinds of cultural mediations, I believe he is correct that some
kind of  "schematization" is necessary for us to advance our understanding - not
to mention our teaching - of literature in the academic sphere.  There simply is
no "outside" to analytical categorization in the academic world; it is what we do.
Frye places the value of literary study, accordingly, in the advancement of our
collective knowledge, an advancement which he - and I - believe should be a
product of careful analysis.
Stanley Fish seems to agree that there is no escaping analytical
schematization in literary studies, but approaches that conclusion from a very
different set of assumptions about the value and meaning of literature.  For Fish,
literary study - or any academic pursuit for that matter - can not be valued
except through the pre-determined cultural biases that make it possible.
Without going into the details of his argument, Fish concludes that academic
subjects are arch-subjects; there are no ethical imperatives which justify the
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value of such activities which are not always already contingent upon the
indeterminate cultural forces which frame them and thereby give them meaning.
With a striking similarity to de Man's formulation above, Fish asserts that literary
study is valuable because it is a priori valued by the culture in which it exists.  A
further ramification of Fish's logic is that there can be no "progression" of our
collective knowledge about literature.  We can shift our cultural biases around
and therefore manufacture different truths than are currently valued, but there
is no such thing as the truth to progress toward.  This is why Fish "stopped
worrying" about the theoretical value of reading literature, much less the validity
of his own interpretive gestures, and got back to the serious work of analyzing
the readings of other critics.2
If the conclusions of Fish and other anti-foundationalist theorists are
correct, then there is no pre-determined value for literary study, no
undiscovered truth to warrant our analytical efforts.  However, it does not
necessarily follow that literary study or any of the "human sciences" is valueless.
On the contrary, anti-foundationalist theory insists that there is always a surplus
of value and meaning created by our efforts to understand any cultural artifact,
whether it is a poem, a theory, a political movement, or an entire academic
tradition.  It seems to me that the rigorous and ongoing critique of that surplus
is or should be the principle focus of academics.  
Along these lines Christopher Norris offers a third course to my poster
boys for schematization and radical anti-foundationalism.  In his What's Wrong
With Postmodernism? Norris demonstrates how a rigorous anti-foundationalist
critique - like Derrida's or de Man's - is not only beneficial to but is necessary for
the "progression" of knowledge.  Specifically rebutting the claims of Fish and
Richard Rorty, he claims there is nothing contradictory about being committed
                                                 
2 The above summary of Stanley Fish's work is culled from wide reading in his corpus, but many of the
ideas I attribute to him here can be found in the introduction to Is There a Text in this Class?
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to both "scientific inquiry" and "epistemic relativity," and that their claims to
the contrary ignore "that in fact [the two] are mutually supportive; that science
requires a systematic reflection on its own socio-historical contexts of
emergence; and that the failure to sustain this critical awareness is the source
of various illusory or mystified knowledge-effects" (100).  Norris believes
scientific methodology can produce "facts," as long as one keeps in sharp focus
that those "facts" are always subject to the principle of "epistemic relativity,"
which he (following Roy Baskar) defines as the awareness "that all beliefs are
socially produced, so that knowledge is transient and neither truth-values nor
criteria of rationality exist outside historical time" (98).  He contrasts this
principle to "the doctrine of judgmental relativism, which maintains that all
beliefs are equally valid in the sense that there are no rational grounds for
preferring one over the other" (98).  Throughout his book Norris juxtaposes
these two types of anti-foundationalist thought, resolutely maintaining that the
"good" principle of "epistemic relativity" (associated with Habermas, Bhaskar, de
Man, and Derrida) is a necessary partner with science in the progression of
knowledge while the "bad" doctrine of "judgmental relativism" (identified with
Fish and Rorty) is one of those "illusory or mystified knowledge-effects" which
come from a lack of rigorous critical analysis.  In Norris' estimation, the
proponents of "judgmental relativism" suffer from "a wide-spread failure of
intellectual nerve, coupled with a basic refusal to conceive of how [science,
criticism, philosophy, and sociology of knowledge] might yet be related in the
common effort to think their way through and beyond the limits of received
consensus-belief" (101).
Although I would never accuse Stanley Fish of having a lack of nerve, I do
believe Norris' synthesis of the Aristotelian and anti-foundationalist traditions
situates the value of academic study correctly: i.e. in the dialectic between the
pursuit of scientific "truth" and the painstaking analysis of how such "truths" are
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created.  Even if this dialectic never stumbles upon the final, ultimate truth
about anything, the polysemous and polyvalent truths generated by this
generation of readers have an undeniable cultural/political value in that they will
become the foundation for the truths of the next.  Hence, the stories we tell
ourselves about ourselves - about our reality, history, literature, etc. - are
intensely important and should be examined closely from and within a variety of
perspectives, one of which, I contend, is what I've been calling neo-appreciation.
This, in fact, is one of the most public and political benefits of analyzing literary
reading as “truth-making.”  It can help us to maintain a conscious and ongoing
critique of the interpretive conventions we will leave for posterity, particularly
where they are already poised to be absorbed uncritically: in the classroom.
By constructing the Hegelian triumvirate of Frye (thesis), Fish
(antithesis), and Norris (synthesis), I offer a rather reductive representation of
how a range of critics are approaching the larger theoretical questions which are
most relevant to the classroom method I will outline in subsequent chapters.  As
should be clear by the foregoing, however, the justification for this dissertation
and the method it proposes is more ethical than theoretical.  I argue for practical
action according to the terms of our apparent and collective identity as literary
academics.  Although I find myself most sympathetic to Norris' synthesis of the
Aristotelian and anti-foundationalist theoretical traditions, I do not see this
dissertation as directly engaging in those debates but as a reflection of them.
Rather, I offer neo-literary appreciation as a way that we can better calibrate our
identities as teachers to our identities as scholars.  Further, I will maintain that
the type of classroom method I propose below does not require a particular
theoretical orientation; my "reflections" of and upon critical theory are therefore
meant to be indicative of commonly held ideas about literature, written in broad
strokes.
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I learned that "broad strokes" are sometimes necessary and highly
productive from Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, in many ways the inspiration for this
dissertation.  Auerbach uses the opening line from Marvell’s "To His Coy
Mistress" as a particularly appropriate and revealing epigraph for his book.  "Had
we but world enough and time," Auerbach seems to suggest, those of us who
love to read, think, talk, and write about literature would indulge our passion for
it languidly:
An hundred years should go to praise
Dante, and on Cervantes gaze
Two hundred to adore the Bard's full breast,
But thirty thousand to the French Realists.  
However, like Marvell, Auerbach is a pragmatist; life is too short for prolonged
dalliance with the object of ones affection.  Auerbach adopts this rhetorical
position as he embarks upon an analytical project of such broad scope that no
one could hope to treat it thoroughly, much less exhaustively.  Auerbach, in
fact, admits in Mimesis that had he been able to pursue his topic - ”the
interpretation of reality through literary representation” - in a rigorous, scholarly
manner he “might never have reached the point of writing” (557).  Without a
doubt, it is most fortunate for literary studies as a whole that he did write
Mimesis; it stands among a mere handful of book-length works that can be
considered  “classics” of literary criticism.  Painting in broad, elegant strokes,
Auerbach creates a taxonomy of “literary representations of reality” which in
turn provides a framework for over five hundred pages of articulate and
insightful commentary ranging over twenty-five hundred years of literature.
Needless to say, for Auerbach to roll all this strength and sweetness into a ball,
he had to cut a few corners along the way.   
Beyond its function as a tacit apologia, Auerbach’s analogy between
literary criticism and affairs of the heart has some interesting theoretical
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implications as well.  By adopting Marvell’s rhetoric of consummation, Auerbach
identifies Mimesis as a certain type of literary criticism, a type that has
somewhat different methods and motivations than other, more rigorously
“scholarly” projects.  Throughout Mimesis Auerbach mentions insights about
literature that can be reached only through “scientific criticism,” “philology,” or
“in-depth linguistic analysis”; he uses these terms to describe literary criticism
that tests specific hypotheses in painstaking detail, making sure every cultural,
semiotic, and intertextual angle is addressed.  In its Epilogue, he juxtaposes “the
method of textual interpretation” employed in Mimesis to other styles of
criticism that are more “theoretically” and “systematically” developed (556).
Certainly Auerbach was capable of producing “theoretically” sound and
“systematically” structured scholarship; other of his publications attest to the
fact.  In fact, Mimesis itself is full of what others have called exemplary
philological close-reading.  Auerbach, however, apparently felt his methodology
needed to be explained and defended.  Specifically, he maintained the breadth of
the subject matter required him to eschew focused, scholarly “analysis” in favor
of the more flexible and far-reaching critical mode he calls “textual
interpretation.”  In brief, he chose to create a reading by a scholar rather than a
scholarly reading.
Whether or not Auerbach’s apologia is disingenuous--as apologia generally
are--its appearance at the beginning and end of Mimesis announces that he
offers the book in a different spirit than, for instance, his celebrated work on
Dante.  He knows he is up to something different, something outside his usual
job description; most of Auerbach’s written legacy is traditional, philological
analysis, but Mimesis is largely a narrative, a story he tells us about the
"representation of reality" within the arch-narrative of literary heritage.  Vassilis
Lambropoulos, for one, takes Auerbach to task for his storytelling:
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Auerbach did not compose a History of Literature or the history of
a particular idea, figure, or theme that would have been yet
another all-encompassing, encyclopedic compendium; he wrote the
Story of Literature – a selective philological survey which traces
the origins and evolution of that chosen art, the art of the Book.
(7)
Although Lambropoulous means it as an indictment, the above is in fact a
delightfully concise description of both the structure and the chief value of
Mimesis.  I would, however, make one key revision of Lambropoulous’
assessment of Mimesis: Auerbach consciously and unabashedly wrote “his”
rather than “the” Story of Literature.  As stories go, Auerbach’s is quite good.
It has sweeping, panoramic spectacle, heroes (the Elohist, Dante, Zolá, Christ),
villains (Homer and the Nazis), suspense (“how can he possibly unify Virginia
Woolf and Dante Alegeri?”), and a classic denouement where all is revealed and
the loose narrative strings are bound together.  Certainly Auerbach believes his
account of figural realism is accurate, but there is nothing in Mimesis which
suggests he thought he had uttered the last word about literary realism, much
less literature as a whole.   
In its conclusion, Auerbach balances his discomfort with the sub-standard
analytical methods and untried ideas that comprise Mimesis with his confidence
that “the texts themselves” will indicate whether or not his ideas are flawed:   
The method of textual interpretation gives the
interpreter a certain leeway.  He can choose and
emphasize as he pleases.  It must naturally be possible to find what
he claims in the text.  My interpretations are no doubt guided by a
specific purpose.  Yet this purpose assumed form only as I went
along, playing as it were with my texts, and for long stretches of
my way I have been guided only by the texts themselves.
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Furthermore, the great majority of the texts were chosen at
random, on the basis of accidental acquaintance and personal
preference rather than in view of a definite purpose. Studies of this
kind do not deal with laws but with trends and tendencies, which
cross and compliment one another in the most varied ways.  I was
by no means interested merely in presenting what would serve my
purpose in the narrowest sense; on the contrary, it was my
endeavor to accommodate multiplex data and to make my
formulations correspondingly elastic.  (556)
My project does not ask to be excused on the basis of wartime, as Auerbach's
does, but it does sympathize with the angst of necessarily treating a vast
subject in a summary manner.  Instead of in the texts, I rest my faith in reading;
i.e. I believe that reading-acts achieve closure and that they will do so at least
partially according to identifiable conventions.  Like Auerbach, I am obliged to
express my beliefs by telling my story of literary reading.  This story is at times
theoretical, at times demonstrative, thoroughly taxonomical, and not
infrequently performative.
As I turn toward the proposition and subsequent application of neo-
appreciation pedagogy in the following chapters, therefore, I will no doubt give
short shrift to some of its theoretical implications.  I do so not because I think
such issues are unimportant but because the entire project is cast so deeply
into the problematics of reading that a lack of focus on my pragmatic goals will
likely drown the project in qualifications and self-reflexive digression.  As
interesting as such theoretical problems may be, I will leave them for another
commentator or another day.
I have much smaller fish to fry.   
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Chapter One:
Neo-appreciation pedagogy and the Lectical Triangle
Language is like a windowpane.  I may throw bricks at it to vent my
feelings about something; I may use a chunk of it to chase away an
intruder; I may use it to mirror or explore reality; and I may use a stained-
glass windowpane to call attention to itself. . . .  Each of these uses of
language has its own processes of thought.
James Kinneavy, A Theory of Discourse
This chapter develops and qualifies the analogy between reading-acts and
reading-texts I proposed in the introduction as the preliminary step towards
creating a practical neo-appreciation lesson plan for undergraduate literature
courses.  First, I will consolidate and elaborate upon those key assumptions
about the "lectical" theory already implied in the introduction which bear directly
upon the form of the method I will detail below.  (The adjective "lectical" used
throughout this essay denotes "having to do with reading as a cognitive
process"). These assumptions are "theoretical" in the sense that they are the
general claims of the logical system out of which I will make a variety of specific
assertions.  Before I go any further, then, I want to clarify and qualify how that
system is warranted and employed within the bounds of this project.  I will do
my best to shoot for the middle ground between Emersonian exhortation and
sophomoric apologetics.
Assumption #1: Literary texts do not absolutely determine
their value or meaning, but they do project a "lectical"
horizon that affects how they can be read by any reader.
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A variety of theoretical paradigms argue the first part of this assumption:
i.e. that texts - literary or otherwise - are indeterminate.  Such critiques of
textuality invariably posit some sort of text-based indeterminacy that thwarts
direct, extra-textual reference.  Reference and textual coherence, therefore,
occur only as "additions" or "supplements" to the written words of a text.
These indeterminacies have been given a variety of names; they are called
"gaps," "lacunae," "vacancies," "ruptures," and "aporias," just to mention a few.
That one can locate the textual site of such indeterminacies and thereby launch
a critique of common "supplements" to them has been well documented.  Paul
de Man's "Epistemology of Metaphor" discussed above is one example of how
clear and productive such analyses can be.  
Far fewer contemporary critics, however, have made positive assertions
about how or even to what extent the words of a text delimit the possible ways
it can be read.  It is much easier - and less risky these days - to show that a
given text can not be semantically controlled than it is to offer an account of
how a text might direct its own mediation.  It is easier because there are
established, credible methods for analyzing textual indeterminacy, and it is less
risky because no "positive" assertions of meaning or value need be made which
could in turn be shown to be indeterminate.  Such demonstrations of the
semantic instability of text, therefore, are virtually irrefutable if they are crafted
with a modicum of skill and one judges them solely on their own terms. Instead
of giving up the search for knowledge because it will always be authorized by an
impure, culturally determined logic, I am of the opinion that we should continue
to examine all the "truths" we currently value by employing a stringent dialectic
between "scientific" theory and a thorough cultural critique.  My re-formulation
of appreciation pedagogy makes gestures from both sides of this dialectic.  It
offers a model (therefore an implicit "theory") of the cultural phenomenon of
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literary reading and a method for subjecting that phenomenon to a general
critique.  
There are, of course, existing models of reading which address to what
extent a textual feature determines a reader's response to it.  A number of such
efforts have located textual features which describe the "presence" of some
sort of abstracted reader "in the text."  Riffaterre's "superreader," Wollf's
"intended reader," Fish's "ideal reader" (which he has subsequently repudiated
for a "community of readers"), and Iser's "implied reader" are all variations on
this general move.  Such inquiries often produce valuable insight into how certain
works "project" or even demand a certain kind of reader or reading.3   By
focusing on an abstracted reader-in-the-text, however, one implies that the
reader's job is to identify with the role he or she is offered by the author.
Reading, therefore, becomes a form of compliance, and readings are more or
less "successful" depending upon how well a reader obeys the text.  Although I
agree that readers often follow textual cues regarding whom they should be
while reading a particular literary work, I am equally interested in analyzing how
they can resist the cues they are offered.  In short, I believe identification with
the reader-in-the-text is just one of many strategies which should be addressed
by the more general account of literary reading I propose.
Of the "reader response" critics mentioned above, only Wolfgang Iser
offers a detailed description - in The Act of Reading -of how and which textual
features delimit an interpretive or "lectical" horizon.  For Iser, the interaction
between the structural elements of a fictional text and a reader's consciousness
creates an "aesthetic object" - i.e. the phenomena we call “literature” - which is
                                                 
3 Waddlington's analysis of the projection of "voice" in Faulkner is both trenchant and useful.  His focus
upon the particular lectical challenges and felicities that Faulkner's readers face is a good example of how
localized and concrete "reader response" criticism can be.  Poirier, on the other hand, offers a more
universal model of the pragmatics of reading literature.   Both works, however, at least partially  assert that
literary works - at least good ones -  suggest how they are to be read, and by extension, what kind of
readers we need to be to consume them.
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a very real but necessarily ephemeral and culturally contingent entity.
According to Iser, the act of reading fiction transcends the projection of a world
by a text - the "fictive" world  - and the prior understanding of the world by a
reader - his or her "real" world - to generate new possibilities of being in a
transient, but actual, third world: the "imaginary" world.  Iser colonizes this
unapproachable third world through his analysis of the first world of literature:
textuality.  
Like most contemporary philologists, Iser describes fictional textuality in
terms of its fragmentation.  Unlike empirical reality, which is perceived as a
whole but only understood when reduced to comprehensible fragments (Iser
leans on Gestalt theory here), literary texts are perceived as fragments--or
"segments" in Iser's terminology-- which must be connected if a whole
understanding is to be reached.  Iser calls the spaces between textual segments
"blanks"; readers fill in these blanks according to culturally dictated conventions
of reading further mediated by their individual dispositions, thereby creating a
system of connected segments which Iser calls a "referential field" (202).
Although the "time-flow" of a reading is linear in the sense that readers progress
through a text by encountering and subsequently filling blanks, each connection
made by a reader affects not only the new addition to the referential field but
the entire system of previously connected segments (203).  Once readers
connect a given segment to the referential field, that segment loses its status
as the focus of their attention, and becomes the perspectival "standpoint" from
which they will address the "blank" that marks the boundary of the next
segment to be connected (203).  Segments already connected and thereby
assimilated into the referential field are called "vacancies" by Iser.  However,
since each new segment encountered can potentially and retroactively disrupt
the semantic relationships which connect the various vacancies into a single
referential field, all understandings-in-progress of a literary work are unstable
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and uniquely temporally situated.  Iser calls this retroactive affect on the
"meaning" of the referential field a "reciprocal transformation" which occurs
between blanks and vacancies. So each time a reader fills a blank in a text, the
aesthetic object--the ultimate product of the referential field--is both
constituted and re-constituted.  
So far, so good.  Iser's model seems to offer a topography of textual
elements which instigates literary meaning production even if the actual
"aesthetic object" remains beyond analysis on the other side of the subjective,
although not arbitrary, mediation of the reader.  However, the difficulty of
actually implementing even this rather modest achievement upon a given
fictional text becomes apparent when one lists the many types of blanks that
can occur.  Some types of blanks that Iser identifies are: 1) shifts in narrative
perspective, of which he names four--narrator, character, plot, and "fictional"
reader point-of-view; 2) Graphic breaks, such as chapters, serial publications,
footnotes, and, presumably, the beginning and end of the work; 3) "negations"
of the reader's expectations.  
This last type of blank, negation, is the bugbear of the system.  First of
all, the destabilization of socio-cultural norms and conventions are negations--a
necessary effect, according to Iser's model, of any and all (mis)representations
of real conventions in a literary context.  Stanley Fish's critique of Iser's
equivocal definition of "convention" strikes home here ("How to..." 222); taken
to the absurd, every single word represents a semantic convention that is
destabilized by the fictional context.  Another type of negation is the
modification of a reader's comprehension of a text within the time-flow of a
reading due to the "reciprocal transformation" effected between blanks and
vacancies mentioned above.  Yet another type of negation is the violation of the
reader's expectations, intentionally manipulated through literary conventions.  
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Even if we are generous enough not to follow these many "blanks" to
their logical conclusions, the overlapping interconnectedness of Iser's system of
absences is so dense that its complexity overwhelms its descriptive utility,
especially since the entire referential field is situated in time.   
This is not to say that Iser’s theoretical gesture is worthless; over twenty
years after its publication, The Act of Reading continues to draw both extensive
emulation and criticism.  That his work has stimulated discussion is in itself
valuable.  To my project Iser offers an additional benefit: a coherent and
plausible description of the basic architecture of lectical events.  Iser, in effect,
coins terms that describe the aporias of language from the perspective that
they are, in fact, ultimately overcome by most readers.  The "blanks" do get
filled, and thereby aesthetic objects are brought into being.  The term "reading-
act" which I employ throughout this work is roughly equivalent to the process by
which Iser's "aesthetic object" is created, and is meant in part as recognition of
the debt I owe him here.  Specifically, this dissertation shares Iser’s interest in
the re-construction of literary reading as well as his emphasis on developing
terminology for reasoned dialogue about that process.  Iser’s system of blanks
and vacancies is indeed so complex and overlapping that it does not bring one
any closer to “fixing” textuality, but that is neither his goal nor mine.  Textuality
will not sit still by itself, much less if you put a reader in the room with it.  As my
discussion above indicates, there is no question of achieving objectivity; the
best one can do - and it is no small feat - is to establish a communal subjectivity
out of which critical discourse can occur.  My shared goal with Iser and like-
minded scholars is a desire to address this apparent interchange between
literary texts and their readers in a way that enriches - and critiques - our
common understandings of it and thereby enhances classroom pedagogy.
Although Iser’s theory of reading does not provide an efficient
compositional or analytical method with which one can interrogate reading-acts,
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some recent efforts in literary ethics do.  Moreover, most of the recent work in
literary ethics is founded upon a radicalized analogy similar to the one I propose:
i.e. the way we engage other people has some functional resemblance to the
way we engage literary texts.  For instance, in The Company We Keep : An
Ethics of Fiction, Wayne Booth uses this analogy to describe the horizon of
responses projected by a given literary text.  Booth describes this horizon in
anthropomorphic terms; texts either “invite,” “tolerate,” or “resist” responses to
them.  Booth’s justifications for his “metaphorical way of talking” about
textuality are largely anecdotal and hypothetical.  For instance, in one passage
Booth uses a series of parodic revisions (intended as corruptions) of Yeat’s
“After Long Silence” to both demonstrate how a literary work “invites” certain
evaluations and why such evaluations are not necessarily illogical, unwarranted,
or unreliable.  Booth admits that if we ask which "After Long Silence" is better,
we will immediately come up against the impossible task of establishing universal
criteria for all excellent poetry, what I identified above as the central problematic
of traditional aesthetics.  Any such criteria would indeed be hopelessly
“subjective” in that the possible criteria for “great poetry” are virtually infinite
and therefore the only way to narrow the field is by adhering to the
idiosyncratic, literary preferences of the individual reader or some sort of
“community” of readers. To avoid this problematic, Booth suggests we should
instead ask of his three versions of "After Long Silence": “Are these lines better
than those, in this poem?” (103).  This shift in focus is crucial for Booth in that
the evaluative project moves from judging a work according to “extrinsic”
universal criteria (The Rules of Great Poetry) to judging it by “intrinsic” criteria
for excellence projected by the work itself, in this case Yeats’ “After Long
Silence.”   
Booth is aware that some might suggest the difference between
establishing the universal criteria for poetry and establishing the particular
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criteria projected by “After Long Silence” is a difference of degree not of kind.
In response, he appeals to the reader’s experience of the poem in comparison to
his revisions:
It might be argued that if we face the pluralities of criteria, we can
“prove” any poem superior to any other poem, on any arbitrarily
chosen axis of value; in short, we need only become complicated
subjectivists.  But to say as much would be to ignore the quality of
our concrete experience of diverse narrative purposes.  For the
purposes of a political campaign, Yeats’s poem would be inferior to
“I Like Ike” or “Yawn with Ron.”  For the purposes of parody, my
corrupt versions of “After Long Silence” better it.  For the
purposes of educating first graders, almost every work I mention in
this book will be found deficient. But by the criteria that “we” all
find called into play when reading Yeats’s poem, his own revisions
are quite clearly superior. . . .  Only an artificially impoverished
experience-free world could lead us to conclude that the
multiplicity of criteria leaves us choosing blindly. (119)
In this short passage Booth gives us a good example of why those who
reject evaluative criticism (whom Booth dubs “subjectivists”) have little
difficulty refuting the claims of those who try to practice it.  One has only to
point out that the abstract concept “the quality of our concrete experience of
diverse narrative purposes” which Booth treats as a self-evident and self-
explanatory known quantity is precisely the point where his model dips naively
(perhaps) into the unknowable.  There is no reliable access to “our concrete
experience” any more than “we” can be sure of “the criteria ‘we’ all find called
into play” when reading any literary work.  Such rhetorical gestures - a
“subjectivist” might continue - are little but transparent attempts to gain the
reader’s assent since there is no objective way to substantiate the claim that
49
any literary work is “better” than another except according to some culturally
contingent criteria.  In other words, although Booth is sufficiently aware of the
theoretical problems of making claims in the first-person plural to put “we”
within question marks, he asks us to overlook those problems on the authority
of what he assumes is our common experience of the poem.   
However, in this same passage Booth also provides a good example of
what many find compelling about arguments like his which employ the rhetoric
and logic of anecdotal evidence.  Such arguments tend to attack radical
skepticism as a whole and post-structuralist or deconstructive theory in
particular by claiming that such assertions of indeterminacy do not account for
the apparent determinacy of experience.  In essence, Booth attempts to valorize
praxis over theory by offering demonstrations of the frequent incompatibility
between the logically sound abstractions of theory and  “concrete experience.”
Regarding his “experiment” with “After Long Silence,” for instance, Booth
cajoles his readers to trust their “responses” to his examples above all else,
knowing that his argument will fall flat if they don’t.  Addressing those readers
who do not immediately concur with his aesthetic judgment of Yeats’ poem, he
writes:  
If you as a reader here really disagree with the judgment, I know
not what to do with you, except to plead “Read it again - and then,
no matter what the result, read on.”  But be sure that you in fact
disagree rather than simply suppose it possible that someone
might.  Of course a reader totally inexperienced with English poetry
might disagree, but do you?  (103)
Booth’s appeal here highlights yet another common feature of  “practical”
criticism as it is applied in literary studies; he assumes and even insists upon a
distinction between “normal” readers and professional, academic readers.  In the
passage above, this assumption is somewhat tacit (“Of course a reader totally
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inexperienced with English poetry might disagree, but do you?”), but elsewhere
he argues for the value of reading within and against a community of competent
readers, a practice he calls “coduction.”  Although he acknowledges the range of
literary competency is very broad, Booth insists it is not infinite for any
particular literary work.  Again, his point is demonstrated anecdotally: “What I go
to Shakespeare or Homer for, or whether I go to them at all, will vary from age
to age, but no age that pays any attention to them will find them justifying a
pornography of child torture, say, or a happy indifference to filial piety” (99).
Such interpretations, Booth argues, are strongly “resisted” by the texts in
question and would be rejected by anyone with even a nominal understanding of
the culture within which they appeared and against which they should be read
(99).   Booth admits that he “does not know what to do” with readers who
might resist his anecdotes, but for the purposes of making an effective
argument he doesn’t have to.  The chances that anyone outside of the literary
academy would read The Company We Keep at all are very slim, and anyone who
has been educated in the norms and traditions of Western literary art would
have to resort to sophistry to disavow the absurdity of characterizing
Shakespeare as being indifferent to filial piety, or as being a child pornographer
of any kind.   Since Booth characterizes contemporary skeptics as sophists
whose theories only make sense in an “experience impoverished world,” readers
who disagree with his judgment can be conveniently lumped with other
“subjectivists” who absurdly deny the self-evidently valid experiences of the rest
of “us.”  However, as long as one agrees with Booth, as long as readers feel they
share a common understanding of Shakespeare or any literary work, his
anecdotes carry the weight of lived experience, and thereby have a personal
"objectivity" that is undeniable, if logically refutable.
Booth uses similar arguments to substantiate another major feature of his
extended analogy between reading fiction and meeting people: his concept of
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the "implied author."  Much like the abstracted implied readers of Iser et al,
Booth's implied author is not the "real" author but those textual features which
"imply" an authorial ethos.  Although this qualification is an important defense
against the "intentional fallacy," the question still arises whether or not a "real"
author’s intentions control how a text is received.  Booth maintains this question
posits a false dilemma; either authors control their texts or they do not.  If they
do, then it follows that there is a right or at least an “authorly” reading that can
be drawn from a given text.  If they do not, then there is no rational basis for
using "the author" as a touchstone of meaning.
I agree with Booth that the case is not so cut and dry.  Authors do have
intentions for their texts; a botanist does not (usually) intend to be read as a
poet, and a poet does not want to be read as a medical ethicist.  These
intentions, whatever they may be, to some extent dictate the form a text takes,
who publishes it, which shelf it sits upon in the bookstore or the library, and,
perhaps most importantly, in what context a reader comes into contact with it.
Often books come pre-categorized for the reader by prior readers.  Consider
such transmissions of intention as “Turn to page 143 of your Text and work
problems….” or “I just finished the coolest biography of Nixon, I think you’d like
it” or “Paradise Lost is the only great epic poem composed in English.”  Texts
often come with a recommendation, sometimes even a resume’.  Long before I
read The Old Man and the Sea, for instance, I was aware that Hemingway was a
“great novelist” and by extension his novels were first rate.  I had no idea what
his texts were like or how they compared to novels I was familiar with, like the
Hardy Boys series, but when I did pick up Hemingway’s novel for the first time, I
expected to read a great work of literature - an expectation which greatly
affected how I consumed it.  My expectation and subsequent act of reading The
Old Man and the Sea as a great novel was to some extent pre-determined by
Ernest Hemingway: by his delivery to a certain editor in a certain context, by the
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promotion of the book as great literature by a literary master, and most
importantly by its subsequent canonization (for much more complex reasons
than I am willing to address at the moment).  
There are, of course, many other ways authors can assert their intentions
for how their texts should be read.  Some works, for instance, announce their
author’s intended context in their titles; i.e. the book tells you, in its title, “I am
a novel” or “I am a Human Anatomy textbook.”  Furthermore, the intended
lectical context of a text can be projected by the "form" its author chooses to
give it.  For instance, confronted with a text written in short, rhythmic lines that
rhyme, most readers – until they receive contradictory evidence – will decide
they are reading a poem.  The reader may ultimately decide they are reading a
parody or a nursery rhyme or a greeting card, but those decisions will also, to
some extent, be due to the reader’s comparison of the form of the text to his or
her repertoire of linguistic / cultural conventions.  My point here and elsewhere,
is not that readers are forced to reproduce the author’s intentions when they
read literature, but the fact that works of literature “invite” some reading
strategies and “resist” others is contingent upon both how it was written - by an
author, presumably on purpose - and in what cultural context it is read.
Although traditional literary appreciation took intentionality for granted, my
version of appreciation pedagogy treats the attribution of "intention" during a
reading-act as a problematic yet common lectical strategy, not as a thing that is
simply absent or present.
Although most current formulations of literary ethics trade upon the
analogy between “people” and “texts,” Booth's willingness to blur the lines
between textuality and consciousness far exceeds the comfort level of some of
his fellow literary ethicists.  Like Booth, Adam Newton casts ethics as the study
of how cultural entities (whether they are people or texts) must confront the
alterity of other such entities, but he is unwilling to push the analogy between
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"intersubjective" and interpersonal behavior as far as Booth, neither is Newton's
argument as dependent upon anecdotal evidence.4
The chief asset and liability of Booth's The Company We Keep, therefore,
is the wealth of information about reading he culls from an introspective analysis
of how one (Booth) engages with and ultimately judges the "other" of fiction.
Booth freely acknowledges the problematics of his "metaphorical way of talking"
but contends -as I do - that the alternative of not talking at all about the
evaluative dimension of reading literature is even more problematic, and
ultimately "unethical" behavior for literary professionals.  We also both identify
the "illustration" of our subject matter as our principle goal (381), which
underlines why his work is so helpful to my own.  Booth’s extended analogy
between fiction and friends is very teachable; it is catchy, and undergraduate
students almost immediately understand much of what he has to say about the
relationship between a text and its reader.  Like all strong analogies it offers us
a great deal of information about an "unknown" referent - in Booth's case,
reading as an ethical encounter - by claiming a resemblance between it and
something that is more familiar - how we interact with other people.
Unfortunately, all analogies are also inherently "false," in the sense than they go
further than can be logically justified (which is not at all).  Booth recognizes that
much of his project is merely a shift in the arch-metaphor of literary study, but
defends it as a shift that nevertheless brings different language and therefore
different kinds of thinking to bear on its subject matter:
Though [my analogy] will obscure some truths that are revealed in
current pursuits of 'meaning' and 'non-meaning,' we can hope that
it may release a kind of critical conversation too often inhibited by
                                                 
4 Dr. Newton's problems with Booth's formulation of literary ethics were communicated to me in various
conversations we have had over the years, but a written account of the differences between his work and
Booth's can be found in the introduction of Narrative Ethics, 10-11.
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more mechanized pictures of texts / webs / prison houses /
mazes/ codes / rule systems / speech acts / semantic structures.
(170)   
My own project shares this hope that new ways of talking will promote new ways
of thinking - at least for students.  
A distinction should be made here, however, between 1) the rhetorical
topos of valorizing "praxis over theory," 2) the rhetoric and philosophy of
Pragmatism, and 3) the general critical move of being "practical" regarding what
one can know, say, or teach about any cultural artifact.  All of these ways of
talking have long histories in critical discourse, and this dissertation employs
each in some way.  Booth's reliance upon anecdotal evidence to persuade his
audience (a reliance which I share) draws on such an ancient tradition it can not
be dated; if it is not the meat and potatoes of argumentation, it is at least the
knife and fork.  The philosophical tradition of Pragmatism also has ancient roots;
most analysts trace it back at least to sophistry, in particular Protogoras and his
famous postulate "Man is the measure of all things." 5  The fact that appeals to
praxis are often used to refute (or more often dismiss out of hand) the anti-
foundationalist assumptions of Pragmatism is not as paradoxical as it might
seem.   Booth, for example, rejects those he calls "subjectivists" by identifying
them with "sophistry," as if the term is a priori  pejorative.  
This is not mere name-calling; Booth is deploying the time-honored
strategy of countering skepticism with "real world" examples, a rhetorical move
that dates back at least to Plato's Gorgias.  In that dialogue, Socrates attempts
to convert a trio of rhetoricians to the dialectical method.  His first two
interlocutors, Gorgias and Polus, succumb to Socrates' questions, and eventually
                                                 
5 All of the essays included in Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism, Steven Mailloux, ed. explore links between
ancient and contemporary skepticism in some way, so the collection is a pretty good introduction to the
philosophical roots of pragmatism and other contemporary forms of critical discourse.
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assent to his claim that the "good" is equivalent to the "true," and by extension
that rhetoric is not an "art" (i.e. a science) founded on the systematization of
truth (episteme) but a form of flattery which merely manipulates popular opinion
(doxa).  However, Socrates' third interlocutor, Callicles, will not commit to
Socrates' game of responding to binary questions.  Although at times Callicles
replies with a simple "yes" or "no," as Socrates' repeatedly requests, often he
hedges his answers ("If you say so" or "The latter follows from our previous
admissions" or "The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth"), and sometimes
refuses to answer at all by claiming not to understand the question.  The
disputants eventually become frustrated with each other's way of talking, both
bewailing the other's slippery use of language.  Soon after Socrates' inversion of
Polus' defense of rhetoric, for instance, Callicles calls Socrates out with a short -
and partially accurate - analysis of the Socratic method:
For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in
the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar
notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional.
Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another:
and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is
compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your ingenuity
perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him
who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined
by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you
slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very
discussion about doing and suffering injustice."
This analysis only goads Socrates, who never answers Callicles' critique directly;
without missing a beat, Socrates redoubles his "quibbling" dialectical attack on
rhetoric.  Callicles eventually becomes exasperated with Socrates' strategy of
using analogies drawn from "real life" to define philosophical terms: "By the
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Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and
doctors, as if this had to do with our argument."  In turn, Socrates becomes
irritated that Callicles refuses to play along with his game of coming to "first
terms":  "You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are
arguing, we are always going round and round to the same point, and constantly
misunderstanding one another."  Unable to agree about how to speak to one
another, the dialogue breaks down; Callicles falls silent, and Socrates is forced to
deliver his truth about truth in a monologue. Even before his peroration is
complete, all of the guests at Gorgias' table, particularly Callicles, seem ready to
move on to dessert.
No doubt, Plato offers the exchange between Socrates and Callicles as an
example of a particular type of Sophistic cowardice.  Another way to read
Callicles' eventual withdrawal from the argument, however, is that he becomes
bored with Socrates' "quibbling," his incessant use of "real life" analogies to
define absolute terms.  After all, this is the only dialogue that I can recall where
Socrates does not actually defeat his interlocutor.  Whatever motivation readers
attribute to Callicles (he is, after all, a character in a fiction), this dialogue also
dramatizes a perennial, rhetorical impasse between skepticism and
systematization.  In short, skepticism and systematization use the same method
- reference to conventional understanding of the "real world" - to support
apparently conflicting projects: the analysis of truth versus the discovery of
truth.  As any freshman composition textbook will tell you, classical
argumentation requires some common assumptions about what is being
discussed.  Socrates and Callicles' dialogue fails not because they can not agree
about what is real but because they can not agree upon what they are really
doing .  Socrates is interested in discovering the truth through words and
Callicles is interested in exploring the words in Socrates' "truth."  
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These conflicting interests might be personal and pecuniary; after all,
sophists and dialecticians have always and still profess competing theories in the
academic marketplace.  More to the point, however, is that their failure to
communicate is a necessary artifact of their unwillingness to agree upon what
they are talking about.  By contrast, Gorgias and Polus both agree to talk to
Socrates about the truth/value of rhetoric.  By doing so they have already
assented to the founding assumption of all traditional, systematic philosophy:
that the truth can be discovered.  Callicles, however, enters his dialogue with
Socrates as an analyst, not as a disputant.  He wants to talk about how Socrates
has been talking to his compatriots.  Since Socrates does not want to talk about
talk and Callicles does not want to talk about truth, they have nothing to say to
each other, and Socrates is forced to shut up or make a speech.  Needless to
say, he speechifies; the very thing he berates the sophists for doing.  
In this dissertation I find myself on both sides of this perennial dispute
between skepticism and schematization.  Like Callicles, I am interested in
analyzing conventional ways of talking about literature.  To do so, however, I am
forced to accept some kind of systematized account of the "truth" about
reading, writing, and thinking if this essay is to: 1. Have something to analyze,
and 2. Be coherent as a composition.  Although the theory of reading I offer
below is significantly more qualified and provisional than one Socrates could
support, I would not use it if I did not think it had some truth value.  Moreover,
the fact that both my skeptical and schematic gestures are chiefly
substantiated by appeals to praxis  (or anecdotal evidence, which is essentially
the same thing), is an artifact of my resolve to say something about how people
understand fiction.  Like Gorgias and Polus, having agreed to speak publicly
about what might be true, I have already assented to the use of "real world"
application as a measure of truth-value, no matter how qualified or provisional.    
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More recent disputes about what one should do with words often
duplicate the impasse dramatized in Gorgias between Socrates and Callicles, with
the significant difference that the playing field between philosophical "truth-
seekers" and sophistic analysts is more level than it has been in over two
millennia.  Jasper Neel, for instance, believes the feud between ancient "theory-
stars" (Plato and Aristotle) and teachers of rhetoric (Protagoras, Gorgias,
Isocrates) is still being dramatized in many contemporary English departments
(78 - 80).  Certainly, almost every English department over the last thirty years
or so has had to revisit this ancient debate, often resulting in very real shifts in
economic and administrative power toward those that teach the practical
application of rhetoric via freshman composition courses.   Although perhaps
Neel oversimplifies the tension between theory and practice in contemporary
English departments (few professors in the position to debate policy would
identify themselves as being "theory-stars," for instance), he makes the salient
observation that most students do not have the requisite reading or writing
skills to understand much less produce contemporary "theory" without some
prior training in the basics of rhetoric (80).   
Neel's account of the struggle between theory-stars and rhetoric
teachers at the departmental level neatly and plausibly deploys the ancient
combatants "theory" and "practice," and he is quite right that some such
struggle has been taking place for some time.  His argument, however, is a good
example of how thoroughly convoluted terms like "theory," "rhetoric,"
"practice," and "Pragmatism" have become in the last few years.  Neel wants to
distinguish between the "disinterested intellectual inquiry" of theory-stars like
Derrida, Fish, Rorty, and Hillis-Miller (writers he admits he uses not because they
are unique but because they are "famous"), which yields few "practical" results,
and the real work of rhetorical pedagogy, which does (79).  Neel does not go so
far as to claim that "theory" is useless, he merely wants to raise the currency of
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being "practical" about the kinds of things - i.e. basic rhetoric and composition
skills - that can and must be taught to undergraduates.  
It is telling, however, that at least two of the theory-stars identified by
Neel (and Booth and Norris) as being involved in impractical scholarly activities
are also often associated with Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish.  In a
recent collection of essays entitled The Revival of Pragmatism Rorty and Fish are
given respectively the first and last words.    
Rorty's essay in this collection attempts to recast Pragmatism as a form
of "utilitarian polytheism" (21).  Rorty is interested in defending the apparent
tolerance of theism in American Pragmatism (specifically in James and Dewey) in
contrast to other types of radical skepticism (Nietzsche is his primary example
of this camp) which are not.  Since Rorty is so often cast as a latter day
Callicles, it is interesting that his contribution to this collection demonstrates
how pragmatic skepticism is not only inherently sympathetic to democracy (a
point that is virtually a tenet of pragmatism), but it can perform the same moral
function as religion.  In the process of making his argument, Rorty lists the key
theses of his version of Pragmatism:
1) "Beliefs are habits of action...";  "Because the purposes served
by actions may blamelessly vary, so may the habits we develop to
serve those purposes."
2)  "If there is no will to truth apart from the will to happiness,
there is no way to contrast the cognitive with the noncognitive,
the serious with the nonserious."
3) However, "pragmatism does allow us to make another
distinction . . . between projects of social cooperation and projects
of individual development.  Intersubjective agreement is required
for the former projects, but not for the latter."
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4)  "The only possible objection to [religious belief] can be that it
intrudes an individual project into a social and cooperative project,
and thereby... is a betrayal of one's responsibilities to cooperate
with other human beings."
5) Therefore, "the pragmatist objection to religious
fundamentalists is not that fundamentalists are intellectually
irresponsible..., rather they are morally irresponsible in attempting
to circumvent the process of achieving democratic consensus
about how to maximize happiness" (27-28).
The traditional critique of Pragmatism, of course, is that since truth is
cast as a form of belief, it provides no philosophical basis from which to
condemn (currently) socially reprehensible actions like fascism, child
pornography, spousal abuse, etc.  Rorty tries to answer this criticism with thesis
number three above: moral choices are performed in two realms, the public and
the private.  According to Rorty, moral choices in both of these realms are
mediated purely by an individual's "will to happiness," but in the pubic realm an
individual's happiness is achieved through cooperation and therefore must
account for the beliefs of others.  This postulate is a slight revision of the one
Gorgias and Polus try to defend against Socrates' dialectical attack: pleasure is
the ultimate good.  However, while the Greek sophists use that postulate to
promote the practical value of rhetoric as a means for achieving happiness (by
defeating the arguments of others), Rorty uses it as the basis for why one is
morally responsible to come to terms with others, at least while pursuing
"projects of social cooperation."  In other words, Rorty takes the Socratic
position; we need to talk to each other to establish mutually acceptable
"truths," to achieve a "democratic consensus" that ultimately will maximize our
common "happiness."  Obviously, Plato and Rorty have very different
understandings about what "truth" is, but it is instructive that the chief
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progenitor of essentialism and the current poster boy for pragmatic skepticism
call for the same kinds of public actions.  
Stanley Fish is a better candidate for the role of Callicles, and many a
modern day Socrates is or should be grateful for his consistent refusal to assent
to first terms.  If all else fails, one can always bolster one's assertions by flailing
Fish for being an unreasonably slippery sophist.  Dr. Fish is almost always good
for a sound byte or two in this regard.  For example, in the aforementioned
collection of essays on Pragmatism, Fish in his own words has been given the
task of "summing up or wrapping up or mopping up" after the various other
contributers.  At the end of some four hundred pages of thoughtful commentary
regarding the possible uses and/or value of pragmatism, Fish posits:
If pragmatism points out that its rivals cannot deliver what they
promise - once and for all answers to always relevant questions -
pragmatism should itself know enough not to promise anything, or
even to recommend anything.  If pragmatism is true it has nothing
to say to us; no politics follows from it or is blocked by it; no
morality attaches to it or is enjoined by it.  (419)
Taken by itself, this passage is ripe to be harvested for yet another straw Fish
citation.  Here, as in similar assertions he has been making for the last twenty
odd years, Fish is arguing against taking critical theory of any kind too seriously;
philosophy, political science, linguistics, psychology, jurisprudence, and
particularly literary criticism are all just discourses of particular and always
changing "interpretive communities" which are self regulated by current fashions
of rhetorical potency.  In other words, an assertion within any of these
discourses is "true" if its relevant "interpretive community" believes it is true, or
at least plausible.  Following this assertion, Fish "stopped worrying and started
learned to love interpretation" (again?) because the absence of any extra-
rhetorical truth liberates him from the anxiety of getting it wrong: as long as he
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writes persuasively.  No wonder he has no worries; the man can write a hell of an
essay.
It is no accident, however, that Stanley Fish is placed in the "mopping up"
position of a collection of essays about Pragmatism.  Whether it is a "new"
theory or just a re-heated way of talking, nearly all of the essays I have read
which address Pragmatism do so with an eye to its potential for generating real
benefits for real human beings.  Our collective interest in the possibility of any
kind of transcendental truth might be merely an artifact of communal wish
fulfillment, as Fish asserts in one of his rhetorical modes.  However, in another -
less frequent - rhetorical mode, Fish implies that there are some strong,
practical reasons to do theory.  Regarding the critique of First Amendment
jurisprudence, for instance, he asserts that the language used to argue such
issues "is either empty and incoherent or filled with an incoherence I don't like"
(421).  Fish goes on to say, however, that such "empty" language should not be
eradicated from jurisprudence, only that it should not be "worshiped," because:
If we worship it we shall find ourselves saddled with things we
don't want; but if we avail ourselves of it - with a lightness that will
be bearable in that it does not penetrate to our being - it can be
put in the service of what we do want."  (421)
In a much earlier essay, "Demonstration vs. Persuasion: Two Models of Critical
Activity," Fish similarly shuttles between the first person singular ("I don't like")
and the first person plural ("we don't want") while defending the value of doing
literary criticism even though such gestures can have no pretensions to extra-
rhetorical truth.  In that essay, Fish argues that his notions about the rhetorical
nature of "truth" make literary criticism a worthless word game only if one
believes "that in order for something to be interesting, it must directly affect
our everyday experience of poetry: and that assumption is in turn attached to a
certain anti-theoretical bias built into the ideology of New Criticism .., and it is
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that point of view that I have been challenging" ("Demonstration" 371).  Both
of these passages imply that what Fish is doing - i.e. metacriticism - has "real
world" benefits.  In the first example, deploying language with a non-reverential
"lightness" can be used to get what "we" want, presumably laws that are
conducive to or at least are not hostile toward certain (liberal?) applications of
the First Amendment.  In the second example Fish implies that metacriticism has
value because it opposes certain foundationalist assumptions about the goals of
critical discourse: i.e. to discover the extra-rhetorical truth about poetry.  Fish
does not dispute that "our everyday experience of poetry" can be affected by
critical discourse, only that the criteria for value for such gestures is not the
discovery of truth but whether or not or to what degree they win assent from
their audience.  Both of these statements assert, therefore, that some ways of
talking about language, law, literature, etc. serve "our" interests more than
others.  In other words, he implies that "our" truth is preferable - more humane,
more accurate - than "their" truth, whomever they may be.   
All this is not to say that Stanley Fish is a hypocrite because he in fact
believes some things are more true or at least more desirable than others; the
passages above, and the many others like them in his corpus where he asserts
some "truth" or another, can be understood within his contention that "truth"
and rhetorically contingent beliefs are the same thing, and furthermore that
there is no shame in asserting the former as long as one admits it is also the
latter.   From Fish's perspective we can't help having beliefs, so we should stop
searching for a non-existent, absolute truth and just get to work: whether that
work is doing philosophy, interpreting literature, writing history, or trying legal
cases.  Where he is a bit disingenuous, however, is in passages where he
debunks the possibility that the process of arguing our rhetorically contingent
beliefs within a given "interpretive community" might be progressive and
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transformative, perhaps even a little transcendental.  For instance, in the
process of mopping up the question of Pragmatism, he tells us it teaches:
That we live in a rhetorical world where arguments and evidence
are always available, but always changeable, and that the
resources of that world are sufficient unto most days.  It is neither
a despairing nor an inspiring lesson, and it doesn't tell you exactly
how to do anything (it delivers no method) although it does assure
you that in ordinary circumstances there will usually be something
to be done.  (432)
Pragmatism is rhetoric is a game we play: go fish.  However, in the next and final
paragraph of the essay, Fish seems to proffer an "assurance" such as he credits
to pragmatism, delivering to his reader a sort of backhanded peroration:
But successes do happen; obstacles are sometimes overcome; new
and hitherto unthinkable links are forged.  That is the world
pragmatism describes and the world we inhabit independently of
its description.  Pragmatism is the philosophy not of grand
ambitions but of little steps; and although it cannot help us to take
those steps or tell us what they are, it can offer the reassurance
that they are possible and more than occasionally efficacious even
if we cannot justify them down to the ground.  (433)
Surprise, surprise!  Stanley Fish is a pragmatist!  Pragmatism describes the world
correctly, albeit with too much gusto.  What Fish has been up to all along is not
a refutation of whatever Pragmatism might mean but a particularly qualified
pragmatist account of the world, one that refuses to accept the claims of like-
minded theorists without processing them through his own ideas about
language, meaning, and the possibility of efficacious action.
Maybe it’s just me, but I can't help hearing reverberations of Emerson in
this peroration.  A variety of commentators (Rorty, Cavell, Poirier, to name a
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few) identify Emerson as the progenitor of American Pragmatism, or (as in the
case of Cavell) assert that what is now called Pragmatism exists only by virtue
of its tension with Emersonian Transcendentalism.  Clearly, Fish's rhetorical style
is very different than Emerson's, but they seem to be covering similar ground,
each offering both qualifications and assurances.  One can leaf through Bartlett's
quotations to find any number of Emerson's grandly ambitious exhortations, but
such bumper stickers should not be understood apart from the highly qualified
and patently skeptical essays within which they appear.  Take, for instance, this
passage from Emerson's "Circles":
But lest I should mislead any when I have my own head and obey
my whims, let me remind the reader that I am only an
experimenter. Do not set the least value on what I do, or the least
discredit on what I do not, as if I pretended to settle any thing as
true or false. I unsettle all things. No facts are to me sacred; none
are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at
my back. (310)
And again, from the same essay, Emerson describes the halting progress of the
intellectual worker in a world hostile to "new" ideas:
Step by step we scale this mysterious ladder: the steps are
actions; the new prospect is power. Every several result is
threatened and judged by that which follows.  Every one seems to
be contradicted by the new; it is only limited by the new. The new
statement is always hated by the old, and, to those dwelling in the
old, comes like an abyss of skepticism. But the eye soon gets
wonted to it, for the eye and it are effects of one cause; then its
innocency and benefit appear.  (304)
Even his most over-the-top exhortations - "If the single man plant himself
indomitably on his instincts, and there abide, the huge world will come round to
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him" - are almost always immediately followed by an admission that intellectual
labor is struggle: "Patience - patience" ("The American Scholar").  Emerson
reminds us that intellectual labor is arduous and never finished but also that
occasionally, as Fish concedes, "successes do happen."  Moreover, Emerson, like
Fish, warns that progress is made "by little steps," but that there is "always
something to be done."  Carefully, patiently, one tries out one's ideas within a
contingent world, albeit reassured that "the resources of that world are
sufficient unto most days."     
I am not merely playing a game of "spot the pragmatist," although I do
see a conceptual thread linking many of the authors I have discussed so far.
Fish, Emerson, Callicles, Rorty, Booth, Iser, Norris: all of these writers seem to be
struggling in often very different ways with the twin impulses of doubt and
belief. Specifically, all of these writers seriously doubt the adequacy of language
to say anything objectively true about the world.  And yet, all of them find some
reason to keep expressing what they believe about life, language, and the
possibility of right action in the world.  Perhaps, the attempt to say something
more true than the last guy or gal is nothing more than a persistent and
nostalgic desire for getting it right, the urging of a vestigial organ left over from
the Enlightenment.  Perhaps, as Fish and Callicles are forthright enough to point
out, we keep talking about the possibility of truth value because it pays to do
so; the spoils of the profession go to the rhetor who carries the day, or as Fish
puts it, "the prize in the competition is the (temporary) right to label your way
of talking undistorting, a label you can claim only until some other way of
talking, some other vocabulary elaborated with a superior force, takes it away
from you" ("Pragmatism" 431).   
These very real motivations not withstanding, I think there are some
other reasons why the above mentioned writers strive for a greater measure of
truth value through language, specifically through the simultaneous production
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and analysis of theories of meaning production.  The most obvious one is that
though language is inadequate to the task of describing the world, it does not
necessarily follow that all linguistic descriptions of the world are equally
inadequate.  It is not entirely irrational, therefore, to hope that one's latest
attempt to get it right might be a little less wrong than one's last attempt.
Moreover - in the spirit of Booth's "coduction," Rorty's "projects of social
cooperation," and even Fish's "interpretive communities" - there is the
possibility that through dialogue with others, dead or alive, occasionally "new
and hitherto unthinkable links are forged."  Although the steps may be small and
halting, there is the possibility that the process of continually confronting our
intersubjectivity through careful analysis does more than just create new ways
of talking.  Occasionally such efforts might yield new ways of being toward each
other publicly that are less hostile to our private freedoms.  As mentioned
above, one of my primary justifications for neo-appreciation pedagogy is that we
should be very careful and conscious about our roles as cultural transmitters.
The valorization of both doubt and faith that is endemic to Pragmatist thought
has greatly influenced how I think about my duty as a teacher.  The trick, of
course, is to make sure that self-consciousness does not devolve into timidity
or, worse, a disingenuous rehashing of literary "heritage."
Another theme that keeps cropping up in the writings of this gypsy
caravan of Pragmatists is that the process of speculating about meaning
production can be personally transformative.  Whether it is primarily
performatively (as in Emerson), or analytically (as in Rorty and Fish), or
schematically (as in Iser and Booth), each of these writers demonstrates that
the process of considering the words of others and producing some words of
one's own can produce a new understanding of one's relation to the world.
Quite simply, thinking and writing about meaning production tends to produce
new forms of self.  This is not necessarily a good or bad thing, nor is it exclusive
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to Pragmatism.  However, most of the writers generally associated with
Pragmatism - and certainly the ones I have listed above - demonstrate a
particular awareness of their enmeshment in language, and how that
enmeshment both constitutes and constrains who they are at a given moment.
Furthermore, they see this enmeshment not as a calamity, but as the
springboard of their intellectual life.  A Pragmatist doesn't bemoan subjectivity;
he or she works with and within it.  You'd have to ask them, of course, but from
my reading it seems like they feel their conscious enmeshment in language is a
good thing.  It seems to bring them pleasure.  Again, one of the overt
pedagogical objects of neo-appreciation pedagogy is an analysis of literary
and/or linguistic value.  Our students often do not share or understand the
pleasure that can be drawn from being immersed in language, the joy of playing
with words and ideas, whether they are ours or someone else's.  The Pragmatist
celebration of subjectivity sets a liberating tone for students who are all to
often restrained by their fear of getting it "wrong."  Pragmatism teaches such
students that they will always get it wrong to some extent, but in the process
they might also get some things right.
Whether or not Pragmatism is a movement, a theory, or just a new name
for a very old bag of tricks, this dissertation shares a general affinity with these
twin impulses of doubt and belief, and I therefore employ some of the same
tools to till my little plot of intellectual ground.  More specifically, I believe it is
worth talking about conventional strategies for reading literature because they
seem to exist, even though our only access to them is through speculation,
careful as it may be.  I have no doubt that I will get it wrong at times, although I
believe much of what I have to say about reading-acts is right.  My hope is that
when I get it wrong I will do so in interesting ways.
This dissertation also employs some of the theories of meaning
production discussed above in some very specific ways.  The assumption that
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heads this section is "literary texts do not absolutely determine their value or
meaning, but they do project a 'lectical' horizon that affects how they can be
read by any reader."  Following some of the ideas attributed above to
pragmatism, I assert that meaning production during a reading-act is a
deployment of self and a particular understanding of the world in response to a
particular textual pattern.  I believe the Pragmatist notion of communally and
dialogically determined "truth" is a good model of what happens when we read.
We are taught to pretend that fictions are not things; they are meaning-full
entities which we must cooperate with - like people - in order to understand
them.  Although I believe there are times when readers focus upon the
"thingyness" of texts, and a variety of my classroom strategies are designed to
encourage students to do so, the fact remains that most of the time we read
with the pretense that fictional words should be understood as a human voice,
and therefore reading is approached as an intersubjective encounter.  It is here
that Booth's version of literary ethics has its most force and influence upon my
work.  The analogy between reading fictions and meeting people highlights the
fact that both encounters are governed to some extent by a range of
conventionally determined rules of intersubjective engagement.  Although the
conventions for dealing with people and dealing with fictions are very different in
some ways, I maintain both can be identified, categorized, and even hierarchied
according to ubiquitous practice.  In the terms of this project, fictions project
lectical horizons which in turn invite, tolerate, or resist certain lectical strategies.
The lectical triangle detailed below is one way to organize these lectical
strategies; lectical analysis as a whole sets up a protocol for undergraduate
students to interrogate particular textual patterns with that taxonomy.    
In addition, the Pragmatist notion that our intersubjective encounters
with the world are to some extent self-transformative informs both the metíer
and the tone of how lectical analysis should be practiced in the classroom.  I
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describe the product of a reading-act, an aesthetic object, as a new, real artifact
of a reader's encounter with a text.  Reading is a process of accommodation
that transforms (an author's) words into (a reader's) thoughts, and which
consequently constitutes an addition to the reader's understanding of world, and
by extension him or her self.  In short, reading changes you, therefore you
should be careful - and conscious - about it.  This general belief about the affect
of reading instigates a variety of procedural elements of my classroom method.
Specifically, lectical analysis should be performed self-consciously, like an
Emersonian essay.  It should be understood as a public performance of self
which refers to something - the past, a text, a reading-act, a thought - that
cannot actually be reconstructed, only reconfigured in language to be used as
fodder for new discourse and fuel for new forms of self expression.  This
reconfiguration can always be performed cynically, but I encourage students to
analyze reading-texts with respect for the unique alterity of a fiction as they
find it.  Here, of course, I am echoing Emerson's famous question at the
beginning of "Experience": "Where do we find ourselves?"  His answer, I find, is
similar to my own, and consequently one I try to persuade my students to
adopt:
Onward!  Onward!  In liberated moments we know that a new
picture of life and duty is already possible; the elements already
exist in many minds around you of a doctrine of life which shall
transcend any written record we have.  The new statement will
comprise the scepticisms as well as the faiths of society, and out
of unbeliefs a creed shall be formed.  For scepticisms are not
gratuitous or lawless, but are limitations of the affirmative
statement, and the new philosophy must take them in and make
affirmations outside of them, just as much as it must include the
oldest beliefs. (892)
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Although I am quite certain that Emerson would have strong doubts about the
liberating effect of undergraduate literary study, I try to foster such moments in
the classroom by consistently asking students to perform concurrent acts of
doubt and belief.  Assignments are structured to thwart the dominion of their
(apparent) tendency to absorb information uncritically while requiring them to
act as if they accepted ideas that still seem quite foreign to them.  Many, very
traditional pedagogical methods can be said to do the same thing, of course, but
my assignments are overtly structured to encourage an unresolved but highly
productive tension between what students believe about a fiction and a careful
(self-)critique of those beliefs.   
Before students can do anything other than be irritated by my
Emersonian cry to press "Onward," they need to be taught some sort of method
for expressing their (often unconscious) beliefs about what one should do with
fictions and a way to interrogate how those beliefs are deployed in the reading-
acts they and others perform.  This has required developing a vocabulary that is
simple enough for them to remember but specific enough to have some
analytical utility.  In short, the method needs to be practical for undergraduate
application or it will be worse than useless; it will only confirm their belief that
literary study is itself useless.  Here I rely upon the third of the fragments I have
shored up against my reasons: the appeal to praxis, Pragmatism, and the
necessity of being practical.  "Being practical" in the classroom usually requires
some sort of schematization.  Students quite simply are deeply resistive, and
therefore rarely understand, abstract concepts that are not organized into some
sort of easily understood, differential system.  Accordingly, I would assert part
of the reason that the Freudian model of personality, the Marxist model of social
economy, and the rhetorical triangle have had such far-reaching effects upon
their respective disciplines is that the wide-ranging and abstract "truths" they
express can be elaborated indefinitely (by professional academics) but also
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expressed heuristically (for students).  In the classroom, I offer my system of
lectical analysis and the theoretical assumptions that support it as simply as I
possibly can.  Every semester I adjust the vocabulary and deployment of my
heuristic to account for what seems to work and what doesn't.  Accordingly,
many of the terms I employ in the classroom are used not necessarily because I
believe they are the most accurate words for the concept at hand but because
through experience I have learned the best words often induce the worst kind of
confusion.  Since I can't always predict which words will be most easily
accessible to students (they eat up the word "aporia," for instance; go figure),
at times I have had to subordinate what I believe ought to be said about reading
fiction to what practice has shown more likely can be understood about it in the
undergraduate classroom.  Following this same principle, I retool traditional
literary terminology whenever possible rather than create utter neologisms.
Students have already heard words like "image," "symbol," "plot," and "theme";
to perform lectical analysis they just need to learn how to deploy those words a
little differently.
 My duty to the audience of this dissertation, however, is significantly
different to the one I discharge in the classroom.  The purpose of this essay is
to elaborate upon - and defend - the reasoning that supports my classroom
pedagogy.  I teach the way I do because it works; I am writing about the
theories that surround and support the way I teach because it is interesting (in
all meanings of the word) to do so.  Like other systematizers I have mentioned -
notably Booth and Iser - in this dissertation I attenuate my engagement with the
big questions of meaning production by limiting the focus of my analysis, that is,
by being practical about what can be said about meaning production in a single
volume.  Booth's efforts in The Company We Keep, for instance, are focused
upon developing an "ethics of fiction."  The focus of this dissertation is at the
same time more general and more specific.  It is more general in that I want to
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offer undergraduate students a more widely applicable model of reading, one
that can describe other modes of response in addition to the purely ethical.   
Like Booth, however, I do not have the time or the inclination to account
for all of the possible ways readers can evaluate fiction.  Therefore, I choose to
focus on one of the most common criteria of literary value, particularly among
undergraduate students: the assessment that a literary work has "lectical
realism."  By this term I do not mean that the fiction realistically represents
some thing, event, idea, or experience, i.e. that the fiction has verisimilitude, but
that the reader has somehow accommodated the reading-act into his or her
understanding of the "real" world.  As will be detailed more fully below, "lectical
realism" is a quality attributed to virtually all fictions by the process of achieving
closure during a reading-act, a process which chooses what kind of pretense will
be used to incorporate the words of a fiction into the reader's reality.  The term
"lectical realism," therefore, is an arch-assessment of fiction, the foundation
upon which all other assessments - among them that a fiction is "realistic" - are
built.  In essence, this means the only reading-acts which do not include an
assessment of "lectical realism" are those where the reader resists the
"invitations" of a fiction for some reason, usually due to some conflict between
the lectical horizon the reader perceives is projected by the text at hand and his
or her lectical repertoire.  Below I will discuss how this terminology is deployed in
the practice of lectical analysis (as well as explore potential problems it elides).
At this point, however, I merely want to emphasize that my focus upon lectical
realism as the primary product of lectical closure is performed within - and
evidenced by - the traditions of praxis, Pragmatism, and practicality.   
Similarly, I spend more time below exploring the implications of the
assumption that texts "project a lectical horizon" than arguing whether or not
they actually do so.  Since Booth has already expended so much energy in the
defense of that assumption, I am content here to build on his labor.
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The model I want to build, however, requires a few other assumptions
about reading-acts.  Specifically:
Assumption #2: Reading-acts are created by the "closure"
of textual aporias and subsequent lectical assessments by a
reader.
This assumption calls for a highly qualified definition of truth-value, one
that is adequately articulated by Bhaskar's "doctrine of epistemic reality"
quoted in the introduction above.  As Norris suggests about this doctrine, the
stories we tell ourselves about history, literature, or even ourselves often
achieve the status of “truth” due to the ubiquitous practice of reading for
closure.  Reading, then, is in a sense not only a truth-seeking endeavor (we try
to find out what is “true” about or in a given text) but potentially a strategy for
truth-making.  Although I address some of the practical implications of this
conclusion below, for a complete discussion of the issue as a theoretical problem
I direct the reader to the work of Norris, Terry Eagleton, or Paul de Man.
A few other assumptions about "closure" are necessary for my analysis of
common lectical strategies, none of which can be thoroughly substantiated with
"objective" evidence and therefore must be qualified.  The first of these is that
the aporias of a text must be "closed" somehow prior to lectical judgment or
interpretation.  To what extent one closes a text "subconsciously" or
"consciously" is inaccessible except through introspection or second hand
report, but there is general agreement that textuality is always indeterminate
without substantial lectical mediation.  Certainly there are pre-understandings
and pre-judgments which are always brought to any reading-act and can be
deployed during it (particularly in the case of a second reading), but my
assumption here is that such pre-understandings - along with the words on the
page - are the materials of lectical mediation, not its product.  For instance, in
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this project at times I will address a particularly common "product" of literary
reading: the assessment that the text in hand is "realistic" (not to be confused
with the "arch-assessment" of the essay, that a text has the quality of "lectical
realism").  It should be clear from the start, however, that this assessment is
never a necessary product of any reading of a given text.  On the contrary, one
can quite easily approach a text with the pre-judgment that it is or should  be
"realistic" and come away from the reading-act with the assessment that it is
not.  Similarly, I will show how textual features which seem to "resist" the
assessment that they are "realistic" can be closed in such a way that such an
assessment is not only possible, it is probable.  In short, there are no such things
as inherently "realistic" texts or readers.
The above distinctions describe the elements of a reading-act in the
following order of occurrence: 1. The recognition of a lectical horizon, comprised
of textual features or "fragments" and a reader's pre-understanding of the
world; 2. The "closure" of the text, which is effected by lectical strategies for
(artificially) establishing reference between textual fragments and a "world"; 3.
The assessment of the text, which is a complex attribution of meaning and value
by the reader.  This model of reading is essentially a less detailed version of
Iser's, with the additional and general presumption of the existence of lectical
"assessments."  While both Iser and Booth create a variety of literary
assessments in the course of their arguments, I begin with the assumption that
any literary work can be deemed "realistic" or "intellectually stimulating" or
"entertaining" and then work backwards to show how such assessments might
be made possible by employing certain strategies of closure.  This model further
indicates that lectical assessment is re-assessment, or rather a re-reading of the
closure of a text.  Although I have no rigorous way to interrogate this assertion
(how long after closure does assessment take place? Seconds?  Milliseconds?
Days?  Is it a function of will? Memory?  Morality?  Are assessments ever final or
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are they always re-assessed?), I make the distinction between "closure" and
"assessment" in order to better discuss the relationship between the process of
reading and its products, both of which I identify as elements of the reading-act.  
Clearly enough, reading-acts as I describe them do not occur every time
someone picks up a work of fiction.  I define fictional reading-acts as "complete"
readings of a textual feature by an "engaged" reader.  "Complete" here has two
criteria: 1. All of the words of the textual feature are read; 2. All aporias
recognized by the reader are "closed" in some way.  According to these terms,
the completeness of a reading is mostly a function of the individual reader's
willingness and ability to address whatever challenges a text presents to him or
her in the moment.  This point is meant to account for the obvious differences
in the lectical strategies of readers, or even the same reader on different days.
To some readers, for instance, Gulliver's Travels is a fantasy narrative; for others
it is a satire of eighteenth-century English politics.  Although one might correctly
say that the latter is a more sophisticated or informed assessment, clearly
someone could read all of Gulliver's Travels and "appreciate" it without assessing
the satirical interpretation it also "invites."  This distinction allows one to insist
that students perform "complete" reading-acts (something they can do) without
insisting they perform all of the reading-acts overtly "invited" by the text at
hand before they know how.  Since I believe that literary pedagogy is inherently
a form of cultural transmission, I would assert that one of its goals should also
be to supply students with information about the culture within which a fiction
was written as a step towards understanding the terms of its critical heritage: in
other words, so the literary "canon" defined in part by that heritage can be
critiqued.   
These notions about the completeness of reading-acts concur in theory
with Iser's formulation of the sequential nature of reading, that "segments" of
textuality are connected by a reader in time.  It follows that reading-acts are not
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"complete" only when the last word of the work is read but also at any time a
reader stops an engaged reading-act-in-progress.  Below I will use the term
"textual feature" to denote groups of words which are considered together by a
reader during a reading-act.  Obviously, setting the limits of a "textual feature" -
i.e. deciding which words are "in" it and which words are not - has potentially
important semantic ramifications.  Textual features may be words, phrases,
sentences, passages, paragraphs, chapters, stanzas, or entire fictions; the words
of a textual feature may be syntactically contiguous or they may be separated
by words that are not considered a part of it.  Most importantly, how many and
which words are included within a given "textual feature" is determined by a
reader as opposed to the intrinsic structural elements of the text.  This is not to
say that texts do not have identifiable, structural units which affect how readers
respond to them, only that reading-acts are not utterly dictated by those
structural units.  The distinction here is between units of text which can be
identified according to grammatical and literary convention (The Scarlet Letter
has twenty-four chapters, its first paragraph is comprised of one sentence of
twenty-three words, there are over two hundred occurrences of the word "red,"
etc.) and the specific units of text which are used by a reader to perform a
specific reading-act.  One cannot predict, therefore, which units of text will be
treated by a particular reader as separate textual features, but after the fact,
one can use a reading-text, if one is created, to match the textual features
reported by that reader to textual cues that apparently "invited" them.
According to the sequential progress of reading-acts, one can and does
make a series of lectical assessments throughout the reading of a text,
assessments that can change with each new textual feature encountered.  A
complication of this definition is that textual features stop being words as they
are accumulated into an aesthetic object; in other words, a textual feature will
eventually become a thought about the word or words that comprised it when it
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was first encountered.   Moreover, the "final" lectical assessment performed
after all of the words of a fiction have been read is not different in kind from the
many assessments made prior to it, although, obviously, the factors which
impinge upon it multiply as a reading progresses.  Although here I will not dwell
on these complications of my notion of "complete reading-acts," I recognize
them and will address them more thoroughly in subsequent chapters.
This definition of "complete" readings is meant to delimit what I mean by
lectical "engagement" and "non-engagement" here and below.  My definition of
"complete" fictional reading-acts describes specific behaviors (reading all the
words, closing all the aporias) which must be performed within the lectical
context of "literary engagement."  "Engagement" here is roughly equivalent to
Austin's description of perlocutionary "uptake" in How to Do Things with Words.
Austin defines "uptake" as the recognition by an audience that a certain
conventionally determined speech act has been made, that is, that the audience
recognizes an appropriate rhetorical context against which an utterance can be
understood (117).  In the case of fictional reading-acts, this suggests a reader
must "engage" a fictional work as fiction, and consequently understand it, in
part, against cultural conventions surrounding that particular type of speech
act.6  "Uptake," however, is only the first stage of perlocutionary activity in that
it provides a conventional context for other "effects" a speech act may elicit
from its audience while remaining distinct from them.  Austin insists that
locutionary and illocutionary acts are conventional while perlocutionary acts are
not (121), although "conventional acts may be made use of in order to bring off
the perlocutionary act" (122).  In other words, he suggests that speech acts are
                                                 
6 Austin famously excluded fiction from his theory of speech acts, claiming that fictional speech acts are
"parasitical" upon the form of "normal" speech and therefore are "in a peculiar way hollow or void" (22).
Whether Austin meant that speech act theory can not be used to describe fictional speech acts or whether he
merely excluded them from How to Do Things with Words is and has been up for debate.  Ultimately, I
agree with those, like Iser, who think speech act theory has some descriptive utility regarding literary
language; for a contrary opinion, see Fish, "How to Do Things with Austin and Searle."
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understood by employing linguistic and social "conventions" while at the same
time recognizing that perlocutionary effects are not fully determined by the
speech acts they confront.  This dissertation shares Austin's interest in
describing how language "invites" certain responses, but it does so with less
confidence in linguistic and social conventions as knowable objects and with
more confidence in our ability to describe lectical activity in conventional terms.
"Engaged" readers of fiction, then, are those readers that use their pre-
understanding of fictional conventions - as a subset of their pre-understanding
of a "world" - to close the aporias of a fictional work.  Since "engagement" sets
the context for assessment, readers who do not recognize an "invitation" to
perform a fictional reading-act may try other, less effective, means of achieving
closure and thereby develop a low assessment of the work.  One can try to
comprehend "The Waste Land," for instance, as a newspaper article, but the
poem strongly resists the discovery of fact, the overt goal of journalistic prose.
Simply put, "The Waste Land" is a lousy piece of journalism.  Readers who
assess low value to a fictional work because they employ ineffective strategies
for achieving closure might be tempted to blame the text itself, as our students
often do.  However, in the case of a work like "The Waste Land" that has been
variously and consistently valued as fiction by scores of readers, a lack of
appreciation for it is often a function of limited lectical skills: i.e. an insufficient
understanding of how one can read it.  Although "The Waste Land" may be lousy
journalism, it is not a lousy poem according to the current literary conventions
against which it "asks" to be read.  One may value it less than other fictions,
one may even find the entire aesthetic of high modernism tedious, but to claim
it is a bad poem is just plain wrong.
The word "wrong" above identifies the fictional reading-act at least
partially as an ethical act.  "Fictional engagement" as I define it implies a
contract, the recognition by a reader that the text in question should be read as
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a fiction with a particular lectical horizon.  Although such assertions may smell
like traditional assertions of text-immanent value, an ethical commitment to
reading literature is not a commitment to a particular reading-act only a
commitment to a reading-act which takes into account the unique alterity of the
text under consideration.  It is quite possible, therefore, to perform a reading-
act that can be justified by some textual features which is "wrong" in that it
does not account for the conventional context projected by the text.  The
assessment that "The Waste Land" is a bad poem, for instance, might be
developed according to the erroneous assumption that all poems should overtly
and directly tell a story; such an assumption is incorrect in that current literary
convention accommodates non-narrative forms of fiction, a convention within
which a reader has implicitly agreed to operate.  Certainly one can find a
coherent narrative in "The Waste Land," but to do so requires lectical strategies
other than those needed to find one in The Iliad or even Frost's "Mending Wall."     
Not having the lectical resources to recognize how a fiction asks to be
engaged is only one way that readers fall short in their implied obligation to
remain engaged during a reading-act.   Most readers have abandoned their
"ethical" duty at one time or another while attempting to respond to a
perceived aporia.  In some cases, one aborts a reading-act out of frustration
and/or lack of interest.  I have tried a couple of times to read Fielding's Tom
Jones, for instance, but so far haven't made it past the eighth chapter, a
situation I would like to blame on Fielding or the novel itself but can't in good
conscience.  Plenty of readers have found much to love and admire about the
novel and the novelist; Frank Kermode, for one, insists it is one of the first
"great novels," and I have no reason to doubt his assessment.  Neither is my
failure to read Tom Jones caused by a lack of lectical skills.  I have successfully
and joyfully read many fictions from the early modern period and in a
comparable style (so I'm pretty sure I have the lectical resources to appreciate
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it); I have also persevered through reading-acts which bored me to distraction
(so I know I can fulfill my lectical obligations if I am adequately motivated).  The
truth of the matter is that each time I have tried to read it, I get bored and
become unwilling to fulfill my obligations as a reader.  My best guess is that to
date my only motivations for reading the novel have been for my own edification
and pleasure, and so far I haven't enjoyed reading the novel that much.
Although as a point of professional pride I feel like I should read it (after all, it is
one of the first "great novels"), apparently that motivation in itself has not been
compelling enough for me to persevere through a complete reading.7  In other
cases, I have fulfilled part of my obligation as a reader by reading all the words
of a fiction, but ultimately didn't perform a complete reading-act because I gave
up on some aporias.  I have read all of Joyce's Ulysses, for instance, but I know
for a fact that a number of times I recognized an aporia but chose not to go to
the effort to close it, even though I retained a nagging feeling that I should be
able to; instead, I just keep reading until I found a textual feature I could close
without as much effort.  Although most are guilty of this type of lectical laziness
at one time or another, it is important to distinguish between such half
measures and complete reading-acts, between being an engaged and a
disengaged reader.
The foregoing suggests that one of the main objects of literary pedagogy
should be to increase a student's lectical repertoire.  In one sense, this is why
literature instructors have always taught their students literary conventions and
cultural history in order to enrich their reading experiences and improve their
analytical skills: in short, we try to increase their pre-understanding of literature.
The pedagogical model I propose includes such information, but also offers
students explicit directions on how to deploy literary "heritage" in ways with
                                                 
7 Since writing the above example I have, out of shame, read Tom Jones, though I can't honestly say that I
feel substantially more edified.
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which they are unfamiliar.  By doing so, one can show students both why and
how literature is and has been valued.  By teaching a rhetoric of literary reading,
we can overtly show our students our discipline is not devoted to the mere
transmission of culture value - no matter how qualified - but to its critique at its
source: the individual reading-act.
As much as this project is offered within a neo-ethical context, the
central analogy which gives it form - reading-acts are like reading-texts -
identifies it as a fundamentally rhetorical exercise.  It is rhetorical in the de
Manian sense that it is overtly authorized by a metaphor, not a fact, and as such
can make no claims to absolute truth.  It is rhetorical in a procedural sense in
that it offers a way to analyze the strategic use of language; i.e. it offers a
"rhetoric" of literary reading.  It is rhetorical in the casual sense that it is an act
of persuasive discourse, an argument warranted by a particular set of
assumptions about the context, structure, and value of literary reading.
Although I have a lot of rhetoric in my ethics, and visa-versa, inevitably the
practice of one will to some extent cross into the realm of the other, and neither
can be completely isolated from an aesthetics of some sort, particularly within
the literary classroom.  The likelihood that this inter-relatedness is not just
apparent but constitutive leads to the third and most important assumption of
this dissertation:
Assumption #3: Lectical acts bear some structural
similarity to rhetorical acts in that their strategies for
establishing meaning and value are always warranted by the
presumption of an identifiable referent.
I have tried above to show how the ubiquitous practice of reading for
closure is one of the most pervasive phenomena of language although
theoretically it is never directly authorized by textuality.  Even communicative
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acts which posit the ultimate inadequacy of language to refer to anything but
itself depend upon the practical adequacy of language to communicate that
particular "truth."  The truth-value of de Man's "Epistemology of Metaphor," for
instance, must be established against the assumption that "language" operates
the way he says it does and that his audience will be able to understand his
analysis of language despite his overt claim that language can not be "fixed" as
an object.  Furthermore, the text asserts that the specific tropological analyses
performed are to be understood as evidence of the general tropological nature
of "language" at large.  He does not suggest that language is tropological only
some of the time; he offers a universal model of language.  To understand and
assess this claim one needs to refer to some pre-understanding of what
"language" is or might be, otherwise his arguments have no substantiation, no
material evidence with which to convince the reader his model is accurate.  The
essay, then, invites the assumption that "language" is a real thing that exists, a
referent that its audience can identify during their reading.  
Furthermore, de Man's text directly invites its own lectical closure with a
"performative" conclusion, the circular construction "epistemology is metaphor
is rhetoric is epistemology"; although circles are often used metaphorically to
represent a perpetual movement with no beginning or end, they are by definition
closed.  He follows his analysis of an identifiable thing - "language" in the
abstract - with a demonstration of how that thing works.  In effect, this
compositional strategy encourages readers to use their own "deconstruction" of
his performance as the warrant of his claims about the indeterminacy of
language.  In other words, "The Epistemology of Metaphor" offers its own
reading-act as a possible stable referent.  Like Wayne Booth's insistence that
only readers from an "impoverished experience-free world" could fail to assent
to his claims, de Man's essay asks to be substantiated by an individual
experience of reading.  Since they are cognitive events, reading-acts are
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immaterial and ephemeral, but they are also actual.  Reading-acts enjoy the
authority of concrete experience; they are as real to the individual who performs
them as a phenomenon can be.
So: rhetorical analysis can identify textual strategies which invite readers
to close the aporias of a given text in a certain way using a certain referential
warrant.  Sometimes these invitations are direct, as when Booth "pleads" to his
readers "to read it again" if they do not agree with his analysis of Yeats.
Sometimes these invitations are merely implied, as with de Man's performative
conclusion.  Sometimes a text both implies and actively resists a referential
warrant.  Such is the case with "language" as an implied warrant of de Man's
essay.  De Man goes to great lengths to undercut all notions of "language" as a
stable, knowable "thing" which can be directly referred to even though from one
perspective his argument depends upon that reference being established by the
reader.  A rhetorical analysis can underline to what extent "The Epistemology of
Metaphor" invites and resists "language" as a referential object, but it would
take a lectical analysis, as I have described it, to outline the conditions under
which that reference might be established.
Simply prising apart rhetorical and lectical acts does not solve all the
questions surrounding the relationship between textuality and reading, but it
does focus attention on the fact that rhetorical and lectical acts must overcome
two very different challenges.  Rhetorical acts must contend with the inherent
openness of textuality, and lectical acts must contend with the onus of closure.
Clearly, the practical use of language as communication requires that both of
these challenges be met somehow, so my model attempts to account for them
both in a way that is accessible to students.  Which came first, strategies of
linguistic expression or strategies for understanding phenomena, is an important
question for anthropological linguistics, but it need not be answered before we
address those strategies as they exist in current cultural conventions.  Whether
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or not the lectical act is the chicken, the egg, or the omelet, therefore, is a
problem I'll have to bracket for the time being so I can focus on how it is
commonly practiced.
There is no avoiding, however, that in practice the individual lectical act is
developed in response to a rhetorical act, to a text of some kind.  As discussed
above, the rhetorical strategies of a text delimit its own lectical horizon without
determining what the actual reading-act will be.  Since the rhetorical act of
textuality must precede any lectical act based upon it, one might conclude that
reading is fundamentally rhetorical, or at least subsumed by rhetoric as a sub-
category.  This conclusion implies reading is parasitical upon writing, but I think it
is more productive -and probably more accurate - to think of the two as being
symbiotic.  Writers strategically construct texts with a concern for how they will
be read.  Readers perform lectical acts in response to how they were written.
Although the two processes are not identical, it seems that they are responding
to the same linguistic phenomenon: language does not refer to anything
objectively real.  I submit, however, that our desire to communicate about
"reality" is strong enough that we routinely overcome the indeterminacy of
language through reference to some warrant - some thing, idea, or experience -
we at least provisionally treat as real.  The fact that such beliefs are always in
error on a theoretical level only emphasizes why they should be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny.  
Even if we bracket the problem of the exact causal relationship between
rhetorical and lectical acts, a sequential model of reading, such as this one,
eventually comes up against the problem of time, or, more accurately, the
compositional and theoretical problems inherent to describing events which are
simultaneously created by and imbedded in a reader's changing perceptions of a
fiction and how those perceptions relate to the past, present, and future during
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a reading-act.  This problem highlights how much is elided by my analogy
between reading-acts and reading-texts, and therefore merits some attention.  
First, there is the problem of determining what, in fact, is being unified
into an aesthetic object.  Above I have used the term "textual feature" to
denote words in a fiction that are understood together by a given reader as a
single semantic unit.  According to my use of the term, textual features can
hypothetically be of any length, but there is a practical limit to how many words
a person can regard at once.  In the demonstrative examples above I used
textual features that were relatively brief - i.e. words, phrases, or sentences -
but clearly much larger groups of words are commonly understood together as
semantic units.  Traditional literary criticism recognizes this practice with terms
like "setting," "character," "theme," "plot," "sub-plot," "exposition," "climax,"
"dénouement," etc.  Such terms traditionally attribute a particular semantic
purpose to a group of words: a group that is often too large to be understood
as words.  If the "setting" of a fiction, for instance, can be said to be those
words which pertain to the physical surroundings of the fictional world within
which narrative events take place, even a short story will have a "setting" that
contains too many words to be held in a reader's mind while performing a
reading-act.  Even a fiction where all the constituent words of its "setting" could
hypothetically be regarded at once - William Carlos William's  "The Red
Wheelbarrow," for instance - is not read by memorizing those words and then
calling them a "setting."  Neither do our minds work like computers that can,
according to some organizational criteria, index the words encountered in a text
into functional categories.   Rather, the "setting" of a fiction is developed as a
concept - an idea - that is understood as the reference of all the words in
response to which it is created; it is not equivalent to those words.   The setting
of "The Red Wheelbarrow," for instance, is typically identified by students as a
"farm," a "barnyard," a "red-neck's house" or some such stereotypical place
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which includes but is not limited to specific images drawn from the poem: a wet,
red wheelbarrow and some white chickens.  The word "farm" does not appear in
the poem, but for some readers that word best represents at least part of what
the actual words of the poem have become for them: an idea of a setting.
Whatever setting is attributed to the poem, one can assume that setting
contains more than a wheelbarrow and some chickens in the vacuum of space;
whether a given reader imagines a farm with a barn, shed, fences, dust, etc. in
addition to a wet wheelbarrow next to some chickens is less important to my
immediate purpose than to note that the setting of the poem is not restricted
to its words.  Rather, the reader must use his or her understanding of the words
of the poem as images to develop a fictional "place" which accommodates that
understanding in some way.    
To complicate matters more, individual words or phrases are often
concurrently employed by multiple "groups" with different semantic functions.
In "The Red Wheelbarrow," for instance, any attribution of tone, style, plot,
theme, character, conflict, etc. will have to be made in response to the same
fourteen words which illicit an attribution of setting.  This point indicates why
creating a coherent understanding of the "The Red Wheelbarrow" is very
challenging for many readers; the great variety of semantic functions that
according to literary convention one might expect to "find" in any poem must be
parceled out to the few words of that particular poem.  Feeling that they do not
have enough material to understand it as a coherent poem, such readers get
frustrated, and often complain that "The Red Wheelbarrow" "doesn't mean
anything," when in reality their complaint is that they feel compelled to make
the words mean more than they know how to as a poem.   They have no
problem understanding the text as a sentence from a prose narrative, but
according to the conventions for reading prose it is a non sequitor; that is, it
"doesn't mean anything" without the further elaboration one can (usually)
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expect from a prose narrative. In the terms of this project, their (limited)
understanding of literary convention compels them to create a more elaborate
aesthetic object than from their perspective the textual feature invites.  
Such readers are operating under a misconception about the distribution
of labor during a reading-act.  They believe that meaning is text-immanent and
have been taught - in their high school literature class, if nowhere else - that
poems are particularly meaning-full, so they feel imposed upon by the text,
particularly if the reading-act is required as coursework.  With a modicum of
encouragement, however, most such readers have no difficulty elaborating a
setting, tone, plot, character, theme, etc. out of the fourteen words of "The Red
Wheelbarrow," but they usually do so with much less confidence than when they
create similar semantic groups in response to texts that give them more words
to work with.  Three important points about textual features are illustrated by
the above anecdote: 1. In this poem, at least, the same words can and should be
treated as multiple textual features with different semantic functions if they are
to be unified as a poem.  2. Because there are too few words to perpetuate the
pretense of direct, text-immanent reference, the resultant aesthetic object must
be constructed out of "ideas" which are conspicuously not "in the text." 3.
Some readers need to be taught such lectical strategies are appropriate for
reading poems before they are willing or able to employ them.  
 "The Red Wheelbarrow" is different from most fictions in that all of its
words can feasibly be read at the same time, a condition that recommended it
for a demonstration of how a single group of words can and sometimes must
function as multiple textual features in order to create a unified aesthetic
object.  It is also different from many fictions in that its aesthetic object is
considerably larger and more complex - at least when expressed as a reading-
text - than in its original form.  As pointed out above, one of the most common
problems readers have while reading "The Red Wheelbarrow" is that their pre-
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(mis)understanding of poetic convention dictates poems should have more
meaning than some readers can immediately "find" in that particular poem.  The
obvious and most typical solution to this lectical problem is to extend the
referential possibilities of the poem to the point where the aesthetic object
represents much more than the words of the poem denote.  For instance, one of
my students wrote the following journal entry regarding Williams' poem:
The poem seems to be about despair.  The wheelbarrow is a
symbol for how hard the farmer has to work just to stay alive and
to feed his children.  What he has to do with the wheelbarrow is
not really important by itself.  Maybe something is in it that was
ruined by the rainstorm like food for the chickens who he needs to
grow fat so he can sell them to make money to keep his farm.  His
whole life gets melted down into this one little problem which is
not really that big of a problem.  All he needs to do is get a new
wheelbarrow or some more food or something.  Instead he just
worries about the wheelbarrow instead of doing the work he needs
to do to make his life better.
Its conversational style aside, this "reading-text" quite clearly indicates at least
one of the strategies used by this reader to create a coherent aesthetic object.
This reader treated "The Red Wheelbarrow" as a monologue by a fictional
character existing in a fictional world.  Since the words of the poem offer so few
explicit details about what kind of fictional world might be created out of them,
the reader quite simply extrapolated a world he felt was consistent with the
clues the text "gave" him.  The "wheelbarrow" the "rain" and the "chickens"
were all given functions within the life of a fictional character, the "farmer," a
life which is first surmised, then observed, and ultimately judged by the reader
as a fictional life within a fictional world.  
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Although this reader effectively invented a fictional world that does not
appear in the text, the resultant aesthetic object was not a product of free
invention; it was partially determined by the words and structure chosen by
Williams for the text.   This is not to say that this reader was compelled to
create a certain fictional world, but clearly there are elements of the poem that
explicitly invite some of the lectical mediations he performed.  For instance, one
can trace this reader's decision to read the poem as a monologue to the words
in the first line: "So much depends upon."  Although this phrase is not
particularly "imagistic" - i.e. none of its words overtly denote physical things to
be imagined - the phrase implies a judgment about the rest of the words in the
poem, words which by comparison can quite easily be read as images.  The
presence of this judgment implies a judge - a person from whose perspective the
red wheelbarrow is much depended upon.   The importance of the first line as a
projection of "character" is further substantiated by the syntactical relationship
it has with the rest of poem; "So much depends upon" operates grammatically
as subject and verb to its direct object "a red wheelbarrow glazed with rain
beside the white chickens."  In the simplest, most direct, grammatical logic, an
actor ("so much") performs an action in the present tense ("depends upon") in
relation to a thing ("a red wheelbarrow…").  
There is, of course, a conflict between the implication of judgment
conventionally denoted by the verb "depends upon" and the abstract nature of
its subject, "so much."   Quite simply, the words "so much" are so abstract that
they could mean anything, or in the terms of this project, they neither resist nor
invite any particular conventional reference beyond the fact that they are being
used as a singular noun - a person, place or thing  - and that, according to the
intensifier "so," its proportion is emphasized in comparison to some other
"much."  The abstract nature of the grammatically indicated "actor" of the
poem, therefore, poses a lectical problem which the reader will have to resolve
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somehow, presumably in relation to other words that have denotations more
conventionally delimited.  Of these, the verb "to depend upon" denotes an
action which requires the ability to assess functional relationships between
things, an ability which most often is attributed solely to humans, but at the
very least requires sentience.  In and of itself, then, the verb "depends upon"
implies a perspective from which the subject and the direct object is regarded;
that is, it indicates that the "real" actor referred to by the sentence is not the
abstract subject "so much" but some person who has the ability to interpret a
relationship between "so much" and "a red wheelbarrow…."  The poem does not
give us any information about this implied "real" actor except through the most
denotative portion of the poem, the direct object "a red wheelbarrow glazed
with rain beside the white chickens."  However, the mundane and relatively
insignificant nature of the things most often denoted by words like
"wheelbarrow," "rain," and "chickens" conflicts with the implication of functional
importance denoted by "depends upon";  "so much" - whatever those words
might mean - could not exist or at least would not be itself without the
existence of "a red wheelbarrow…." Therefore, the poem poses a particular
lectical problem, which expressed as a question would be something like: what
kind of person under what kind of conditions would think some/any thing of
relative importance "depends upon a red wheelbarrow…"?  This question, among
others, is strongly implied by the words and structure of "The Red
Wheelbarrow," and consequently the reader is invited to develop an answer to
that question as a lectical problem.    
Whether an actual reader recognizes this or some other invitation in the
text and how he or she ultimately responds during a reading-act is another
question entirely.  One can speculate about apparent relationships between a
reading-text and the fictional text that occasioned it, but doing so always comes
up against the inadequacy of language to represent thought.  One can
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determine with certainty, for instance, that the first line of "The Red
Wheelbarrow" invites readers to interpret the poem as a monologue and that my
student used that strategy during the creation of his reading-text, but there is
always the possibility that the relationship between those two texts is
circumstantial rather than causal.  In other words, there are other ways my
student may have created his reading-text than by approaching the first line as
an invitation to create a character/speaker.  Although the semantic horizon of
the verb "to depend upon" does specifically imply judgment and therefore a
judge, all linguistic utterances imply a speaker to some extent.  My student,
therefore, did not have to recognize the complex grammatical relationships I
outlined above to recognize the possibility that this or any fiction can be
understood as a monologue spoken by a fictional person in a particular fictional
world, a recognition that might have led to the reading-text that appeared in his
journal.   Even if one listed out all of the apparent ways my student's attribution
of character might have been overtly invited by Williams' text, one could never
be certain which of the possibilities were employed in the actual creation of the
aesthetic object.  This is because the aesthetic object is a cognitive event and
therefore is structured differently than the reading-text that represents it and
the fictional text to which it responds.  We know that some event happens when
a fiction is read (and therefore exists briefly in the mind of the reader) which
subsequently can be used as the stimulus for a reading-text; we can name that
complex, cognitive event an "aesthetic object," but there is no infallible method
for gauging how well a particular aesthetic object is represented by a particular
reading-text.  This is the case not just because a reader might be mistaken or lie
about an aesthetic object they have had - both of which are always possibilities
- but because the process of changing thought into language replaces the
unique, time-embedded contingency of an aesthetic object with
conventionalized syntax.  In other words, if aesthetic objects are texts, by all
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evidence at our command they are organized quite differently than what I have
been calling reading-texts.  
My student's reading-text above, for instance, delivers a series of
interpretations regarding a character he created in response to "The Red
Wheelbarrow," a character he calls the "farmer."  As discussed above, the text
invites readers to treat it as a monologue by a character, but it doesn't
articulate who that character is and why he or she thinks "a red wheelbarrow…"
is so darn important. Consequently, all details about the character must be
elaborated connotatively by a reader.  My student, for instance, created a male
character who is a "farmer"; although he specifically indicates the farmer is a
poor, hardworking father who through lack of perspective has over emphasized
the importance of his wheelbarrow and therefore feels "despair," it stands to
reason that a whole host of other assumptions about the "life" of this character
are consolidated in my student's reading-text by the single word "farmer."
Whatever those other assumptions may be (grows vegetables? wears overall?
has a straw hat? chews tobacco?) they are not represented in his reading-text
but must have been a part of his aesthetic object in some way.  Words do not
feel despair or lose perspective; only people do.  The word "farmer," therefore
has to represent the idea of a person, an idea that had to be developed
connotatively (according to my student's unique lectical horizon in the moment)
out of the words "a red wheelbarrow…."  Presumably, my student neglected to
list out the entire contents of his lectical horizon for the word "farmer" because
it was unnecessary to do so to express his perception of the aesthetic object in
the form of a reading-text.  By doing so he was following a principle of linguistic
economy conventional to speech; in other words, he put into words only those
ideas about his character that he thought were necessary to represent his
aesthetic object to someone else.  This does not mean, of course, that the
ideas, connotations, images, stereotypes, etc. which he "left out" of his reading-
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text were unnecessary for the creation or unique form of his aesthetic object.  It
only means he was following the conventions for expressing rather than
constructing an aesthetic object.      
There are many other (possible) structural differences between reading-
texts and reading-acts, but this central distinction between the former being an
expression and the latter being a construction of an aesthetic object is sufficient
to set both the goals and the limits of lectical analysis.  According to this
distinction, the reading-texts which are examined by lectical analysis are the
products of a double translation of which one of the necessary "texts" is missing
- the aesthetic object.  Quite simply, words - or textual features - must be
translated into and thereby represented by a complex amalgam of ideas - the
aesthetic object - that is flexible enough to entertain multiple, concurrent
semantic functions and yet be perceived as single, unified phenomenon before it
can in turn be represented in language as a reading-text.  Neither of these
"translations" - i.e. from text into thought then into text again - are available for
direct analysis, so there is no way to determine what exactly is lost or added to
an aesthetic object by a reading-text that attempts to reproduce it.     
This failure of language to replicate phenomena has been the bugbear of
all systematic attempts to describe human experience.  At the same time,
however, the assumption that this failure is not a complete failure has warranted
all such attempts.   The founding assumption of this dissertation, that there is
some functional similarity between reading-acts and reading-texts, is shared in
one form or another by most theories of reading, particularly those that owe
anything to the phenomenological tradition.  Although no amount of analytical
rigor or schematization can make analyzing a text the same thing as analyzing a
thought, reading-texts, whether our own or some other reader's, are currently
the closest we can come to aesthetic objects.  Hopefully, my stated allegiance
to the three P's -praxis, Pragmatism, and practicality - explains why I think
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proceeding with the best albeit flawed tools at our disposal is better than not
proceeding at all.  The careful analysis - and production - of reading-texts can at
least determine what seems to be happening during a reading-act, and thereby
provides us with a clearer understanding of the breadth of changes that must
occur between the time a reader first begins a reading-act and the time he or
she tries to represent that experience mentally, verbally, or graphically as a
reading-text.  In other words, if we can't be certain what a reading-act or its
resultant aesthetic object is in the moment, at least we can try to describe what
it appears to have done after the fact.  The taxonomy of reading strategies
detailed in the next chapter offers a vocabulary for such descriptions, and
lectical analysis as a whole offers students a way to deploy them in the
classroom.
Assumption number three above asserts that in the process of
overcoming the same linguistic problem, rhetorical and lectical acts commit the
same kind of errors, or rather, rhetorical acts project the kind of errors a lectical
act must commit.  Following this assumption I will categorize the referential
"warrants" of lectical acts using traditional methods of categorizing rhetorical
acts.   
Rhetorical tradition identifies the projection of meaning and value as
rhetorical "appeal."  The three types of appeal, the logical, ethical, and pathetic,
correspond to textual features which traditionally were understood to guide the
total meaning and value of a given work: the logos, ethos and pathos of the
rhetorical triangle.8  Although there have been various amplifications of the
                                                 
8 James Kinneavy's A Theory of Discourse is not the first or last in-depth analysis and augmentation of the
rhetorical triangle , but it has been one of the most influential over the last quarter century and is the closest
to my heart.  Anyone interested in the history and application of the rhetorical triangle would do well to
start there.  In addition, the epigraph to this chapter is meant to be an homage, both to the man and his
work.
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rhetorical triangle over the millennia, it typically is implemented in undergraduate
composition classes - and sometimes in literature surveys - as a heuristic for the
overall rhetorical context within which a text can be understood.  This heuristic
is applied as both an analytical and compositional tool.  As I have told my
students for years, one of the reasons these highly abstract terms are still in
use is that there are no ancient Greeks around to contradict our application of
them.  Of these three indices of rhetorical meaning, "logos" has the most
denotations attributed to it.  I stopped counting at entry one hundred and
seventy five, but some of the most significant denotations include: word, oracle,
tale, ground, thesis, argument, statement of theory, rule, law, narrative, fable,
plot, subject-matter, speech, reason, thought, value, and idea (Perseus Project).
I have roughly arranged these few of the many denotations of "logos" from the
most specific to the most general.  All the other denotations - with the possible
exception of "value" - can be subsumed under the arch-abstraction "idea."
According to this organization, an "idea" can be a cognitive event or faculty
(thought, reason), a textual feature (subject-matter, thesis, argument, plot,
rule, ground, word), or another name for the text as a whole (speech, fable,
narrative, law, statement of theory, tale, oracle).  That all of these denotations
can also be equated with "value" serves to underline the traditional valorization
of "idea" as the most important element of a rhetorical act.
The valorization of the logical over ethical or pathetic appeals continues
in contemporary rhetorical pedagogy, especially in undergraduate composition
classes.  In the compositional mode, "logos" refers to the writer's main idea for
a potential rhetorical text, the "thoughts" he or she has out of which a text will
be written and presumably represent.  Thus, the rhetorical triangle is used to
develop a logical structure that can be expressed within the conventions of
formal, academic prose: a structure that the writer's "thoughts" likely do not
yet have.  In the analytical mode, the rhetorical triangle treats logos as the
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referent of the apparent logical structure of a text, the formal representation of
an "idea" in a speech act.  Students are encouraged to develop an
understanding of the main idea of a text, understandings that are themselves
rhetorical assertions and must therefore be substantiated by textual evidence.
Both modes, therefore, are used to establish reference between textual features
and an "idea" that might not be written but nevertheless is assumed to be
"real" or at least valid.
Of the three indices of the rhetorical triangle, the modern usage of
"pathos" most closely follows its original denotations in Greek, which include
"that which happens," "incident," event," "the properties of things,"
"experience," and "emotion."  The common practice of identifying the pathos of
a text as that part of it which is designed to "move" or affect the emotions of
its audience builds upon these earlier denotations of the word.  If one is to
"move" one's readers, one must first understand the context within which the
text will be read; that is, one must identify the "events," "experiences," and
"things" most relevant to the audience about a text or topic.  In effect, one
must imagine the "reality" of the audience: what about my idea will attract/repel
them?  What beliefs do they hold which are similar/different to my own?  What
images or allusions will make them sympathetic to my arguments?  Taken to the
absurd, the pathos of a proposed text is potentially all phenomena, past,
present, and future, since the text cannot absolutely control which "reality" will
be referenced by a reader.  
In practice, however, this absurdity never happens due to the desire for
closure.  Readers usually want to establish reference - particularly when they are
required to do so before the next class meeting - and will therefore develop an
experiential context out of the cues offered up by the text.  Consequently, while
using the rhetorical triangle in the compositional mode, we encourage our
students to develop "cues" or "signals" which will have real meaning and force
98
for their readers.  While the logical appeal seeks to reference an idea, a logico-
linguistic abstraction, the pathetic appeal seeks reference in past experience; i.e.
to become a part of the reader's real world.  In the analytical mode, students are
asked to identify the "real" events, experiences, and things to which a text
refers; that is, the context within which they believe it should be understood.
As with attributions of logos, students are usually required to substantiate their
analyses of pathos with evidence from the text at hand.   
The relationship between what the word "ethos" used to mean and how it
is currently used in rhetorical pedagogy is less obvious than with the other two
indices of the rhetorical triangle.  The primary denotations of ethos in Greek are
"custom" and "habit," but by extension it also denotes an "accustomed place"
or "abode" (Perseus Project).  Perhaps it is this denotation that led to the
current meaning of "ethos" as that element of a text where one finds the
author's "character" or even the author as a character.  The implication is that
the ethos is the "abode" of a text's personality, the home of its self.   
In contemporary rhetorical pedagogy, this self is specifically a stylistic
rather than logical or even actual self.  One identifies or composes the ethos of
a text not through reference to a self that simply exists but through reference
to a performance of self which is itself a representation of something else.
Accordingly, when we ask our students to analyze the ethos of a text we
instruct them to identify not what a text says so much as how it goes about
saying it.  Similarly, in the compositional mode we instruct students to develop
their ethos by adopting a "voice" that represents the identity they want to
project in their work.  The assumption that warrants all projections and analyses
of ethos is that one's stylistic performance is an indicator of one's real
"character" or identity; this assumption implies that one's "self" can not be
separated from one's actions.  This, of course, is consistent with the traditional
definition of ethics as the study of moral action in the world, although traditional
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ethics generally includes the additional assumption that one's actions should
reflect a "moral" character.  In both rhetorical and ethical formulations of
"character," however, the focus is upon the performance of character, since
one's "actual" character or personality is not observable except through such
manifestations.  In other words, if ethos is the abode of a text's "self," then it is
an empty house, all style and no substance.  The ethical appeal of a text, then,
invites readers to use its stylistic features to complete a double reference: 1) to
a "real" performance of character imbedded in conventions of "ethical" behavior
2) to a hypothetical, embodied character which is extrapolated from those
conventions.
All this talk about how textual cues refer to ideas, identities, and things in
the real world does not imply that the rhetorical triangle is used uncritically in
the contemporary classroom, even though most notions of text-immanent
meaning and value have long since been rejected on theoretical grounds.  On the
contrary, the rhetorical triangle is principally used to demonstrate the
contingency of all attributions of meaning, whether one approaches that
contingency as a writer or a reader.  In the process, however, it also tacitly
recognizes that reading, at least, is referential in practice - that closure happens.
Certainly the rhetorical triangle is an abstract simplification of rhetorical context,
but its simplicity is precisely what recommends it as a classroom heuristic for
the complex theoretical heritage that substantiates it.    
If assumption number three above is correct, then one should be able to
develop a heuristic for lectical strategies which uses the same referential
warrants as the rhetorical triangle: ideas, things, and people.  However, we do
not need to go to the trouble of crafting a "lectical triangle" for rhetoric and
composition curriculum because in the analytical mode the rhetorical triangle
adequately describes the range of lectical strategies applied to those works
most often analyzed and composed in such courses: i.e. non-fictional prose.  In
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other words, the rhetorical triangle is already being used as a lectical triangle to
teach the "appreciation" of non-fiction.  This is particularly true in those classes
where the instructor offers models of effective rhetorical acts which students
are required to analyze.  Such assignments are equivalent to what above I called
"reading-texts": that is, textual accounts of what - and how - a non-fictional
work can or even should be understood.  
Anyone who has tried, however, knows that fictional texts do not respond
to the rhetorical triangle as well as non-fictional ones, quite simply because
there are significantly more lectical strategies conventionally associated with the
reading of fiction.  For instance, the analysis of ethos in a non-fictional work
recognizes only one type of lectical strategy: using a text's stylistic performance
to extrapolate the character of the speaker of a work.  The stylistic performance
of the text, therefore, is subordinated to the traditional purpose of non-fictional
prose: the communication of an "idea" between one person (the author, or
author-in-the-text, if you prefer) and another (the reader).  
Once one decides to read a text as fiction, however, its stylistic
performance can be approached in a variety of ways in addition to being
indicative of the speaker's character.  To begin with, determining "who is
speaking" is not a difficult problem for readers to overcome while reading non-
fiction while it is often the main problem in fictional works.  Even those works
which employ an anonymous or patently artificial speaker - Swift's "A Modest
Proposal" for instance - will usually be read as performances of the author-in-
the-text if they are read as non-fiction.  One can employ the same lectical
strategy with a work read as fiction, but there will also and always be other ways
to interpret its stylistic performance.  Gulliver, for instance, has been read both
as Swift's "persona" and a straw man attacked by his satire of English culture.
Both assessments of the Gulliver character employ the same lectical strategy;
they treat the "voice" with which Gulliver narrates the story as an indicator of
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Swift's "real" attitudes and beliefs.  In other words, Gulliver's performance as a
speaker has been used to understand something about Swift, and by extension
what Swift might have been trying to communicate through his masterpiece.
Certainly the Gulliver character invites this lectical strategy, but as a stylistic
performance it also can be understood and "appreciated" in other ways.  As
pointed out above, Gulliver's Travels can also be read as a fantastic story, a
witty parody of the travelogues that were popular at the time.  As such,
Gulliver's "voice" can be read and understood as a mimetic gesture: i.e. as the
performance of his  "character" as a fictional character.  That the Gulliver
character is plausible, entertaining, and accessible to a great variety of readers
as a fictional character has been well documented, and does not depend upon
reading it as an indicator of Swift's "character" or attitudes.  By contrast, the
unnamed speaker of "A Modest Proposal" can be recognized and valued as a
finely crafted parody of 18th century social "reformists," but as long as the
essay is read as non-fiction, the speaker must be read primarily in its capacity as
an indicator of meaning.  Analyzed as an ethical appeal, the skill with which the
speaker is crafted is used to raise the reader's estimation of the author -
Jonathan Swift - and thereby further the main "idea" of the piece: i.e. that the
English are consuming Ireland.  The Gulliver character, however, can be
appreciated - that is experienced - solely as a stylistic performance: as long as it
is read as fiction.   
The foregoing asserts that the "ethos" of a non-fictional rhetorical act
adequately describes the range of lectical acts one could warrant through
reference to its stylistic performance.  This is so because when one is reading
non-fiction one reads primarily to understand its logos, hence the relative value
of the ethical and pathetic elements of a non-fictional text are assessed
primarily according to how well they support its logical appeal.  However, the
conventions of reading fiction do not necessarily valorize the attribution of logos
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over other possible lectical strategies.  Any reader can choose to value the
"idea" of a fiction more than its stylistic performance or its phenomenal context,
and certainly some fictions invite this strategy more than others, but that
choice is not predetermined as it is when a text is read as non-fiction.   
 This observation might be taken to indicate a fundamental difference in
non-fictional and fictional writing, but it is more accurate, I believe, to interpret
it as a difference in how the genres are conventionally read.  Although current
literary convention embraces "openness" as a necessary and often positively
valued element of fictional textuality, it does not follow that fictional language is
somehow more open or ambiguous than other linguistic gestures.  If fiction is
"allowed" to be more open than software manuals, for instance, or divorce
decrees, it is because the common strategies for reading fiction are more varied
and elaborate.  Certainly one can debate endlessly about what a legal document
means, but it would be wrong (and inadmissible in court) to interpret the phrase
"will provide child support" as a metaphoric reference to the payee's inner child.
Legal documents resist the lectical strategy of metaphoric and/or symbolic
reference as long as the reader recognizes the conventions within which they
"ask" to be read.  However, once one has decided to read a text as fiction (a
decision which can always be made), the lectical strategies at one's immediate
disposal multiply.  As soon as one decides the note on the fridge is not a note at
all but a poem, the way one should approach the text changes radically.  How
one might decide a text is fiction (as opposed to legislation, philosophy,
biography, editorial, etc.) need not be fully determined in order to analyze clear
cases where that decision has been made.  A divorce decree may be read as a
fiction, but we know "The Waste Land" has been.  Moreover, the fact that some
texts resist clear generic identification does not refute the existence of genre
specific lectical conventions.  Whether Julius Caesar's autobiography, for
instance, is fiction, non-fiction, history, or propaganda is not as important during
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its lectical analysis as how readers might try to mediate the multiple generic
identities it invites.  Therefore, as long as one does not insist upon categorizing
texts into monolithic genres, those that fall within the gray areas of generic
identity can and should be interrogated by a lectical analysis of their apparent
ambiguity.  
Since fictions invite more reading strategies than the rhetorical triangle
offers, I have developed a heuristic - the lectical triangle - which elaborates the
traditional tripartite division of rhetorical acts into a general taxonomy of
common lectical strategies for fiction.  Although the main categories of this
taxonomy are developed according to the three traditional guarantors of
rhetorical reference, the specific lectical strategies identified with each of those
categories are drawn from my analysis of various reading-texts tempered by my
observations over the last ten years in the classroom.  The practical application
of the analogy between reading-texts and reading-acts, therefore, must serve as
the principle evidentiary support for this project.  To some extent, of course,
this analogy is necessarily false; text is not cognition, even though there may be
similarities between how the two manipulate language.  
The proof in this particular pudding, however, is that the method works.  I
have had a great deal of success over the last few years using it to teach what I
called above neo-appreciation in literature courses.  Although students do not all
learn to love all kinds of literature, I have found that this neo-appreciation lesson
plan seems to encourage a greater percentage of them to engage with a wider
range of literary experience.  Although there are always some students who
refuse to discard their traditional notions of text-immanent meaning and value
(notions which ultimately depreciate some "canonical" literary forms in their
eyes), a greater number of students seem to feel empowered by the knowledge
that literary value is contingent at least partially upon reading strategies which
they can analyze and implement if they so choose.  In other words, students
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seem better equipped and more willing to understand the context within which
most literary scholars value literary study.    
The Lectical Triangle:
Above I indicated that the referential guarantors of the rhetorical triangle
must be reformulated if they are to account for the greater range of lectical
strategies available for fictional texts.  The first step in that reformulation is to
recognize rhetorical appeal and lectical response as being different processes
which use the same three abstract categories of reference: reference to ideas,
to phenomenal reality, and to stylistic performance.  As abstract as they are,
the words logos, pathos, and ethos will not bear the contortions to which I
would have to subject them to make them work in the lectical triangle.
Moreover, since the lectical triangle represents modes of "closing" rather than
"opening" texts, it seems there should be some sort of terminological distinction
made between those two distinct although related processes.  Although I could
probably enlist some other abstract Greek words to do the job, it seems more
appropriate to name the indices of the lectical triangle after three traditional
modes for understanding reality: materialism, idealism, and subjectivism.
Lectical strategies, therefore, are organized into the following three categories:
1. Materialist strategies, which are warranted by material evidence of a fictional
"world" 2. Idealist strategies, which are warranted by "ideas" about the world  3.
Subjectivist strategies, which are warranted by a lectical performance, that is,
by attending to the reading-act itself as a subjectively determined experience.
Such nomenclature is not meant to suggest that these three different
types of lectical acts correspond directly to or are chiefly used to understand
certain types of philosophical texts; rather, the philological connection between
lectical acts and the rhetoric of philosophy is meant to indicate that this
tripartite division has a long history, one to which students may already have
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been exposed.  Further, the fact that the roots of the three terms point toward
their respective referential guarantors is mnemonically helpful for students.  I
retool these terms rather than create utter neologisms, therefore, in order to
make it easier for students to understand and remember them.  Following the
same principle, I chose "Idealist" over its general synonym "Essentialist", and
"Subjectivist" over other candidates such as "Indeterminist," "Skeptical," or
"Anti-foundationalist."
In addition to having different referential warrants, these three lectical
modes are further distinguished below according to how they accomplish five
general tasks attending the assessment of "lectical realism": 1. Choosing a
"target reality" 2. Choosing a "lectical focus" 3. Developing a "semantic
context" 4. Achieving "lectical coherence" 5. Performing a lectical assessment.
The general categorization of these strategies for establishing lectical "realism"
is as follows:9
Materialist strategies: these strategies close textual features by
constructing referential “contexts” out of linguistic representations of “things”
"people" or "events."  Fictional “reality,” therefore, is created by emphasizing
the mimetic function of fictional "images" and by subordinating other textual
elements to that function. Some of these strategies are:
1. Treating a fictional “world” as the target “reality” of the text;
2. Focusing upon narrative progression or "plot" over its "diction" or
"theme";
3. Extrapolating a semantic context by reading textual features as
"images"; i.e. treating words as a mimetic representations of a
phenomenal milieu;
                                                 
9 See Appendix A for the version of this information that I hand out to my students.
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4. Achieving lectical coherence by developing “episodic motifs” between
fictional "events" or textual features;
5. Reifying fictional characters/narrators/events/things to attribute
motive and agency as the basis of an assessment of their "mimetic"
value.
Idealist strategies: these strategies close textual features by identifying
them with “ideas” about the "real" world.  The reader thereby emphasizes what
the fiction is perceived to mean.  Some of these strategies are:
1. Treating fictional "meaning" as the target "reality" of the text
2. Focusing upon "theme" over the plot or diction of a text;   
3. Establishing a semantic context by reading textual features as
symbols; i.e. treating words as allusive references to "symbolic
systems" (religious dogma, symbolic paradigms, literary traditions,
mythology, cultural archetypes, etc.);
4. Achieving lectical coherence between textual features by developing
analogical motifs;
5. Identifying fictional characters/narrators/events/things as "figurative"
representations of the "real" world in order to assess their symbolic
value.
Subjectivist strategies: These strategies close textual elements through
self-referential gestures - i.e. through a focus on the performance of a reading-
act.  Subjectivist strategies treat the unique lectical experience of a particular
reading-act as the  “reality” of that reading-act.  Fictional "reality" and
"meaning" in the Subjectivist mode, therefore, are interrogated as artifacts of
reading as opposed to artifacts of some independent “reality.”  In other words,
Subjectivist readings employ lectical strategies of the other two categories in
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the process of constructing their own (self) referential gestures.  Some of these
gestures are:
1. Treating lectical experience as the target reality of the text;
2. Focusing upon a text's diction over its “theme” or “plot";
3. Suspending the attribution of semantic context to textual features by
treating them as aporias; i.e. by resisting or deferring monosemic
reference to a "fictional reality" or an idea about the "real" world;
4. Interrogating lectical coherence by recognizing and remembering
unresolved aporetic relationships between textual features; hence,
Subjectivist reading-acts are consolidated using "dialogic" motifs.
5. Assessing value to the experience of performing a reading-act as
opposed to the potential mimetic or symbolic value of a fiction.
This taxonomy is structured differentially; i.e. the terms are meaningful
only in contrast to each other.  The words "theme," "plot," and "diction," for
instance, are highly equivocal if used as denotations of distinct, objectively
observable elements of fictional texts.  However, in this project such terms
denote identities which readers commonly attribute to textual features in a
fiction, not attributes it simply has.  While the pretense of text-immanent
meaning is crucial to the performance of some lectical strategies, particularly in
the Idealist and Materialist modes, the theory of reading offered here asserts
fictional meaning is a product of lectical mediation, not textual composition.
The abstract distinction between "theme" and "diction," then, is not equivocal
but conventional; i.e. the slippage between such terms is moderated by the
individual reader according to his or her understanding of cultural conventions.  
The traditional literary vocabulary in this taxonomy, however, is often
deployed in very untraditional ways, so much so that they sometimes achieve
the status of coinage.  These coinages, like all heuristic gestures, are a form of
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shorthand used to represent complex concepts in a relatively simple way.   Since
the lectical triangle does not have an existing theoretical superstructure to
support it, as does the rhetorical triangle, I am going to have to do some
foundation work.   
I will lay this foundation by addressing at length the five "tasks"
performed during a reading-act, detailing how the three lectical modes address
those tasks.  I am aware that the strategy of listing these "tasks" sequentially
implies that reading-acts are performed in a conscious, synchronic order.  Most
reading-acts, however, do not commence with a conscious decision to read for a
particular fictional reality or lectical focus; neither does one reach the end of a
fiction and consciously decide, "Gee, I've been reading for theme" or "Eureka!
I've created a fictional world!"  This entire project, in fact, is predicated on the
assumption that lectical strategies are all too often performed unconsciously,
particularly by students.  Actual reading-acts, as we shall see below, are too
complex and variegated to be adequately described by a single, synchronic
model.  Although reading-acts are without a doubt developed sequentially (i.e. in
time), they occur at the speed of thought; determining the actual sequence of
the cognitive events that make up a given reading-act, consequently, is
currently beyond both the human and physical sciences.  
However, admitting that we cannot know the physical structure of a
particular reading-act does not mean we can not identify conventional, lectical
strategies that must have been used at some point during it.  Whether one
develops a "semantic context" - a line-level lectical strategy discussed in the
next chapter - before one chooses a "lectical focus" may not be accessible to
such a project, but if a reader attributes a plot to a fiction, for instance, one can
then speculate with some certainty about some of the specific lectical strategies
he or she must have applied to line-level textual features to make such a
determination.  Conversely, if a reader reports she thinks a character "is a good
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person" because of events which "happen" in a fiction (a Materialist strategy for
attributing mimetic value, detailed below), one knows she has to some extent
created a "fictional world" which warrants her belief.  The relationship between
lectical strategies which determine what a fiction "is" as a whole and those that
structure how it "comes to be" out of specific textual features, therefore,
should not be thought of as separate links in a causal chain.  Both groups of
strategies must already be in a reader's lectical repertoire as latencies, i.e. as a
part of a reader's pre-understanding of the range of what a fiction can be and
how one can read it.   
Following these observations, when a reader chooses to respond to a
textual feature with a particular lectical strategy in his or her repertoire, I
contend that choice mobilizes other lectical strategies based upon similar
presumptions about the nature of fiction and fictional reading.  In this study I
have organized lectical strategies which imply or have affinity for each other into
the three modes of the lectical triangle.  The relationship between different
lectical strategies within a particular mode, therefore, is paradigmatic, not
causal.  One cannot read the plot of a fiction, for instance, without already
knowing how to create discrete images out of words, but neither can one
address a particular word or phrase as an element of a plot without
understanding that fictions can "have" plots.
As I formulate the elements of the lectical triangle and discuss how
lectical analysis as a whole can be used in the undergraduate classroom, I am
often obliged for the sake of clarity and relative brevity to discuss lectical
strategies - and the modes and "tasks" I have arranged them under - as if they
are discreet entities or events which can be partitioned into reliable categories.
The implied rigidity of my taxonomy is to some extent inherited from the
tradition of analytical schematization and to some extent an artifact of my
compositional strategy.  Since analysis is always a form of discourse, the goal of
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this project is to offer ways to talk about what we already know about reading-
acts, not to express a totalizing - or even new - truth about them.  My adoption
of this goal is an example of me being both "practical" and "Pragmatic."  As
should be increasingly clear as this dissertation progresses, demonstrative
examples are offered to explore how various lectical strategies respond
differently - and sometimes collaboratively - to the complex problem of "closing"
a fiction.
Task 1: Choosing a "target reality"
Readers accomplish this task by deciding how a fiction will be
incorporated into their "reality." In all three modes the "target reality" is
provisional, text-specific, and temporally situated.  I agree with Iser that a
reading-act produces an "aesthetic object": an ephemeral, cognitive event
created by a reader's attempt to reconcile perceptions of text with his or her
prior experience.  As discussed above, there are three traditional referential
warrants a reader can use to reconcile fiction to his or her pre-understanding of
world: material evidence, ideas, and subjective experience.  These correspond to
three basic perspectives or assumptions about the relationship between a fiction
and a reader's "real" world: that is, that portion of the reader's world - the
"target reality" - against which a fiction will be understood and valued: 1.
Fictions portray fictional worlds 2.  Fictions communicate symbolic meaning
about the "real" world 3.  Fictions stimulate lectical experiences.  By focusing on
one of these general perspectives over the others, a reader chooses a "target
reality" which will affect how a given textual feature is understood.  If the reader
is able to close the apparent aporias of a fiction employing one or more of these
perspectives, then he or she will consequently attribute the quality of "lectical
realism" to it.  In other words, once a target reality has been used to close a
textual feature, the reader has established how it is "real" to him or her,
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whether it is as a fictional world, a meaning about "the" world, or as a reading
experience "really" in progress. This process is perhaps most easily understood
as the adoption of a certain role by the reader in relation to the text.
In the Materialist mode, the reader takes on the role of the observer of a
fictional world, a world which is created by someone else, presumably an author.
The reader's job, accordingly, is to turn textual features into perceptions of
phenomena, that is, to pretend that the words one is reading represent things
and events within a world one is watching.  The physical properties of this
fictional "world" are extrapolated from the text in conjunction with a reader's
pre-understanding of a world.  Since the determination of what is "real" in a
fictional world is deferred to the text (or the author-in-the-text), a fictional
world can have radically different physical laws than the reader's world and still
be attributed the quality of "lectical realism."  Once the reader adopts the
pretense of being an observer of a world, thereby attributing it lectical realism,
he or she is poised to make further judgments about the world being watched.
One of the most common assessments of a fictional world in the Materialist
mode is whether or not that world is "realistic," an assessment that also does
not depend upon a reader's familiarity with the kind of world represented.  This
is why I do not need to serve on a pirate ship to decide whether or not Long
John Silver is a "realistic" fictional character; I only have to accept that his
behavior is consonant with the fictional world I extrapolate from Treasure Island
as a whole in conjunction with what I already know or believe about pirates.
Readers in the Materialist mode, in fact, have a great deal of tolerance for
unfamiliar fictional worlds.  As long as they are able to respond to the cues of
the textual pattern in some way, their relative ignorance about pirates, muskets,
black holes, or Hindu theology will not constitute a significant aporia.  
In the Idealist mode the reader adopts the role of a translator of symbolic
meaning.  In this mode, the fictional world of a text is treated like a symbolic
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statement about the "real" world, a statement that must be decoded somehow.
Idealist strategies, therefore, must pretend the words of a fiction have a
purpose beyond describing events in a fictional world; the fictional world is
presumed to say something, not just be something.  A textual feature is deemed
to have lectical realism in the Idealist mode, therefore, to the extent that it can
be incorporated into - or sometimes expand - a reader's understanding of his or
her world.  An Idealist reading of the Long John Silver character, for example,
would be less interested in whether or not that character acted like a "real"
pirate than assigning a "meaning" to him which could then be understood in
relation to something in the reader's experience.  One might decide, for
instance, that Long John Silver represents a paternal figure for the protagonist
Jim Hawkins, and thereby interpret the description of their relationship in
Treasure Island as an elaborate representation of the small intimacies and
betrayals, those daily ambiguities of blood relation, that can be found in many
"real" parental relationships.  Although such an interpretation must be
developed in part out of a fictional "world," lectical acts that conclude the
relationship between Silver and Jim has lectical realism by virtue of what it
means about the "real" world belong in the Idealist rather than Materialist
category.    
Both the Materialist and the Idealist modes presume the reader's role is to
submit more or less passively to "intentions" projected by the text.  According
to this presumption, the Materialist "target reality" is a fictional world one
should observe and the Idealist "target reality" is a meaning one is meant to
translate.  While both of these fictional realities are presumed to be text-
immanent, Subjectivist readings at least implicitly presume the reader shares
responsibility with the text for what happens during a reading-act, and therefore
such readers take on the role of a collaborator.  
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Theoretically speaking, Subjectivist readings are more epistemologically
and ontologically accurate than those of the other two modes, at least
according to prevailing theories of reading.  They focus upon the reading-act -
rather than the fictional text - as the warrant and guarantor of a developing
aesthetic object.  Subjectivist readings focus upon the immediate reality that
confronts the reader: an awareness of the reading-act in progress, an awareness
that is usually instigated by some sort of aporia, some issue that thwarts the
seamless pretense characteristic of Materialist and Idealist readings.   This is not
to say that Subjectivist readings are necessarily more consciously theoretical,
much less that they are more accurate or true, only that they implicitly
recognize - or are impelled to recognize - that reading is not passive.  Marked
and defined by an at least partial awareness of ones current active participation
while reading, Subjectivist reading-acts are open to assessments of value
unavailable in the other two lectical modes.  Many readers, for instance, enjoy
paying attention to the process of reading a fiction.  They will re-read passages
not because they don't or can't understand them, but because by doing so they
perpetuate the event they are experiencing.  They return for nuance in the
words, contemplate various possible connotations, both literal and figurative,
perhaps make a referential judgment, perhaps not.   
Although the above may sound like a description of  "close" reading, what
I have in mind here is not analytical reading, as such, but playful reading: playful
in the sense of being open ended; playful in the sense of not being goal
oriented; playful in the sense that the play's the thing.  Playful readings in this
sense are not necessarily oriented toward New Critical, deconstructive, or reader
response theories; they merely recognize that the process of reading can be
valuable apart from its ostensible goal: semantic closure.  In many ways, then,
Subjectivist readings follow the rallying cry of 19th century aestheticism: Ars
gratia ars.  Furthermore, unlike the other two modes, in the Subjectivist mode
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the reader does not have to pretend that lectical experience refers to something
real; it is as real as a thing can be.  All this does not mean that Subjectivist
readings are immune to pretense, or that only sophisticated and trained readers
perform them, only that sometimes readers of all levels pay attention to what
they are doing while reading words rather than what they pretend is happening
and/or what those words might mean.  From this perspective, the value of
Treasure Island is not buried in the text like so many pieces of eight.  The text is
at best a map with the longitude and latitude effaced: oblique directions to a
reality one is in the process of experiencing.  
Task Two: Choosing a "lectical focus"
Readers accomplish this task by emphasizing one of three traditional
interpretative schemas over the others: plot, theme, or diction as stylistic
performance.  The visual metaphor implied by the word "focus" is particularly
apt here, since lectical focus, like ocular focus, is accomplished by emphasis, not
by absolute exclusion.  One can choose to understand a fiction primarily as a
unified narrative about a series of events or characters (i.e. as a plot), but doing
so requires the accommodation of textual features usually associated with
theme or style.  Accordingly, lectical focus is not something that a fiction "has,"
it is something a reader employs.  The lectical focus of a given reading-act, then,
is a projection by the reader of an interpretive template upon a fiction, a
template which to some extent precedes the reading-act itself.  If we accept
that readers often valorize one of these templates over the other while reading,
certain further distinctions between them can and should be made.
 I employ the word "plot" to describe the lectical focus of the Materialist
mode.  "Plot" here is meant in its most common and abstract critical sense.  In A
Handbook To Literature, Holman and Harmon adequately define plot in this sense
as "an intellectual formulation about the relations among incidents of a drama or
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a narrative, and it is, therefore . . . an ordering control for the reader" (379).
Students thoroughly understand this general concept; in fact, many of them
doggedly pursue plot in fictions which have few or contradictory narrative
elements.  They want to know "what happens" in a fiction.  Even when a textual
pattern actively resists the pretense of orderly narrative progression, as long as
they operate in the Materialist mode readers will virtually equate fiction and
narrative, and therefore must somehow incorporate "non-narrative" elements as
they develop a unified story.  One can read Moby Dick, for instance, as a unified
series of events told by a particular witness, but to do so requires mediating
Ishmael's discourses about life, the sea, sailing, whales, women, etc. (i.e. most
of the novel), perhaps as "narrative digressions" or as representations of his
thoughts.  Some textual patterns - the epistolary novel, for instance, or first
person narration - both mirror and invite the lectical impulse to locate all the
words of a fiction within a fictional world.
Although most of them have heard the word applied to literature before,
undergraduate students are typically less conscious about how they read for
"theme" as opposed to "plot."  Holman and Harmon define fictional "theme" as
"the abstract concept that is made concrete through its representation in
person, action, and image."  This definition clearly presumes that "theme" is an
text-immanent feature of textuality, although the "abstract concepts" which
constitute a theme must often, if not always, be drawn from the reader's pre-
understanding of a world, in particular, their understanding of current
conventions for reading fiction.  The decision to read a theme into a fiction is
made according to the reader's repertoire of symbolic archetypes (what I will call
"symbolic systems" in the next chapter) in combination with the understanding
that according to current literary convention any textual feature might be a
symbol, that fiction always has a thematic latency.  It follows from this that
although a fiction can invite or resist a thematic reading (or even the attribution
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of a particular theme) such invitations must be actualized by a reading-act and
therefore can not be absolutely dictated by the text.  In Moby Dick, for instance,
the speaker Ishmael both implies and denies that the pursuit of the whale should
be read thematically.  If, contrary to his explicit instructions, readers choose to
turn Ishmael's narrative into a "hideous and intolerable allegory," the sheer
volume of possible symbolic references apparent in the novel creates a lectical
problem.  Is Ahab's persecution of the whale a symbol for humankind's
obsession with Christ, Satan, sex, the void, or one of the many other possibilities
implied by Ishmael?  If Ahab is meant to be everyman, then who is Ishmael?
God?  The writer?  The reader?
Moby Dick does not solve the thematic riddles it offers readers, but those
who want to find a thematic unity for the novel can do so.  Ramon Saldivar, for
instance, suggests that the persecution of the whale is a figure for the
tropological nature of language and the monomaniacal pursuit of absolute
meaning and identity where none exists.  Saldivar claims "the nature of narrative
as Melville came to see it [is] that its ultimate objects, in which it can most fully
secure for itself the signs of the self, turn into ambiguous allegories.  These
allegories in turn leap out, faithlessly, to fill and deny the very void in which they
are represented" (155).  In other words, the "theme" which Saldivar attributes
to Moby Dick is the "theme" of contemporary tropology; he claims Melville
intends to represent metaphorically both the act and the consequences of
representation itself.  Saldivar's tropological analysis, therefore, opens up the
aporia of Moby Dick's metaphoric structure while at the same time creating a
unified interpretation of the novel through the "theme" of tropology: a theme
which he "brings" to his reading.  
Although Holman and Harmon's literary handbook adequately defines how
"plot" and "theme" have traditionally been used as interpretive tools in literary
studies, the lectical focus of the Subjectivist mode cannot be so easily identified
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with traditional critical practice because it denotes a lectical rather than a
textual "reality."  Above I detailed why the conventional denotations of "ethos"
were inadequate to describe the many ways the stylistic performance of a
fiction can be read, most of which have something to do with how it feels to
read.  Accordingly, the Subjectivist mode focuses upon how a fiction occasions a
lectical experience, and ultimately a lectical performance, rather than passively
appreciate its "stylistic performance."
The fact that Subjectivist readings do not seek reference to an
independent, extra-lectical "target reality," however, does not mean they are
produced independently of textual features, nor that the strategy of focusing
upon lectical performance does not have a cultural history like the strategies of
reading for plot or theme.  I contend that the practice of valorizing "style" over
plot or theme, which often occurs in traditional aesthetics, tacitly asserts the
affective - and thereby lectical - dimension of literary value.  Holman and
Harmon's definition of "style," for instance, reproduces this tacit equation of
stylistic and lectical performance.  Holman and Harmon do not pretend to deliver
a theory of literary stylistics; as is appropriate to any general lexical effort, they
offer their readers a general account of how the word "style" has most often
been used in the past.  Accordingly, they define style as "the arrangement of
words in a manner best expressing the individuality of the author and the idea
and intent in the author's mind" (487).  Although this definition specifically
identifies "style" as a textual feature - an "arrangement of words" - Holman and
Harmon go on to admit tacitly that the style of a text is largely determined by
its "connotations."  Elaborating upon their definition, they assert:   
It is impossible to change the diction or to alter the phrasing of a
statement and thus to say exactly the same thing; for what the
reader receives from a statement is not alone what is said but also
certain connotations that affect the reader's consciousness.  And
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from this it follows that, just as no two personalities are alike, no
two styles are exactly alike. (487)
In the process of repeating the traditional "ethical" analogy between
personality and style, Holman and Harmon indicate that the style of a text is
created not just by its unique verbal structure - by "what is said" - but by how
the "connotations" of that verbal structure "affect the reader's consciousness."
In other words, the style of a text is both an elaboration of and dependent upon
its unique diction; if the words were different, the affect upon the reader would
be different.  
This definition contains two apparently contradictory assertions: 1. It
recognizes that the "style" of a text is not contained by its words but must be
"felt" or at least experienced by a reader, i.e. that it is at least partially
subjectively determined, and 2. It distinguishes between the dependency of
"style" upon the "diction" of a text and some other element of textuality which
does not share that dependence.  Although they do not say to what textual
"style" is being compared, I offer its traditional differends, plot and theme, as
being the likely suspects.  The way Holman and Harmon define them, a text can
indeed be paraphrased or adapted and still "have" the same plot or theme, i.e.
you can change the words somewhat and still "say exactly the same thing."  The
recently televised version of Moby Dick, for instance, offered many of the
narrative features of Melville's novel; Ishmael both narrates in voiceover and
participates in a truncated version of the Pequod's ill-fated pursuit of the white
whale.  I have not conducted a formal survey on the matter, but I am confident
that readers of the novel and viewers of the mini-series could develop very
similar if not identical accounts of the plots of these two very different texts.
Similarly, there is nothing about the televised version of Moby Dick that would
interfere with viewers and readers developing similar thematic understandings of
the two texts.  This is not to say that all attributions of theme or plot are
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equally invited by Moby Dick the novel and the teleplay based upon it.  For
instance, Saldivar's thematic unification of the novel would be more difficult -
but not impossible - to develop out of the broadcasted adaptation of Moby Dick
because many of Ishmael's "narrative digressions" were not included in the
teleplay, in particular his discussion of the appalling "whiteness of the whale."
Since such passages are instrumental to Saldivar's particular "reading-text," it
could not be exactly duplicated from a viewing of the adaptation, although one
could still project his general theme of tropology upon it.  The white whale could
still be understood as a metaphor for metaphor; Ahab and Ishmael could still be
understood as figures for the inadequacy of (self) identification through
language.  This is so because the strategy of reading (or viewing) for plot and
theme treat the specific verbal structure of a text as a transparent medium, the
means through which one can see or understand the total fictional realities to
which those strategies presume the text refers.   
However, Holman and Harmon's concept of stylistic performance insists
upon a direct referential relationship between the exact verbal structure of a
text and its style; the words of the text cannot be transparent because in one
sense they are equivalent to its style.  In other words, readers know what the
style of a text is only by assessing its diction as language, not by using it to
reach some other referential object, as in the case in attributions of theme or
plot.  According to their definition, paraphrasing a text changes its style because
style is partially constituted by the specific connotations of its diction.  It
follows from this that style is not equivalent with diction, it is something more,
some "thing" that must be provided by some one to the words of a text.
Moreover, connotative reference is not valued for its own sake but because it
can "affect the reader's consciousness."  Following this model, the style of a
text is ultimately not a textual feature at all; it is a product of reading a specific
text with a specific diction which produces a specific result: an assessment of
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style.  This model of style as being produced rather than merely received, of
course, directly contradicts Holman and Harmon's primary definition of style as a
textual feature - unless  one uses the word "diction" to denote that part of a
text's style which is written, not read.  If one does so, then Holman and
Harmon's definition of style is not contradictory, it merely equivocates between
style as a textual feature (i.e. diction) and style as a product of lectical
performance.  This crucial equivocation is made evident by their use of the verb
"to say"; in their formulation, one cannot "say the same thing" about a text (i.e.
its complete stylistic impression) if one changes "what is said" in a text (i.e. its
diction).  In other words, the stylistic "saying" of a text is both written and read.   
The above analysis is not meant to denounce Holman and Harmon's
definition of style, but to demonstrate that traditional notions of text-immanent
style both depend upon and elide a distinction between the stylistic expression
of a text (i.e. its diction) and the stylistic impression it makes upon a reader (i.e.
its lectical assessment), and that the unique stylistic value of a text is
determined by both of these acts.  Put simply, one cannot talk about the
stylistic value of a text without to some extent talking about its stylistic affect,
about how it feels to read it.  By contrast, traditional formulations of "plot" and
"theme" tend to completely elide the lectical mediations that make them
possible.  If a novel falls open in the forest, it most certainly has a plot and a
theme, according to traditional aesthetics, but its words must be read before its
unique diction can make a stylistic impression.  It is in this sense that I contend
the traditional valorization of literary style has always been a valorization of
lectical experience, in particular over mimetic reference or symbolic meaning.  
Given this understanding of style, Holman and Harmon's insistence upon
the absolute interdependency of style and diction makes perfect sense while
their implied equation of them does not.  There is no style "in the text" except
for its diction; moreover, the stylistic experience or "impression" developed
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during the reading of a text must be developed in response to its diction, the
unique vocabulary and syntax printed on the page. I recognize these implications
of traditional literary aesthetics, therefore, by identifying "diction" as the
"lectical focus" of the Subjectivist mode, a focus which is grounded in and
ultimately valued by its "target reality," lectical experience.  This move indicates
the phrase "stylistic performance" actually denotes two performances: 1. The
rhetorical performance of creating a text with a unique diction, and 2. The
lectical performance of incorporating the experience of reading that unique
diction into a unique reading-act.  This project attempts to interrogate how
these two performances accommodate and to some extent determine each
other in actual reading-acts.
While the first two lectical "tasks" describe how readers pretend what in
general a reading-act "is," the three listed below describe how they make it
"come to be" out of specific textual features.  The main difference between the
two tasks discussed above and those discussed below is that almost all adult
readers of fiction use all three modes of choosing a target reality and a lectical
focus at times while some of the more concretely defined, "line-level" lectical
strategies listed below are less universally employed.  In other words, I assert
that anyone able to read Moby Dick as fiction would be aware that, at least
hypothetically, it could be understood and valued as 1. A story within a fictional
world,  2. A theme with symbolic meaning, and 3. An experience one has in
response to its specific diction.  From my experience, even those students who
have only the most basic lectical repertoire are able - through the vocabulary
and practice of lectical analysis - to become more conscious of how they are
already reading, and thereby set the stage to expand their repertoires.  For
instance, a reader very well may attribute a symbolic meaning to Moby Dick
without consciously unifying different textual features through analogical
reference, one of the "line-level" strategies I attribute to the Idealist mode.
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Some students reach college without really knowing what the word "analogy"
means, much less how to project one between textual features.  However, the
process of being forced (by a heartless instructor) to account for their symbolic
gestures down to the line-level calls attention to the fact that they are already
performing many of the same lectical strategies as the "smart" students to
whom talking about literature seems to come naturally.  This tends to break
down the boundaries between students who "get it" and those who don't.  The
implication here, of course, is no matter how universal lectical strategies may be,
they are learned, and therefore can be taught.  As discussed above, the fact
that readers have different latent lectical repertoires is both one of the principal
justifications for and difficulties of teaching undergraduate literature classes.
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Chapter Two: Semantic Context
The problematic closure assigns a domain, a territory, or a field to an
inquiry, a research, or a knowledge.
Jacques Derrida, Aporias
The epigraph to this chapter is offered as a tacit recognition of the
problems inherent to "closing" the question of lectical closure in any systematic
way while at the same time asserting the necessity of doing so if anything is to
be said about reading.  "Problematic closure" is not a pejorative in Derrida's
lexicon; it is merely his name for the circumscription of meaning into a coherent
field of study.  Since this chapter attempts a systematic description of how
words are turned into thoughts, I thought I might chasten my formalism with a
cold splash of skepticism before things got too hot and heavy.  The field I want
to enclose in this chapter is particularly swampy, so I want to define a few terms
before I demonstrate how readers close the aporias of fiction at the line-level:
that is, the ways they complete the lectical task of establishing a "semantic
context" for textual features.
The "semantic context" of a given reading-act is a system of reference
created by a reader to mediate between specific textual features and a potential
"target reality" and "lectical focus."  This formulation borrows heavily from Iser's
description of reading as the sequential "joining" of textual segments by a
reader into a "referential field" which then informs and is affected by the
incorporation of subsequent segments (202).  I maintain that the target realities
and textual foci of the three modes of the lectical triangle imply different, basic
methods for incorporating individual textual features (or segments, as Iser would
say) into a developing aesthetic object by establishing a "semantic context" for
each of them.  I use the adjectives "mimetic," "allusive," and "elaborative" to
124
describe for undergraduates the three methods of establishing semantic context
outlined by the lectical triangle, and the nouns "image," "symbol," and "aporia"
to denote what a textual feature has become after semantic context is
established via one of the lectical modes.
I have found that many students have already encountered the literary
term "mimetic" and therefore it is relatively simple to modify it for application in
lectical analysis.  If, following traditional critical usage, literary "mimesis" is the
"artistic imitation of life," then mimetic semantic context is established by
pretending a fiction is an imitation of a fictional world.  Students quickly grasp
that mimetic reference between textual features and a fictional world
extrapolated from them is not one to one; an entire phenomenal milieu can be
developed from just a few fictional "imitations" of phenomena, as was
demonstrated above regarding Williams' "The Red Wheelbarrow."  Erich
Auerbach is just one of a whole tradition of readers who maintain that one of
the chief functions of fiction is to provide clues - what Auerbach calls figura -
which refer to an entire phenomenal and intrahistorical milieu, a background
against which individual textual features can be understood (73-76).  Lectical
strategies of the Materialist mode operate according to this same referential
pretense; the words on the page are treated as pieces of a world which must be
reconstructed by the reader before any further lectical assessment can be made
about the fiction at hand.  In other words, in the Materialist mode the primary
meaning of a fiction is its existence as a series of phenomena that can be
observed as one observes quotidian reality.  
This is not to say that the observation of fictional phenomena in the
Materialist mode is made "real" because the observation of non-fictional,
quotidian phenomena is less problematic, less fraught with referential aporias,
only that the two events share similar assumptions about the referential task at
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hand, or rather that Materialist lectical strategies mimic the most common
referential strategy for understanding quotidian reality: recognition.  
The distinction I am making here is simpler than it sounds and can be
illustrated quite easily to students through demonstrative examples.  For
instance, if one sees a person slip upon a banana peel in the student union,
before one can understand what has happened - much less what it means - one
must establish a context for the phenomenon observed.  One must understand
that a person with certain attributes (whether male, female, fit, aged, youthful,
disabled, cogent, intoxicated, conscious, laughing, crying, or injured, etc.) has
slipped for some reason (whether by accident, for fun, as performance art, as
political statement, or by providential design) upon a banana peel (which could
be real, a prop, or something slippery that just appears to be the skin of a
banana) in a specific place (on concrete, on the floor, in public, in the student
union, in the U.S.A., on October 12, 2002, etc).  On the most simplistic level,
one decides what has happened by comparing one's current observations with
one's previous experience with similar phenomena, then focusing upon and
unifying the various individual phenomena (no wrinkles on the face, a blush on
the cheek, nervous laughter, steady movement of the person's leg, a diamond
heart-shaped earring in each lobe, etc.) into a coherent "event."  This process of
identifying phenomena by referencing memory is adequately described by the O.
E. D.'s definition of "recognition": "The action or fact of perceiving that some
thing, person, etc., is the same as one previously known; the mental process of
identifying what has been known before."  If I understand the "event" as "an
able-bodied, young woman who is blushing, laughing with embarrassment, and
apparently unhurt has slipped by accident upon a banana peel," it is because
there are some elements of the "event" which I recognize as things I have
"known" or seen before.  Students immediately grasp that coming to such an
understanding is contingent upon my unique perspective (someone from across
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the room might not see or hear the laughter), focus (I might not pay attention
to the disheveled man in black hurrying out the door with a purse under his
arm), and pre-understanding of a world (the chiropractor standing next to me
knows even minor accidents can be crippling).  In other words, students quickly
or already understand that what a quotidian event "means" - at least at first - is
what an individual observer recognizes it as.
Although such exercises are rather simplistic, students need some version
of "Relativism 101" before they can perform lectical analysis.  In my experience,
they seem to learn how to identify Materialist semantic context more quickly
through analogies to how they attribute meaning in their "everyday" lives than
they do through an overtly theoretical discussion of lectical strategies.  The key
distinction they must understand between Materialist and Idealist semantic
context is that a Materialist "meaning" of a fiction is first and foremost a
"being," an event that is recognized within a fictional milieu.  In short, Materialist
strategies presume a fiction means what it "is" (or what it has come to be)
while Idealist strategies presume a fiction is what it means.
 Of course, once a fictional - or quotidian - phenomenon has been
recognized as "being" a part of a coherent thing or event, additional
assessments or understandings of it will be made according to what it is has
been recognized as.  This point explains how a Materialist mediation of a fictional
world, its "primary" meaning, can lead to additional responses, interpretations,
and experiences; i.e. subsequent lectical assessments of meaning which may or
may not be Materialist.  Returning to the analogy between fictional and quotidian
worlds, whether one screams, laughs, applauds, calls 911, or just keeps walking
after observing someone slip on a banana peel is contingent to some extent
upon what one has recognized it as, but one is also free to respond to or bring
other observations or interpretive strategies to bear on the event.  For instance,
upon reflection one might attribute a more universal meaning to the event, such
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as "students are too stressed out to watch where they are going" or even
interpret it as a symbol for the hazards of navigating one's personal scholastic
journey within a sprawling bureaucracy.  Moreover, once one comes to an
understanding of a phenomenal event one may have any number of affective
responses to it.  One could be simultaneously amused, amazed (after all, what
are the chances of seeing a slapstick cliché in the flesh?), and yet somewhat
unnerved after witnessing such an event.  How one ultimately feels about or
interprets an event, however, takes the form of a second-order response - a
response to one's response, so to speak.   
Readers of this dissertation will recognize the importance of - and
problems with - this distinction between "primary" and "secondary" responses
to phenomena, particularly the phenomena of a fiction.  By identifying sequential
levels of semantic reference one can at least partially account for the
complexity of an actual reading act.  Although it is feasible that a reader might
decide the ultimate meaning of a fiction is its "being" (i.e. as a specific fictional
event or thing against the background of a specific fictional world), it is more
likely that Materialist "being" will be used by the reader to develop another or a
series of semantic attributions, value judgments, and/or lectical experiences.  As
Iser asserts with his model of the reading-act, semantic closure is always
provisional, not just during the reading of a fiction, but days or even years after
a reader has decided "what it means."  In other words, any lectical assessment
can lead to a subsequent reassessment by the reader, but that reassessment
will be determined to some extent by what the fiction was first understood as.
During a lectical analysis of a reading-act, therefore, one tries to examine how a
reader's final (or at least most recent) assessment of a fiction depends upon
earlier assessments, and - through the concept of "semantic context" -
eventually trace all of those assessments to particular textual features.  
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As mentioned above, semantic context is developed in the Materialist
mode by approaching textual features as "images."  I use this term because it is
already in common parlance and therefore students usually do not have to learn
the word itself, only how its usage is qualified and focused during lectical
analysis.  For example, the traditional literary denotation of the word "image,"
according to Holman and Harmon, is "a literal and concrete representation of a
sensory experience or of an object that can be known by one or more of the
senses" (248).  Although "image" denotes a type of textuality in traditional
critical usage, in lectical analysis reading a word or series of words as an image is
a type of meaning production, a strategy that can be applied to most fictional
textual features.  In other words, in lectical analysis textual features are not
"images" until one reads them as such, but once they have been read as images
their semantic function is - at least at first - devoted to the development of a
phenomenal milieu within a fictional world.  The shift in focus from textual to
lectical analysis, therefore, is a shift from describing a being to describing an
action; in the Materialist mode this is a shift from identifying "images" which
simply exist in a text to examining how textual features can be "imagined."
Following tradition, Holman and Harmon point out that images can be
literal or "figurative" because if an "image" is a type of textuality, as opposed to
a lectical assessment, then one must account for the fact that an apparently
imagistic phrase - such as "a wild rose-bush" - could be read as a symbolic
reference to some other meaning beyond its function as a representation of "a
sensory experience."  By contrast, I maintain that the same words can be
understood both literally and figuratively because readers can employ different
types of lectical strategies while reading and re-reading them.  For the purpose
of distinguishing between the three modes of the lectical triangle, then, textual
"images" do not produce "figurative" reading-acts; reading a textual feature as
an "image" is the strategy used when a reader pretends a textual feature is a
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"being" - not a meaning - in a fictional world.   Furthermore, traditionally
recognized textual patterns other than "images" can be read as images.  The
terms "dialogue," "narrative exposition," "setting," "character," "mood," and
"historical allusion," among others, all denote qualities that traditionally have
been attributed to textuality which are ostensibly imagistic.  These and a
number of other terms are useful as descriptors of different textual patterns,
but in this project I choose the word "image" to denote what any textual feature
can be read as during a Materialist reading-act.  Below I will demonstrate how
such terms can be exploited while performing lectical analysis in the classroom,
but even then I treat traditional notions such as "setting" and "character" as
being types of lectically determined images.  "Figurative" meaning production is
the hallmark of the Idealist mode, as we shall see below.  To promote clarity I will
use other terminology to denote what textual features are read as during
Idealist reading-acts.  
Perhaps a short demonstrative example is in order.  The first chapter of
Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter includes the following language:
On one side of the portal, and rooted almost at the threshold, was
a wild rose-bush, covered, in this month of June, with its delicate
gems, which might be imagined to offer their fragrance and fragile
beauty to the prisoner as he went in, and to the condemned
criminal as he came forth to his doom, in token that the deep heart
of Nature could pity and be kind to him.  (36)
According to Holman and Harmon's definition of "image" as a textual
type, this sentence is imagistic from start to finish; through a series of linguistic
"images" it offers a representation of a "sensory experience or object," in this
case a rose-bush by the door of a prison in Colonial America.  As a way of
making informal distinctions between textual patterns ("this is an image; that is
dialogue") such nomenclature has some practical use.  However, as soon as one
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tries to determine how the sentence is to be understood - i.e. to what extent
individual images "have" inherent literal or figurative meaning - significant
difficulties emerge.  The phrase "a wild rose-bush" certainly sounds like a literal
representation of a thing, but what about its "delicate gems" that "might be
imagined" to offer solace from "the deep heart of Nature" to (hypothetical?
real?) prisoners that pass by?  The "wild rose-bush" is the subject of the
sentence, but is it the semantic focus, that is, the thing which all the other
words describe? Or, as is quite plausible, does the "wild rose-bush" symbolize
the "deep heart of Nature"?  Is this sentence to be read as a single "image" or is
it comprised of several "images"?  The sentence appears in a chapter entitled
"The Prison Door," the very door at whose threshold the "rose-bush" is rooted;
does this mean that the image(s) of this sentence are to be subordinated to the
chapter's "dominate" image, the door, or perhaps the "dominate" image of the
novel, the scarlet emblem Hester wears on her breast?  Of the twenty phrases in
the sentence, only one is not an overt representation of a sensory experience or
object: the phrase "which might be imagined."  But that phrase very well might
be read as the semantic fulcrum of the sentence, the phrase which articulates
the semantic choices the sentence offers the reader; in a fiction, at least, a wild
rose-bush might be a symbol for Nature, or it might just be a rose-bush, or it
might be both.   
In short, there is no way to decide whether or not the phrase "a wild rose-
bush" is a literal image, using Holman and Harmon's denotation of the word,
unless we know whether or not the reader understands the rest of the sentence
figuratively: i.e. as meaning something about the relationship between "Nature"
and human suffering, or some such.  Using the terms of this project, whether
the phrase "a wild rose-bush" is literal or figurative is determined by the
semantic context within which it has already been understood, that is either as
an image or a symbol.
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This ambivalence between the literal and figurative in Hawthorne's
sentence is not unique, although it is explicitly highlighted by the qualified and
passive construction of the phrase "which might be imagined."  As pointed out
above, even textual features that do not overtly invite a figurative interpretation
can be understood figuratively once a reader has decided to read them as
fiction.  Of course, this assertion is valid only if one accepts that there are in
fact certain minimum standards for reading a text as fiction.  Specifically, this
project presumes that anyone who could meet the admissions criteria for a
college-level literature course would understand that fictions can represent both
"things" and "ideas," that they can tell stories about and offer interpretations of
a world, and that they can be comprised of "images" and "symbols."  I maintain
that one can safely presume collegiate readers have a much more elaborate
understanding of how fiction can be read, but here I offer these minimum
standards for the purpose of building a pedagogical method for that population.
One does not have to accept that these minimum criteria for college-level,
fictional reading are inherent to fictional texts to recognize that they are
mandated by lectical conventions.  Concerning lectical analysis, then, students
are taught that by recognizing a specific textual feature in a fiction as an
"image" - a literal representation of a sensory experience or object - a reader
has already chosen to make a fictional world out of the words on the page, a
choice which he or she must already know is always available while reading
fiction.  
As in the other lectical modes, this Materialist method for establishing
semantic context determines how a given textual feature will be understood and
indicates its general lectical horizon without dictating a specific or absolute
semantic identity.  This marks one of the limits of lectical analysis.  The only way
to access the unique, reader-specific semantic identity of a textual feature is
through the reader's retrospective account of the reading-act he or she has
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produced.  Such accounts will include referential choices made according to both
conventional and idiosyncratic pre-understandings of world.  Although
retrospective self-analysis is a notoriously suspect source of information, I
maintain it is relatively easy to distinguish between lectical mediations based
upon general conventions and those that respond to a reader's idiosyncratic
understanding of "reality."  For example, once a reader reports she has read the
phrase "a wild rose-bush" as an image, we know the reader's fictional world
includes a plant sprouting roses next to a dreary prison door, but we do not
know what variety of the rose family she "recognizes" in that world.  "Wild
roses" look differently than "American Beauty" roses, for instance, which have
grown wild.  Moreover, the phrase does not indicate what color the roses are,
although almost all readers will attribute some sense of color to it during the
process of reading it as an image.  Although individual words have
conventionalized qualities associated with them when they are "imagined" (roses
have color, hair has length, lawns are mowed or overgrown, people have age,
etc.), even if a reader reports the phrase "a wild rose-bush" represents "a lush
bush of red American Beauty roses in full bloom which has not been tended"
there are idiosyncratic connotations beyond and behind that semantic choice
which are unique to the reader's life experience and therefore can not be
approached through convention.  Perhaps her long deceased grandmother's
house is ringed in overgrown rose bushes which have been ignored by the
current tenants.  Perhaps she received a batch of American Beauties as a gift
when her daughter was born.  Perhaps there was a picture of a big, red rose on
the package of spaghetti she boiled for dinner last night.  If, as is entirely
possible, the phrase is subsequently re-read as a "symbol," each of the decisions
made during its original, imagistic reading can radically effect what the phrase
can mean figuratively, that is, when it is understood according to Idealist lectical
strategies.  Imagining the prison door roses to be red rather than white or yellow
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does not prescriptively designate a subsequent symbolic meaning, but it does
access different symbolic conventions.  Hawthorne, for instance, exploits the
many symbolic conventions surrounding "redness" in The Scarlet Letter,
repeatedly underlining the many and often conflicting semantic possibilities
those conventions might offer a reader.
This last point underlines another important element of any reading-act:
i.e. establishing the limits of the "textual feature" under consideration.   For
instance, the phrase "a wild rose-bush" can be read as a textual feature by itself
or as a part of a larger textual feature comprised of the entire sentence.
Alternatively, a reader might identify a textual feature that included words that
immediately precede our quote (for instance, "in the soil that had so early borne
the black flower of civilized society") and/or words that follow it (such as "it
had sprung up under the footsteps of the sainted Ann Hutchinson, as she
entered the prison door").  Moreover, there is nothing that stops a reader from
identifying yet another textual feature that includes both the sentence quoted
above and the following words from Chapter VIII:
The child finally announced that she had not been made at all, but
had been plucked by her mother off the bush of wild roses, that
grew by the prison-door.
This fantasy was probably suggested by the near proximity of the
Governor's red roses..., together with her recollection of the prison
rose-bush, which she had passed in coming hither.  (77)
The decision to read these separate representations of the prison rose bush
together as a single textual feature, of course, changes the semantic horizon of
them both.  If, for instance, a reader understands the words "a wild rose-bush"
in Chapter I as an image, and further as referring to a growth of white, wild
roses, then the passage from Chapter VIII offers two important bits of
information about the fictional world he or she has created: 1. The prison-door
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roses are likely red, since they are "suggested by the proximity of the
Governor's red roses," and 2. Pearl both notices and verbally, at least, identifies
herself with the rose-bush.  Further, the fact that in both passages the narrator
overtly suggests the rose bush could be read as a symbol might provoke the
reader to revise her strategy of reading it as an image.  The important, if
obvious, point here is that the meaning of a textual feature is determined not
only by how a reader chooses to understand it (i.e. which lectical mode is
employed) but also by the words a reader chooses to include in it.  A further
crucial point is that both of these determining factors are subject to cultural
conventions which are learned, and therefore can be taught.
These distinctions between idiosyncratic and conventional lectical
responses are meant to refine and qualify my earlier assertions about how texts
"invite" but do not determine reading-acts.  Following Booth (and Iser, Austin,
Newton, etc.), I maintained above that a given text can "invite" certain
conventionalized lectical strategies and "tolerate" or even "resist" others.  Some
of these conventions structure the lectical response (i.e. determine how as
opposed to what a textual feature might mean), and a reader must have some
awareness of them to understand a text as fiction; some of the most
elementary of these are the "minimum standards" listed above, although there
are others.  The lectical triangle is meant as a taxonomy of these "structural"
conventions of lectical response.  In the immediately preceding passages,
however, I have begun to demonstrate how "structural" conventions can affect
or be affected by the semantic conventions of individual words.  In short, certain
words or combinations of words will "invite" certain types of responses and
resist others.  For instance, the phrase "a wild rose-bush" invites an imagined
attribution of color (even for a blind reader), "tolerates" an imagined attribution
of thorn size, and almost certainly "resists" an imagined attribution of political
affiliation - unless the text offers the reader additional information.  As we will
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see below, if the phrase is eventually or concurrently read as a symbol, its
semantic horizon is significantly broadened.  A "symbolized" - as opposed to
imagined - "wild rose-bush" might very well invite an attribution of political
affiliation, particularly if the fictional setting is 15th century England.  That the
semantic horizon of a given word or phrase is to some extent conventional is
clear; although distinguishing between conventional and idiosyncratic lectical
responses at the word/phrase level will always involve speculation, I maintain
that careful analysis of the interaction between the "structural" and "semantic"
conventions of lectical response can create informed speculation, provisional
determinations of the range of responses a given textual feature invites.       
I have discussed the mitigating factors that impinge upon reading any
textual feature as an image in such great detail because these same factors
affect all word/phrase level attributions of meaning.  Consistently recognizing
these contingencies keeps one - and one's students - sensitive to the
problematics which attend any analysis of what a fiction might mean.  By
categorizing the most common "structural" lectical strategies employed by
readers, however, one can at least begin to talk about how readers negotiate
the many semantic possibilities that confront them when they open a book.
Yes, readers must decide which words constitute a textual feature, and textual
features can change from moment to moment during a reading-act; yes, readers
must negotiate between literal and figurative references for every textual
feature; yes, both these decisions will be affected by the unique semantic
horizon of the individual word(s) under consideration.  But all of these choices
are pre-mediated to some extent by conventions established by lectical
traditions, in this study the tradition surrounding the assessment of lectical
realism in fiction.
Keeping these qualifications in mind, I turn now to how semantic context
is established in the Idealist mode: i.e. by reading a textual feature as a
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"symbol."  In lectical analysis, virtually any textual feature can be read as a
symbol, just as it can always be read as an image, because during such exercises
the focus is upon lectical mediation rather than textual classification.  The most
abstract and traditional sense of the word "symbol" is thereby retained albeit
from a different perspective; when a textual feature is read as a symbol it is
read as a figurative representation of some thing or idea beyond whatever
literal/imagistic meaning can be attributed to it. When delivering this concept to
undergraduate students I tell them Idealist semantic context is "allusive" in that
it alludes to some kind of symbolic system that readers can use to interpret a
textual feature.
My use here of the phrase "symbolic system" is purposefully broad to the
point of abstraction.  As with all the abstractions employed in this project, the
denotation of this phrase is delimited largely through internal differentiation,
that is, in comparison to other terms also defined within the project.  At the
most general and simplistic level, therefore, a "symbolic system" is any cultural
artifact in a reader's pre-understanding that he or she uses to interpret a
fictional, textual feature figuratively.  Such artifacts can be legends, myths, or
other fictions; they can be religious, political, historical, literary, or folk
traditions; as indicated above, they can also be the "semantic conventions"
surrounding a textual feature.  Symbolic systems can even be "coined" by
readers out of connotations they associate with a given textual feature.  (I will
discuss this type of symbolic system in some depth below when I consider
"lectical coherence").  During actual Idealist reading-acts, all of these types of
symbolic systems will be comprised of both conventional and idiosyncratic
features; the focus of lectical analysis, of course, would be to determine to what
extent a given textual feature invites reference to conventionalized elements of
an identified symbolic system.  What a symbolic system cannot be - again,
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purely for the purpose of differentiating terms - are cultural artifacts used to
read a textual feature as an image, i.e. as a part of a fictional world.  
In classroom application this formulation is not as complex or vague as it
may seem.  Returning to the passage from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter for a
demonstrative example, the phrase "a wild rose-bush" invites reference to a
variety of symbolic systems.  The most obvious invitation is the narrator's
suggestion that the rose-bush "might be imagined" to represent the compassion
of "the deep heart of Nature."  This textual feature invites reference to several
different symbolic systems.  First, one should recognize that the phrase "which
might be imagined" operates as an overt invitation to employ one of the most
basic lectical strategies: reading a word as a symbol, in this case the word "rose-
bush" as a symbol for the "deep heart of Nature."  Above I identified pre-
understanding of this strategy as a "minimum standard" for college-level readers
and further as a lectical convention which structures response, that is which tells
a reader how rather than what a textual feature might mean.  Lectical tradition
mandates that when narrators overtly delineate a symbolic reference, as in The
Scarlet Letter, readers can choose to employ the offered reference during their
reading-act.  In this respect, by my own definition lectical tradition is itself a
"symbolic system."  
In this project, however, I distinguish between lectical conventions which
structure response and literary traditions which offer a particular semantic
horizon and therefore can be referenced as symbolic systems.  Accordingly, the
phrase "which might be imagined" invokes a general lectical tradition but the
words "a wild rose-bush" and "the deep heart of Nature" invoke specific
semantic traditions in literature.  The literary personification of "Nature" has a
long history, one that intersects with philosophical, religious, political, and even
legal traditions.  The symbolic use of the word "rose" also has an ancient and
very broad literary history.  Readers who employ the lectical strategy of reading
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Hawthorne's sentence as a symbol can and even should develop a meaning for it
through reference to those two traditions in some way.  The fact that the
literary traditions surrounding the words "rose" and "nature" are so broad and
ambiguous, of course, constitutes a potential lectical problem, an aporia which
must be overcome somehow.  Needless to say, this passage is one of many in
Hawthorne's corpus which have been read as explicit references to the problem
of understanding symbols, particularly literary symbols.  Although the passage
most certainly and explicitly invites such a response to the voluminous symbolic
systems offered by "rose-bush" and  "Nature," in the Idealist mode the reader
by definition has already decided to perform a symbolic reading-act, regardless
of the ambiguities he or she might have to overcome in the process.  As we shall
see below, reading-acts that focus on the problem of establishing reference for
a particular textual feature are categorized under the Subjectivist mode.
Although I listed a variety of symbolic systems above, there are no real or
objective criteria to distinguish between literary, folk, or religious traditions, for
instance, because such categories are so thoroughly interrelated.  Hawthorne's
"rose-bush," for example, might very easily be symbolized by a reader to refer
to the "Rose of Sharon" mentioned in the Song of Solomon.  Whether the
symbolic system thereby accessed should be called a literary, religious,
mythological or folk tradition, or a political ideology is not important to this
preliminary outline of lectical analysis, although lectical analysis is offered as
another way to interrogate how those different cultural perspectives interrelate.
It can be objectively determined, however, that the word "rose" has a long and
complex history in Christian culture, whether a given reader is aware of that
history or not, and therefore reference to that history is to some extent invited
by the text.  This is not to say that Hawthorne intended his rose-bush to be
read as a Christian symbol, much less as a symbol for the Rose of Sharon in
particular, only that the word "rose" includes within its semantic tradition certain
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Christian references which can be used to understand it symbolically.  Neither
does this mean that reading-acts which ignore the potential symbolic
relationship between the rose-bush and Christian tradition are necessarily inferior
to those that do.  The goal of lectical analysis is to examine how and under
which conditions particular reading-acts have been made, not to determine
which reading-acts should be made regarding a given fiction.  
This goal notwithstanding, lectical analysis also offers student readers a
method for understanding the cultural biases that have enforced canonical
readings of fictions like The Scarlet Letter in the past.  Furthermore, it offers
them an account of what counts as "plausible" reading-acts within the scholarly
tradition.  Since students are almost always expected to perform plausible or
persuasive interpretations of fiction during a literature course, it seems only fair
to teach them general criteria for distinguishing between those interpretations
that are well within the range of "plausible" scholarly commentary and those
that are not.  In Booth's terminology, this means students need to learn how to
determine when a reading-act is invited, tolerated, or resisted by a fiction in a
manner that both recognizes and interrogates the interpretive heritage of
scholarly culture.
Perhaps an example of how these concepts are translated into classroom
practice is in order.  During a class discussion a few semesters ago, one of my
students (who had been taught the rudiments of lectical analysis) suggested
that Hawthorne's rose-bush can be understood symbolically through reference
to the Rose of Sharon.  She offered the class a short description of the
interpretive tradition surrounding the phrase "I am the rose of Sharon, and the
lily of the valley" (The Song of Solomon 2:1), including the ancient typological
interpretation of the rose as a symbol for Jesus of Nazareth.  She claimed on
the basis of that symbolic system that the rose-bush passage invites readers to
interpret it as a symbol of redemption for sinful behavior, specifically that
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Nature offers pity and kindness to Hester even as her neighbors prepare to
humiliate her.  After helping her explore some of the ramifications of her analysis
(Is Hester thereby identified as a martyr?  A saint?  Is nature pitted against the
Puritan status quo by such a reading act?), I gently challenged her analysis by
pointing out that the "Song of Solomon" can be read literally as a passionate
love poem as well as an allegory for the spiritual marriage between Jesus Christ
and the Christian church.  After giving her that information, I asked her how her
claim that the rose-bush is a redemptive symbol was complicated by the
apparent romantic and sexual content of the "Song of Solomon."  In the class
discussion that ensued, this particular student and some of her classmates came
to the conclusion that the novel as a whole does in fact invite readers to relate
sensuality with spiritual redemption and sexual repression with spiritual
stagnation.  Although not all of the students present agreed with this analysis,
all of those who participated in the discussion recognized that the analysis was
"plausible" since it was directly linked to textual features which "invite" it.  In
other words, they saw why the original claim proposed would make an
acceptable thesis for an essay about The Scarlet Letter within the interpretive
community of collegiate academics.
Clearly, such classroom dialectics will not add much to Hawthorne
criticism, but they do tend to teach students how to take more responsibility for
their analyses of textual features.  Moreover, by insisting that they practice
lectical analysis upon assigned readings, classroom discussions can develop out
of understandings students already have about the fiction at hand,
understandings which they have already examined (hopefully) using a common
method and terminology.  Since most fictions tend to invite a limited number of
themes, quite often lectical analyses offered during class discussions are subtle
variations of the critical tradition of the text under discussion (provided there is
one).  In effect, the critical heritage of a novel is recreated by the class through
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a guided dialectical analysis, not just delivered through a lecture.  Neo-
appreciation methodology of this sort, therefore, often arrives at the same
conclusions as more traditional "survey" courses but via a different path.  I
found that students who come to a traditional understanding of a fiction
through their own analytical conclusions learn more about the dynamic between
text, culture, and reader than do students who are offered pre-fabricated
readings, no matter how open or qualified.  Moreover, the skills learned by
applying lectical analysis upon one text are transferable to any other, whereas
merely lecturing that The Scarlet Letter thematically associates sensuality and
redemption is text-specific information that can be repeated on a mid-term but
teaches students very little about fiction at large.
As the case history above suggests, classroom discussions based upon
lectical analysis usually do not produce monolithic readings.  Most often one
student's analysis is either problematized by or must co-exist with a variety of
other analyses that are equally plausible.  I have found, therefore, that almost
every Materialist or Idealist lectical analysis proposed during class time
eventually leads to the question of to what extent the fiction at hand invites
Subjectivist reading-acts.  Above I mentioned that semantic context in the
Subjectivist mode is characterized by a resistance to or at least a deferral of
referential closure.  Subjectivist semantic context is developed, therefore, by
elaboration; the reader in this mode entertains multiple referential possibilities
for a given textual feature without assessing ultimate "meaning" to any of them.
Or, rather, the ultimate meaning of a textual feature in the Subjectivist mode is
the experience of playing with its referential possibilities.  Whereas a reader may
very well attempt a Materialist reading of a textual feature before choosing an
Idealist strategy to establish closure (and visa versa), a Subjectivist reading
achieves closure by deciding no single referential object can be given semantic
priority over other apparent options.  
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Earlier in this dissertation I outlined the three stages of a reading-act: the
recognition, closure, and assessment stages.  This general model must be
refined somewhat to adequately distinguish between the three lectical modes.
During the recognition stage a reader develops a lectical horizon in response to
a perceived semantic aporia; this lectical horizon is an inventory of all possible
"meanings" a textual feature might suggest to a reader at the time given her
unique pre-understanding of world.  During the closure stage the reader chooses
a lectical strategy he or she believes best resolves the textual aporia under
consideration.  In the Materialist mode, readers resolve aporias by reading
textual features as images; in the Idealist mode, they resolve aporias by reading
textual features as symbols. In the Subjectivist mode closure is achieved by
reading a textual feature as an aporia, an ambivalence between two or more
referential possibilities.  This formulation is not meant to be a cute oxymoron;
one can move beyond the recognition stage of a reading-act by deciding the
best way to understand a textual fragment is not as an image/thing or a
symbol/idea but as an aporia/experience.  In other words, since in the closure
stage the reader adopts a strategy to read the words on the page as something
else other than words, in the Subjectivist mode that "something else" is a
semantic ambivalence whose resolution is deferred, for the time being at least.
One could say that in the Subjectivist mode a reader settles upon an "aporetic"
horizon, a set of particular references culled from the more comprehensive
referential inventory of his or her unique lectical horizon.  An "aporetic" horizon
differs from a lectical horizon in that it is much more limited - it includes only the
most likely and appealing referential options that occur to a reader as opposed
to the entire range of referential possibilities included in the lectical horizon.  An
aporetic horizon is also more consciously constructed than a lectical horizon.  A
reader doesn't really "choose" the total sum of possible meanings that occur to
him or her when confronted with a textual feature (i.e. her lectical horizon), but
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the decision to continue to play with some of the referential possibilities
occasioned by an aporia is always at least partially conscious.  In effect, the
reader chooses to treat the textual feature under consideration as an object for
contemplation, and thereby highlights the experiential element of the reading-
act.
Again, the foregoing notion of closing an aporia by treating it as  an
aporia is not meant to be a "performative" rhetorical gesture, like de Man's
phrase "the metaphor of metaphor."  Returning to The Scarlet Letter for a
demonstrative example, I have already listed a number of the semantic
possibilities which might occur to a reader in response to the phrase "a wild
rose-bush," but the total range of meaning which could be attributed to the
phrase is significantly more vast.  As pointed out above, the semantic tradition
surrounding the word "rose" alone could fill up a multi-volume concordance.  If
we add to this set of semantic possibilities all the idiosyncratic connotations
that the phrase "a wild rose-bush" might suggest to a reader, then we get a
sense of how vertiginously broad - and ultimately inaccessible - a hypothetical
reader's lectical horizon might be.   
The concept of a lectical horizon, however, is only useful when applied to
an actual reader during an actual reading-act, a unique person with an
identifiable pre-understanding of things like language, literature, fiction, and rose
bushes.  Earlier in this chapter I used the term "semantic horizon" to denote all
of the semantic possibilities, both conventional and idiosyncratic, which a textual
feature might refer to.  Needless to say, the range of semantic possibilities a
particular reader actually uses to read a textual feature is much narrower than
that textual feature's "semantic horizon."  For example, I understand some
different things about fiction, Hawthorne's corpus, The Scarlet Letter, "wild"-
ness, and/or "rose"-ness than a colleague of mine whom I recently asked to re-
read the opening paragraphs of The Scarlet Letter.  She reported, among other
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things, that wild roses in New England are more likely to be white than red, and
that she couldn't read The Scarlet Letter without thinking about the
marginalization of the feminine voice on the internet.  Although I recognize both
of these items are part of the "semantic horizon" of Hawthorne's rose-bush,
neither was in my most recent "lectical horizon" for that passage.  Similarly, my
most recent lectical horizon differed in some specific ways from that of a
nineteen year-old woman, named Ann, who I asked to read the passage in
question.  Ann did not understand the words "metafiction" or "allegory" but
made a semantic connection between Hawthorne's rose-bush and the past tense
of the verb "to rise," according to her because she had recently written a poem
that punned upon "rose" and "to rise."  All three of us, in other words, had
different lectical horizons for the phrase "a wild rose-bush," different semantic
resources out of which we accomplished our common goal of understanding
Hawthorne's words.  
Of course, our lectical horizons shared some items as well.  Just to name
a few of these: all of us knew that a "rose-bush" is a plant which can grow
uncultivated, that roses have thorns, that words in a fiction can be read as
images or symbols, that Hawthorne's work is often understood to be overtly
symbolic, that roses are often used as a symbol of love and/or passion, and that
there is a conspicuous contrast between the colonial prison (that "black flower
of civilized society") and the "wild rose-bush" growing at its threshold.  
The boundary I am treading here between idiosyncratic and conventional
responses is particularly slippery.  Using the terminology outlined above, my
colleague, Ann, and I each had a unique lectical horizon as we approached the
same textual feature within minutes of each other, horizons which shared some
structural conventions (e.g. words in a fiction can be symbols or images) and
some semantic conventions (e.g. roses are plants with thorns; roses can be
symbols of romantic passion).  These shared conventions account for most of
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the similarities in our reading-acts.  However, not all of the differences between
our lectical horizons - and there were several - were due to idiosyncratic
responses; that is, just because we each had and have a unique set of life
experiences which informed our reading-acts.  Some differences were due to the
fact that we each had and have different understandings of the conventions
relevant to reading the piece of fiction before us.  For example, since we both
understood the conventionalized concepts denoted by "allegory" and that
Hawthorne's work has been read in the past using those concepts, my colleague
and I entertained semantic possibilities that couldn't - or at least didn't - occur
to Ann.    
In addition, some of the differences in our lectical horizons were a
function of our different lectical habits rather than our relative ignorance or
knowledge about fiction, Hawthorne, and roses.  Before this most recent reading
of the rose-bush passage, for instance, I was aware both that words can be used
as puns and that there has been a strong critique of the marginalization of
women on the web.  However, for some reason neither of these possibilities
occurred to me as being relevant to that particular reading-act.  Perhaps, as a
middle-class, Caucasian male, I am less personally invested in marginalized voices
than my colleague is and therefore less apt to attach that theme to any fiction.
Perhaps, I am less amused by and therefore less attuned to potential puns than
Ann.  Or, perhaps, I didn't consider any color but red for Hawthorne's rose-bush
because of a momentary fit of laziness induced by low blood-sugar.  My point is
that one can have knowledge of things or ideas which might be relevant to a
fiction - i.e. within its semantic horizon - without attending to them during a
particular reading-act: i.e. without including them in a particular lectical horizon.
The fact that I was engaged in a dialogue with other readers made it easy to
rectify these shortcomings in my previous lectical horizon; upon being reminded
of the above semantic possibilities I almost immediately reassessed my reading
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of the passage, a reassessment which very well may have established a new
reading "habit."  The very strong possibility that the wild roses may be white,
for example, has reinforced my consideration of the link between Pearl and the
rose-bush mentioned earlier in this chapter.  Whether or not that symbolic link is
important to all readings of The Scarlet Letter is not the point; my reading of
the novel has been enriched.  The contemplation of how "whiteness" contrasts
with redness, of how Pearl contrasts with Hester, and how all of these items are
concurrently identified in a variety of ways opens new ways to think about a
novel that I have been thinking about for quite some time.   
Frankly, I didn't need the superstructure of lectical analysis for
conversations with fellow readers to broaden my understanding of Hawthorne's
novel; I have the training and inclination to completely revise my assessment of
a fiction out of even the most informal conversations.  Typically, however, my
undergraduate students are neither trained nor inclined to look closely at how
they create meaning.  In fact, it tends to irritate or embarrass them when first
asked to do so.  For most of them, therefore, some sort of systematization of
fictional reading is necessary for them to develop the habit of creating rigorous,
critical readings.
Of course, one of the central challenges of teaching students lectical
analysis is that it is always to a certain extent self-analysis, and therefore can
not be performed with any absolute certainty: a quality of literary discourse that
makes them nervous because they want to be certain about "what's going to be
on the test."  By creating common terminology and analytical methods,
however, I have found that lectical analysis creates a more stable system of
discourse for readers who are largely ignorant of the way they consume cultural
artifacts and have few resources to express what they do understand about
their cultural experiences.  As a remedy to this situation, lectical analysis tries to
interrogate and distinguish between the idiosyncrasies of lectical focus or habit
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during a particular reading-act (e.g. my low blood sugar) and the idiosyncrasies
of personal experience of the individual reader (e.g. unlike Ann, I have not
written a poem which puns on the word "rose") which make our reading-acts
different; these different types of idiosyncratic response are in turn
distinguished from the structural and semantic conventions which invite very
different readers to construct very similar readings.  
Another of the challenges of lectical analysis is that some of the material
it tries to describe resists definitive categorization.  For instance, one might
argue that knowing the most common color for wild roses in New England is not
only essential to understanding Hawthorne's first chapter but that it is general
information accessible to any reader, and therefore should be considered a
semantic convention, not a semantic idiosyncrasy.  Likewise, the fact that Ann
has played upon the semantic ambivalence inherent to the word "rose" in one of
her poems might lead one to characterize her use of that experience in her
reading-act alternatively as an idiosyncratic experience, a lectical habit, and/or a
response to a structural convention.   This particular problem of establishing the
limits of "conventionality" has plagued speech act theory and most varieties of
formalism, but all taxonomies share the more general problem of setting criteria
for categorization.  Because they must be simple enough to be coherent,
systems of discourse are inherently reductive and therefore sometimes are
unable to account for the near infinite variety of cognitive experiences, much
less the expression of such experiences in language.  It does not follow,
however, that the conclusions of systematized discourse are inherently flawed
or that they have no truth-value, only that they should always be qualified.
The foregoing distinctions between conventional and idiosyncratic
elements of a lectical horizon and to what extent they are conscious are
particularly important - and problematic - regarding Subjectivist lectical
strategies.   To summarize, a "semantic horizon" is the total range of possible
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references for a textual fragment for all readers, and a "lectical horizon" is the
range of references for a given textual fragment which occur to a particular
reader during a particular reading-act.  Neither of these horizons is created
consciously or at least purposefully by a reader while confronting a text,
although lectical horizons are affected by the conscious choice to read a
particular fiction at a particular moment in time.  The semantic horizon sets the
theoretically possible limit for a given textual fragment, and the lectical horizon
sets the practical limit for a reader during the recognition stage of a reading-act.
An "aporetic horizon," by contrast, is the subset of a reader's lectical horizon
that he or she has decided to treat as an aporia, thereby entering the closure
stage of a Subjectivist reading-act.  I see this "decision" as being a different kind
of cognitive act than those used when a lectical horizon is developed more or
less automatically out of the reader's cumulative pre-understanding of world in
response to a textual fragment. I submit that in most reading-acts this
unconscious and automatic response to a textual fragment leads directly and
seamlessly to the closure stage due to and in accordance with the lectical habits
and limited knowledge of the individual reader.  Quite simply, most of the time
we don't recognize the cognitive problem that reading always presents us.   
In some cases, of course, the reader becomes aware of a semantic aporia
during the recognition stage that complicates his or her progress toward
closure.  Once consciously aware of an aporia, a reader is obliged to examine his
or her lectical horizon in order to determine which of the referential options and
strategies contained in it is the best one for the textual fragment under
consideration.  A reader can experience the awareness of an aporia as an
impetus to get about the business of establishing reference, an act which
usually takes little effort and happens very quickly, often in milliseconds, even
for readers with little formal training.   
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If the aporia is not easily resolved, readers have two basic courses of
action: to give up or to treat the aporia as an aporia.  The first of these two
options is characterized by anxiety or apathy and the second is characterized by
contemplation.  Above I defined "complete," fictional reading-acts with the
following criteria: 1. All of the words of the textual feature are considered 2. All
of the aporias recognized by the reader are closed.  These criteria assert a
standard for lectical behavior.  As indicated in Chapter One of this essay, I can
choose to "give up" on a fiction due to my inability or unwillingness to complete
a reading-act, but if I do so I can't honestly claim to have read it.  This is a key
point: closing an aporia by creating an "aporetic horizon" establishes semantic
reference; it is not a form of "giving up," like my aborted attempts to read Tom
Jones or Ulysses.
Even though the above distinctions are pretty soft in the abstract, they
are necessary to differentiate between what always happens during any reading-
act, what happens when a reader employs a Subjectivist semantic context, and
what happens when a reading-act is aborted or only partially completed.  As with
the many other abstract definitions in this study, these only have force in their
application.  In that spirit, I will contrast the strategies my colleague and Ann
used to read Hawthorne's "wild rose-bush" passage to better distinguish
Subjectivist semantic context from the other two lectical modes.
In both cases I told my volunteers to read the first two paragraphs of the
Scarlet Letter and that I would ask them some questions afterward.  Both
readers had a pre-understanding of the novel: Ann had seen a film adaptation,
had read some of Hawthorne's short stories, and had retained some of the
critical heritage surrounding Hawthorne's corpus that she had been taught in a
high school literature course; my colleague had read the novel several times and
had a general understanding of its critical canon, although she had not read it
recently.  As soon as she finished reading, Ann looked up and said, "Do you want
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to know about the rose bush?"  I told her yes, and asked her what she thought
about it.  She told me it was being used as a symbol for "Nature or God or
something like that" and that Hawthorne was trying to show how "narrow-
minded and hypocritical" Puritan culture was.  I asked her why she thought it
wasn't just a physical detail of Hester's world, pointing out the conditional
quality of Hawthorne's transition "which might be imagined."  She replied the
rose-bush is "obviously symbolic," why else "would he point it out in the first
place?"  I asked her if she thought there was a "real" rose bush by the prison
door, and she said "yes, but it's a symbolic rose bush too."  When I asked her to
describe the rose bush she said it was overgrown and "all brambly, with small,
red roses, like spray roses."  I then asked her to remember what other ideas or
meanings had occurred to her regarding the phrase "a wild rose-bush" while she
was reading it, no matter how absurd.  She listed a number of the most
conventional connotations for the word "rose" - love, passion, woman, beauty,
romance, all of which she associated with Hester - then laughed and said the
"wild rose-bush" had made her think of a funeral, crediting the "black flower of
civilization" line for suggesting that interpretation.  She also said it reminded her
of a poem she had recently written using the word "rose" to denote both a
flower and a verb, although she went on to say her poem is about something
"completely different" than Hawthorne's novel.  I asked her what she thought
the novel was about - since she had not read it - and she replied that the rose-
bush "pretty much sums up" the novel in a single symbol; according to her, The
Scarlet Letter is a condemnation of the enforcement of narrow-minded, social
mores and how "innocent people like Hester" are thereby made to suffer.  Next,
I asked her if the passage communicated anything about literary meaning in
general.  She replied, "What do you mean?"
According to the distinctions made above, Ann performed an Idealist
reading-act of the rose-bush passage.  First, she considered a number of
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semantic possibilities during her recognition stage that she eventually rejected:
she considered an imagistic reading long enough to attribute physical
characteristics to the words (it is overgrown and "brambly" with red blooms);
she remembered her own use of the word "rose" as a pun; she recognized
something "funereal" about the rose-bush, apparently through its association
with the immediately preceding description of the prison as "the black flower of
civilized society."   Although these possibilities were in her "lectical horizon," she
ultimately chose to read the passage as a symbol for Nature/God/Hester,
thereby initiating the closure stage of her reading-act.  This symbolic equation
allowed her to attach certain connotations she had recognized for the word
"wild rose-bush" - i.e. passion, beauty, femininity, and romance - which by
contrast highlight "the narrow-minded and hypocritical" attitudes of the Puritans
and their prison.  
Clearly, many of these choices were guided to some extent by her prior
experience with The Scarlet Letter via the cinematic adaptation, an experience
which she employed as a lectical "habit" in her reading act.  Since Hester is not
even introduced until the second chapter, and since (other than Hawthorne's
history of the prison house itself) Puritan behavior is not addressed in the
passage she read for me, apparently Ann used her prior attribution of a "theme"
to the movie The Scarlet Letter to close an aporia she recognized in the novel
between the description of the prison door - that "black flower of civilized
society" - and the "wild rose-bush."  To describe with some certainty exactly
why and how she used this particular interpretive habit to solve this particular
aporia would require a deeper understanding of cognitive processes than we
currently have.  Luckily, we do not have to solve all the intricacies of human
cognition to recognize that the utilization of such habits is extraordinarily
common behavior for readers and thereby make the deduction that this reader
used that habit during her reading act.  Deductions made according to
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observation and subject report must always be qualified, of course, but unless
one is willing to reject most of the information about cognition garnered from
the social sciences, such speculations are all we have to describe what is going
on in our heads, much less in our readings.    
Besides these rather basic observations, one should notice that some of
the details of Ann's reading-act suggest an interactive relationship between
Materialist and Idealist lectical strategies during the recognition stage.  In other
words, she provisionally attributed imagistic references to the "wild rose-bush"
before she decided to read it symbolically.  This is not to say that she was
ambivalent about the semantic function of the "wild rose-bush" once she
entered the closure stage of her reading; she was adamant that it was a symbol.
Rather, it is important to note that she associated physical characteristics for
the phrase "a wild rose-bush" prior to assigning it a symbolic function.
Traditional literary convention reflects this constitutive relationship between
"image" and "symbol."  Holman and Harmon, for instance, define "symbol" as
"an image that evokes an objective, concrete reality and has that reality
suggest another level of meaning"; the editors of The Norton Anthology of
English Literature define it as "the representation of an object or event which
has a further range of reference beyond itself."  Both of these definitions
ostensibly claim that while some textual features have only literal meanings, a
"symbol" should always be understood to have both literal and figurative one's.
As discussed above, the critique of text-immanent fictional meaning thoroughly
undercuts all notions that words can be reliably identified as images or symbols
which "have" definite literal or figurative references.  However, this dissertation
concerns itself more with how readers commonly perceive words in a fiction than
what words theoretically or even "really" are.  From this perspective, readers
consistently confirm that literary "symbols" perform both a literal and figurative
function.  Ann, for instance, believed there was a "real" rose bush growing next
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to the prison door in Hester's "world" even while she was insisting that it was
primarily a symbol for the "passion," "beauty," and "romance" which is
victimized by the narrow-mindedness of Puritan morality.  Although clearly Ann
had imagined a fictional "world" which included "a wild rose-bush," she
subsumed that understanding under what she apparently believed was a better,
or at least more complete, symbolic understanding of the words.  
Although the theoretical problems surrounding the distinction between
"literal" vs. "figurative" reading-acts are very complex and as of yet unresolved,
in lectical practice symbolic reference almost always coexists with an "imagistic"
understanding of a textual fragment, particularly in prose fiction.  I believe this is
true for two reasons.  First, although the semantic horizon of a word changes
when it is read primarily as a symbol, most of the items in that horizon are
extrapolated from physical characteristics commonly associated with that word.
This is obviously the case with words like "rose" which commonly denote
material "things" (its common symbolic association with "love," for instance, can
be attributed to physical characteristics of rose plants, like sweetness, softness,
even thorniness), but it is also true with words that primarily denote concepts
rather than things.  The adjective "wild," for instance, does not denote a
particular material "thing," but it does often denote a particular horizon of
phenomenal characteristics that can be applied to almost any thing or concept;
a wild rose, a wild horse, and even a wild idea are going to be unruly, untamed,
and free, or at least existing outside a recognized order.  Once the abstract
characteristic is associated with a material thing, therefore, it can be "imagined"
to denote physical qualities; a wild rose might have some dead branches and
probably is not pruned; a wild horse might rear at the approach of a human and
have a matted mane; a wild idea could make someone shake their head or laugh
due to its unreasonableness.  Such "imagined" references are highly contingent
upon the pre-understanding of the reader, but they are not absolutely arbitrary;
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there are semantic conventions surrounding "wild" and "rose-bush," for
instance, which delimit what images they might denote both separately and
when considered as a single textual feature, regardless of the reader's
idiosyncratic experience.  Particularly in fictional reading-acts, one doesn't have
to insist on the theoretical primacy of literal understanding to recognize that the
imagistic possibilities which occur to a reader during the recognition stage of a
reading-act affect to some extent what a textual feature might mean when read
as a symbol.
The second reason why symbols almost always have an imagistic
component is that words in a fiction are usually understood within and/or
against a fictional "world."  Interpolating a "world" from words is perhaps the
most fundamental lectical strategy, next to the assumption that language
imparts meaning.  Even the mnemonics used to teach the alphabet traditionally
employ rudimentary narratives, little stories which assert that words and even
letters are to be understood within a world.  The New England Primer (c. 1683),
for instance, matches a letter with an illustration and a short couplet: "D - A Dog
will bite/A Thief at night" (83).  Such methods teach beginning readers not just
to understand words within a world but usually within a particular world.
Accordingly, the Primer taught colonial Americans that "The Idle Fool / Is whipt
at School," "Job feels the Rod/Yet blesses GOD," and "Our KING the good/No
man of blood" (83).   
Sometimes the world offered by such mnemonics is quite explicitly
delineated, as in the Primer or in Tasha Tudor's A is for Annabelle, published in
1954.  Tudor's alphabet is also delivered in rhymed couplets accompanied by
illustrations of primly dressed girls playing with Annabelle, a precious, china doll
inherited from "grandmother."  Both the illustrations and the mnemonics
instruct the novice reader to associate the rudiments of written language with
the arch-narrative of traditional, Western femininity: "G for her Gloves made of
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fine leather/H is her Hat with an elegant feather…, S is for Slippers to wear at
the dance/T for her Tippet the latest from France…, W - her watch to tell her
the time/X is the letter for which I've no rhyme."  Both the narrative and
pictorial images of a certain feminine culture are explicit, if rudimentary and
archaic even in 1954.  According to A is for Annabelle, girls are elegant, stylish,
prompt, and flummoxed by difficult intellectual problems, like coming up with a
word that starts with X.  Interestingly enough, the illustration that accompanies
the X couplet depicts some other alphabet book open to a page which reads "X
is for Xerxes the king."  Both the New England Primer and Edward Lear's "A
Nonsense Alphabet" used King Xerxes to teach the letter X, but Tudor is content
to teach her reader's that they need not concern themselves with the world of
ancient kings; the feminine world that she offers is smaller, and less exotic.
Moreover, Tudor's illustration for  "X is the letter for which I've no rhyme" is the
only one in the book which does not depict either the doll or the little girls who
attend her with demure smiles on their faces.  Instead the two girls are drawn
from the rear bending over an alphabet opened to "X"; their expressions are not
represented, but the doll Annabelle is seen in profile, with a slight frown
replacing the smile that appears in every other illustration.  
Not all texts, of course, imply "fictional worlds" as explicitly delineated as
Tudor's.   Some texts, like Wallace Stevens' "Anecdote of the Jar," offer the
reader only hints about how one could make a world out of its words:
I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.
The wilderness rose up to it,
And sprawled around, no longer wild.
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The jar was round upon the ground
And tall and of a port in air.
It took dominion everywhere.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not give of bird or bush,
Like nothing else in Tennessee.
Although every line in the poem can refer to the physical attributes of some
thing existing in a "world" (with the possible exceptions of lines six and nine),
the descriptions offered are patently abstract.  We are told it is round, tall, gray,
bare, and on the ground, but these modifiers do little to describe the jar beyond
substantiating there is nothing remarkable about it.  We are given more
information, however, about what the jar "does" in contrast to the equally
abstract "wilderness" which surrounds it.  The jar "makes" the wilderness
"surround that hill"; it makes the wilderness rise up, and sprawl around it; it
makes the wilderness "no longer wild."  Since only lines 1, 2, 6, and 7 address
the jar by itself, it is fair to conclude that the poem emphasizes the conceptual
relationship between the words "jar" and "wilderness" more than it tries to
evoke a concrete description through them.  This is not to say that a reader
could not understand "Anecdote of the Jar" through purely Materialist reading
strategies; the poem most definitely would "tolerate" being treated as an image.
The abstract, conceptual nature of the words chosen by Stevens, however,
more strongly invites an Idealist reading-act.  In other words, the reader is given
much material to interpret the relationship Stevens constructs between the
words "jar" and "wilderness" as ideas or symbols but is given few materials to
interpret those words as images, as things which exist in a fictional world.
Readers who choose to interpret "Anecdote of the Jar" as a mimetic
representation of a fictional world will have to supply all the physical details of
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that world except that it contains a jar on a hill somewhere in the wilderness of
Tennessee.  In short, such readers will have to do most of the work.   
Readers who choose to read the poem with Idealist strategies, however,
receive substantially more help from Stevens.  Although most of the words in
the poem are too abstract to denote specific, concrete images, many of them
have a long semantic heritage as symbols; that is, as discussed above, they
constitute "symbolic systems" in and of themselves.  Accordingly, the words
"wilderness," "wild," "rose," "hill," "round," "air," "dominion," "bird," "bush," and
even "Tennessee" bring to a reading-act an identifiable horizon of semantic
conventions which are available to most readers.  Stevens' choice of verbs also
problematizes literal references a reader might try to make for such words,
particularly concerning the relationship between the "jar" and the "wilderness."  
Words like "made," "surround," "rose up," "sprawled," "took," and "give" imply
the jar and the wilderness are sentient beings, which is in conflict with their
conventional, literal denotations.  In other words, the contrast between the
literal denotations of words like "jar" and "wilderness" as objects and the
anthropomorphic quality of verbs like "took" and "give" create an aporia: one
that is more difficult to resolve for Materialist than Idealist reading-acts.
Although an image of non-sentient objects can be constructed out of
anthropomorphic verbals, combined with the abstract quality of the nouns listed
above this textual feature invites an Idealist/symbolic interpretation of the poem
as a whole and only tolerates a purely Materialist/imagistic one.  
The foregoing analysis is not meant to prove that "Anecdote of the Jar"
should be read as a "symbolic" poem but to explore the affinities and
resistances it has to various lectical strategies.   Moreover, this analysis begins
my illustration of how the three lectical modes - like the three indices of the
rhetorical triangle - are necessarily interrelated even though I assert they employ
different referential strategies.  
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Accordingly, the example above is meant to demonstrate that the
fundamental difference between the Materialist and Idealist modes is not that
the former treats words as pure images and the latter treats words as pure
symbols, but that these two lectical modes seek to ground fiction in the
reader's "real" world" in different ways: the Materialist by imagining and thereby
observing a fictional world as if it was real and the Idealist by interpreting a
fiction as a statement or message about the meaning of the world.  Using the
terminology of this dissertation, these different "target realities" imply different
"semantic contexts" within which specific textual features can be understood as
primarily either an image or a symbol.  
By contrast, the Subjectivist mode grounds fiction in a reader's "real"
world by focusing upon the reading-act as an experience in that world.   This
"target reality" implies that the experience of establishing reference for specific
textual features is itself one of the fundamental purposes of reading fiction.  In
other words, if fiction is to be lived, not just understood, then the contemplation
of fictional reference is a valid and valuable product apart from what a fiction
might or does mean to a specific reader.  Before a textual feature can be
experienced as contemplation, however, it must first be recognized as a lectical
problem that requires contemplation: i.e. it must be recognized as an aporia.
The "semantic context" of the Subjectivist mode, accordingly, is characterized
by the identification and acceptance of at least two, irresolvable referential
possibilities for a single textual feature: that is, its "aporetic horizon."  This
means, of course, that the Subjectivist mode is inherently dependent upon the
other two lectical modes to generate referential possibilities with which to
create an aporetic horizon.   
Let's return now to the comparison of Ann and my colleague's responses
to The Scarlet Letter to more concretely demonstrate how the Subjectivist
mode is both different from and yet dependent upon the Materialist and Idealist
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lectical modes.  As mentioned above, both of my readers had a pre-
understanding of The Scarlet Letter, but only my colleague had actually read the
novel.  She had, in fact, read it a number of times; like Ann, this means she had
a lectical "habit" available to her as she approached the novel once again at my
request.  Even before she finished reading, my colleague laughed and said "ah,
yes.  The roses at the prison door - perfect!"  Upon finishing the passage she
revealed why Hawthorne's words were "perfect" for her: "I can't read this
without thinking about what I'm going to go talk about in a few minutes," she
laughed, brandishing a stapled article in her hand.  My colleague proceeded to
explore various correlations between The Scarlet Letter and the article in
question, which apparently discussed the marginalization of the feminine voice
on the internet.  Among other things, she noted that Hawthorne's "wild rose-
bush" offers "mute testimony" on Hester's behalf against those that publicly
humiliate her, in part because she refuses to speak out against her lover
Dimmsdale.  My colleague applied this interpretation of Hawthorne's rose-bush
to the denigration of women on the internet by pointing out that that form of
male-dominance is also often witnessed in silence.  
Reducing her comments to their logical conclusion, I said to my colleague
"So, The Scarlet Letter is about misogyny on the internet."  "It's not just about
that," she replied, "I just can't help seeing these connections right now."  Upon
asking her what else the passage meant to her "right now," she attributed a
number of other references to it, including a version of Ann's symbolic equation
of the rose-bush with Nature/God and the revelation that in that part of New
England, of which she is a native, the rose bush would almost certainly be
covered with tiny white blooms in June, particularly since the jail was somewhat
inland.
While she was exploring these interpretations, my colleague referred back
to the text a number of times, reminding herself of Hawthorne's exact words.  In
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addition, she was so animated while she discussed the passage - smiling,
laughing, using physical gestures to emphasize her points - that I told her it
seemed like she was having fun.  She laughed again, and said, "Well, Hawthorne
gives you a lot to play with."   
  Immediately one can see some fundamental similarities between the
reading-acts reported by my two subjects.  Both had a pre-understanding of the
novel as a whole and employed that information while reading.  Both also
considered a variety of imagistic and symbolic references for the passage at
hand.  Both identified the words "a wild rose-bush" as a significant textual
feature: something that without prompting they felt compelled to respond to
somehow.   
However, the way my two readers used these similar elements during
their reading-acts differed in some fundamental ways.  For instance, my
colleague used her pre-understanding of the novel as a whole in a less totalizing
way than Ann.  Instead of using what she already knew or believed about The
Scarlet Letter as the model for her reading-act, she used it as material with and
against which she created new interpretations of the novel as a whole and the
first two paragraphs of it in particular.  For instance, her new understanding of
The Scarlet Letter as an allegory for the treatment of women on the internet
was conspicuously affected by her previous readings of the novel, but was
neither superceded by nor limited to them.  When asked, she immediately replied
that the novel was not "just" an allegory about the internet, although she
"couldn't help" from reading it that way "right now" because an article she had
just read and was on her way to discuss was also about how women - like Hester
- are still publicly humiliated in cyber-space.  Like Ann, my colleague tacitly
admitted to importing the theme of the unjust and hypocritical persecution of
women from her previous encounters with the novel, but her application of that
theme to the first two paragraphs of the novel was less absolute.  While Ann
161
claimed the phrase "a wild rose-bush" was a symbol for the novel as a whole, my
colleague went to some lengths to apply what she already thought about those
words to what she was currently thinking about in her "real" life.   Moreover, my
colleague was more ambivalent about all of the possible interpretations she
generated during her reading-act.  For instance, she almost immediately qualified
her new internet allegory interpretation of the novel by pointing out that
Hawthorne has a very ambiguous relationship with traditional male-dominance,
both as a canonical, male writer and due to particular textual features of the
passage under consideration.  For evidence, she cited that although "Nature"
might be a sympathetic witness to Hester's persecution, according to her own
interpretation, it offers no real assistance: only silence and commiseration.  
In addition to these references, part of what my colleague admitted to
enjoying about Hawthorne's work was the verisimilitude of the setting in Colonial
Boston.  Born and raised in the area, my colleague was certain what kind of rose
bush Hawthorne placed at the prison door, what the temperature likely was in
June, and even knew the approximate geographical orientation of the prison in
relation to the coast, downtown Boston, etc.  In other words, she was quite
willing and able to (re)imagine a "fictional world" she had created for The Scarlet
Letter.  Moreover, she used specific physical characteristics she attributed to
the "wild rose-bush" - whiteness and hardiness - as part of her new "allegorical"
interpretation of the novel.  As she explored her interpretation of the rose bush
as a "mute" witness to Hester's public humiliation, my colleague checked
Hawthorne's words a couple of times, subsequently attaching the concept of
purity to the physical attribute of whiteness and the concept of immortality to
the physical attribute of hardiness.  Both of these symbolic connotations were
contrasted to the "black flower of civilization" (which she read as a symbol for
male-dominated culture) and incorporated into the range of meanings she
attributed to the passage.
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This last point identifies the most fundamental difference between how
my colleague and Ann read the first two paragraphs of The Scarlet Letter, and
why the former's reading-act was performed primarily in the Subjectivist mode.
My colleague used her lectical horizon for the text (i.e. those elements of her
pre-understanding of world she considered relevant to that reading-act) along
with the words of the text to develop a range of possible interpretations that
occurred to her at that moment, while Ann used the same basic materials to
identify a particular symbolic interpretation, from her perspective for all time.  If
pressed, Ann very may well have qualified her interpretation more; however the
fact remains that she was certain what the rose-bush meant to her.  Moreover,
it is almost certain that additional information - such as reading the rest of the
novel, for instance, or even learning what the critical term "metafiction" denotes
- might induce her to change her interpretation, but at the time, using her own
resources, she had come to a decision: Hawthorne's rose-bush is a symbol for
Hester/God/Nature and by itself presents the central theme of the novel.   
By contrast, my colleague consistently reevaluated each reference she
attributed to the text as soon as it was made.  Although in the past she had
come to a decision about what the passage meant, she used those
interpretations as a foil for, rather than a foregone conclusion about, the new
responses she had to the text in the moment.  Although I can't pretend to know
for sure what had or was happening in her mind as she read and spoke about the
passage, according to her own report and my observations of her, her reading-
act seemed to continue long after she read the words the first time at my
request.  As mentioned above, she did have immediate responses to it - "The
roses at the prison door: perfect!" - which included both new and prior
interpretations of the novel.  However, she was not content to end her reading-
act with those references.  Instead she chose to continue reading after she
finished the first two paragraphs; she bounced one idea off another, returned to
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the text for further information and inspiration, and paused at times to think and
reconsider how her various ideas about that fiction at that moment interrelated.
It is quite possible that her decision to "play" with the text as much as she did
was influenced by the context within which she performed her reading-act;
sitting alone by herself, approaching the novel again due to some other
motivation than the request of a colleague, she may have read it much less
elaborately.   Whatever pressure she may or may not have felt to perform an
impressive reading-act, she chose to respond to the challenge presented by
Hawthorne's words - and my request - by resisting a number of plausible
references which could have resulted in a single, unified interpretation of the
passage.  By contrast, Ann responded to a similar - although certainly not
identical - challenge by considering the possible references that occurred to her
and choosing what she saw as the best one.  
Above I asserted that choosing a "target reality" during a reading act was
tantamount to choosing a role or perspective in relation to a fiction, and that
the Idealist and Subjectivist modes achieved that task differently; the Idealist
reader approaches the text as a translator, and the Subjectivist reader
approaches it as a collaborator.  These two roles tacitly accept different levels
of responsibility for the ultimate product of a reading-act - an aesthetic object -
and in the process imply a different conception of what an aesthetic object is
and how one goes about creating it.  A translator's job is to change the form of
whatever is being translated - be it a poem, a pictograph, or a line of software
code - so that it can be understood.  By definition, something that has been
translated is no longer what it was, but the assumption is that its new form
closely corresponds to the meaning of its old, at least if is to be considered a
"good" translation.  When translating different languages, these
correspondences have to be created according to the translator's best
understanding of the semantic conventions of both vernaculars, otherwise
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connotation and style might be lost.  For instance, the phrase "me gusta mas" in
Spanish is better translated into English as "I like it" rather than "it pleases me,"
even though the latter represents the syntax and the denotations of the words
more directly.  Translating "me gusta mas" as "it pleases me" ignores the
informal tone of the phrase, shifts it into a slightly more formal style, and implies
a passive point of view which - by convention - the phrase does not evoke in
Spanish.    
So, one translates a word or phrase from one language by recognizing the
word or phrase in another that best represents the original's complete meaning.
Analogously, in the Idealist mode one translates a textual feature of a fiction by
recognizing a correspondence between that feature and a "symbolic system"
drawn from the reader's pre-understanding of world which he or she treats as
the fiction's intended meaning.  If, for instance, my colleague had decided that
her internet allegory best represented the meaning of the first two paragraphs
of The Scarlet Letter, then I would identify her reading-act as being primarily
Idealist, and moving into its closure stage with that decision.  If she had done so,
one could deduce that she had likely established reference for that passage by
recognizing a correspondence between it and at least three symbolic systems,
none of which can be completely delineated (because they existed only in her
mind at that moment) though they can be provisionally delimited, or at least
named.  These would be: 1. Her recollection of the theme she had attributed to
the novel in prior reading-acts, 2. Her understanding of the critique of male-
dominance, and 3. Her recollection and interpretation of the article about
feminine voice on the internet.  Although below I will discuss how scholarly
tradition might evaluate the use of such symbolic systems as being more or less
plausible "translations" of the passage, lectical analysis - even of a hypothetical
reading-act - seeks only to identify which strategies are actually used by a
reader.  Pursuing that goal, if my colleague had stopped reading the passage
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once she established reference between the text and the symbolic systems
listed above, she would have performed a model, if somewhat complex, Idealist
reading-act.  
By all evidence at our disposal, however, my colleague did not stop
reading at that point; she continued to play with Hawthorne's words until I
observed out loud that she appeared to be enjoying herself.   As soon as I
caught her having fun, she stopped contemplating the possible meanings of the
text, assessed her reading-act (i.e. by laughingly admitting that Hawthorne had
given her "a lot to play with"), and began to ask me questions about my project,
why I had asked her to read the passage, etc.  As mentioned above, the closure
stage of a Subjectivist reading-act commences when a perceived aporia is
accepted as a lectical problem that does not have to be resolved.  Instead, it
can be contemplated as an event in and of itself before the reader continues
reading or moves on to some other activity in the "real" world.  At exactly which
point in time my colleague began to play with the aporias she recognized in the
passage is hard to determine.  It is quite possible that she was poised to do so
before the reading-act began due to a lectical "habit."  In other words, her pre-
understanding of Hawthorne's corpus, her prior experiences reading The Scarlet
Letter, her conception of how one should read fiction in general, and/or her
perception of the context of this particular reading-act may have induced her to
approach the text with the intention to create an elaborate or at least careful
account of what it might mean.  It is also quite possible that at some point
during the reading she recognized a textual feature that could or should be
contemplated, began to do so, and thereby entered the closure stage of her
reading-act.  Whenever it began, it is pretty clear when the closure stage of her
reading-act ended: i.e. with her implicit assessment of it as a pleasurable
reading-act.  I believe my colleague was still performing her reading-act during
her conversation with me up until the moment when she laughed (a non-verbal
166
communication of her pleasure or possibly embarrassment at my recognition of
her pleasure) and admitted she had been playing with Hawthorne's words.  At
that moment she stopped reading Hawthorne and started doing something else -
talking to me.  By contrast, by the time Ann started talking to me she already
had closed and assessed her reading-act; the passage was best understood as a
symbol.  During our conversation, she only repeated and defended an
interpretation that was complete by the time she looked up and asked "Do you
want to know about the rose bush?"   
If the semantic context of a textual feature is the principle by which a
reader establishes reference between the words of a fiction and some version of
world, then one should be able to discover the semantic context of my
colleague's reading-act by observing what the text came to be for her during her
reading.  The 'rose-bush" passage did not become a particular meaning for her,
as it did for Ann, or an image in a fictional world, as it might have for some other
reader.  It became an experience, an event in my colleague's quotidian world for
which she took partial responsibility - as a collaborator - and was able to assess
after it was over.  She took her time with the text, indulging her different
interpretations of it alone and in comparison to each other without committing
to any of them.  Her commitment seemed to be to the process rather than
product of her reading.  One of the obvious differences between the three
lectical modes is that readers tend to spend more time in the closure stage
during Subjectivist reading-acts than in the other two modes.  Although
"contemplation" occurs at the speed of thought (unless it is simultaneously
expressed in language as a reading-text, as with my colleague's reading-act),
one can assume that it takes comparatively longer to elaborate and interrogate
multiple references for a textual feature than it does to imagine it in a fiction
world or develop a single symbolic reference for it.  This does not mean that
Subjectivist reading-acts are necessarily more complex, informed, sophisticated,
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or correct, only that their purpose is to interrogate rather establish reference.
The process of deferring reference for a textual feature, however, almost
paradoxically establishes a Subjectivist reading-act as a phenomenon in the
reader's "real" world that then can be perceived, assessed, and valued like any
other phenomenon.  In other words, an aporia encountered in a text can become
an aporia in a developing aesthetic object through a Subjectivist reading-act;
needless to say, jumping the ontological boundary from words on the page to
thoughts in the mind is just as significant - and fraught with pretense - in the
Subjectivist mode as in the other two modes.
The foregoing double use of the word "aporia" causes little confusion in
the classroom (amazingly enough), but I should make a few further distinctions
here.  Teaching students how to "spot" aporias is the first skill they need to
learn to practice lectical analysis.10  As will be detailed in a subsequent chapter, I
give students a list of general distinctions between "textual" and "lectical"
aporias, between aporias that can be recognized by anyone "in the text" and
those that can only be identified with any certainty by analyzing the reading-
text of a particular reader.  Although the distinction between these two types of
aporias is slippery, the process of interrogating how the apparent "lectical
aporias" of a reading-text relate to particular textual patterns calls attention to
both the contingency and the determinacy of actual reading-acts.   Since the
distinction between these two types of aporias is principally delivered to
introduce students to particular critical skills needed to perform lectical analysis,
I do not generally emphasize the equivocal nature of that distinction: unless
someone asks, of course.
 In addition, students seem to have little trouble distinguishing between
the general theoretical point that lectical mediation is instigated by perceived
                                                 
10 See Appendix A for the handout regarding "spotting aporias."
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aporias and the Subjectivist strategy of treating a particular textual feature as
an aporia.  The postulate that reading is the process of creating coherent
aesthetic objects out of inherently aporetic texts is presented as a provisional
"truth" to students, and only at the beginning of the course as a theoretical
justification for spotting "real" aporias in the reading-texts created by them and
others.  Although this shift from the theoretical to a practical denotation for the
term "aporia" does not cause them undue confusion, the sheer range of lectical
events that might be aporetic sometimes does.  They readily recognize that
those textual patterns listed as "textual aporias" (graphic breaks, shifts in
diction, repetition of textual patterns, to name a few) strongly invite lectical
mediation of some sort.  They also seem to understand that some "lectical
aporias" are highly conventionalized (e.g. perceived conflicts in semantic
reference and function or perceived limits of a textual feature) and some are
more inherently idiosyncratic (e.g. commencing or stopping a reading in progress
or a perceived resistance of a textual feature to one's lectical strategies).  By
interrogating this admittedly vague boundary between conventional and
idiosyncratic response, and by emphasizing that both types of response are
always needed to perform reading-acts, students often become more
comfortable with expanding their lectical repertoire, while at the same time they
get a clearer sense of what kind of conventionalized responses are good
candidates for evidentiary examples in (graded) reading-texts.  In other words,
they sharpen their awareness of what "reading too much" into a fiction means,
and how the criteria for plausibility changes when one shifts from creating a
private reading-act to creating a public reading-text.11  
                                                 
11 Here as elsewhere I am following Rorty's distinction between private versus "cooperative" projects, i.e. a
Pragmatist ethics based on establishing consensus for mutual benefit.  A concise account of his thoughts on
the matter can be found in "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," 28ff.
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However, it generally takes a little time to convince students that aporias
of any kind are not just "problems," "issues," "gaps," "questions," or "impasses"
but they can also be perceived as invitations to and progenitors of pleasure.  So
far, I have discussed and given examples of aporias as agents of "disruption," as
moments in a reading-act which "impede" its orderly progression towards
closure.  The vaguely pejorative connotations of most of these
descriptors/figures for aporias occlude what I see as one of their most important
functions, particularly when they are recognized as aporias in a Subjectivist
reading-act.  Aporias can be the mark of stylistic beauty, or at least stylistic
"distinction."12
What I am thinking about here are those moments when readers find
themselves paying attention to how a fiction is written rather than what it
represents or means.  Traditionally, such moments have been discussed under
an appreciation of style, and have employed faintly archaic qualities such as
"eloquence," "sublimity," "vividness," and "beauty" as the abstract marks of
text immanent "feeling."  Above, I tried to demonstrate that traditional notions
of style equivocate between the words of a text - its diction - and the affect of
reading those words, at least one of which is the assessment of stylistic value.
During that discussion I maintained that in the Subjectivist mode readers choose
the diction of a fiction as the textual focus of a reading-act in progress.  One of
the causes (or consequences, since I conceive lectical modes paradigmatically)
of choosing diction as the textual focus of a reading-act can be a recognition of
stylistic difference between the fiction at hand and other fictions the reader has
consumed.  This recognition can be attributed as a mark of singularity, a badge
of distinction that nevertheless exists only in comparison and contrast to other
textual patterns, other attributions of style.  In other words, stylistic "affect" as
                                                 
12 See Derrida's Aporias, 13ff, for a discussion of the pejorative connotations of the word "aporia," both in
his corpus and in common critical parlance.
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I conceive it is a contemplation or interrogation of a perceived difference, a
difference that subsequently can be valued or ignored, but which always takes
the form of a dialogic exchange between the experience of reading the diction at
hand and prior experiences with other "dictions."  Whether a reader hates, loves,
or takes no notice of the unique diction of a fiction is a function of what
experiences he or she has had - and can remember - regarding the appreciation
of style.  This explains why students will often equate the diction of writers as
different as Shakespeare, Milton, and Dryden.  From their experience, all three
textual patterns are identical: they are archaic, complex, and all use the word
"fain" as if it means something.  From one (academic) perspective, such
assessments of style are wrong.  Traditional literary pedagogy corrects such
"mistakes" by expanding a student's understanding of Seventeenth Century
diction and teaching him or her how to read for style.   A neo-literary
appreciation pedagogy can - and should - also pursue these classroom goals, but
it can do so while highlighting the fact that stylistic affect and value is always
assessed through the same lectical strategy, whether one is a first semester
freshman or a tenured professor.  The fact that they already read for style -
albeit too often unconsciously - tends to make the stylistic appreciations of
more informed or sophisticated readers seem less mysterious - or idiotic.      
Below I will more thoroughly discuss some of these distinctions about how
semantic context is established in a reading-act, particularly regarding the
problematic relationship between strategies of closure and strategies of
assessment.  First, however, I need to outline how individual textual features are
consolidated into a perceived "whole text" so that my refined definitions of
"closure" and "assessment," when I turn to them, will have more practical force
and utility.  The foregoing discussion of semantic context primarily focused on
relatively simple textual fragments; I have done so, of course, for clarity.  Most
reading-acts, however, are significantly more complex than the few
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demonstrative examples I offer above.  In the next section, therefore, I will
outline how one can talk to students about the often intimidating complexity of
reading-acts in a relatively simple way.
172
Chapter Three: Lectical Coherence
For there is always going on within us a process of formulation and
interpretation whose subject matter is our own self.  We are
constantly endeavoring to give meaning and order to our lives . . .
with the result that our lives appear in our own conception as total
entities.
Erich Auerbach, Mimesis
A reading-act has "lectical coherence" when a reader perceives it as being
adequately unified or, in other words, when the reader has solved to his or her
satisfaction the aporias that he or she has recognized while creating an
aesthetic object.  The Lectical Triangle includes three general ways of
establishing lectical coherence between textual features and the aesthetic
object: i.e. by establishing "episodic," "analogical," or "dialogical" motifs.  Below
I will outline how each of these different methods can develop a single, unified
aesthetic object by sequentially incorporating the textual features a reader
recognizes in a fiction.
Throughout this project, I have used traditional literary terms to describe
what textual features are treated as when they are consolidated into an
aesthetic object.  A word, phrase, sentence, etc. can be treated as an image,
symbol, or aporia, and these can be used to form larger semantic groups, which I
also name according to literary tradition.  For instance, a group of images can be
consolidated into an idea of "setting" which in turn is consolidated as an element
of "plot."  Moreover, nothing stops a reader from using the same textual feature
for multiple semantic functions.  In the example of Hawthorne's "rose-bush," for
instance, we found that even a reader who insisted that textual feature is
primarily a symbol also recognized that it is to some extent an image.  One can
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always conceive of a "pure" Materialist or Idealist reading-act, but such events, I
believe, are relatively rare (even though for the sake of clarity I occasionally
offer demonstrative examples which imply the contrary).  As will be
demonstrated below, most reading-acts use strategies from all three lectical
modes even when they are predominantly characterized by one of them.   
All of these semantic groupings, this vast web of referential possibilities
and correspondences, must be managed and effected by a cognitive process
that in the most general terms can be called "memory recall."  Iser goes to some
lengths to describe how aesthetic objects are recalled from memory during a
reading-act both in comparison and contrast to how "everyday" phenomena are
stored and retrieved from memory, at least in part so he can substantiate his
claims through cognitive psychology and ordinary language philosophy.  My
model of the relationship between reading and recall is significantly more simple,
but consequently more abstract.  Lectical analysis only requires two types of
ideas available for recall at any given moment during a reading-act: 1. Those
ideas that are in the reader's pre-understanding of world. 2. Those ideas that
collectively constitute the aesthetic object.  Iser maintains that such ideas are
consolidated as "gestalten," groups of thoughts with a perceived or potential
correspondence of some kind, the creation of which is stimulated by the words
on the page.   
I have no quarrel with this formulation or the body of psychological theory
it comes out of, but lectical analysis requires a detailed account of the principles
according to which such ideas are organized more than a comprehensive,
theoretical account of what they are.  Moreover, words like "gestalt" tend to
make undergraduates' eyes glaze over, so I try to employ terminology which is
at least nominally familiar to them whenever possible.  Hence, I am content to
teach my students that "textual features" stimulate readers to remember
thoughts they already have about the world and the fiction at hand and that
174
these thoughts are organized as different categories of meaning: images,
symbols, plots, themes, settings, characters, tone, style, etc.  As an aesthetic
object is built up during a reading-act, therefore, it becomes less and less
directly connected to the text that stimulated it, as Iser points out, and more
guided by the way the text has been consolidated into an aesthetic object
through these different categories or groups of thoughts.  These groups are
interconnected in a variety of ways; smaller groups, for instance, combine and
overlap to make larger groups.  The Scarlet Letter, for example, includes many
occasions of the word "rose" and a number of variations on the word "forest."
A reader might create a "rose" group and a "forest" group as separate groups
of images, and subsequently include both of those semantic groups, along with
others, into an "setting."  At the same time, however, the reader might
recognize the "rose-bush" passage as a symbol for "nature," or some such, and
thereby begin to establish connections with textual features that he or she
believes invite a similar attribution, such as occurrences of the word "forest."
Even from this brief, hypothetical example, one can see how many different
"groups" of thought are possible and necessary to even reductively represent
the complexity of aesthetic objects.  Once again, this problem is greatly
mitigated during lectical analysis by proceeding from the products rather than
the potential causes of an aesthetic object.  
During lectical analysis, however, we do need to be able to identify as
many of these semantic groups as we can, so we need terminology that
represents the various layers that might be revealed or implied by a given
reading-text.  I will use the word "motif," therefore, to denote a group of
thoughts about a fiction which are developed out of at least two textual
features.  New textual features - or ones that are re-read - are consolidated into
the aesthetic object as part of a "motif": a collection or sequence of thoughts
that have a perceived consistency in their semantic reference or function.  I do
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not explain to my students exactly how one recognizes the word "wheelbarrow"
can be turned into an elaborated idea of a setting, for instance; to do so would
require teaching them a general theory of cognition, a task I leave to psychology
professors.  Instead, I use the abstraction "memory recall" to denote the
process by which readers establish both semantic reference and function for the
words before them.  
Although the use of memory during a reading-act is different in some
ways from how it is used in "ordinary" life, by applying what they already (think
they) know about memory to the act of reading fiction, students almost
immediately grasp some important concepts about aesthetic objects that would
otherwise entail a great deal of theoretical superstructure.  First, memories are
highly subjective, and therefore unique to the individual, but they are not
completely arbitrary; they are at least based upon some "real" event.  Second,
memories are not equivalent to the event they supposedly represent; some of
the physical details of events are radically simplified or even distilled in memory
and some are emphasized and elaborated.  Third, memories seem real but are
notoriously untrustworthy; more accurate reproductions of a past physical
event, such as a video tape, often reveal more and different things about an
event than are recalled.  Fourth, memories can be extraordinarily elaborate and
complex, and yet be recalled in an instant.  Fifth, memories are available for
interpretation, revision, and assessment by the person who recalls them.  Sixth,
we use memories of past events/ideas to interpret present phenomena.
Seventh, memories can be comprised of recognizable, interdependent parts that
nevertheless are perceived as a unified whole.  The analogy between "ordinary"
memory recall and the way aesthetic objects are developed during reading-acts
can only be pushed so far, but it does supply students with an easily understood
framework within which they can begin to explore the differences and similarities
between what they think is "real" and how they pretend fictions are real.
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The last observation about memory recall listed above - that memories
are comprised of recognizable parts that nevertheless are perceived as a unified
whole - corresponds quite closely to what I call lectical coherence.  Following
distinctions made above about the first three lectical tasks, lectical coherence is
established in the three modes according to what a given textual feature is
being treated as.  In the Materialist mode, therefore, a textual feature being
treated as an image is incorporated into the aesthetic object by establishing a
correspondence - through memory - between that textual feature and at least
one other image which already exists in the aesthetic object.  The group of
thoughts that is thus created is perceived as a "motif": a serial repetition of an
identifiable semantic reference or function.  The general principle of
correspondence that binds such images together in the Materialist mode is one
of coexistence.  They are treated as things, people, events, or conditions which
both exist in the same fictional world (i.e. in the target reality of a Materialist
reading-act).  As detailed by my discussion of Materialist "lectical focus" above,
fictional worlds are generally processed as a plot, a story about some thing or
event that is constructed out of many various details, such as attributions of
character, setting, conflict, climax, narrative events or action, etc.  Even though
the textual features which stimulate these and other elements of an attributed
plot may be encountered piecemeal and out of "chronological" order, clearly
readers have the ability to organize these different elements into a coherent
progression of fictional events.  
According to lectical convention, these fictional events must be
consistent with what the reader believes about the fictional world he or she is
making as well as what he or she believes or knows about the "real" world.  One
of the most common strategies for organizing fictional events with some
consistency is through an attribution of a "fictional chronology" not necessarily
equivalent to the order in which those "events" are developed during a reading-
177
act out of textual features.  In other words, readers accumulate information
about fictional worlds by changing the actual chronology of a reading-act into a
fictional chronology, a pretense of a sequence of interrelated fictional events
that is consistent with the reader's understanding of quotidian chronology.  As
in quotidian experience, one develops, revises, and reassesses one's
understanding of what a fictional thing, person, or event is as more information
about it is revealed or imagined.  
One of the most obvious differences between quotidian and fictional
chronology is that the latter is based upon the assumption that fictional events
have a coherent significance within a complete fictional world, even if neither
has yet to be determined.  In other words, as soon she reads a textual feature
as an image, a reader knows (from lectical convention) that image is more than
just a part of a fictional world; she also knows that it is at least a significant and
quite possibly a crucial element of what that fictional world already is.  This a
priori projection of coherence upon fictional reading-acts accounts for why
readers have no difficulty elaborating an entire world and attributing multiple
semantic relationships from even the briefest of textual features, such as "a red
wheelbarrow/glazed with rain/next to the white chickens."  
Fictional chronology, therefore, is developed in a heightened state of
awareness of the significance of its constituent elements in comparison to
quotidian chronology.  Each new textual feature which is perceived as an image
must be assigned at least a provisional significance or function in relation to the
entire fictional world to which it presumably belongs but which has not yet been
constructed.  Although most of us would like to know the ultimate meaning of at
least our own life, if not Life as a whole, most of the time we are not constantly
attuned to how that meaning depends upon our quotidian experience from
moment to moment.  Interestingly enough, those who do constantly see
universal importance in the minutia of daily life - Jonathon Edwards, for instance
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- usually understand their lives as being a small chapter in a grand narrative,
often written by a deified author.  During a fictional reading-act, however, every
detail, every image which a reader encounters, may be the defining moment, the
semantic crux of an entire fictional world.  At the very least, therefore, readers
are compelled to identify what a textual feature is or does in relation to what, by
convention, it might be.  Textual features read as images are therefore
organized within recognizable motifs, which are given a provisional significance
as a part of a whole which has not yet been revealed.  These parts are organized
not as mere moments in time that may be significant, as in quotidian
chronology, but as episodes whose significance and fictional chronology are a
priori assumed will be understood by the time the fiction has been completely
read.
The importance of this heightened awareness of the a priori significance
of fictional textual features cannot be overemphasized, and to my mind is one of
the key differences between aesthetic and quotidian experience.  I would hazard
that there are moments in our "real" lives that take on an aesthetic character
from the same projection of a priori significance: the birth of one's child, for
instance, or one's wedding.  Similarly, one appreciates the aesthetic qualities of
a sunset, for instance, by attending to its various phenomenal details as if they
are important in themselves; noticing the exact shade of orange upon the
fringes of a cloud and the sails of a catamaran becomes an object for
contemplation rather than just some things one sees.  I am aware this does not
constitute a full-blown theory of aesthetics, but I would assert this heightened
sense of the significance of particular phenomena is characteristic of aesthetic
experience, whether the phenomenal stimulus of that experience is a sunset, a
person, a song, or a novel.  Determining exactly what kinds of phenomenal cues
invite a person to produce an aesthetic object, of course, is the holy grail of text
immanent aesthetics.  Although I am not on that particular mission from God,
179
lectical analysis does concern itself with delimiting how such invitations are
made during fictional reading-acts, even if I have no recourse but to sweeping
abstractions like "lectical convention" when it comes to distinguishing between
more or less "aesthetically inviting" textual patterns.  The human mind is the
Chapel Perilous of aesthetic affect, and we do not yet have any but anecdotal
accounts of its mysteries.  This does not mean that supplicants to the altar of
art do not have relevant things to say about their aesthetic experiences - after
the fact.  I guess this conceit casts lectical analysis as a straw poll of celebrants
at the church door: "Oh, ye with the divine light in your eyes, tell me of the
sanctum sanctorium...."
We may not know what exact words will instigate a particular reading-act,
but we do know some of the beliefs that readers of fiction are strongly impelled
to employ when they approach a text as fiction.  Lectical convention, at least,
mandates that all the textual features of a fiction be addressed with the
attitude that they are unified, in some yet to be determined way, and therefore
are all of some relative importance.  All three lectical modes respond to this
mandate of lectical convention, albeit, as we shall see below, in different ways.  
Focusing on the Materialist mode for the moment, however, episodic
motifs satisfy this mandate to organize accumulated information about a
fictional world when they perform the function of "exposition."  When episodic
motifs operate as exposition, therefore, they exist as an ever-evolving taxonomy
of the different fictional things, people, or events a fictional world might include.
This expositional function is often suggested to readers by a perceived
repetition of an image.  If, for instance, in the first chapter of a novel a
newspaper vender is mentioned once ("he nodded at the trollish newspaper
vender just as it started to rain."), is apparently given brief dialogue in the
second ("'Hey,' the old man said, 'are you just gonna read that, or you gonna
buy it too?'") and is found dead in the third ("I found out the next day that the
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sirens were for the corner newsman, who had been killed for no good reason by
no one in particular."), most readers will craft a motif - the vender - which can
be thereafter be treated as a single image, a character, a part of the setting, a
symbol, etc., etc.  A key characteristic of all motifs is that they remain open-
ended and available for modification until after the entire fiction has been read
and assessed.  Moreover, inclusion in a motif is not dictated purely by an explicit
repetition or variation of a textual feature.  In the above - hypothetical - novel,
for instance, the deduction that the words "the trollish newspaper vender," "the
old man," and "the corner newsman" all refer to a single fictional person is not
absolutely required of the reader, but that deduction or something like it is
strongly invited.  There is nothing that stops a reader, however, from attaching
every mention of print media or of old men in subsequent textual features to
the "vender" motif.   Moreover, the reader is free to attach idiosyncratic
semantic references or functions to that motif which can affect her aesthetic
object.  The reader's grandfather, for example, may have been short, fat, ugly,
and mean - i.e trollish - and therefore she subsequently attaches those
references to a kindly "grandfather" depicted later in the novel.   
Motifs in general are developed as perceived repetitions of an identifiable
semantic reference or function; the expositional function performed by some
episodic motifs is promoted by organizing textual features into provisional
categories subject to conventionalized understandings of physical being in the
world.  Textual patterns, of course, will often exploit these conventions.  As
mentioned above, the author does not have to explain that all three textual
features of the "vender" motif are offered as a single fictional person because
lectical convention dictates that images should be attributed the same basic
properties as the quotidian phenomena to which they seem to refer, except
when to do so would create an aporia.  Although we do not have access to the
actual "images" created by a reader in response to a textual feature, we always
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know something about the physical properties that should be attributed to them
through recourse to the semantic horizon of its words.  The first textual feature
above, for example, mentions "a trollish newspaper vender."  These words do
not tell the reader much for certain about the fictional person they invite him or
her to imagine, but they explicitly invite an attribution of personhood and
occupation, both of which are semantically delimited in some specific ways.
Personhood itself tells us some things about what the word "vender" should be
imagined as.  Persons - unless specifically otherwise indicated - have object
permanence, that is they continue to exist even when we are not in their
presence or thinking about them.  It is mandated by lectical convention,
therefore, that if the word "vender" is read as a fictional person, that person
continues to exist in the fictional world attributed to the fiction one, two, or ten
chapters later.  Since that fictional person is a "newspaper vender," we also
know something about his social status.  Currently, any one who sells
newspapers on the street belongs to the working-class.  This attribution is very
complex and highly contingent upon the reader's own class identity, but is
nevertheless strongly invited; whatever this textual feature comes to mean to a
particular reader, to some extent it calls for a class reference.  The newspaper
vender might turn out to the mayor in disguise or an eccentric millionaire, but
until the text offers different or more information, one should assume the
vender is relatively poor, an assumption which is deeply resonant in Western
culture.  The entire phrase "a trollish newspaper vender" probably also delimits
the attribution of gender.  Could a woman sell newspapers on the street?  Of
course - I saw one doing so last month.  I'm fairly certain, however, that the
occupation of newspaper vender is heavily marked with a male gender identity.
Similarly, trolls are usually represented as male, although there are some
exceptions.  One could substantiate this assumption with various cultural
artifacts, but never establish more than some sort of ratio: one which
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establishes a more or less likelihood of gender.  My point is that we do not need
to know the exact probability of a newspaper vender being male to know that
the words "a trollish newspaper vender" probably invites an attribution of
masculinity.
In the classroom, this "probability" can be substantiated by a quick straw
poll.  Getting in the habit of polling students about the connotations they
attribute to textual features reinforces a number of the main precepts of lectical
analysis.  First, it makes more explicit the depth of mediation involved in any
reading-act.  Since attributional discrepancies usually surface, polling also gives
the class the chance to compare notes.  Doing so often leads to interesting
investigations of their different understandings of words and "the" world.  In
addition, polling tends to illuminate the often vast differences between my
understandings of life and literature and those of my students.  In other words,
it keeps me cognizant of my own ignorance of their world and thereby keeps me
more honest about my own mediations between text and world.
Another common function of episodic motifs is the attribution of
causality, that is, when images are treated as "real" things, people, or events
which affect each other in a fictional world.  For instance, an image of a
rainstorm may be joined to an image of a frown as an episodic motif even
though no causal relationship between them is made explicit by the words of the
text. In this way a whole host of correspondences are deductively created by
readers according to their pre-understanding of world and the current aesthetic
object.  A fiction does not have to delineate "the heavy rain had seeped through
his cotton jacket soaking him to the skin which made him uncomfortable and
therefore he frowned" to establish a connection between the words "rain" and
"frown" and thereby treat those words as images within a coherent episode, in
this case united through the principle of material causality.  The unifying
potential of the smallest details of fiction treated as cause is a mainstay of
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fiction as a whole, but is perhaps most obviously exploited by mysteries or
detective stories.  "A loose hair," "a dropped handkerchief," "a rough
childhood": any such textual features can be attributed with a causal power that
unites many other images into a single motif.   
Although the above demonstrative examples are commonplace
observations of how unified motifs can be built out words (particularly when
applied to a traditional prose narrative), students have to learn how to analyze
even these basic lectical strategies before they can understand more
complicated and less commonplace conventions for mediating fiction.  Moreover,
episodic motifs in particular are often created unconsciously and therefore bear
scrutiny.  Granted, part of the value of episodic motifs is this very
unconsciousness; they are perceived by the reader as transparently happening
rather than being created.  As stated above, most Materialist strategies are
both dedicated to and created by maintaining the illusion that a fictional reality
is being observed as one observes quotidian reality.  At least one of the goals of
lectical analysis, however, is to take that illusion apart after it has been cohered
into an aesthetic object.
I am aware that my ubiquitous use of the word "as" does not adequately
explain the problematic relationship between how motifs are developed and how
or to what extent fictions "invite" readers to make certain lectical choices.  One
of the important questions which straddle this relationship is whether or not
reading-acts which ignore "invitations" from a fiction can be characterized as
wrong.  The simple answer to this question is yes: readers can create aesthetic
objects which are demonstrably incorrect.  Authors create fictions with an
awareness of lectical conventions, even if only because they practice those
conventions themselves.  As mentioned in an earlier chapter, however, whether
lectical conventions are chickens or eggs is difficult, and unnecessary, to
determine while analyzing the pragmatics of reading.  In order to perform a
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fictional reading-act according to current lectical conventions , one needs to be
able to recognize textual patterns which have traditionally been used to invite
certain lectical strategies.  The creation and comprehension of any linguistic act
requires that the speaker and the auditor both understand the fundamental
lectical conventions of the dialect being used as well as its vocabulary and
grammar.  If this were not the case, newly-coined figurative expressions would
be unintelligible without a gloss.  For instance, if I write, "Philosophers are
constantly applying nail polish on the claws of tigers," my reader will recognize
the semantic conflicts between the subject of that sentence and its object
phrase as an invitation to read it as a metaphor.  This is not because a literal
understanding of the sentence is impossible - who knows for certain what the
illuminati do in their free time, and I could always be ignorant, joking, or lying -
but because my reader knows that the grammatical relationship asserted
between "philosophers" and "tigers" clearly exceeds the common denotations
and connotations of their respective semantic horizons as literal or "real" things
in the world, and therefore, according to lectical conventions shared with me, I
am probably  asking to be understood figuratively.  This conflict between the
semantic horizons of the words of my sentence is not just apparent, it is an
objectively identifiable "textual aporia."  It is "in the text" as much as the
conventional definitions of its vocabulary.  Moreover, the fact that the above
sentence appears in a doctoral dissertation and is marked - by "for instance" -
as a demonstrative example, suggests the sentence asserts something about
the "real" world in general and the immediately preceding claim in particular, at
least according to the lectical conventions of formal academic prose. Without
any other information about how to interpret the sentence as a "real" assertion,
it would be incorrect to understand it as a plausible assertion of what
philosophers really do to tigers; it should be understood as either 1. An
unbelievable, unsupported, and specious claim 2. A joke, or 3. A metaphor.  
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The claim that any textual feature "should" be understood in a particular
way highlights the dependency this project has upon an "Pragmatist" ethics of
some sort, one that I am aware is more implied than delineated in these pages.
Sure, it is easy to create demonstrative examples which appear to have
"objectively identifiable" textual "invitations," but what are the specific ethical
imperatives, presumably contained within these shared "conventions" I keep
talking about, which authorize one to determine for certain whether a particular
understanding of a text is "right" or "wrong"?  My short answer is that such
determinations are made according to a Pragmatist understanding of the ethics
of public behavior.  We are given the freedom to read according to our own
inclinations albeit within broadly circumscribed criteria: i.e. lectical convention.
The "private" act of reading, therefore, takes on the ethical quality of a "public"
act, what Rorty would call a "project of social cooperation" (28).  This is one of
the elements of my central analogy between reading books and interacting with
people which I believe is not merely figurative.  I believe that lectical convention
dictates we should give fictions the same regard, the same respect for alterity,
that is accorded to the thoughts and words of other people in the "public"
sphere.  Just as a Pragmatist account of public behavior impels us to seek
consensus out of self-interest, and therefore circumscribes "proper" ways of
behaving towards others, a Pragmatist account of lectical behavior impels us to
perform our subjectively determined acts of meaning production according to
certain pre-ordained dicta.  In other words, both quotidian and lectical behaviors
are performed under and subject to an internalized understanding of the rule of
law.
According to the assumptions above, responses to textual patterns are
delimited by lectical conventions which wield the cultural force of law, although
one may obey or disobey any of these laws in many ways.  One can always
choose to be a "outlaw," and as long as ones reading-act is never articulated as
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a reading-text, the penalty is usually fairly light.  However, fictions are written
with an understanding of and an appeal to lectical conventions, so even such
"closet" lectical outlaws are often excluded from what they have to offer.  In
this same vein, ignorance of a law does not defend one from the penalties of
violating it, particularly once a reading-act has been expressed as a reading-text.
The penalty for flagrant violations of lectical convention in public are also usually
quite slight, but occasionally - for professional literary scholars and their
students, for instance - such violations can carry a sharp fine.  
All this indicates that ignoring the authority of a particular lectical
convention over a textual pattern under its "jurisdiction" is a mistake within the
specific cultural context that defines those laws.  By choosing to read a text as
fiction within a particular cultural context, therefore, one tacitly agrees to
recognize and obey such laws in some way.  Just as there is a big difference
between the received moral tradition of a given culture and the codification of
that tradition into a legal code, there is a big difference between the received
lectical tradition which any reader must understand in some way to create a
reading-act and how that tradition is represented in writing as systematized
"laws" of reading.  Traditional literary pedagogy is full of such laws, stretching
from the dicta of Aristotle's Poetics to the less direct legal code implied in the
headnotes of current literary anthologies.  Since no such set of laws is equal to
the task of comprehensively representing the lectical conventions of a culture at
a given moment in time, they usually are quite general, abstract, and qualified.
Like the laws of a political body, therefore, such lectical laws deliver their
exceptions along with their rules.
Following this tradition within both the teaching of and discourse about
literature, I offer the lectical triangle as a codified system of "laws" which
represents the lectical tradition of Western culture at the turn of the Twenty-
first century.  Just as a legal code must be practiced as jurisprudence, I also
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offer in this dissertation a procedural method for interrogating this system of
lectical laws, a method I collectively call here lectical analysis.  The presumption
of writing down THE LAWS of reading fiction is not lost on me, no matter how
much I qualify or backpedal.  Moreover, I attempt this project only because the
lectical tradition I attempt to represent through the lectical triangle is already
being taught in literature courses, albeit, I contend, too often too
unsystematically for students to understand its implications.  What they do
understand, or at least hope, is that there must be some laws governing the
reading of fiction, if for no other reason than they are aware they will be judged
according to their ability to obey those laws during class assignments.  Given
this implied requirement of the literary classroom, and pushing the analogy
between a legal code and the lectical triangle a bit further, requiring students to
read fiction without giving them explicit limits how they should behave during
those readings is like telling citizens they will be punished for immoral behavior
without defining what "moral" behavior is in at least a general way.  Although
social order can be maintained in such a political climate (by force), its
administration would necessarily appear arbitrary at times, and therefore
promote the kind of anxiety often demonstrated by students of literature.  A
publicly articulated system of law and jurisprudence, however, offers a forum for
negotiating the ambiguities that are always present in an abstract legal code.
Under such circumstances one can always appeal to the court of public opinion.
I embarked upon this digression from my discussion of Materialist lectical
coherence to explain, qualify, and hopefully substantiate some of the normative
gestures already made and lay the ground rules for those to come.  The only
real justification for this dissertation and the classroom method it describes is
its utility as a discursive heuristic for the almost hopelessly complex process
through which readers "close" fiction.  Its other main goal of being an accurate
representation of current theories of reading fiction is only achieved, therefore,
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if it is simple enough for students to learn and apply to specific reading-texts.
The ultimate pedagogical goal of lectical analysis is for students to acquire the
tools and the experience to practice a particular skill: the skill of analyzing and
critiquing the cultural tradition surrounding fiction.  Before they can critique that
tradition, however, they need to have a general idea of what it is, particularly as
it manifests within collegiate-level academic culture.  The "laws" delivered by the
lectical triangle, therefore, have to be elastic enough to represent the freedom
that readers have within that culture but honest enough to account for the
abstract but pervasive normative tradition within which that freedom is
delivered.  It is in this spirit that I make distinctions between textual features
that invite, tolerate, or resist certain lectical strategies.
Returning to my discussion of Materialist "lectical coherence" in particular,
there are many functions an episodic motif might perform simultaneously.  I
have already discussed above how readers can attribute fictional chronology,
exposition, and causality to a series of textual features as the organizational
principles for episodic motifs.  These three common functions of episodic motifs
correspond to conventional ways of organizing sense phenomena moment by
moment in our "real" lives.  This last point calls attention to a general function
of motifs that is not often examined closely, except by reading theorists: how
motifs build expectations during the course of a reading-act.  For instance, it
stands to reason that a reader who understands the "vender" motif as a
character would look for different correspondences for it in subsequent textual
features than a reader who understood the same motif as setting or mood.
While the "vender" motif as character might very easily be made to correspond
to some other character motif, thereby changing the significance of them both,
that same motif treated as setting might more likely be understood along with
images like an overturned garbage can, dirty rain in a gutter, and the
subterranean rumble of a subway car to create an idea of a fictional place within
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which fictional events take place.  Although such "expectations" do not
absolutely dictate how a reading-act progresses, there is no doubt that
individual readers develop lectical "habits," some which can become quite
inflexible.   Moreover, since the referential possibilities of almost any textual
feature are manifold, readers often will continue to develop motifs they have
already recognized when confronted with a similar textual feature rather than
explore other ways to understand it.  The textual features listed above which
constitute the "vender" motif, for instance, could quite easily be interpreted
collectively as a "symbol" (perhaps for the "heartlessness of the city" or
"senseless death" or some such) subsequent to understanding it as setting, but
doing so would require the reader to shift lectical gears, so to speak.  That
readers shift gears constantly during their progress through a fiction is obvious
and necessary; that they also often do not recognize invitations to do so out of
lectical habit is less obvious, but can be substantiated somewhat by lectical
analysis.   
For instance, I noted above that the phrase "a trollish newspaper vender"
probably invites an attribution of male sex, but definitely invites an attribution of
personhood.  Since that textual feature does not specifically denote gender, it
would tolerate the attribution of female sex to the vender.  Upon the
appearance of an "old man" selling newspapers in a subsequent chapter,
however, it would be demonstrably wrong to ignore the textual invitation to
create a motif, since personhood includes the characteristic of object
permanence.  The strong invitation to treat the two textual features as an
episodic motif about a single fictional person would thereby be in conflict with
identifying the vender as a woman.  I maintain that the lectical aporia thus
created should be resolved by changing an attribution that is tolerated - the
vender is a woman - to be consistent with an attribution that is strongly invited
- the "trollish newspaper vender" and the "old man" tending a newspaper stand
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are the same fictional person.  Readers have great freedom regarding how they
resolve such conflicts (perhaps the vender motif is a not just a fictional person,
but primarily a symbolic allusion to Tiresius, and therefore has the gender
identity of a hermaphrodite), but they are not given the freedom to decide
whether or not such conflicts should be resolved.  Hence the process of reading
always involves second-guessing our lectical choices as we encounter new
evidence about them from apparently relevant textual features.  In other words,
each new textual feature implicitly interrogates the "rightness" of the aesthetic
object developed thus far.    
One can see from the preceding discussion that the three "functions" I
identified with episodic motifs describe only a few of the many qualities
commonly attributed to the quotidian world which readers pretend are qualities
of fictional worlds.  Many other conventionalized beliefs about reality, like object
permanence and stereotypes of class or gender, are used during Materialist
reading-acts to build up a fictional world out of episodic motifs.  Moreover, due
to the deferral of responsibility for fictional worlds to an other, readers are often
more likely to act upon conventionalized beliefs than they are during quotidian
actions, at least partially because they are required to do so.  The aesthetic
object should be constructed according to the unique textual pattern of the
fiction at hand, but the cultural references thereby invited are subsequently
available for critique by our "quotidian" identity.  That is, although we must read
according to the stereotypical beliefs about the world we think are probably
invited by the text, we can ultimately assess the resultant aesthetic object
according to our unique understanding of self-in-the-world.  After I create a
coherent aesthetic object, therefore, I am free to disagree with the terms of the
fictional world I helped create.  This dialogue between the conclusions of our
lectical and quotidian selves is not only allowable, it is necessary for the ultimate
assessment of a fiction, the final lectical task of a reading-act.
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Clearly, however, not all fictions invite episodic motifs as explicitly as the
example offered above.  In fact, some readers are extraordinarily devoted to
developing a Materialist understanding of all fictions, even when doing so is only
tolerated or in some cases resisted by a text.  Consider, for instance, Adrienne
Rich's poem "Our Whole Life":
Our whole life a translation
the permissible fibs
and now a knot of lies
eating at itself to get undone
Words bitten thru words
meanings burnt-off like paint
under the blowtorch
All those dead letters
rendered into the oppressor's language
Trying to tell the doctor where it hurts
like the Algerian
who walked from his village, burning
his whole body a cloud of pain
and there are no words for this
except himself  (133)
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In many ways, this fiction seems to resist Materialist reading strategies, at least
in comparison to more traditional narratives.  The first problem that confronts
readers here is deciding what constitutes a textual feature.  Theoretically,
textual features can be of any length, but as indicated above one can only
regard so many words at once before they must be translated into thoughts.
Even a fiction short enough to be memorized with little effort, such as "Our
Whole Life," is not read by a memorization of all its words; fictions are broken
down into smaller units - textual features - according to the inclinations of a
reader in response to the patterns of a text.  One of the most conventionalized
systems of textual organization, of course, is formal grammar.  In short, readers
often treat grammatical subdivisions of a fiction as cues to how it should be
broken down into manageable textual features.  "Our Whole Life," however, is
difficult to consume according to formal, expository grammar.  Phrases and
sentences are not marked with punctuation (saving a lonely comma in the
twelfth line), conjunctions and other connectives are often omitted where one
might expect to find them, and verbal functions are left ambiguous.
Consequently, it is difficult to say for certain what the semantic relationships
between many of the words are meant to be using only formal English grammar.
Readers of "Our Whole Life" should, of course, recognize that it is offered
as a poem, and consequently can and should be read using organizational
conventions that exceed formal grammar.  How does one know "Our Whole Life"
is a poem and should be read differently?  One answer is that it appears in a
book subtitled "Poems old and new"; that is, Adrienne Rich purposefully marked
the publication that I purchased as poetry.  I could always read the text as
something else as well as a poem - cultural criticism, perhaps - but failing to
recognize its textual pattern is poetic would be contrary to my implicit
obligation to follow lectical convention, an obligation which I bring on myself
when I choose to read.  Students in an undergraduate literature class, moreover,
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are positive "Our Whole Life" is a poem because their instructor has told them
so and it is listed under "Contemporary American Poetry" in the anthology in
which they read it.  In other words, the lectical context of the text strongly
invites readers to approach "Our Whole Life" as a poem, and therefore apply
certain lectical strategies strongly associated with that genre of textual pattern.  
But let's say, hypothetically, that a reader finds "Our Whole Life" typed
as above on a discarded piece of paper.  Without a doubt, the textual pattern of
a title followed by lines of words broken occasionally by extra spacing still
strongly invites being read as poetry.  Moreover, readers should know that
poems often do not always follow formal grammatical conventions and that the
semantic relationships between their words are not always explicitly indicated,
and therefore be able to recognize that textual pattern in "Our Whole Life."  One
could, of course, create a text that used this textual pattern that was not meant
to be read as a poem.  An office memo, for instance, in this pattern might read
something like this:
Memo to all employees
Memo to all employees our newest colleague
just hired a vice-president
many years labored cincinnati ohio
working for Procter and Gamble
All those pesky deadlines defeated
welcome her new family member show
now, the ropes of our own making
utmost consideration  
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Even if this text is offered in the lectical context of an inter-office memo, in
addition to that context, and the lectical strategies thereby implied, its readers
should also recognize that its textual pattern identifies it as poetry.  However
readers resolve the apparent conflict between the lectical context of the text - a
brief communication from management at the workplace - and the textual
pattern it is offered in, for it to be intelligible the text would have to be read
according to an explicitly poetic grammar, governed by different organizational
cues than formal, expository, non-fictional prose: i.e. the textual pattern that by
convention is used in inter-office memos.  Whether it is understood as a poem, a
joke, a typo, or nonsense, readers should confront the aporia created by the
text's invitation to employ conflicting cultural conventions during their reading-
acts.
Once a reader recognizes "Our Whole Life" as poetry, therefore, there are
a number of organizational cues he or she should also recognize.  These, like all
other lectical conventions, are accessed through memory and are managed
according to probability.  "Our Whole Life" offers one such cue in its title.
Titles, a reader should know, often offer an organizational principle for their
fictions in and of themselves.  In other words, titles give readers an
organizational focus prior to engaging the subsequent words of the text.  The
title Billy Budd, for instance, tells the reader to look out for a character by that
name, and when that character is encountered, to treat him as an important if
not central clue to what that fiction means.  Likewise, The Scarlet Letter and
"The Red Wheelbarrow" call attention to a certain textual pattern in their
respective texts.  Without reading anything but those titles, readers should
recognize that Hawthorne and Williams invite them to look for textual features
that correspond to those titles because they are the likely focus of an
organizational plan.  Upon confronting the textual pattern of "Our Whole Life,"
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however, this lectical convention at least partially conflicts with another cultural
convention regarding poems as a sub-genre of fiction: i.e. poems are often titled
by their first line.  In other words, the title of "Our Whole Life" very well may not
be an invitation to focus upon those words when they are encountered in the
first line; it may purely serve a naming function, a way to distinguish this poem
from others.  This conflict between fictional conventions constitutes a textual
aporia, one that should be recognized on some level by readers as a lectical
aporia, a problem to be resolved during the reading-act.  The first words of the
poem "Our whole life" are even more thoroughly marked as a textual aporia in
that their semantic relationship with the noun phrases that follow it is not made
explicit.  "Our whole life," "a translation," and "the permissible fibs," in other
words, are offered as a series of things without clear directions about how they
are interrelated, and therefore each might be read as subject, object, or
appositive.  Moreover, lectical tradition stipulates nouns can and sometimes
should be attributed a verbal function while reading poetry.  
I maintain that the lack of an explicit grammatical cue regarding the
function of those words requires readers to fall back on lectical conventions
which might imply how they can or should be interrelated.  One of the most
fundamental cues of function in formal grammar is sequence.  In English, the
most basic sequence of grammatical function is subject-verb-object.  This
convention identifies the phrase "Our whole life" as the likely subject of the idea
of the first textual feature of the poem, whatever words that may include.
Readers are not compelled, of course, to read even the words "Our whole life"
together, much less along with "a translation the permissible fibs" as
constituting a single textual feature.  As noted above, the lack of grammatical
hypotaxis between the three noun phrases constitutes a textual aporia.
Moreover, as I will discuss below, the words "our," "whole," and "life" are all
textual aporias due to their overtly polysemous semantic horizons, and therefore
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each is conspicuously available to be treated as a textual feature by itself.
However, the textual pattern of "Our Whole Life" offers readers another
organizational cue with which to overcome the problem of creating textual
features out of its words: it is explicitly pre-organized into sections with line
spacing.  The double spacing between the first two lines and the next two
strongly invites readers to divide the poem into groups of words to be treated
together, and to continue to treat subsequent double-spacings as individual
parts to be compiled into a single unified text.  This textual pattern is likely
parsed by the reader before the first word of the poem is read, but certainly by
the time he or she confronts the problem (for the first time) of which words
constitute textual features.
In combination with the other "cues" mentioned above, I assert that this
textual pattern strongly invites readers to regard the first phrase of the poem as
the semantic focus of at least the first two lines.  An analysis of the textual
aporia can get us this far, but to proceed we need to turn to a description of the
lectical strategies which might be applied to that first phrase: i.e. a description
of how the different lectical modes might organize an aesthetic object
depending upon what the first phrase is read as.  In other words, since the
reader will be all but required to decide at least provisionally what the first
phrase "our whole life" should be read as by the time he or she finishes the first
two lines, it stands to reason that that decision will greatly affect how the rest
of the poem is organized and thereby understood.  Starting with the Materialist
mode, if the words "our whole life" are read as an image that is moreover
marked as being an important if not "central" image, it follows that the words "a
transaction / the permissible fibs" will be subordinated to it in some way as
other images which explain what it means or does, if not as a "subject" per se
then as a semantic focus.  This implication sets up a potential lectical pattern -
or habit - depending how a reader attributes function to these first eight words.
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If, for instance, the reader understands "a translation" as an appositive phrase
subordinated to "our whole life," he or she has established a lectical pattern;
that is, he or she will likely at least provisionally project the same hypotactic
function upon the subsequent phrase "the permissible fibs."  If the reader
thereby treats the first two lines of the poem as a sequence of related images
all of which are organized according to the semantic function of defining the
words "our whole life," he or she has by my definition created an episodic motif.
A conventionally dictated quality of all motifs is that they are "open-
ended" as long as the reading-act is still in progress.  That is, all motifs operate
as categories of thoughts which potentially might be useful to incorporate
subsequent textual features into an evolving aesthetic object.  Accordingly, I
maintain that readers who decide the first two lines describe "our whole life" as
an image, a thing in a fictional world, will approach the third line of the poem
with that same lectical strategy highlighted among all the other possible lectical
strategies available to them.  Although the double line break marks the third line
as belonging to a different part of the overall textual pattern of "Our Whole
Life," the fact that it starts with the conjunction "and" invites readers to
consider continuing the motif established in the first two lines.  If the reader
perceives no conflict to incorporating lines three and four as more appositive
images included in the developing "our whole life" motif, then it seems
reasonable that the reader will approach the next textual feature with an even
stronger inclination to continue developing that motif/image.  Following this
likelihood, the decision to treat the first words "our whole life" as an image sets
up a lectical pattern that can organize the entire poem as a single episodic
motif, a series of attempts to define what the fictional thing represented by
"our whole life" is or might be.
The orderly progression of this pattern of lectical coherence could be
interrupted in a variety of ways, of course.  A reader might, for instance, decide
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that the capitalization of "Words" in the fifth line constitutes a conventionalized
textual cue that a new thought has begun.  Following that convention of formal
written grammar, the poem would not have eight textual features indicated by
line breaks - all subordinated to the "our whole life" motif - but a total of four
textual features beginning on lines one, five, eight, and ten respectively.  This
alternative parsing of the textual pattern puts the phrase "Our whole life" on a
more equal footing with the phrases "Words," "All those dead letters," and
"Trying to tell."  There simply is no way to predict for sure how a given reader
will manage these conflicting textual cues (as well the many others not
mentioned) before the fact; all one can do is analyze how textual aporias
probably instigated lectical mediation according to the evidence of a reading-
text.  That the same textual pattern can explicitly invite both of these lectical
patterns underlines the speculative nature of lectical analysis and the limits of
its ability to describe what really happened during a particular reading-act.  Two
readers, for instance, very well might use these different patterns of lectical
coherence to come to the same basic conclusion: that the poem is about the
image "our whole life," an image from which an entire fictional world could be
interpolated.  They might, therefore, create very similar reading-texts based
upon very different reading-acts.  Conclusions about the exact pattern of lectical
coherence each used should be correspondingly tentative, but one could be
quite certain that the principal strategy of lectical coherence in each was
creating some sort of episodic motif.
For the purposes of defining episodic motifs in comparison to the motifs
of the other lectical modes, however, I want to consider more closely what kind
of fictional world might be created by treating the entire poem as a single motif
focused on the words "our whole life" as image.  If the subsequent words of the
poem are understood as appositives of that phrase, at first glance the fictional
world that is thereby constituted is a very strange and patently metaphoric
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world.  In other words, the strategy of lectical coherence suggested above
characterizes "our whole life" as the only fictional thing that "exists" in the
fictional world created out of it; all the other images in that episodic motif are
attempts to describe that one "real" fictional thing through figurative language.
This begs the question how can a figure of a fictional thing be an "image" itself,
that is a fictional thing in its own right that is pretended to "exist" in the same
fictional world as its "literal" referent?  The answer is deceptively simple: such
figures can be understood as images of fictional speech.  In the quotidian world,
people often use elaborate figures to describe a particular thing or idea,
particularly when that thing is represented initially in language as abstract as
"our whole life."  Moreover, whole strings of figurative appositives might follow
such an utterance in ordinary language, all of which should be understood as
different verbal strategies employed by the speaker to communicate an
understanding of a single, literal thing or idea.  Since fictional worlds are
constituted - in part - according to qualities conventionally attributed to the
quotidian world, there is nothing that stops a reader from pretending an entire
poem is an "image" of a fictional verbal gesture.  
This one point indicates how important episodic motifs are to lectical
coherence in general.  To whatever extent words in a fiction tolerate being
understood as representing utterances about a thing in a fictional world, to just
that extent they can be understood as an element of a fictional person.  A
verbal utterance requires a person, whether that person is actual or fictional.  All
attributions of author, speaker, narrator, and character, therefore, can be and in
many cases should be deduced from such attributions of fictional speech.
Episodic motifs, therefore, are most often responsible for solving the lectical
problem of "who is speaking" during a reading-act through a pretense of fictional
personhood.  Although there are other ways to resolve that problem, clearly the
pretense of the author's voice is one of the most common, followed closely by
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the pretense of hearing a story told by a narrator.  Even when a fiction gives us
no explicit cues to create a speaker, as in "Our Whole Life" or "The Red
Wheelbarrow," lectical convention dictates that we can always deduce a fictional
person from textual features.  
Some textual patterns, of course, invite an attribution of certain kinds of
fictional people.  An author can always be attributed as the "voice" who is
speaking, but some textual patterns explicitly imply other fictional people should
be imagined by the reader.  Narrators, for instance, can be attributed to some
textual patterns which would resist being understood as the author, like when an
event is described which the "real" author could not have witnessed.  Similarly,
quoted or paraphrased dialogue in a fiction indicates some fictional person
should be imagined other than the author or narrator.  That every word in a
fiction must have been written by the "real" author(s) does not inhibit the
ubiquitous practice of creating fictional worlds inhabited by these various types
of fictional people, all of whom are each constructed during a reading-act
through the development of episodic motifs.  Episodic motifs, therefore, in
addition to the other functions listed above, are also the way readers manage
the traditional literary concept of "point of view."  Readers decide, in other
words, "who is speaking" at a given moment during a reading-act by recognizing
a correspondence between a textual feature and an already existing motif of
fictional personhood or, alternatively, by attributing to that textual feature a
new fictional voice.  Whether a reader treats the "our whole life" motif,
therefore, as an image of the "voice" of Adrienne Rich, an anonymous authorial
speaker, or a character, once he or she attributes fictional personhood to the
poem's textual pattern it is a small deductive leap - for most readers - to
extrapolate an entire fictional world consistent with that one image.
A further implication of this function of episodic motifs is that almost all
Idealist and Subjectivist lectical strategies are to some extent made possible by
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them.  Before one can decide a fiction represents a symbolic meaning applicable
to one's understanding of the "real" world, as in the Idealist mode, one has to
attribute a point of view from which that symbolic meaning is represented.  I
should make clear here that the "point of view" which is attributed to a fiction
via an episodic motif is not the same as the lectical "perspective" from which
the reader makes that attribution.  Although I agree that many textual features
invite readers to adopt certain perspectives or roles in relation to them - i.e. the
reader-in-the-text identified in a variety of reader response models - I see a
substantive difference between those perspectives adopted by living persons
and the points of view attributed to fictional persons.  As discussed above,
one's perspective or role at a given moment during a reading-act defines one's
lectical relationship to the text, of which I recognize three basic types: the roles
of Materialist/observer, Idealist/translator, and Subjectivist/collaborator.
Shifting back and forth between these lectical perspectives may change a
reader's understanding of a given point of view, for example, a character's, but
doing so does not necessarily entail adopting that point of view.  Although one
can indeed pretend to "be" a character, that lectical strategy is just one of
many that can be used to develop a fictional world from the more general
Materialist/observer lectical perspective.  Accordingly, the same character motif,
once developed, can be used to attribute a symbolic meaning or as the impetus
to interrogate a textual feature as a lectical aporia.
For the above reasons, according to my taxonomy of lectical
perspectives, episodic motifs are disproportionately responsible for lectical
coherence in comparison to the Idealist/analogical motifs and
Subjectivist/dialogic motifs described below.  This, of course, is an artifact of
my central objective of the lectical triangle: to describe the most common,
general lectical strategies used by readers of fiction.  Following this objective, it
makes sense that my taxonomy reflects the ubiquitous practice of developing
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lectical coherence through the pretense of fictional being.  Most readers develop
a narrative context for textual patterns as a default or at least initial coherence
strategy, even while reading fiction like "Our Whole Life" which very well may
resist being read as a story.
The fact that episodic motifs are used more frequently and perhaps more
fundamentally than motifs from the other two lectical modes, however, does not
belie the importance of all three lectical modes to the act of reading fiction.
Episodic motifs are created according to the principle of coexistence, and
therefore organize fictions via the same system of reference most familiar to
readers: quotidian world-making.  One must have an idea about what a
phenomenon "is" in relation to other things in the world before one can assess
its value or meaning.  At least provisionally, readers tend to project this same
pragmatic upon the phenomena of sequentially encountered textual features,
establishing open-ended categories of co-existence between textual features.  
It is quite possible, nevertheless, for readers to recognize almost
immediately that some textual features can and sometimes should be organized
within a pattern of meaning rather than just a pattern of co-existence.  Patterns
of meaning can be developed according to the principle of semantic
"equivalence" between a textual feature or motif read as symbol and some
other textual feature or motif.  In this dissertation I call such patterns of
meaning "analogical" motifs.  Episodic motifs differ from analogical motifs in that
the former structures the pretense of continuous events in a fictional world and
the latter structures the pretense of equivalent reference to the reader's
understanding of world.  As pointed out above during my discussion of semantic
context, the only preconception about fiction that is more prevalent than the
pretense of fictional reality is the assumption of fictional meaning.  Fictional
meaning can be attributed to episodic motifs, of course, but as we shall see in
the next section that attribution is performed after coherence is established.
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The process of establishing lectical coherence via analogical motifs, on the other
hand, itself attributes a provisional fictional meaning.
Also as pointed out above, the decision to read a textual feature as a
symbol is most often preceded, if only momentarily and unconsciously, by
reading it as an image.  Either through a pre-understanding of symbolic
equivalence as a conventionally prevalent lectical strategy or a recognition of a
symbolic heritage of a particular textual feature (e.g. the word "rose" in
Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter), readers remember some thing or idea which a
textual feature appears to represent.  As in the rhetorical use of analogy, the
textual feature is thereby understood by attributing to it information about
some thing or idea that is already known, and therefore can be remembered.
During a reading-act this basic principle of organization can establish coherence
between textual features in a way that is much less circumscribed than in
episodic motifs.  Both types of motifs are developed according to perceived
resemblances between its members, but episodic motifs are governed by
conventions of literal meaning and analogical motifs are governed by
conventions of figurative meaning.  An episodic motif is workable, therefore,
only if it is consistent with the other fictional things, people, and events already
"coexisting" in the unique fictional world thus far developed during a given
reading-act.  An analogical motif, by contrast, is useful if it appears to add
meaning to the aesthetic object.  That meaning also needs to be reconciled to
whatever fictional world has been created, but, unlike episodic motifs, analogical
motifs are not bound by conventional understandings of being-in-the-world.
Concepts like object permanence, chronology, and a host of other "physical"
properties which must be considered while reading a textual feature as an image
do not need to be considered while reading it as a symbol or while re-reading an
image as a part of an analogical motif.  
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The foregoing characterizes analogical motifs as being gestures of re-
reading, of reorganizing textual features already understood as images into new,
specifically symbolic patterns of meaning.  This, I maintain, is the most common
use of analogical motifs; they provide an alternative method of meaning
production that however does not necessarily eradicate its initial mode of
meaning production.  Portions of an episodic motif understood as a character,
for instance, can thereby be made equivalent to portions of another character
motif in a way which accesses additional symbolic meaning without negating the
imagistic function of either character motif.  One can understand the deaths of
two characters, therefore, not just as events in a fictional world but also as an
opportunity to understand how the idea of death is represented by the fiction as
a whole.  This comparison and contrast of the specific terms of fictional being
allows a reader to assess not just what an image is or does within a fictional
world but also how it can be referenced to his or her pre-understanding of the
world.
Another important difference between analogical and episodic motifs is
that the former are recognized through apparent contrast as much as through
similarity.  In other words, textual features which are apparently very different,
for instance a character who dies and a character who survives, often can be
perceived as cues to understand them together, that is to give them
equivalence under a third index of meaning: a pre-existing symbolic system of
some kind.  Readers know through cultural convention that fictional death often
is meant to imply the rejection of qualities attributed to a character.  From our
earliest contact with fiction, we are conditioned to respond to this textual
pattern.  The big, bad wolf gets killed by the good woodsman.  The lazy little pig
gets eaten and the prudent little pig gets to laugh last.  Such textual patterns
invite readers to identify the abstract, conventionalized idea - or moral -
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according to which "good" and "bad" behavior can be recognized, not just in the
fictional world but also in reference to the reader’s quotidian world as well.13
Of course, not all invitations to create analogical motifs are as clearly
invited as in the textual pattern of "The Three Little Pigs," neither do all ideas
which they are made to represent take the form of a clear moral.  Like the
lectical habit of establishing a plot, however, attributing a central or dominant
set of ideas to a fiction is a very common and persistent lectical habit left over
from our early training as readers/auditors.  The symbolic potential of virtually
every textual feature keeps readers in a state of hyper-awareness of possible
symbolic meaning.  Moreover, once a textual feature has been read as a symbol
during a reading-act, it stands to reason that the reader's attention becomes
even more focused upon how other textual features or existing motifs might
also be organized into a more widely applicable symbolic understanding of the
fiction at hand.  Some textual patterns take advantage of this lectical
convention, and thereby invite the development of analogical motifs.  As I
pointed out above, Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter has a reputation for being an
overtly "symbolic" novel; just its critical heritage alone might invite a reader to
look for analogical correspondences between textual features more than he or
she ordinarily would.  
There are other textual patterns in that novel, however, that also
conventionally invite analogical motifs.  Hawthorne's choice of introducing at the
beginning of his novel a "wild rose-bush" which "might be imagined" to be an
agent of Nature is one such textual pattern.  As detailed above, the word "rose"
has such a vast symbolic tradition that almost any use of it in a fiction invites a
symbolic understanding of it.  The semantic horizon of "rose" is even more
emphasized by the conditional tense of "might be imagined" followed by an
                                                 
13 For a thorough interrogation of images and symbols of death in fiction, see Alan Friedman's Fictional
Death.
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example of what it might be imagined as: Nature.  This textual pattern calls
attention to the general lectical strategy of understanding fictional things to
mean more than what they seem.  A reader does not have to be conscious of
this reminder to receive it.  I submit that merely the sharp contrast between the
delicate blooms of the rose-bush and the weather worn "black flower" of the
prison is enough to suggest something more is meant by "a wild rose-bush" than
a plant.   
Needless to say, repetition also plays an important function in such
textual patterns.  The fact that most of the words of the first chapter of the
novel are occasioned by or contrasted to the "wild rose-bush" even further
encourages readers to approach that textual fragment, at least, as a source of
symbolic meaning.  I believe that once that recognition is made, subsequent
textual features are more closely examined, not just for "rose-ishness," to use
this example, but for symbolic potential in general.  A reader does not even need
to know, therefore, the traditional definition of "allegory" as a literary genre to
respond to the many allusions to that genre scattered through The Scarlet
Letter.  Readers may not know, for instance, that the character Pearl shares her
name with one of the most famous Christian allegories in English, but that
ignorance should not stop them from recognizing that name as an invitation to
create an analogical motif.  Quite simply, Hawthorne hedged his bets so
thoroughly that to ignore the symbolic potential of the name "Pearl" - both due
to its semantic horizon and a series of narrational speculations about what the
name might mean - would be a mistake.  Of course, what the name "Pearl," or
any other textual feature thus marked, is supposed to mean in particular is not
nearly as circumscribed.  In other words, the textual pattern of The Scarlet
Letter invites symbolic references in general but does not deliver a pre-
structured moral like a parable or a fable.
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Although most analogical motifs depend to some extent upon imagistic
understandings of textual features, some textual patterns invite or at least
tolerate reading-acts that are symbolic from the ground up.  The textual pattern
of "Our Whole Life," for instance, conspicuously calls attention to the
importance of its first phrase before a primary semantic reference or function
needs to be attributed to it.  Moreover, the fact that "Our Whole Life" should be
read as a poem should highlight for a reader one of the most conventional
stereotypes about poems: they are often meant to be understood symbolically.
Upon confronting the variety of textual aporias listed above in that poem, the
reader should therefore at least consider reading the words "our whole life" as a
symbol, a linguistic gesture whose primary referent is not some thing in a
fictional world but some idea about the reader's "real" world.  Above I
maintained that symbols are referenced to a pre-existing symbolic system in the
reader's pre-understanding of world, which includes of course a unique
understanding of received cultural conventions.  Of course, readers can build
their own symbolic systems during the course of a reading-act which thereafter
become available for symbolic reference.  In other words, as soon as a
provisional symbolic reference for a textual feature is made, it takes on the
function of a potential symbolic system.  Analogical motifs, therefore, often
perform the function of creating symbolic systems in response to specific
textual features by imposing a predetermined semantic relationship - i.e. analogy
- upon them.
In the poem "Our Whole Life," for instance, readers are perfectly within
their rights to resolve the textual aporia between the two noun phrases of the
first line by treating them together as an analogical motif.  Instead of treating
the first phrase as the subject of an imagined fictional speech, as in the episodic
motif I detailed above, this analogical motif requires that the reader compare
and contrast the two noun phrases to determine what they might mean
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together in reference to his or her understanding of world.  The resultant
symbolic system, therefore, is instigated by the implied question "how is 'our
whole life' like 'a translation'?"  Although I have not seen this particular analogy
before, there is a long tradition of comparing human life and experience to a
variety of texts: "You can't tell a book by its cover," "All the world's a stage,"
"You are being melodramatic, Gladys," etc.  As pointed out above, however, the
horizon of symbolic meanings generated by a reader need not be particularly
definitive or prescriptive; all they have to do is appear relevant to the reader at
a given point in a reading-act.  Moreover, lectical convention dictates that while
reading poetry, such symbolic meanings might be quite obscure; readers, in
other words, should expect poems to offer them symbolic references which they
might find unfamiliar.  
A reader who found only a few ways to understand those two noun
phrases together, therefore, very well might still perceive them as being
productive of some meaning and therefore valuable, particularly at the beginning
of a poem.  Upon confronting the next line - "the permissible fibs" - the same
reader might try to incorporate that line into the existing analogical motif or not,
depending upon the lectical horizon attributed to the motif.  If, for instance, the
reader decides that the motif means something like "life is like a translation in
that some things can not be communicated in words," then she may not
immediately see a connection between that idea about the world and the phrase
"the permissible fibs."  Two lines down, however, the line "words bitten thru
words" should catch the reader's attention as being relevant to an analogical
motif about words.  Lines five through nine all include denotations of language:
"meanings burnt-off like paint… all those dead letters… the oppressor's
language."  If these lines are incorporated into the motif established in line one,
the analogical balance between "our whole life" and "a translation" is changed;
the motif now offers more information about "language" and "words" than it
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does about "life."  Following conventions of analogy, this means that the
ultimate symbolic reference of the motif, the thing that is unknown but is
hopefully made known through the analogy, is best represented by the phrase
"Our whole life."  The remaining lines of the poem might not initially seem
relevant to this hypothetical reader, and therefore she might understand them
as a short narrative about an Algerian.  Since fictions are assumed to be unified,
however, the reader would at some point have to resolve that small episodic
motif to the analogical motif that initially structured the aesthetic object.  Most
readers would have little trouble doing so; after all the Algerian is "trying to tell
the doctor where it hurts" and "there are no words for this."  Since lines two
through four - initially omitted from the motif - are syntactically attached to line
five, "Words bitten thru words," the reader should be able to resolve all the
inconsistencies initially created by the analogical motif and thereby have a
complete, coherent understanding of the poem as a symbolic comparison
between "our whole life" and certain qualities of language.
A few elements of this hypothetical analogical motif should be
highlighted.  First, the specific terms attributed to the initial analogical pairing in
the first line determine the likelihood of subsequent textual features being
seriously considered for inclusion in that motif.  Since according to lectical
convention analogical motifs are useful if they produce symbolic meaning,
readers have great freedom while establishing the specific terms of that
meaning, much more so than when imagining the specific terms generated by an
episodic motif.   The semantic horizon of "our whole life" and "a translation"
considered together is neither infinite nor arbitrary, but a reader's choice of
terms from that horizon is not bound by received conventions of probability as
much as are choices made within the pretense of coexistence in a fictional
world.   Returning to the "legal versus moral" analogy used earlier in this
chapter, readers confronted with the task of attributing a symbolic reference do
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so knowing the "laws" governing their behavior are extraordinarily abstract.
They know they are required to act, and moreover to act rightly, but they are
given few if any details about what "right" or even legal action might be
regarding the specific textual features in hand.  As pointed out above, if such
readers feel they will be punished for "wrong" action - as undergraduate
students often do - this lectical task can be anxiety producing.  Most readers,
however, are aware that the "laws" pertinent to symbolic meaning production
are quite laissez faire; as long as they produce meaning and are made consistent
with the rest of the aesthetic object, symbolic attributions are "right."  Within
the sub-culture of collegiate-level scholarship, of course, a few additional,
equally abstract criteria of "rightness" are imposed upon readers.  I will discuss
the problem of accommodating these below when I address classroom
applications of lectical analysis.
This freedom that readers are given by lectical convention is reflected in
the hypothetical reading-act above.  Just because a close, scholarly reading can
detect symbolic correspondences in every line of "Our Whole Life" after the
fact, does not mean that a reader would be "wrong" to create an analogical
motif out of the two phrases of the first line and yet not see a correspondence
to that motif in the second line: at least not initially.  One can predict with some
certainty that readers should consider a particular textual pattern as an
invitation to develop an analogical motif, but one can not predict what the exact
terms of that motif will be because readers are given so much freedom in that
regard.  Particularly in the initial development of an analogical motif, as in the
first line of "Our Whole Life," the specific terms of the symbol attributed to it by
a reader change it from an identifiable group of words to a concept, an idea that
focuses upon a particular lectical horizon abstracted out of the broader
referential possibilities included in the semantic horizon for those particular
words.  Since this translation from words to idea is inherently reductive and is
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only governed by convention in the most abstract way, readers often create
symbols in response to textual features in the moment which ignore semantic
correspondences that might be recognized after the fact, that is, upon closer
consideration.   In the hypothetical example above, for instance, there is no
lectical convention that compels that reader to recognize a correspondence
between a thought represented by "understanding words in translation" and the
words "the permissible fibs" - at least upon initial consideration.  The word "fib,"
for instance, might carry a strong connotation of "childishness" for her or that
fibs are always spoken, connotations which she might not be able to attach
immediately to her ideas about the analogical relationship between translation
and life.  Failing to accommodate her understanding of "fibs" to the pre-existing
motif would not stop her reading-act in its tracks, it would only create a lectical
aporia that at some point would have to be resolved.  Exactly when or how such
lectical aporias are resolved can only be determined from specific reading-texts:
i.e. from a reader's report of what textual features caused him or her difficulty
and what strategies were used to overcome that difficulty.  
This point underlines another important quality of analogical motifs.  The
interpretive freedom that makes them highly semantically productive also tends
to create unique lectical aporias that have greater force than a given textual
pattern invites.  Iser writes that this is a necessary effect of the "selection"
process by which readers choose between the referential possibilities
"projected" by the text (124-34).  My point here is that readers should know
that lectical convention identifies symbolic meaning production as being an
overtly subjective action, and therefore it is okay to omit symbolic possibilities
that the author might have intended.  This lectical convention encourages
readers to create symbolic references which seem relevant to them at the time -
since they can not do otherwise - with the pre-understanding that their choices
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are not right or wrong, they are more or less productive and consistent with
themselves.  
This perceived shift in responsibility for the exact terms of the aesthetic
object from the author to the reader is characteristic of Idealist reading
strategies.  The perspective thus adopted is one of a translator, one who is
responsible for changing words which are initially unintelligible into ideas which
are coherent and meaningful.  Since readers should know something is always
lost in translation, they follow their own inclinations about what and how much a
given textual feature treated as a symbol should mean.  The further implication
of this lectical convention is that symbolic reference in general and analogical
motifs in particular should always be treated as referential guesses, provisional
attempts to create meaning which likely will have to been modified to be
expanded.   As long as one is reading from an Idealist perspective, one knows
that a symbolic reference has not been exhausted; one can always consider it
again in the light of new textual features.  Moreover, I submit that this
ruminative quality is inherent to symbolic meaning production, that according to
lectical convention, symbols are supposed to be considered repeatedly and
often in depth.  In short, symbols have the reputation for being sneaky; they can
be trusted only so far, so one has to keep an eye on them during a reading-act.
This conventionally dictated quality of analogical motifs suggests they are
developed hermeneutically.  An interpretation that seems to be meaningful is
considered in contrast and/or comparison to a textual that might be meaningful
under the assumption that they must be made consistent in some way.  The
hermeneutical method was developed in response to apparent conflicts in
scripture which were intolerable according to articles of faith.14  The appearance
                                                 
14 The fundamental interpretive methods of hermenuetical exegesis have been described by many over the
last millennia or so, but first and probably best by St. Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana, particularly the
first section.
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of conflict within this interpretive model is not only allowable, it is expected.
The interpreter's duty, however, is to develop some correspondence between
apparently conflicting elements of one's interpretation with the full knowledge
that the text not only tolerates such mediation, it requires it in order to be
understood.  Although according to lectical convention all referential gestures
are available for revision, Idealist strategies authorize error and
misunderstanding as being likely elements of meaning production.  The text,
according to the hermeneutical model, does not contain the whole truth it is
assumed to represent; the text is a tool to discover that truth through
interpretation, or rather, by translating it into an idea that is at least consistent,
if not true.  Even though most readers have never heard the word hermeneutics,
I contend they approach symbolic meaning production in fiction with these
general interpretive attitudes.  Idealist lectical coherence, therefore, is more
fundamentally ruminative and tentative than Materialist lectical coherence.  It is
developed through interpretive circularity rather than linear reference; it is more
paradigmatic than syntagmatic.  This string of differential equations is not
meant to suggest that episodic motifs cannot or should not be reconsidered or
revised during a reading-act, only that by comparison analogical motifs are
always structured in a way which encourages their revision and elaboration.
If Idealist lectical coherence is created via analogical motifs that always to
some extent encourage revision and elaboration, one might ask what is the
difference between those interpretive gestures and the one's I have identified
with the Subjectivist mode above.  At one point during my discussion of
Subjectivist semantic context, for instance, I asserted that readers operating in
that mode consciously close lectical aporias by treating them as aporias.  The
effect of this lectical strategy is that the ultimate meaning of a textual feature
is deferred.  I characterized this type of semantic context as being "elaborative";
rather than attributing a single reference to a textual feature, an aporetic
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horizon of referential possibilities is developed which is carried forward during a
reading-act as an unsolved problem, issue, or "distinction": i.e. as an aporia that
need not be resolved to continue reading.  What, then, is the difference between
a textual feature that is understood as a polysemous, aporetic horizon and an
analogical motif which by convention should be treated as a provisional,
hermeneutic gesture, an overtly subjective attempt to develop symbolic
meaning?  In other words, if an aporetic horizon is a paradigm of unresolved
referential possibilities and analogical motifs are structured according to
tentative paradigmatic correspondences between ideas, how - and to what
purpose - does one distinguish between them?
The answer to this very fair question lies in the difference between the
goal of establishing semantic context and the goal of achieving lectical
coherence.  The lectical task of establishing semantic context during a reading-
act is accomplished by closing a specific lectical aporia so that reading-act can
continue.  I identified three basic ways this task can be completed: by treating a
textual feature as an image, as a symbol, or as an aporia.  The first two of these
types of closure constitute judgements, no matter how tentative or speculative,
about the semantic reference and function of a textual feature.  The last of
these three, treating a textual feature as an aporia, constitutes the judgement
that closure can not be determined between a set of semantic references or
functions, and therefore the lectical aporia should be retained as an open
question; i.e. it should be remembered as something that should be
contemplated while confronting subsequent textual features.  For any thought
to be remembered for very long, either during a reading-act or during our
quotidian lives, it must be rehearsed.  Since convention mandates that all
perceived aporias should be closed somehow, even during Subjectivist reading-
acts, a textual feature treated as an aporia should be contemplated frequently
as the reading-act progresses so it is not forgotten.  If, for instance, a reader
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recognized the first word of "Our Whole Life" as a lectical aporia, and further
decided that it could not be adequately resolved without reading more of the
poem, that deferral of judgement highlights the problem of establishing
reference for the next textual feature encountered.  To be more specific, if a
reader decides to defer judgement about which of the various the points of view
the word "our" might represent - does it refer to the speaker and someone else
in the speaker's fictional world? To all people in the abstract? To the speaker
and me? - that judgement radically affects what "whole" or "life" mean, or
rather, it fails to delimit what they might mean.  The decision to close an aporia
by treating it as an aporia, therefore, always impedes the progress of a reading-
act; it reminds the reader not to be too hasty in his or her judgements about a
new textual feature because such judgements are based on an uncertainty.  
In this respect, choosing a Subjectivist semantic context for a textual
feature and developing an Idealist/analogical motif have similar affects upon a
developing reading-act; they both encourage readers to be conscious of the
uncertainty upon which an aesthetic object is at least partially founded.  One of
the main differences between them, of course, is that analogical motifs make
decisions, no matter how provisional or tentative, about how a number of
textual features correspond in relation to each other and ultimately to the
fiction as a whole.  Analogical motifs, therefore, articulate a lectical system or
pattern, albeit with enough uncertainty that it should remain under question.
Choosing to understand a single textual feature as an aporia does affect
subsequent actions during a reading, but it is not itself an attempt to develop a
lectical pattern.  Any decision made during a reading-act affects the developing
aesthetic object, but gestures of lectical coherence are specific attempts to
organize the vast quantity of ideas generated about a text into a pattern that
can be more easily recalled as a reading progresses.
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Motifs, then, are groups of ideas about a fiction which associate various -
and sometimes the same - portions of its textual pattern under a particular
semantic reference or function.  Motifs are created in the Subjectivist mode as
well as the other two even though the goal of lectical coherence is in some
respects in conflict with the overall goal of Subjectivist reading: i.e. to focus
upon the process of reading rather than to complete a reading as efficiently and
"correctly" as possible.  This overall goal notwithstanding, Subjectivist lectical
gestures must be cognitively organized in some way for them to be rehearsed
periodically and therefore to remain a part of the developing aesthetic object.
During my discussion of Subjectivist semantic context above, I asserted that
closing a lectical aporia by recognizing it as an aporia is not the same thing as
"giving up."  However, if one defers monosemic reference for a textual feature
and then subsequently forgets one has done so, one has effectively "given up"
one's responsibility as a reader.  In that section I offered my encounter with
Joyce's Ulysses as an extreme example of how one can let the recognition of
unresolved aporias devolve into an aborted reading-act.  To stop this from
happening readers must do two things: 1. Be selective about which features are
closed as aporias, and 2. Create motifs that group lectical aporias in some way.
The first of these two actions is self-evident from the pragmatics of reading.
Even from the Subjectivist perspective one cannot be said to have read a fiction
if one has not regarded all of its words in some way.  For a reader to progress
past the first textual feature of a fiction that feature needs to be recognized as
something in relation to the textual pattern that follows it.  It, of course, can be
recognized as a number of things, or rather can be attributed a number of
semantic functions and references, but it cannot merely be discarded.  At the
very least, the aporia must be carried forward as number of possible references
to be clarified and/or elaborated in comparison to subsequent textual features.
The hypothetical reader who could not decide between three possible references
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for the first word of "Our Whole Life," for instance, did decide to consider - at
least for the moment - only those three possibilities.  This constitutes a
selection process, a narrowing of the lectical horizon into a more manageable
aporetic horizon that is possible to remember.  Moreover, this aporetic horizon
can be represented (at least in language, but by extension in thought) as a
general problem recognized in response to the first word "our": the problem of
who is speaking and who is addressed by the poem.  This problem must be
understood as a problem reflected and potentially resolved by the fiction as a
whole for the reading-act to continue.  In other words, the problem recognized
in response to "our" needs to stop being about that word alone; that problem
needs to be considered in connection with subsequent words or it will be
forgotten.   
Does this last assertion mean that the actual words of a fiction have a
shelf-life, a determinate period of time before they will be forgotten if
something is not "done" to them?  Yes, at least in lectical practice.  One can, of
course, memorize the words of even a very long fiction, but doing so requires
rehearsal of those words; one must perform the conscious cognitive action of
repeating them until they can be recalled consistently.  Although this choice is
always available to readers, clearly it is not the same thing as, or at least one of
the most common ways of, recalling an aesthetic object during a reading-act.
Words, like "our," are changed into thoughts about their semantic reference and
function, thoughts which do not necessarily require the word itself be
remembered.  Moreover, our thoughts about specific words or textual features
must be organized somehow before a reading-act progresses very far.  One
could remember that the word "our" has an indeterminate antecedent, the word
"whole" might be synonymous with "all" or a pun on the word "hole," and the
word "life" might be a reference to the fact of existence or the temporal period
of existence, but at some point remembering all those separate aporetic
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horizons would become impossible, not to mention boring.  Moreover, the
conventions of language through which aporetic horizons must be recognized in
the first place also insist that individual words should be read as patterns; it is
simply wrong to read the word "life" in Rich's "Our Whole Life" without
considering its syntactical relationship to the words that precede and follow it.
The vast number of possible permutations of what even just the first three
words of that poem might mean when considered together precludes listing
them out either in this dissertation or during an actual reading-act.  The fact
that every word in a fiction is at least theoretically a textual aporia does not
mean that all words should be recognized as lectical aporias by any one reader
during a reading-act.  To do so would not only be impossible, it would be absurd.
The pragmatics of reading an entire fiction, therefore, require a reader to be
selective about which aporias will be included in the developing aesthetic object.   
Describing how a particular reader selects certain lectical aporias to focus
upon over others can only be described in general terms because Subjectivist
strategies are developed and judged according to their relative plausibility
whereas the other two modes are developed according to conventions of
probability.  The difference between the criteria of the "plausible" and the
"probable" is one of degree not kind, but the two words do denote different
types of orientation to received cultural conventions.  Probability denotes a
quality that is attributed through deduction: an application of general rules
assumed to be relevant to a particular phenomena about which there is some
uncertainty.  Plausibility, on the other hand, denotes a quality that is attributed
to something that is possible according to and within a discursive, social
context.  One determines an idea is plausible if it is "believed" by someone or
some group of people; something is not merely plausible, it is plausible to
someone, even if that someone is not specifically named.   In other words, the
criterion for the plausibility of an idea is assent to its possible truth, not a
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determination that it is likely or even in most cases true.  Readers can judge
which lectical aporias are plausible, therefore, with less adherence to received
cultural conventions; hence, those judgements are often more idiosyncratic than
judgements based upon probability.  Deciding before the fact which specific
textual patterns within a given fiction explicitly invite Subjectivist strategies is
highly speculative, and often takes the form of a guess rather than an analysis.
Although one can with some degree of certainty identify textual aporias in a
fiction which strongly invite some kind of lectical mediation, there are few if any
textual aporias that can only be resolved through the Subjectivist mode, if for
no other reason than Subjectivist understanding is always constructed out of a
range of Materialist and/or Idealist understandings.
Although these problems limit what can be said about Subjectivist
meaning production, some general distinctions about them can be made.
According to the discussion above, for instance, one can be sure that only a
certain number of lectical aporias can be remembered at one time without
simplifying and/or organizing them in some way so they can be rehearsed
through application to subsequent textual features.   What that number is for
any given reader depends upon the relative acuity of her cognitive processes
(whatever that phrase might mean) in combination with her training and
experience as a reader of fiction.  Quite simply, it takes a good deal of mental
discipline to hold a variety of possibly conflicting ideas about anything in one's
mind.  It stands to reason that some people - for whatever reason - are better at
organizing their thoughts than others, but also people who have significant
experience with the particular cognitive event of reading fiction find the
particular challenges of that event less difficult to perform than those who have
substantially less experience with it.  All literature courses give students the
opportunity to practice reading fiction under the tutelage of someone who has
the training and experience to help them improve their reading skills; the lectical
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triangle in part is offered as yet another and hopefully more explicit way of
reaching that pedagogical goal.
Besides limiting them, however, one can distinguish a few other general
ways that lectical aporias can be organized and thereby retained in a developing
aesthetic object: i.e. by creating "dialogic" motifs.  Subjectivist motifs are called
"dialogic" not in the strict theoretical sense used by Plato, Mikail Bahktin, or any
other theorist attempting to describe fundamental epistemological issues.  I
mean dialogic here as an informal, figurative association to the quotidian verbal
event that occurs between people: dialogue. I do so because I have found
students quite quickly understand the complex problem of establishing
Subjectivist motifs during a reading-act through analogies to similar problems
inherent to verbal dialogues between people who disagree about something.  I
choose not to use the word "argumentative" to describe these motifs because
that word carries a connotation of strife and antagonism that is not particularly
characteristic of the way readers create "dialogue" between their own thoughts
about a fiction.  For instance, like verbal dialogues, dialogic motifs are not under
the onus of resolution; a dialogue can have a beginning, middle, and end and yet
not conclude in agreement.  Many verbal dialogues, in fact, do nothing more
than clarify and elaborate the terms about which the two parties agree to
disagree.  Similarly, dialogic motifs define the terms and boundaries of the open
questions a reader has about a reading-act, not as a necessary step towards
determining its ultimate meaning but as a step towards determining what the
reading-act itself is.  The organization of one's doubts about the meaning of a
fiction calls attention to one's participation in the reading-act in progress.  In
other words, what is organized by dialogic motifs is not the various referential
gestures one has made - all based upon some form of pretense - but the actual,
semantic problems one is currently experiencing and/or exploring during a
reading-act.   That one's mental "dialogue" about unresolved issues during a
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reading-act are more playful than aggressive or polemical seems obvious to me,
and can be thoroughly substantiated by lectical experience.  Readers often feel
anxiety of different degrees due to their doubts about semantic reference and
function of textual features, but this strife is generally caused by an inability to
develop dialogic motifs, not because of them.  Dialogic motifs manage the
questions readers have about a fiction so a reading-act can proceed with a
modicum of coherence.
Another facet of dialogic motifs which can be taught through an analogy
to quotidian dialogue is the fact that both actions include two or more
participants which can not be absolutely equated except through their mutual
engagement in a verbal act.  If I am in a dialogue with another person, I may be
able to recognize many similarities between us and what we are saying, but
those similarities do not cause me to come to the conclusion that I am my
interlocutor, unless I have pathologically loose ego boundaries.  Likewise, the
terms of a lectical aporia that is developed into a dialogic motif are organized as
participants in a conflict, as different voices that are unified simply by their
appearance in that conflict.
Perhaps a quick demonstration of these concepts would be helpful.  Using
the same hypothetical reader of Rich's "Our Whole Life," once that reader
identifies and accepts multiple, unresolved references for the word "our," he is
in the position to develop a dialogic motif.  If he decides the unresolved question
presented by that word is something like "which persons, real or fictional, are
being addressed in this poem?" then his consideration of the next two words of
the poem probably will be understood with that question in mind.  Moreover, due
to how they appear within the textual pattern, it would be reasonable for our
reader to attempt to understand those three words together, i.e. as a single
textual feature.  As pointed out above, not only is that noun phrase heavily
marked as a single textual feature due to a variety of lectical conventions, but
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lectical praxis demands that one be selective about the aporias one focuses
upon.  If, for the sake of demonstration, the reader recognizes a semantic
ambivalence regarding the words "whole life" - does the poem refer to all the
elements that constitute a particular or abstract life or does it refer to an entire
lifetime? - he might organize the  possible interpretations for the first three
words under the following question: "Whose and/or what kind of life is being
referred to in this poem?"  Whether the reader considers the questions "whose"
and "what kind" together or as two different aporias is mostly a matter of
individual choice.  Once again, the reader must change the words of the poem
into thoughts about groups of words; there is nothing that stops a reader from
reading the first three words as three different textual features that constitute
three different lectical aporias, except the practical problem entailed with trying
to remember too many unresolved references while reading (however many that
may be for the individual).
Similarly, there is nothing that requires or stops the reader from applying
this aporia to subsequent textual features as the reading-act progresses, but
let's just say that he defers resolution of it for the first five lines.  This means
that as each new textual feature is accommodated by and to the developing
aesthetic object, and however that is accomplished, those closures should be
made with the knowledge that the reader does not know for sure what kind of
"life" they should be understood in relation to or from whose perspective.  The
reader could quite easily develop an analogical motif like the one described
above - "life is like a translation in that some things can not be communicated in
words" - with the caveat "no matter whose or what kind of life is being referred
to."  Upon confronting the next phrase, "the permissible fibs," the reader might
not immediately see a connection between "fibs" and communication, and
therefore have to treat line two as an aporia as well, one that likely could be
organized with lines three through five as a single image of falsehood: "the
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permissible fibs / and now a knot of lies / eating at itself to get undone / Words
bitten thru words."  If at some point during the consolidation of this episodic
motif a correspondence between it and the initial analogical motif is recognized,
the reader should once again be reminded of the deferred aporia of the first
phrase since it is one of the two indices of that analogical motif.  In other words,
the idea that "some things can not be communicated" could be associated with
the images of "falsehood" to create a single analogical motif, but the process of
doing so should be interrogated by the question "whose and what kind of life?"  
This process of engaging new textual features which repeatedly call attention to
an unresolved lectical issue might continue until all the words of the poem are
read, but the reading-act could not be concluded until the initial aporia is
resolved somehow.   One way to resolve it, of course, would be to choose
between the initial referential possibilities identified by it, perhaps something like
"this poem is about life in general, therefore it describes how no one's life, even
mine, can be expressed in words.  Our whole life is only completely
communicated by our whole life."  This choice would characterize the completed
reading-act as being primarily Idealist, even though it was developed in part by
Materialist and Subjectivist strategies.    
Another way to resolve that deferred aporia would be to foreground it
during a re-reading of the poem; that is, to reconsider the choices made during
the reading-act in comparison to the yet unresolved "our whole life" aporia.  In a
longer fiction, say a three hundred page novel, this re-reading might very well
take the form of a conscious, mental review of the aesthetic object, but both
lectical convention and the relative brevity of most poems strongly recommend
that at least some of the actual words be re-read before final decisions are
made about semantic reference and function.  (The fact that students are often
very resistive to re-reading any assignment, no matter how brief, at least
partially accounts for why so many of their reading-acts are aborted.  They give
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up because they can't "get it" the first time around, as they expect or at least
hope to.)  Upon reconsideration, however, our hypothetical "engaged' reader
might find many ways the words of "Our Whole Life" engage and repeat the
problem of determining whose perspective and what kind of life is being
represented in it.  In a flash of inspiration, the reader might even develop a
classic "metafictional" reading of the poem.  After all, the analogical motifs that
structure the above reading are based upon referential indeterminacy; they are
as uncertain as "a translation" from one language to another.  Additional
referential choices are authorized by these "permissible fibs" because the
"whole" truth about the poem can not be determined.  Little fibs, however, can
over the course of a few lines of poetry turn into "a knot of lies eating at itself
to get undone."  Unable to ignore the inconsistencies in one's reading, one has
to dig deeper into the poem, biting through words, burning off meanings like
paint under a blowtorch, etc., etc.  Anyone who knows what the word
"metafiction" means and has been shown how fictions often represent
themselves self-reflexively could fill in the blanks of this interpretation: "Our
Whole Life" is about the problem of understanding "our whole life."  This
understanding of the poem would solve our reader's unresolved aporia by
making it the focus of yet another elaborated analogical motif.  No matter how
much it is organized around the reader's recognition of the indeterminacy of his
particular reading-act, the principle strategy of organization of this reading-act is
Idealist; the poem is treated as a whole as a symbol for the problem of reading
poetry.  In other words, one way to incorporate an aporia into a reading is to
subordinate other elements to it as an allegory of reading.
Dialogic motifs, however, take a different structure and perform some
different functions than such analogical motifs.  For instance, upon reexamining
the poem for a resolution to the "our whole life" aporia, the reader might come
upon a few other textual features that also might invite a similar question.  In
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line nine, for instance, the phrase "into the oppressor's language" is difficult to
unpack without knowing from whose perspective it is uttered.  Is this a clue to
the speaker's identity (Is she a woman? Perhaps African American or Jewish?),
and if so is this a "real" or imagined oppression, that is, should it be taken
literally as a statement of what the speaker's real life is like or is this just
another attempt to describe life in the abstract through figurative language?
The very next line starts off with a gerund -  "Trying to tell the doctor where it
hurts" - which may indicate a thought - whose? - in progress or may meant to
be syntactically subordinated to "all those dead letters" of two lines before.  If
the latter possibility is the case, then who or what are the "dead letters"
supposed to symbolize, or alternatively what does "trying to tell the doctor"
mean if that action is performed by "letters"?  All of these questions of identity
and agency are figuratively linked to the mini narrative of "the Algerian" with the
first word of line eleven, "like."  At least he seems like a real person - even
though he is a simile - until the reader gets to the last two lines: "and there are
no words for this / except himself."  A (figurative) Algerian who can not express
that "his whole body" is in pain in words except through "himself" once again
raises the question of whose life, perspective, and pain is being represented: the
Algerian's? The speaker's? Mine? Everyone's?  
The above set of interrogations of specific textual features articulates a
dialogic motif that could yet be resolved through a referential decision, but also
could be assessed at the end of a reading-act as interesting and productive
question raised by that reading.  If the reader ends his reading-act with the
contemplation of these unresolved questions of identity and agency, questions
which reverberate through and define the limits of his aesthetic object, then he
has performed a principally Subjectivist reading-act.
The above hypothetical reading-acts were primarily designed to
demonstrate both the differences and complex interactions between Subjectivist
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lectical strategies and those of the other two modes.  As indicated above,
Subjectivist strategies must use the strategies of reference identified with the
other modes of reading, but they do so from a different perspective and
towards a different end.  Although the choices made in all three modes are
always a priori available for reconsideration and revision while a reading-act is in
progress, only the Subjectivist mode overtly and consciously organizes aesthetic
objects according to the specific lectical experiences attending their creation.
By focusing upon (indeterminate) fictional meaning as something that is not just
theoretically constructed but is being constructed right now, readers effectively
ground a developing aesthetic object in their immediate quotidian world.  The
(pretense of an) author's perspective of a fictional world or an idea about "the"
world is thereby subordinated to the reader's perspective regarding what is
happening and what he or she is doing with a fiction in the moment.  
Needless to say, there are other ways this general shift in perspective can
be used to organize aesthetic objects than are represented by the somewhat
convoluted example given above.  A more common manifestation of dialogic
motifs, for instance, is developed when readers recognize a pattern of conflicts
in a developing aesthetic object, that is, a series of inconsistencies between
attributions of semantic reference and function.  Such patterns of conflict can
be recognized between attributions made to individual textual features (as in
the example above) or between elaborate motifs.  The symbolic reference and
function of "redness" in The Scarlet Letter, for instance, should be recognized
by readers as a series of textual aporias that could be organized under a single
question, like: "what does 'redness' signify in this novel?"  No matter how a
reader initially approaches or delimits the individual textual features which
overtly invite at least a consideration of "redness" (and such textual features
are manifold), it is arguably wrong for a reader to fail to address the explicit
conflicts between a variety of lectical conventions invited by the textual pattern
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of that novel.  Just to name one, the redness of the letter stitched upon
Hester's dress stands in direct conflict with the long-standing tradition of how
the textual pattern of a "protagonist" or main character is meant to be read.   
To recognize this conflict, of course, the reader would first have to treat
the scarlet letter as a symbol or analogical motif and would have to develop an
episodic motif of Hester as a "protagonist"; both of these attributions are
thoroughly invited by the end of the second chapter, although I will not digress
here to demonstrate how.  Although some textual patterns clearly invite readers
to judge a "protagonist" as an "antagonist," or simply as a "bad" fictional
person (fictional death is just one of the most obvious of these), the textual
pattern of The Scarlet Letter overtly offers apparently contradictory cultural
cues regarding how Hester, and therefore the symbolic reference of redness
physically attached to her, should be understood.  Hester is an outcast (bad)
but she "walks in the steps" of a saint (good); she admits to being a sinner and
defies authority (bad?) but is pious and continues to punish herself long after
that authority would enforce it (good?); the redness of the scarlet "A" is
associated with adultery (bad, at least to some characters, including Hester…
maybe) but the fruit of that adultery, Pearl, who is associated with red roses, is
her principle joy (?).  In other words, The Scarlet Letter can not, or rather should
not, be read without at least considering the conflicts these different culturally
determined cues invite.  Although each conflict could be resolved definitively
somehow (adultery is bad, so Hester is bad), another and probably easier way to
resolve them is to treat them as lectical aporias, as questions the reader
develops in response to and associates with a series of textual features
accumulated into a dialogic motif.  I would go so far as to say that readers who
insist upon making a single, definitive attribution about the symbolic reference
and function of "redness" in Hawthorne's novel have a misconception of lectical
convention: i.e. they believe that fictions - as opposed to reading-acts - must
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always articulate a single, consistent meaning.  Readers who do not know that
lectical convention dictates fictions sometimes offer apparently conflicting
meanings that are not meant nor expected to be resolved but only
contemplated during a reading-act need to be taught that convention, at least
when they reach the collegiate classroom.
In the last chapter, I discussed how some aporias function not as
questions or problems to be resolved but as marks of stylistic distinction, marks
that focus upon the affect of the diction of a fiction at a particular moment in a
reading-act.  Dialogic motifs can be created out of such aporias as well.  In this
formulation, a reader's sense of the unique style of a fiction is managed as a
series of similarly distinct moments during a reading-act, moments where the
reader pays attention to how the fiction has been written in comparison and
contrast to other fictions he or she has read.  There is almost no analytical
access to such moments other than through reading-texts; as they say in the
old country, there's no accounting for taste.  This, of course, doesn't mean that
we shouldn't try to talk about such moments, and how they affect our sense of
the stylistic value of a fiction, both privately and publicly.  Canonicity is so
deeply inscribed with particular traditions of stylistic value that we owe it to our
students to at least try to account for why some textual patterns - i.e. those we
require them to read - have historically been appreciated due to such
"moments" of aporetic distinction.  By doing so, one does not guarantee that
students will thereby have similar experiences with the diction of a fiction, but I
have found that it at least tends to weaken the opinion that traditional indices
of stylistic value are utterly mysterious and subjective (not to mention
misguided and/or pretentious).  More importantly, giving them a method for
analyzing how aporias of "distinction" are organized in the abstract gives
students a way to interrogate those moments of aesthetic appreciation that
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they do have, whether those moments occur in the literary classroom or the
local multiplex cinema.  
 The organization of an aesthetic object through dialogic motifs,
therefore, is a way for readers to keep track of their most overtly conscious
moments of engagement with a fiction by categorizing them.  The practical
necessity of doing so (i.e. so that lectical aporias are not merely forgotten)
sometimes gives way to the experience of playing with multiple semantic
references and functions, an experience which many readers find pleasurable.
The Subjectivist lectical perspective - "I am playing with this fiction right now" -
can, of course, be balanced with and against a Materialist perspective - "I am
observing a fictional reality" - and/or an Idealist perspective - "this fiction means
something about the world" - during a complex assessment of an aesthetic
object, particularly after all the words of a fiction have been addressed, i.e. when
lectical convention dictates all the lectical aporias recognized during that
reading-act must somehow be resolved so that it can end.   This process of
"lectical assessment" will be discussed in the next section.
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Chapter Four: Lectical Assessment
Value cannot be communicated except through the communication of
what is valuable.
I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism
As mentioned above, during the closure stage of reading-acts, decisions
to treat a textual feature as something in particular can be reconsidered no
matter which lectical mode is used.  Such decisions are made according to
perceptions of capacity; i.e. whether or not the attribution works.  Upon entering
the assessment stage, however, the capacity of an attribution is reconsidered
according to a perception of value; not just does the attribution work - this has
already been established - but how well does it work.  When this evaluation has
been made, the reading-act, as I define it, is complete.  
In subsequent paragraphs I will more thoroughly discuss the general
process and systems of value which make this evaluation possible, but first I
want to clear up a few remaining - thus far necessary - equivocations about the
three stages of reading-acts in general.  I maintain that readers consume texts
according to these three basic stages at all levels while reading fiction, whether
they are considering a single word as a textual feature or a one thousand-page
novel after having read all of its words.  This means that the process of reading
an entire fiction entails a series of reading-acts, each of which is a coherent
attribution of meaning and value.  My definition above of "complete" reading-acts
above, therefore, needs to be amended.  The criteria for complete reading-acts
above were: 1. All of the words of the textual feature are read, and 2. All of the
aporias recognized by the reader are closed.  When I first developed these
criteria I was attempting to distinguish between some of the most basic
conventions surrounding the reading of fiction; I was defining the boundary
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between reading and not-reading.  At the time, for instance, I was still using the
term "textual feature" broadly enough that it might have been understood to
denote all the words considered while creating an aesthetic object.  At this point,
however, it should be clear that by the time all of the words of a fiction have
been attributed semantic reference and function, the textual features that were
identified during that reading-act no longer exist as textual features; they have
become thoughts within an aesthetic object.  Similarly, since one cannot predict
exactly which words will be identified as textual features before the fact, whether
or not a reading-act is "complete" can only be determined through an analysis of
its reading-text.  One can identify how a general textual pattern invites the
creation of textual features through a series of textual aporias, but which of
those textual aporias are recognized as lectical aporias by a given reader can only
be determined - and then only speculatively - after such recognitions have been
made.
The three stages of a reading-act, therefore, are completed every time a
textual feature is accommodated by and to a developing aesthetic object.  The
perceived force or intensity of the lectical aporia which sets the limit of a textual
feature, however, greatly affects the reader's attitude toward it.  Lectical
convention dictates that certain aporias - providing they are recognized, of
course - should be treated as being more important than others, unless there are
reasons to the contrary.  Listed in a roughly ascending order of relative emphasis,
some of these "textual" aporias are: 1. Grammatical units (phrases, clauses,
sentences, etc.) 2. Graphic breaks (paragraphs, stanzas, white space, chapters,
etc.) 3. Having read the last word of a fiction.  The relative emphasis
conventionally identified with these different textual cues should be taken into
consideration by readers, but those conventions are not the only things that can
mark a lectical aporia with a particular emphasis or force.  The unique textual
pattern of a given fiction may override any of these cues, particularly the first
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two.  Moreover, the exact terms and structure of the developing aesthetic object
radically affect the force of a given textual feature.  A single word - "rose" in The
Scarlet Letter, for instance, or "white" in Moby Dick - may induce a reader who
has already attributed significant value to that word to pay close attention, to
regard its current appearance or apparent synonym with particular emphasis even
though it is not overtly emphasized in any other way.  According to the same
principle, specific motifs treated as "theme," "plot," or "diction" accumulate
force as a reading progresses.  Whatever reason lies behind the decision to pay
close attention to a given textual feature, in the synchronic progression of a
reading-act that decision is marked as an aporia, a problem or issue that should
be addressed.  
The most thoroughly and forcefully mandated of the above
conventionalized textual patterns is, of course, the last one: having read the last
words of a fiction, whether those words are "The End" or not.  Lectical
convention dictates that the reading-act that should commence upon recognizing
this cue is more important than all of the reading-acts performed prior to it.  The
moment to moment development of an aesthetic object, in fact, is predicated
upon the assumed authority of this "final" reading-act and the further
assumption that at that time the aesthetic object will take the form of a
complete, unified, and consistent attribution of meaning which subsequently can
be valued.  These assumptions allow readers to make provisional attributions of
meaning and value as the aesthetic object develops according to perceptions of
probability and even plausibility since they know after they read all the words of a
fiction any "errors" made along the way will (have to) be cleared up.
The assessment of the relative value and meaning of a complete fiction,
then, is not procedurally different than the sequential, "line-level" assessments
performed as the aesthetic object has been developed.  However, reading-acts
performed on the level of textual features and motifs often are assessed below
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the level of consciousness, or least in such a way that their assessment is not
usually remembered.  Such "developmental" reading-acts must exist, however,
even though one may not be aware a formal process of evaluation has taken
place.  As pointed out above, the conscious mind can only hold so much
information, so the words of a text must be broken up into units small enough to
be regarded as a single thought of semantic reference and function in relation to
the developing aesthetic object, usually by association with at least one open-
ended motif.  Our conscious awareness of the various and interrelated thoughts
which comprise the aesthetic object at any given moment is deployed at
different levels (Iser calls this cognitive process "foregrounding" and
"backgrounding"), at least in part according to how they have been relatively
valued.  This is why one can remember a specific textual feature of which one is
not conscious if one is re-minded of it somehow.  There are various cognitive
parlor tricks which can demonstrate this quality of consciousness.  Right now, for
example, I want you to think about Melville's Moby Dick, not just how it has been
used in this project (although that will be unavoidable) but also regarding what
you think it means or "is" or anything specific you can recall about it.  Okay?
Now I want to re-mind you of the passage when Ahab nails a doubloon to the
mast to bind the crew to his vendetta against the white whale.  Did your initial
recollection include that textual pattern? Yes?  Darn!  Okay, how about these
words from Ahab immediately following that passage: "And this is what ye have
shipped for, men!  To chase that white whale on both sides of land, and over all
sides of earth, till he spouts black blood and rolls fin out.  What say ye, men, will
you splice hands on it, now?  I think ye do look brave."  I got you there, didn't I?
I am aware that such games do not rise to the level of scholarly evidence,
but they can demonstrate a ubiquitous cognitive phenomenon that somehow
must be accounted for; the aesthetic object "contains" more information than
we can immediately access on our own resources through conscious
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"remembering."  We simply do not know what consciousness is, we can only
name various qualities it appears to have to us.  Foreground, background,
conscious, sub-conscious, unconscious, short, long, and deep memories: all of
these are just names we attach to the apparent hierarchical structure of thought,
a structure which has been much discussed but about which little is really known.
The affects of this apparent hierarchical structure upon our behavior and lives, of
course, are manifold, and reading is no exception.  For reading-acts to progress
as quickly as they do, readers can not give equal amounts of their attention to all
the various thoughts which comprise an aesthetic object at a particular moment.
During the process of creating an aesthetic object, therefore, different lectical
patterns or motifs must be given a relative value to maintain coherence.  Iser
calls this parceling out of the reader's attention "the wandering viewpoint"
(108ff); I call the same process "assessment."
There are many lectical conventions which guide the attribution of value
and thereby structure the expectations with which a reader approaches
subsequent textual features.  In novels, for instance, attributions of setting are in
general given less force than attributions of character, although the pretense of
setting is crucial to the pretense of most fictional worlds, and therefore affect
both the appearance and the quality of any fictional "people" which might be
imagined.  Moreover, readers should respond to textual patterns which invite the
valuation of some characters over others.  Either by responding to received
tradition or according to some of their own lectical choices, by the time readers
have read only a few of the words of a fiction, a unique lectical pattern has been
established which must include some provisional sense of the relative importance
of its constituent parts: i.e. its individual images, symbols, aporias, or motifs.
Subsequent textual features can sometimes be accommodated to and by an
aesthetic object so easily that their meaning and value is almost predetermined,
and therefore that process of accommodation is given little attention.  It is for
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this reason that one can consume several pages of a fiction without remembering
any individual attribution of meaning or value; one merely remembers what "has
happened" or what those pages "mean."  At some point - perhaps the chapter
ends, perhaps a textual feature is difficult to accommodate somehow - one again
becomes aware of a lectical aporia and one's assessment of the reading in
progress becomes more conscious.
I'd like to clarify how I am deploying this account of the "layered" quality
of aesthetic objects through a reading-text of my own.  After writing the above
paragraph, I went home and read Zora Neale Hurston's Their Eyes Were Watching
God.  This was my third reading of the novel; I had read it recreationally some
twenty years ago, then again as a graduate student in preparation for my
doctoral exams - sadly, a long decade ago.  These readings had left me with a
rich and fairly specific understanding of the novel; I probably could have delivered
a competent (sounding) lecture on it without refreshing my memory with a
rereading.  There were even specific textual features which I could have turned to
immediately; the second chapter - I remembered - contained two of the most
important analogical motifs, the "blossoming pear tree" and the "mule" motifs.   
From those two motifs I had retained an elaborate understanding of what
the novel means.  I knew there were many reoccurrences of those motifs, though
the only two I remembered clearly were that Tea Cake was represented as an
agent of the pear tree a number of times and the mule "funeral" somewhere near
the middle of the novel.  Oddly, I couldn't recall the full name of the central
character, although I knew the novel was "about" her, or at least the process of
self-discovery her story represented.  Before I began my third reading, I wrote
down the following reading-text in my journal as quickly and succinctly as
possible, doing my best not to edit my recollections as I went:
Zora's novel is about the double-bind of African American women
in the Twentieth century.  The heroine, Janie/Alphabet, is caught
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between two vision of the Negro woman: her own represented by
the Pear tree she sits under at the beginning of the book (second
chapter?) and the mule motif she inherited from her grandmother.
Janie is alternately cast as a bee looking for the pollen of love and
a mule carrying the burdens of the world throughout the novel.
Her first and second marriages (names?) are to men who lord it
over her and do not give her the love she craves and ultimately
realizes she deserves.  Her last marriage to Tea Cake represents
the passion and pain of love and life fully experienced.  Although it
ends in sorrow, her life with Tea Cake is offered as an example of
how people should be with each other, particularly when they are
down in the muck.  They love, laugh, argue, fight, share, live and
die as a unit.  They are people amongst other people, not mules.
Zora's beautiful narration weaves in and out of the story, although
sometimes it is overshadowed by the poetic dialect she puts into
the "moufs" of her characters.  For instance, when her
grandmother makes Janie promise to marry her first husband at
the beginning of the novel, she does so with the plea, "Put me
down gently Janie, I'm a cracked plate."  This beautiful metaphor
out of the lips of a former slave imbues the story with a sense of
majesty.  The people in Janie's world are not mules, even though
often they are not aware of their humanity.  They are poets, living
moment to moment as best they can.
This reading-text, it should be noted, does not represent the aesthetic
object I had for the novel the last time I had read it: ten years had elapsed.
Neither does it fully represent all I might have written - much less thought -
about the novel before my most recent reading.  The phrase "even though often
they are not aware of their humanity," for instance, represents a complex Idealist
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understanding of the novel, one that some of my fellow graduate students
seemed very attached to during our study sessions for our exams.  Without going
into to much detail, I remember both students and teachers making much of the
apparent critique of social hierarchy they saw in Their Eyes Were Watching God.
Some approached this understanding of the novel through a Marxist critique,
others through a Feminist one; in particular, I remembered with a twinge of
resentment a few long minutes during my doctoral exam when one of the
professors on my committee tried to get me to talk about what he saw as the
"symbolic center" of the novel and how it related to the theme of social
hierarchy (although I can't remember if he used that exact phrase).  Although
from his hints - and my discussions with my peers - I was able to talk about social
hierarchy in general and through other passages, I eventually had to give up and
admit that I was not sure which passage he wanted me to analyze.  After he told
me - a passage toward the end which describes the social hierarchy between light
and dark skinned Negroes through an analogy to the pecking order in a chicken
yard - I was able to include that passage in my (memorized) analysis of the idea
of social hierarchy, at least well enough to pass the exam.  All of these thoughts
- and more which I am not mentioning right now - were packed into the phrase
"even though often they are not aware of their humanity."  The phrase also
reflects that ultimately I do not agree that the novel is primarily about social
hierarchy; its grammatical dependence upon the main clause "The people in
Janie's world are not mules" was meant as a qualification, a defense against
rebuttal, and reflects my desire to demonstrate that I am not ignorant of the
"social hierarchy" reading of the novel, then or now.
This last point demonstrates how both reading-acts and reading-texts are
deeply affected by the contexts within which they are performed.  Although I
consciously tried to create a spontaneous, non-academic reading-text, my
training in the rhetoric of academia has been too thorough; moreover, my specific
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experience with the rites of passage of a literary scholar had left an indelible
mark on my aesthetic object for Their Eyes Were Watching God.  In addition, I
wrote the above reading-text with the hope that it would be useful in this section
of this dissertation as a demonstrative example.  All these elements of the
context within which I created the reading-text can be identified in the way it is
written, especially by me, because to some extent I remember what I was
thinking as I applied pen to paper.   
Lectical self-analysis of this sort tends to highlight the web of
contingency surrounding reading-acts and reading-texts, and thereby keeps one's
speculations about them always under scrutiny.  This does not mean, of course,
that such exercises cannot produce accurate analyses of reading-texts or the
aesthetic objects they ostensibly represent, only that the conclusions reached
should always be qualified.  The reading-text above, for instance, reflects several
artifacts of my first two readings of the novel as well as several artifacts of
subsequent discussions about it.  This demonstrates how an aesthetic object can
change long after the reading-act is over.  As a thought, it is susceptible to
reconsideration, to distortion, to accommodation of other perspectives, and to
forgetfulness.  Some of these artifacts, once submitted to lectical analysis, can
be quite instructive.  My devotion to my Idealist reading of the novel, for
instance, was able to withstand the assertions of my colleagues that the novel
was primarily "about" something else: that is, their Idealist reading referenced to
the "symbolic system" of current cultural theories.  This is not because I do not
use those theories myself as symbolic systems; I do, from time to time.  I believe
"The Tempest," for instance, is primarily "about" social hierarchy (although it is
also a damn entertaining romantic comedy).  Neither is it because I do not
recognize those elements in Hurston's novel; she was, after all, an anthropologist.
Social theory was important to her.  No: my devotion to my first understanding is
due to the apparently very high value I placed upon the intertwined (and
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therefore single?) analogical motifs that survived my first two readings.
Moreover, even across the space of a decade, one can see that the symbolic
value placed upon the "flowering pear tree" and "mule" motifs was substantially
supported by Materialist understandings of the characters of the novel but even
more so by a powerful imaging of Hurston herself.  There's Melville and
Hawthorne and Emerson; and then - for me - there's "Zora."  Does this mean I do
not afford her the dignity of a last name, that she doesn't rate a dynasty like the
white titans?  I hope not, although I can't be sure how my middle-class, Southern
upbringing has affected the lens through which I see the world.  I was raised to
some extent by an African American woman who worked for my parents; until
she died last year, I called her "Mattie" - not Mrs. Williams, as she certainly
deserved, particularly when I was still in elementary school.
Do I infantilize Hurston when I refer to her as Zora?  Perhaps, but that is
not how it feels.  My lectical self-analysis indicates I have made her into an image,
in particular, an image of a wise friend for whom I hold deep respect and
admiration.  I feel as if I know her.  My copy of the novel has a photograph of
Hurston on the back cover, likely taken in the thirties during her hey day among
the literary elite of the Harlem Renaissance.  She looks cool.  I have looked at
that photo many times, not just in passing, but in the contemplation of our close
acquaintance.  She has the slightest smile on her face, as if she knows what it
feels like to hear her voice, to emerge from the world of Eatonville with more
than when I entered it.  Moreover, I don't feel racial strife between us; I am just a
man reading, she is just a woman writing - beautifully.  
This last point, the beauty of her "voice," calls attention to how I have
subordinated a Subjectivist assessment of style to my Materialist understanding
of the author/character "Zora."  Moreover, the above reading-text indicates that
I valued my image of Hurston over my image of Janie and the other characters: I
claim there that they are poets by virtue of the "poetic dialect she puts into the
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'moufs' of her characters."  Although I clearly imagined the fictional world of the
novel, I more clearly and ultimately more strongly imagined Hurston imagining it.
The high value I placed upon my pretense of intimacy with its author has affected
how I understand other elements of the novel.  Moreover, the quality of the
personal relationship I imagined I have with Hurston - qualities which I have only
hinted at above - accounts for my resistance to the "social hierarchy" reading-
texts of my colleagues.  I recognize that such readings are more plausible - or at
least appropriate - for public, scholarly consumption, but they are not particularly
relevant to my readings of the novel, except as an indicator of how thoroughly
my lectical and rhetorical strategies have been affected by my scholarly training.
My (pretend) relationship with "Zora" is not primarily scholarly or theoretical; it
feels intimate and informal, not didactic, not rhetorical.  It smacks of the front
porch or the poorly lit cafe booth: not the lecture hall.   
As the above self-analysis demonstrates, lectical analysis does not always
produce fodder for traditional literary criticism.  What it does, however, is expose
some of the attributions which have formed particular reading-texts.
Furthermore, it gives access to speculation about how closely the reading-text
under consideration conforms to the aesthetic object it ostensibly represents and
to what extent it has been affected by the context in which it was written.
Before I performed the analysis above, for instance, I was not conscious of the
overriding force of my pretend relationship with "Zora."  Although the reading-
text above sounds primarily Idealist, it is clear to me - now - that my abiding
affection for the novel is and has been fueled by my affection for my imaginary
playmate, "Zora"; knowing the influence of this strategy upon my earlier
aesthetic object highlights for me some of the lectical habits I probably brought
to my reading of the novel last night, some of the affects of which I will discuss
below.   
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Furthermore, my new awareness of the prevalence of this strategy
compels me to think about where else I have prioritized my relationship with an
author during a reading-act: Vonnegut, for sure, and Hunter Thompson, but
maybe Ginsberg as well.  Of course, all three of these authors to some extent
"ask" for a personal relationship with readers, that is, they write themselves into
the fiction as characters.  This knowledge makes me wonder whether or not
Hurston's narration invites authorial "characterization," or whether I have to take
full responsibility for our pretend relationship.  Did she lead me on or am I a
literary stalker?  Perhaps more importantly, my sharpened awareness of this
reading (and writing?) strategy focuses my attention on to what extent it is a
common strategy.  Once I make the shift from solipsistic, self-analysis to a
contemplation of how similar lectical events might be encouraged from many or
all readers, then I am beginning to approach the realm of literary criticism.  At the
very least, such exercises can operate as brainstorming for literary essays;
needless to say, teaching undergraduates a method for developing a topic for
their essays is helpful to them, and part of our job description.  
Accordingly, the ostensible goal of lectical analysis, whether or not it is
self-analysis, is to identify the lectical conventions employed by a particular
reader as part of a more general program of understanding of how literary
meaning and value are attributed to fiction, not only at its conclusion but all
along the way.  Such a program requires some account of the common criteria
according to which these assessments are made.  This, of course, is another
version of the "holy grail" of traditional aesthetics mentioned above in Chapter 3.
Ultimately, this dissertation takes the deceptively simple - and circular and
Pragmatist - position that individual readers themselves set such criteria
according to which their evaluative decisions are made, drawing from a range of
culturally inherited criteria for valuing fiction.  Although it is not the holy grail, I
believe this theory of norms is a sufficient discursive heuristic for describing
242
particular reading-texts within the collegiate-level, literary classroom, as opposed
to a general theory of reading. The pertinent question here is: "how much do
received conventions of lectical value affect and effect our behavior during
reading?"  Performing lectical analysis within the context of a college classroom
should engage such questions in some direct way since that context always to
some extent involves an evaluation of the student's ability to recognize and
behave within a particular set of cultural conventions, no matter how broadly
drawn.  
One can, of course, develop a list of general qualities or indices of value
that have been traditionally and are still commonly attributed to fictions.
Compiling such a list is itself a normative gesture only if the list is too narrowly
defined - that is, if some possible index of value is left out.  Although the list
below attempts to categorize these conventions in a way that is universally
inclusive while still retaining some nominal utility, no doubt my own cultural
blindness will create some oversights.  In the classroom, I overcome such
oversights by recognizing them when they become apparent and subsequently
exploring them as necessary artifacts of any general analytical system.  In this
dissertation, I offer my reader my apologies in advance for any omissions he or
she notices.
With these obsequies in mind, I offer the following common indices of
value attributed to fiction in no particular order, or rather the order in which they
occurred to me:
1. It is "realistic"; it accurately represents something about or in "the"
world.
2. It is intellectually stimulating; it makes one think about its subject.
3. It is instructive; it provides one with information about "the" world.
4. It evokes emotion; one can experience it as being humorous,
frightening, erotic, exciting, sad, irritating, suspenseful, etc.
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5. It is true; it represents a correct understanding of its subject matter.
6. It is stylistically virtuosic or unique; its form is remarkable in
comparison to other fictions.
7. It is socially, politically, culturally, intellectually, psychologically or
spiritually liberating; one feels more comfortable in some way as a person
in the world having  read it.
8. It is structurally coherent; one can recognize it as a particular, unified
fictional work.
9. It is indicative of the cultural context within which it was written
and/or read; it makes certain elements of that culture intelligible in some
unique way.
10. It is a commodity; one can use it to pursue one's quotidian interests.
11. It confirms one's identity; either through similarity or contrast, one's
beliefs about "who you are" are strengthened.
12. It provides an alternative "reality"; one's attention is focused away
from one's quotidian existence while reading it.
Each of these indices of "positive" value is warranted by a complex set of
assumptions about the world in general and literature in particular.  I leave the
analysis of these assumptions as cultural artifacts to others; I choose, rather, to
explore through lectical analysis how these assumptions about the meaning and
value of literature manifest in the reading-acts created by others and myself.  By
doing so, I am aware I do not therefore dispense with the problem of this list
being overly prescriptive, I merely bracket that problem until it can be addressed
as thoroughly and sincerely as possible during the practice of lectical analysis.
Furthermore, the language used in this list is meant to be flexible enough to
include a variety of perceptions of value that may be expressed differently.  For
instance, value number six above is meant by the phrase "stylistically unique" to
include judgments that a particular fiction is "original" and value number eight is
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meant to include judgments that a fiction is characteristic of a certain literary
genre.  In other words, in application one attempts to make whatever language
or evidence appears in a reading-text correspond to at least one of the abstract
values listed above through synonymy.  When these categories of value are too
abstract, as has been brought to my attention from time to time, I have created
new categories.  Not long ago, for instance, a colleague convinced me that value
number three - the fiction under consideration is instructive - was inadequate to
describe the common use of fiction as an object of cultural analysis;
consequently, I created a new category, value nine, to accommodate that use.
Moreover, there are a variety of other qualities or values that are often
attributed to fiction which do not appear on this list because they are too
abstract to be useful during lectical analysis.  The very common assessments
that a particular fiction is good, fun, canonical, pleasurable, or beautiful fall into
this category of exclusions.  Such assessments are important, but the purpose
of lectical analysis is to examine such general evaluations of fiction as
specifically and concretely as possible.  In other words, the above list of values is
meant to further subdivide what is commonly identified as the "good" or
"beautiful" in fiction.  They are categories of use for fiction, or more specifically
how the experience of reading fiction is commonly used.  
All of these values can be attributed to virtually any fiction via any of the
lectical modes.  However, it is not an accident that the first item on the list is
that fictions can be deemed "realistic."  As detailed in the introduction of this
dissertation, the lectical modes are specifically designed to describe the variety
of ways a fiction can become a part of one's "real" life.  If there is an arch-value
inscribed into the lectical triangle, it is this one.  There is, of course, a big
difference between the process by which one establishes "lectical realism" and
the assessment that it is "realistic."  According to lectical tradition, all reading-
acts must establish some sort of "lectical realism," some kind of pretense of
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reference to a "reality," but not all reading-acts need to conclude with the
assessment that the aesthetic object is overtly "realistic."  As my reader should
recognize by now, what I mean by "lectical realism" is the specific lectical
perspective from which a reader attributes unique terms of being to a fiction.
How a fiction is "realistic," therefore, is determined by the type of being
attributed to it; the ubiquitous use of "as" in this project marks the presence
and importance of this pretense of reference both to the project and the act of
reading fiction that it tries to describe.  Although "lectical realism" describes a
condition that all aesthetic objects must possess, it does not follow that a given
reader will value or even be conscious of the process by which he or she has
established the "lectical realism" of the fiction at hand.  During the assessment
stage, therefore, the "lectical realism" of an aesthetic object affects how it is
judged according to the indices of value listed above, but it does not guarantee
that the reader will decide the extent that the aesthetic object is "realistic" is a
primary or even important part of its ultimate value.  In my experience, students
quite quickly understand the difference between how I deploy the term
"realistic" as a particular index of literary value and the term "lectical realism" as
the unique terms and conditions which make that assessment - and all others -
possible.  Further, they also seem to understand the difference between these
two terms specific to lectical analysis and the more general denotations of
cognates like "Realism" (as a generic description of particular textual patterns)
or how the arch-abstractions "reality" or "real" are used casually as names for
the appearance of things to individuals.  Moreover, students also seem to
understand that the assessment a fiction is "realistic" can include but is not
limited to the assessment that the "images" of a given fiction have
"verisimilitude" or that they are overtly and effectively mimetic in some way.   
Although each of these listed values can be attributed to fiction through
any of the lectical modes, one is tempted to associate certain values with
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certain lectical strategies.  Materialist strategies, for instance, are particularly
effective for attributing value number three, that a particular fiction or textual
feature is "instructive."  The process of imagining a fictional world according to
the specific textual pattern of a fiction often causes readers to think about their
understanding of the world in an unfamiliar way.  A reader who knew little or had
not thought much about misogyny within early Twentieth Century black
communities, for example, might feel like he or she has learned some information
about that social dynamic by reading Their Eyes Were Watching God.  Whether
or not that novel presents accurate information about gender politics is another
question and open to debate.  If, however, according to a reading-text, a reader
tells us that she has found the novel instructive in that regard, there is no
reason to doubt that is how it has been used by her, unless she is being
insincere.  
Similarly, one is tempted to associate value number five - the fiction is
"true" - with the Idealist mode and value number two - the fiction is
"intellectually stimulating" - with the Subjectivist mode.  However, the
assessment of these and any of the other values listed is so thoroughly
dependent upon a given reader's pre-understanding of the world and his or her
previous experience with fictions in general and/or the fiction at hand that one
can not reliably predict how the use of one lectical perspective over another will
affect a reader's assessment of meaning and value before the fact.  Reading-
texts often offer one bits of information about the affect of a particular lectical
strategy as deployed by a particular reader, but even these are highly
speculative, and conclusions based upon them therefore need to be examined
closely before they are treated with any degree of certainty.  My colleague's
reaction to her reading of the first chapter of The Scarlet Letter, for instance,
indicated she enjoyed "playing" with the text by laughing and smiling when she
admitted to doing so.  Although laughter can be the outward manifestation of
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many mental states other than "enjoyment," since what she had been doing just
prior to laughing was exploring the various lectical aporia created by her reading-
act(s) in response to various textual features, I would tentatively deduce she
valued that patently Subjectivist activity according to my perception that the
specific evidence of her affective behavior looked like "joy" rather than
embarrassment, the release of anxiety, or contempt.  Since there is no reliable
way to separate my unique understanding of the stereotypical "meaning" of
body language from this conclusion, it should be highly qualified.  The fact that I
made and expressed that conclusion, however, became the basis of further
discourse and analysis of her reading-act: a general consequence that I believe is
valuable (if always subject to error), at least within the context of scholarly
inquiry.   
Some conclusions drawn from the evidence of reading-texts, however,
can be made with significantly more certainty.  For Instance, Ann's insistence
upon her symbolic interpretation of Hawthorne's "rose-bush" and her
substantiation of that interpretation by her own experience in the world strongly
indicates she valued that textual feature according to at least values five - it is
"true" - and eight - it is structurally coherent.  The appearance of these
assessments of value, moreover, could be further explored by lectical analysis to
learn more about how Ann's unique understanding of those received mores
interacted with specific textual features during her reading-act.
Lectical assessment, then, is the process by which readers reconsider an
aesthetic object as a precursor to assigning it meaning and value; this process is
as crucial to the moment by moment development of the aesthetic object as it
is to the most conscious and final evaluation of a fiction performed after all its
words have been read.  Even at the "developmental" level - immediately after a
textual feature has been closed somehow - lectical assessment involves an
assertion of the reader's current perspective toward the aesthetic object so he
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or she can narrow the criteria according to which it can be judged.  That is,
according to the lectical mode primarily just used to close a textual feature or
motif, the reader reexamines the effectiveness of that closure in comparison to
the current aesthetic object for the ultimate purpose of accommodating the two
to each other.  So it can be relatively coherent, this process involves raising and
or lowering the values attached to different elements of the aesthetic object in
light of the lectical mediations just performed in the recognition and closure
stages of the reading-act in progress.  This evaluative process is another name
for literary "appreciation."  It stands to reason that whenever a particular lectical
closure is assessed to have great value, the reader becomes aware that he or
she is appreciating that attribution of meaning and function, both for itself and
in relation to the aesthetic object as a whole.  However, since these moments of
"appreciation" are often quite brief and sometimes not even perceived or
remembered during "developmental" reading-acts, I will describe how lectical
assessments are performed by the different lectical modes within the context of
the "final" reading-act which is begun after all the words of a fiction have been
read, if for no other reason than these reading-acts are more conscious and
therefore more easily open to demonstrative examples.
In the Materialist mode, at the onset of the assessment stage the
fictional reality that has been imagined into an aesthetic object is reconsidered
by the reader from a more "quotidian" perspective.  In other words, readers to
some extent drop the pretense that they are "someone else" while reading
fiction so that the fictional reality they have created can be assessed using
methods and assumptions used to evaluate other phenomena in their lives.  This
shift in the reader's "lectical self" happens according to how that fictional reality
has appeared to them: fictional people are judged as people-in-the-world; events
are judged as being more or less believable; causal and other relationships of
coexistence are examined for relative probability.  Since these appearances exist
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as thoughts, and the reader is required to develop consistent thoughts about a
fiction, this "reification" of a fictional reality often induces readers to notice
problems with how they have been thinking about that fictional reality now that
they are no longer in the process of creating it.    
Although this distinction between one's identity as a reader who is
observing a fictional reality and one's identity as a person who is evaluating a
fictional reality is rather soft, it is meant to describe the discernible shift in
perspective from attributing a fictional "being" to attributing a fictional
"meaning" and/or value to that being.  Since Materialist closure and assessment
both occur within the pretense of and a focus upon a fictional world, this shift in
lectical perspective is not equivalent to a shift to the Idealist lectical mode.
Idealist lectical assessment considers the value and coherence of an idea about
the reader's world; Materialist lectical assessment considers the value and
coherence of a fictional world on its own terms, although readers must do so to
some extent by employing the unique terms and beliefs they use to understand
and value quotidian phenomena.  In the Materialist mode, therefore, it is not until
the assessment stage that fictional people, things, or events are assigned any
meaning apart from what they are identified "as" in the closure stage.  In other
words, in the assessment stage what an image has been identified as (a person,
thing, or event) can be interpreted to have meaning and value in the same way
quotidian phenomena can only mean something to us after we have decided
what they are.   
This formulation is less complex than it sounds and is created according
to ubiquitous practice; that is, my "theory" of this shift in a reader's lectical self
at the onset of the assessment stage is created to account for what seems to
have happened by the end of a Materialist reading act.  For example, it is only
after I have decided that certain successive groups of words represent a
fictional character "Janie Starks" (I now know her last name having read the
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novel again), who has various relationships with other fictional people and
performs certain fictional acts within a fictional world, that I can think about her
as I would a "real" person.  I cannot like or dislike her, I cannot decide whether
she was right or wrong to shoot Tea Cake; I cannot, in other words, completely
pretend she is real until after I have established - through Materialist closure -
the particular terms of her fictional existence.  When in the Materialist mode, I
like Janie (among other reasons, because I respect people who value love over
social propriety); I commiserate with Janie (because I know what it is like to feel
trapped in a relationship); I feel some anxiety for her during her trial (because I
know how deeply racist American jurisprudence can be, particularly in the early
Twentieth century).  My pretense that Janie is or was alive in a certain way
(established in the closure stage) allows me to judge what I think and feel about
her, but to do so I must at least partially use my beliefs about "real" people,
marriages, and trials.
For lack of a better term, such acts of judgement are called assessments
of "mimetic" value in lectical analysis, although by doing so I risk
misrepresenting what is meant by the term.  Mimetic value is not just a
perception of how "realistic" a fictional world seems to a reader, although that
judgement might very well be reached through the process of assessing mimetic
value.  Materialist reference during the closure stage requires the pretense that
words represent images; Materialist assessment of mimetic value requires a
second pretense so a fictional world can seem to have meaning beyond the
terms of its initial meaning and value: i.e. the structure and appearance of its
existence as a part of an aesthetic object.  
Moreover, as in all the lectical modes, Materialist assessment allows the
reader to assign a relative "structural" importance and identity to a textual
feature in order to promote coherence in the aesthetic object, particularly while
it is in the process of being developed.  In my most recent reading of the novel,
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for instance, I assigned a much higher "structural" value to the passage where
Janie spins the increasingly rabid Tea Cake's pistol to an empty chamber and
puts her rifle in reach and a shell in her pocket.  I do not recall giving that
passage as much emphasis in prior readings, perhaps because this time I was
more clearly aware that she was about to shoot him.  In other words, I
attributed extra significance to her act of placing a shell in her pocket because I
knew in advance that shell was going to end up in Tea Cake's heart. In addition,
however, in this reading I became aware of a conflict in my perception of Janie's
character that hadn't occurred to me before; knowing that the difference
between murder and self-defense is at least partially whether or not the killing
was premeditated and/or avoidable, I noticed that her actions might suggest she
was guilty of a crime, and therefore cause her legal problems.  Moreover, my
experience with countless murder mysteries made me consider - but only for a
second - whether or not this character I like so much was in fact a murderer, or
at least guilty of manslaughter.  I had no problem, however, overcoming that
minor aporia; I now think Janie is only guilty of being torn between the love of
her life and the love of Tea Cake's.  In other words, I associated her conscious
decision to arm herself with an episodic motif comprised of narrative instances
where she is caught between devotion to herself and devotion to another, as in
her promise to Nanny to marry Logan Killicks and her many decisions to submit
to Joe Starks' bullying.  The fact that I almost immediately further associated
that episodic motif with two analogical motifs left over from earlier readings -
i.e. the "flowering pear tree" and "mule" motifs - only served to cement the
function and importance of that single round slipped into Janie's apron.
The fact that all of such attributions and assessments occur within a
reading-act, of course, affects the way one both performs and perceives them.
One of the most important ways those actions are affected is by one's
understanding of the context within which a fiction has been read, and in turn by
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the limits upon one's lectical behavior one believes are mandated by that
context.  If I am reading a fiction within the context of "killing time while on
vacation," for instance, I will behave differently than when I am reading a fiction
so that I can lecture about it to students.  This sense of adjusting one's reading
behavior according to received external standards associated with certain
lectical contexts is articulated well by Wayne Booth's concept of "coduction,"
which will be discussed in some detail during my outline of classroom
methodology in the next chapter.  At this point, however, I would like to
emphasize that the context within which an aesthetic object and its subsequent
reading-text are created should always be considered during a lectical analysis.
As pointed out above, I performed different reading-acts each time I read Their
Eyes Were Watching God, to some extent because each time I was reading for
different reasons.  Although my latest reading did not include some of the
methods I usually employ when I read professionally, there is no doubt my
intention to use my lectical experience as a demonstrative example in this essay
affected what it meant to me.  I contend that the more we foreground our
awareness of this affect of context upon our reading-acts, as I did above, the
easier it is to distinguish between purely idiosyncratic lectical responses and
those that might have some resonance with all or at least many readers.
The reconsideration of symbolic closure during the assessment stage of
an Idealist reading-act requires significantly less additional interpretation than
during Materialist reading-acts. This is the case because the Idealist closure of a
textual feature or motif requires that it has already been attributed a "meaning."
What has not been accomplished in the closure stage, however, is a final
assessment of the relative value and the relationships between the various
symbols and motifs of symbolic meaning that have been accumulated in the
aesthetic object and the unique way those symbolic gestures individually and
collectively refer to the reader's understanding of the world.  In the terms used
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above, the reader must still assess a "structural" value to the Idealist reading-
act.
In the Idealist mode the reader must reconsider the importance of a
symbolic attribution from both the perspectives of reader and a person-in-the-
world.  From the perspective of reader, the symbolic attribution must be valued
in relation to other elements of the aesthetic object.  In other words, the
symbolic attribution in question needs to be placed by the reader within a
semantic hierarchy that both recognizes and unifies all the various semantic
attributions currently included in the aesthetic object.  From the perspective of
person-in-the-world, the symbolic attributions needs to be valued in relation to
the reader's unique understanding of "reality."   That is, to assess completely a
symbol in a fiction one needs to pretend it is a symbol in the world by
referencing it to a "symbolic system," but also assessing how important that
reference is to the developing aesthetic object.  
In other words, the symbolic function of the aesthetic object as a whole
must be made consistent and organized according to its perceived importance
to the aesthetic object taken as a whole.  The criteria according to which
symbolic value is assessed are so idiosyncratic it is hardly worth listing them out.
Symbolic systems are always more evocative than denotative, so even when a
recognizable semantic horizon exists for a textual feature treated as a symbol (I
used the word "rose" as an example of one of these above), it is extraordinarily
difficult to delimit how a given "symbol" might be valued by a particular reader
before the fact.    Particularly during the "final" reading-act of a fiction, this
process also entails regarding how the symbolic meaning of an aesthetic object
interacts or conflicts with whatever fictional world has also been developed
within that aesthetic object.  The symbolic value of a textual feature, therefore,
is assessed by comparing the symbolic function to its imagistic or aporetic
functions.
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As a demonstration of how these various kinds of assessment can
interact to create a single, coherent aesthetic object, I will try a lectical self-
analysis of a passage that had a particularly powerful Idealist impact upon me
during my last reading of Their Eyes Were Watching God:
All night now the jooks clanged and clamored.  Pianos living three
lifetimes in one.  Blues made and used on the spot.  Dancing,
fighting, singing, crying, laughing, winning and losing love every
hour.  Work all day for money, fight all night for love.  The rich
black earth clinging to bodies and biting the skin like ants.  (125)
The similarity between this passage and portions of my reading-text above is
not accidental:
Although it ends in sorrow, her life with Tea Cake is
offered as an example of how people should be with each other,
particularly when they are down in the muck.  They love, laugh,
argue, fight, share, live and die as a unit.  They are people amongst
other people, not mules. (7)
Although it is possible that I remembered Hurston's passage across the
intervening decade between my second reading of the novel and when I wrote
the above words in my journal, I do not believe it likely.  I did not recognize
Hurston's paragraph when I read it this last time; in fact, I thought, "How could I
have missed this?"  Neither did I remark the similarity between Hurston's
passage and mine until I began to write this section of this chapter.  In the
process of scanning my (then) current aesthetic object for a clear example to
use here, I remembered attributing strong symbolic value to Hurston's "jook"
paragraph, looked it up in the book, and only then realized I had used similar
diction in my journal. I might have remarked this paragraph ten years ago, and
thereby unconsciously plagiarized Hurston, but usually when I do so I recall the
"original" text when confronted with it.    
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Neither, however, do I believe that the similarity between the two texts is
accidental.  When I wrote the above journal entry I believed that the novel as a
whole offers a representation of a particularly chaotic and joyful version of
human life.  In addition, I processed these representations as symbols, that is,
under the belief that Hurston represents Janie's life to communicate something
about life in general; specifically, that life - when it is good - is characterized by
a chaotic intermingling of pleasure and pain.  Life is like a funky jook-joint.   For
this reason, I believe it is more likely that my journal entry influenced my reading
of the novel than the other way around.  In other words, one of the elements of
the novel that I have valued in past and that I continue to value is its function as
an example of the "good" life.  I have no reliable way of determining whether or
not I would have attended to this aspect of the novel as much if I had not
written the above journal entry immediately before reading it again, much less if
I would have remarked the "jook" passage in particular as strongly as I did.  Such
speculations may be interesting to the individual, but they are relevant to a
lectical analysis primarily as reminders of how thoroughly contingent both
aesthetic objects and reading-texts are upon a reader's unique and complex pre-
understanding of the world.
There is another possible reason for the similarity between the diction of
Hurston's paragraph and my reading-text.  They both employ a traditional
rhetorical strategy for representing the vast breadth and variety of experience.
There is a long history of representing the complexity of life by listing out
several of its constituent elements, some of which are usually considered in
conflict: e.g. "dancing, fighting, singing, crying, laughing."  (Do I need to offer
substantiating evidence for this claim?  How about Whitman's Leaves of Grass or
much of Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow?)  From this perspective, the
similarity between Hurston's prose and mine can be attributed to our employing
the same convention for representing the complexity of the "good" life.
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Although I used that convention to describe a theme I recognized in Their Eyes
Were Watching God, I didn't learn it from her.  I probably didn't even learn it
from Whitman; the strategy is deeply inscribed in Western culture, from Madison
Avenue to Montaigne.  Moreover, the theme itself is ancient, at least as old as
the Dionysian myths.  In the terms of this project, I very well may have
recognized this similarity between Hurston's "jook" paragraph and a pre-existing
symbolic system, and subsequently treated it as a symbol referenced to that
tradition of thinking - and writing - about life as a jumble of loosely yoked and
yet joyful contradictions.
Although these speculations might adequately explain why I remarked
Hurston's "jook" paragraph so closely during my last reading, there are a few
other lectical artifacts worth pointing out.  Beyond treating the paragraph as a
symbol, I almost immediately associated it with an already developed analogical
motif roughly equivalent to the "chaotic good life" tradition I discussed in the
paragraph above.  Not only did this association link the paragraph to other
passages already organized under that motif (these include the "great tree" of
Janie's life (8) and the many bantering discussions on the porch of the store
(e.g. 59ff, among others), but in some ways it became the epitome of that
motif.  Perhaps this is why I was surprised that I did not remember it; it seems
the best and most concise representation of what I believe Hurston wants to tell
us about the good life.  In all of the earlier instances of this analogical motif, the
pleasure is qualified because Janie - whose perspective I am privileging here - is
to some extent excluded from the action.  At the beginning of the novel, Janie's
connection to the "great tree" of her life is real but not yet realized; she is not
allowed to participate in the banter at the store at all until after Joe Starks has
died, and then only occasionally; even after her marriage to Tea Cake it is not
until they establish themselves at the center of camp life "down in the muck"
that Janie gets to experience the kind of life she has longed for since childhood.
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Furthermore, as I progressed through the novel, the "jook" paragraph took on
the force of favorite memory, further emphasizing its function in my aesthetic
object as the epitome of the "chaotic good life" motif.  As Janie's life with Tea
Cake progresses to its violent end, there are no other instances - that I can
remember, and that is what counts in a lectical self-analysis - where the
spontaneity of their life is not threatened by some outside force, whether it is
the racism of Mrs. Turner or the hurricane that makes them refugees.  It is not
until the last lines of the novel that Janie seems to recover her sense of the
chaotic but ultimately joyful grandeur of her life in the moment, and only then as
reminiscence:
Here was peace. She pulled in her horizon like a great fish-net.
Pulled it from around the waist of the world and draped it over her
shoulder.  So much of life in its meshes!  She called in her soul to
come and see.
I specifically remember choking back tears the first time I read these lines
twenty years ago, although I frankly don't remember why I was so affected by
them.  Perhaps, then, as in my most recent reading, I treated those lines not just
as the last lines of the book, but through association to an already developed
analogical motif I attached to them the force of other symbolic references to
the "good" life.  Part of my idiosyncratic response to this novel is the fact that I
am - perhaps unusually - sympathetic to Dionesian representations of life.
Consequently, when writers, filmmakers, or musicians represent life thusly in my
presence, they are preaching to the faithful.  
In my most recent reading of these last lines, however, I was less
emotionally affected by their symbolic value as a representation of life than I
was by their value as a beautiful piece of writing.  I can't be sure whether or not
this is because I had already assessed such a strong "structural" value to the
"jook" paragraph, although it stands to reason that its status as the epitome of
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the "chaotic good life" theme might have tempered my response when I
associated the last lines to that theme, which I did during my "final" reading-act
of the novel.  Perhaps, in other words, I attended more to the diction of the last
lines rather than my idiosyncratic emotional affinity for the "chaotic good life"
theme because I had already consolidated Hurston's message that life is a big,
old "mostropolous" thing around the "jook" passage, and the lectical aporia that
caught my attention at the end was the marvelous language she used to pull in
the total horizon of meaning I already accumulated into my aesthetic object for
the novel.
As you can see, lectical analysis - particularly self-analysis - tells you as
much about the reader as it does the fiction.  I am aware that such information
sounds "self-indulgent" and in many ways goes directly against current fashions
of responsible literary criticism.  My argument from the beginning of this project,
however, has been that to be responsible readers - whether as pupils or
professionals - we need to take responsibility as best we can for the
idiosyncratic assumptions and actions that contribute toward any reading-act.
By doing so we can at least sharpen the boundary between lectical responses
that are particular to the individual or context of a reading-act and those
responses that can be attributed with some certainty to conventions of writing
and reading fiction.  Moreover, by calling this curriculum "neo-appreciation
pedagogy" I purposefully imply an allegiance to a specifically Romantic heritage
in literary criticism.  In many ways this project looks back to Nineteenth Century
"aestheticism" for inspiration.  I have already discussed my debt to a
philosophical genealogy inspired in America by Emerson, but I also believe there
is a quality to the work of English Romantics, such as Thomas DeQuincey,
Samuel Coleridge, and Walter Pater, that I believe both stylistically and
theoretically is lacking in Twenty-First century literary criticism.  Their work
represents a forthright and unrepentant personal engagement with a fiction.
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Although I espouse a more thorough, careful, and qualified engagement with
fiction than is typical in such critics, I think there is much to be learned about
what is valuable about reading by examining the specific artifacts of reading-
acts, even when those artifacts are obviously idiosyncratic.  The fact that I cried
the first time I read Their Eyes Were Watching God is not in itself data of
interest to the general public, but the fact that people often cry as a part of
their response to art should at least be admitted and, where possible, examined.
The discussion above describes lectical assessment as the process by
which meaning and value are accommodated into and by an aesthetic object,
both semantically and "structurally."  In the Materialist mode this requires a
reconsideration of an "image" against the fictional world that already "exists" in
the aesthetic object.  In the Idealist mode, lectical assessment entails a
reconsideration of a "symbol" against both symbolic and imagistic elements of
the aesthetic object.  As demonstrated above, this process can often entail
multiple attributions of meaning, value, and function to the same textual
feature.  I read the "jook" passage, for instance, primarily as a symbol, but that
lectical choice did not obviate and to some extent required that I also read it as
an image.  Although I will not pause to do so now, one could analyze the text to
interrogate to what extent it invites Materialist versus Idealist strategies and
thereby get a sense of how conventional my reading of it was.  Whatever the
text "invited" me to do with it, a more salient point at this juncture is that this
apparent double attribution did not constitute a lectical aporia for me.  I read it
primarily as an image, subsequently associated very strongly with an analogical
motif that gained the force of a theme.  
If I had contemplated my Materialist and Idealist attributions for the
"jook" passage as a lectical aporia, however, then I would have been poised to
add a Subjectivist lectical assessment to my reading-act as well.  The
assessment stage of a Subjectivist reading-act is a reconsideration of the
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relative importance of an aporia or a dialogic motif already recognized and
incorporated into an aesthetic object.  Since the value of a Subjectivist reading-
act is determined according to the quality of a lectical experience, its
assessment stage involves an "embodiment" of how it has felt to be reading the
fiction, in particular how it has felt to interrogate the unresolved issues thus far
recognized.  In other words, to determine which aporias are important enough to
be treated as fundamental unresolved questions of a reading-act, readers need
to direct their attention upon themselves long enough to compare what they
have been doing with the words of a fiction to what they believe one is
supposed to do with fictions in general.  Like the other two modes, this
comparison is moderated by an individual's understanding of received standards
regarding what is "acceptable" behavior for a reader within a certain lectical
context.  Depending upon the reader's inclinations and habits, however, the
process of assessing one's prior experience and behavior during a reading-act
can itself become a valuable experience.  Many readers enjoy the contemplation
of fiction, which regarded from the Subjectivist perspective creates more
material to be interrogated; the reading-act theoretically can be perpetuated as
long as the reader is motivated to do so, that is, for as long as he or she feels
doing so is valuable.  This theoretical limitlessness of Subjectivist lectical
assessment is always balanced against the lectical conventions of consistency
and closure; to varying degrees all readers know the reading-act must end in a
way that is coherent, even regarding the questions they may still have about it.
Moreover, all reading-acts are subject to practical limits imposed by our
quotidian lives; eventually one must stop reading, even if it is just to go to sleep.
All this talk about embodiment and such is not meant to suggest that the
Subjectivist mode is the primary vehicle for creating literary "feeling."  Very
strong emotional reactions can be instigated by the other two modes, as is
demonstrated by my self-analysis.  In fact, I would hazard that most readers are
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more experienced with Materialist and Idealist methods for feeling their aesthetic
objects than they are with Subjectivist ones.  The three modes, however,
establish different grounds for how an aesthetic object feels to the reader.
Although one can feel "excitement" in the Subjectivist mode, one wouldn't be
feeling excited about what is happening in a fictional world one is pretending to
watch, as in the Materialist mode; one would be feeling excited about the
reading-act one is currently performing.  
Do readers get excited by contemplating aporias?  Most definitely,
although most undergraduates feel such events as irritation.  Similarly, one
might be tempted to associate the feeling of "intrigue" with the contemplative
process of the Subjectivist mode, but one can also be intrigued with the
application of a symbolic motif to one's "real" world via an Idealist reading-act:
"How, exactly," I ask myself, "is the 'chaotic good life' motif reflected in my
life."  Thrown into recollection - a Dead show in Las Vegas?  Playa del Carmen
last summer? - I might play with my memories, feeling a variety of things.
Although I think it is possible to speculate about how a particular textual pattern
tries to elicit particular feelings according to conventions it employs, lectical
analysis proceeds from the evidence of a reader's perceptions, and then works
backward to interrogate how much or little those perceptions were instigated by
a textual pattern.  It is not wrong, therefore, to feel sad at the end of Their Eyes
Were Watching God, even though the textual pattern seems to call for a
celebration of Janie's joy at all the life gathered in her net.  A lectical analysis
would instead ask "why did this reader feel sad?"   
During the "final" reading-act of a fiction - once all the words have been
read - a reader in the Subjectivist mode is compelled to negotiate between
whatever aporias have been "carried forward" from earlier lectical activity as
part of the aesthetic object and the general onus of closure and evaluation.  
Many of these aporias or dialogic motifs are going to take the form of
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unresolved questions about the fiction's meaning and/or value.  Obviously,
different readers are going to have different levels of capacity and tolerance for
aporetic features in their aesthetic objects.  Undergraduate students - unless
they are taught differently - generally feel anxious about unresolved questions
at the end of a reading-act, particularly if it is assigned reading.  If they are not
sure what a fiction means or what is good about it, they worry they will do
poorly on the test or look stupid in class.  Much of this anxiety is due to a
misconception about the amount of ambiguity allowed within the context of
academic reading.  They simply are not aware that a certain amount of
ambiguity is not only tolerated and expected, but for the last century it has
been a mark of literary excellence, albeit aporetic value is usually identified with
less pejorative terms like "rich," "evocative," and "multi-layered."  The italics
above, however, highlight the fact that students are not completely mistaken
about their responsibility to develop at least "coherent" reading-acts in the
literary classroom, and that their ability to do so within the all too vague
boundaries of academic discourse will indeed be tested somehow.  How much is
a "certain amount" of ambiguity, they may wonder, or where lies the precise
threshold between "being confused" and the valid, scholarly contemplation of
ambiguity?  
Lectical analysis offers students both a theory and a method for
sharpening their understanding of when they have discharged their lectical duty.
By teaching them the distinction between confronting a "lectical aporia" (what
happens in the recognition stage of all lectical modes) and the strategy of
developing an "aporetic horizon" (what happens in the closure stage in the
Subjectivist mode), students get a better sense of when a reading-act is
complete and when it is "aborted."   As discussed in Chapter Two, a reader
creates an aporetic horizon by choosing, some - usually only a few - semantic
and/or functional possibilities for a textual feature out of the entire range of
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meaning and function that occurs to them at the time (i.e. out of their "lectical
horizon").  Upon offering a reading-text in public, they seem to accept that it is
reasonable to require that they account for aporetic horizons they "carry
forward" in an aesthetic object.  In other words, they accept they should be able
to talk about why they decided to continue to think about a textual feature as
an aporia rather than choosing one of the available and plausible options
included in their aporetic horizon.  Having the capacity to discuss an aporetic
horizon gives them a rule of thumb for distinguishing (valid) Subjectivist reading-
acts from aborted reading-acts, that is, those times when they simply give up on
a lectical aporia.  As pointed out above, "giving up" can be a function of apathy
or lack of motivation; I believe it is proper to hold students accountable for such
lectical behavior.  
Just as frequently, however, students give up on a lectical aporia because
of ignorance, either of the semantic horizon of a textual feature (e.g. they do
not understand that a "jook" is a bar, even after trying to look it up) or of the
range of lectical strategies that might close the textual feature.  Offering
students information about cultural, linguistic, and historical connotations of
fictions that likely are unfamiliar to them has always been an important part of
literary pedagogy, and a neo-appreciation course should also disseminate such
information.  However, I have found that by overtly focusing upon methods for
expanding their lectical repertoire in the classroom (rather than just telling them
what a passage means), I am able to reduce their anxiety about what they are
required to do with a fiction.  In other words, by showing them explicitly some
new things to do with fictional words, I show them how to discharge their
lectical responsibilities toward fictions which I assume they otherwise would be
unable to read.  What I am talking about here is establishing a classroom climate
in which forthright assumptions of student ignorance are not pejorative or
condescending.  Students often harbor the belief that there is something wrong
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or sub-standard about being flummoxed by a poem whose language or textual
pattern is beyond their lectical resources, but I try to teach them that it is no
more shameful to be stumped by "The Waste Land" or "Hamlet" than it is to be
stumped by polynomial equations before you have taken algebra.  Further, by
teaching them that it is expected and common for readers - particularly at the
undergraduate level - to have ignorance-based lectical aporias, they seem to be
more comfortable admitting their ignorance out loud.  As we shall see in the
next chapter, my assignments and classroom methodology are designed to
encourage the forthright admission of ignorance and to reduce the motivation
for and thereby the practice of passive "giving up."
This focus upon giving them more things to do with fiction is particularly
crucial when it comes to Subjectivist methods of lectical assessment.  Lectical
analysis does not solve the problem that students quite often do not enjoy the
fictions we make them read, it merely attempts to give students additional ways
of understanding why lots of people have enjoyed those fictions in the past.
Whenever a reader sees little or no value in a fiction that she knows has been
highly valued in the past, she is confronted with a lectical aporia.  Like any
lectical aporia, if this difference between received, "canonical" value and
experiential value cannot be resolved by the reader, he or she can carry it
forward as a Subjectivist aporia, an unresolved issue within the aesthetic object.
Students seem relieved to find out they are not required to assess high value to
the works of Shakespeare or Eliot; in my class, however, they are required to
identify criteria by which such works can be valued or, alternatively, the criteria
by which the students themselves have assessed them a low value.  By
emphasizing the contingencies of lectical assessment as an integral part of
reading, students are taught that their duty is not to absorb literary culture but
to critique it, to place it as best they can against the received standards of
value articulated in the list above.  Knowing that the value of a textual feature
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or an entire fiction can be interrogated as an aporia - as the question of value -
seems to reduce their anxiety, and thereby make them more willing to attempt
less familiar (and often more effective) methods of closure and assessment.
Another artifact of this method is that it tends to loosen students' rather
rigid beliefs about what a "good" fiction looks like by focusing their attention
upon how readers might have "good" or "bad" experiences while reading any
fiction depending upon the lectical strategies they use.  Furthermore, the
interdependence of the different lectical modes demonstrates that the same
fiction can evoke different and sometimes conflicting assessments of value for a
single reader.  From my own experience, for instance, in all of my readings of
Their Eyes Were Watching God, I have been mildly irritated by a passage in the
second chapter where Janie relates to Pheoby Watson how she found out she
wasn't white by seeing a photograph of herself (8-9).  Janie relates how she
noticed a "dark chile" standing next to the white children she grew up with, and
wondered out loud, much to everyone's amusement, why that "dark chile" was
there instead of herself.  Upon reflection she sees her mistake: "Ah looked at de
picture a long time and seen it was mah dress and mah hair so Ah said: 'Aw, aw!
Ah'm colored!'"  I have always read this passage as a part of an episodic motif, a
string of images that collectively might be called "Janie's childhood."  The
passage occurs before Hurston drops the narrative pattern of quoting Janie's
words as she tells her story to Pheoby Watson.  Later on, the narrative voice is
less clearly identified.  Chapter Three, for instance, begins with the lines, "There
are years that ask questions and years that answer.  Janie had had no chance to
know things so she had to ask."  Whether this voice is a version of Janie's words
to Phoeby - that is, "free indirect discourse" - or the voice of an independent,
omniscient narrator is ambiguous.  As mentioned above, I have attributed most
of the narration to my image "Zora," a fictional person who speaks to me
throughout the novel.  At the beginning of Chapter Two, however, I have a hard
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time attributing the words "Ah'm colored!" to "Zora"; they are too clearly
marked as verbatim dialogue, and therefore strongly invite any reader to
attribute them to the character Janie.
What has irritated me about the passage is that it seems implausible that
Janie would first notice her race through such events, according to what I know
about six year old children, racial relations in the South, and a variety of other
information about the world which I believe is relevant.  I, of course, might be
wrong; I don't know everything, and almost anything is possible.  And yet,
Janie's account seems inconsistent with what I know about people; I simply have
a hard time believing her.  It has occurred to me, of course, that Janie might be
exaggerating for effect, telling a tall tale to emphasize how she was treated as
an equal by the Washburn children.  Certainly that narrative strategy is used
repeatedly by a variety of storytellers throughout the novel, particularly when
the local men are "playing the dozens" on the porch of Starks' store.  However, I
don't see an invitation in this particular passage to read Janie's story as an
exaggeration, a figure, or a lie.  It seems to me that she is just telling Phoeby
the truth about her childhood.  Confronted with conflict between my perception
that Janie is telling the truth and my belief that the event could not have
happened the way she remembers, this passage has always been highlighted for
me as a lectical aporia.  Ultimately I have resolved this aporia by attributing the
conflict not to Janie, "Zora," or myself, but to Zora Neale Hurston, the person
who wrote down this piece of dialogue.  In other words, I resolve the conflict it
presents by assessing it as a weak piece of writing.  Frankly, each time I have
read the passage I have been bugged that the implausibility of Janie's story
interrupted the smoothly progressing Materialist reading-act I had begun in the
first chapter.  By the time Janie starts telling her life story to Phoeby, I have so
far been firmly rooted in a Materialist pretense that I was watching two women -
whom I already liked - talk intimately in the twilight.  This is not to say that I
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would be irritated by any aporia at that moment; I like to contemplate
ambiguity.  But to be interrupted by an implausible detail that seems contrary to
the whole (Materialist) intent of the passage?  Well, I guess it just reads like a
mistake to me.
The fact that I read the narration of this isolated passage as being inferior
to the rest of Hurston's writing, however, has not stopped me from assessing a
very high value upon the novel as a whole or upon her narrative style in
particular.  My understanding of literary convention is that a fiction does not
have to be flawless to be of great value.  Accordingly, I try to teach students
that they should not ignore passages that take the force of an aporia; rather,
they should try to resolve such moments if they can, but at the very least they
should carry the aporia with them as they proceed, perhaps writing it down in
their journals as a question to be addressed in class.  By doing so, one takes
responsibility for one's lectical behavior, particularly regarding assessments of
value, like mine above, because by doing so the beliefs one has employed to
make those value judgements are brought into sharp relief.  For example, I
assess a relatively low value to the "Ah'm colored!" passage because it is not
"realistic" enough for my taste (lectical value #1 above), particularly in
comparison to the rest of the novel.  It seems petty to do so and not a little
embarrassing to write it down.  I hold Hurston to such a high standard, however,
because most of the rest of the novel seems very "realistic" to me; I have no
difficulty pretending her characters are "real" people, who nevertheless
sometimes speak and act in very extraordinary ways.  
As the foregoing suggests, I have also attributed a great deal of
Subjectivist value to the "style" of Their Eyes Were Watching God.  My latest
reading of the last paragraph of the novel included a particularly strong
assessment of its "performative" value, even though in previous readings I had
consumed it primarily from an Idealist point of view.  As a demonstration of how
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an assessment of style is a Subjectivist value judgement, I offer below further
lectical self-analysis of my experience with the novel, although doing so will
certainly expose even more of my idiosyncratic preferences.  First, the
paragraph in question:
The day of the gun, and the bloody body, and the courthouse
came and commenced to sing a sobbing sigh out of every corner in
the room; out of each and every chair and thing.  Commenced to
sing, commenced to sob and sigh, singing and sobbing.  Then Tea
Cake came prancing around her where she was and the song of the
sigh flew out of the window and lit in the top of the pine trees.
Tea Cake, with the sun for a shawl.  Of course he wasn't dead.  He
could never be dead until she herself had finished feeling and
thinking.  The kiss of his memory made pictures of love and light
against the wall.  Here was peace.  She pulled in her horizon like a
great fish-net.  Pulled it from around the waist of the world and
draped it over her shoulder.  So much life in its meshes!  She called
in her soul to come and see.  (184)
How does one account for the feeling that a piece of writing is distinctive,
that it stands out from other fictional language in a positive way?  How does
one, with a straight face, explain to a room full of teenagers why a paragraph is
beautiful?  On what grounds do I claim that Hurston closed her novel with some
of the most lovely prose I have ever read?  Let me count the ways....
First, I'll try to account for my decision to treat the whole paragraph
primarily as a single textual feature distinguished by its diction. That is, what is
so remarkable about the language in this paragraph that I recognized it as an
aporia?  My initial answer is that it constitutes a shift in tone from most of the
rest of the novel.  Most of the novel alternates between two basic verbal styles:
a fairly straightforward omniscient narration of events and the dialect of the
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quoted dialogue.  In the page preceding this paragraph, this basic pattern is
repeated as Hurston moves back into the "frame" narrative, that is to the
fictional "present" where Janie, returned from her adventures on the muck, is
telling Phoeby Watson the story of her life up to the moment.  This narrational
transition is marked first by two lines of white space, then a narrative voice
which lets us know "Janie stirred her strong feet in the pan of water," then
finally Janie's direct address to her friend: "Now, dat's how everything wuz,
Phoeby, jus lak Ah told yuh" (182).  Phoeby offers her own lectical assessment
of Janie's story - "Ah done growed ten feet higher from jus' listenin' tuh you,
Janie.  Ah ain't satisfied wid mahself no mo'" - and finally Janie ends their
dialogue by enjoining Phoeby not to worry about what the neighborhood gossips
think or say because they are just talking, and talking about life is not the same
thing as living it: "Two things everybody's got tuh do fuh theyselves.  They got
tuh go tuh God, and they got tuh find out about livin' fuh theyselves" (183).
These are the last quoted words of the novel, and they are followed by a
resumption of the omniscient narration: "There was a finished silence after that
so that for the first time they could hear the wind picking at the pine trees"
(183).
Most of the novel follows this rather conventional narrational pattern,
albeit not in the narrative "present."  In the terms of this project, these two
verbal styles constitute two dialogic motifs.  Although I could discuss how they
are "distinguished" from other diction I have read (Hurston's frequent use of
"free indirect discourse" immediately comes to mind), I want to focus here on
the diction of the last paragraph, and therefore merely want to underline how
they are distinguished from it.  For clarity I will refer to these two verbal styles
as "narrator style" and "character style" as distinguished from the verbal style
of the last paragraph, "Zora style."  The narrator and character styles both use
informal, often fragmentary diction, although the character style much more so
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since it is written strictly in dialect.  Although both styles are employed within
the process of narrative exposition, for me their diction often resists the
transparent delivery of fictional data.  The quality "transparency" refers to those
moments in a reading when the style of a textual feature is virtually ignored,
such as with the dialogue cue "she said" or the dry delivery of narrative facts,
like "she walked downstairs and opened the back door."  Although such "stage
directions" do occur in the novel, quite frequently both the narrator and
character styles call attention to the way they relate what is "happening."  In my
journal entry written just prior to my last reading, I pointed out one of my
favorite examples of character style, drawn from the words of Janie's
grandmother: "Put me down easy, Janie, Ah'm a cracked plate" (19).  In that
earlier reading-text, I called this diction "poetic," not to suggest that it
approached poetry as a textual pattern, but to emphasize the interesting and
often skillful use of overtly figurative language to express everyday thoughts
and emotions.  The narrator style also frequently caught my attention with
inventive figures.  A few sentences before the last paragraph, for instance, the
narrator writes, "Janie mounted the stairs with her lamp.  The light in her hand
was like a spark of sun-stuff washing her face in fire" (183).  Do you want
further examples?  How about when a dying Joe Starks gives Janie "a ferocious
look.  A look with all the unthinkable coldness of outer space.  She must talk to
a man who was ten immensities away" (80) or, "They sat on the boarding house
porch and saw the sun plunge into the same crack in the earth from which the
night emerged" (31).
I should say that I assess a high value to both of these verbal styles.
They feel immediate, honest, original, and not infrequently eloquent.  As I read
the novel, occasionally a phrase would sharply catch my attention as being
particularly distinctive, and I would consolidate that lectical moment, that
experience of reading Hurston's language, within one of these two dialogic
271
motifs.  The cumulative value of each such moment gave me a coherent sense
of style.  How do I know this? Well, I remember it happening; I remember pausing
to regard the language rather than the fictional world or the ideas of the novel.
Moreover, regarding this sense of style, I made no distinction between the words
of different characters; for me, they all had the same voice, and that voice was
distinct from the narrator style larger by virtue of vocabulary.  That is, they
often seem to share similar syntactical strategies.  Upon looking back through
the text, as I have done a few times today to transcribe passages verbatim, I
can see a number of differences; that is, upon re-reading I can find other things
to say about the narrator and character styles.  When I finished my latest,
complete reading-act a few days ago, however, I merely saw them as different
but highly sympathetic verbal styles; their diction was doing the same work in
the novel, and they caught my attention in the same ways and with comparable
frequency.
I did, however, recognize a distinct difference between these two verbal
styles and the "Zora" style which I attribute to the last paragraph.  I had already
remarked passages where the narrative voice seemed to shift into a more
densely, overtly lyrical mode.  Moreover, such passages seemed to stand apart
from the delivery of narrative "fact"; they either framed narrative events,
typically at the beginning or ending of chapters, or they commented on them or
some aspect of "life" in the abstract.  Upon looking back at the novel, I can see
this pattern starts with its very first words:
Ships at a distance have every man's wish on board.  For some
they come in with the tide.  For others they sail forever on the
horizon, never out of sight, never landing until the Watcher turns
his eyes away in resignation, his dreams mocked to death by Time.
That is the life of men.
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One of the characteristics I attributed to the motif of Zora style, as I developed
it, was a sense of its focus upon verbal expression rather than narrative
progression.  Although it is not unusual for a novel to begin - or end - with some
sort of stylistic flourish, note that the passage above is not concerned with
letting the reader know what or who the novel is about, it is focused upon
expressing the cliché "when my ship comes in" in new language, sharpening the
old saw for a new purpose: ostensibly a description of "the life of men."
Throughout the novel, I recognized a number of passages that seemed to have a
similar stylistic purpose and impact, albeit often with a greater impact upon me
in the moment.  The "flowering pear tree" passage in Chapter Two is one of
these (10 -11); the description of the rising hurricane - which includes the line
for which the novel is titled - is another (150-51).  As my reading-act
progressed, I continued to remark these lectical moments and process them as a
single voice, to notice their distinctiveness from the other two verbal styles
discussed above, but also from other fictional diction I had read.  So, the first
way that I can account for my Subjectivist reading of the last paragraph of the
novel, is that it became for me the last, and to my taste one of the best,
addition to a dialogic motif that I had been developing since the first line of the
novel.
 This account, however, does not describe exactly what is distinct about
the diction of the last paragraph, that is, why it caught my attention as an
aporia of stylistic distinction.  Trying to describe what is "remarkable" or
"distinctive" - much less beautiful - about a verbal expression is dicey at best,
even if the main criteria for doing so are one's perceptions.  Lectical
assessments in all of the modes all too often appear in reading-texts as abstract
adjectives, but descriptions of style are usually particularly abstract.  If I tell you
that I love the "naturalness" of Hurston's language or that her word choice is
"brilliant," I have done little more than indicate that I performed a reading-act
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that included some kind of a Subjectivist assessment of style, and that I valued
that assessment rather highly.  This, of course, is the kind of slippery ground
where language theorists fear to tread.
However, I believe that teachers should perhaps not rush but at least
venture carefully a little deeper into the realm of speculation, even at the risk of
appearing a bit foolish.  In the classroom, therefore, I attempt to describe
lectical assessments by employing traditional vocabulary used to describe line
level diction - because it already exists - with an additional focus upon lectical
conventions that might have impelled a reader to create a certain assessment of
style.  In the classroom, this usually involves pushing the writer of a reading-text
to at least guess which textual features instigated which lectical responses,
particularly when the reading-text is as abstract as the "word choice is brilliant."
Although the truth-value of such speculations may be very suspect, the airing of
ones lectical laundry in public dramatizes two very important lessons that I
believe are true: 1. Lectical assessment is deterministic, not mysterious, even if
we cannot identify exactly which of the many possible contingencies
"determined" how a particular reading-act was created.  2. It is permissible to
have any opinion about the value of a fiction in the classroom, as long as you
can account for it according to lectical and/or literary conventions.  
I'll push myself a little further into my lectical self-analysis to clarify the
kinds of speculation I try to get out of my students.  My best guess regarding
why Hurston's diction in the last paragraph caught my attention is that it seems
particularly "poetic" to me; that is, I recognized that she employs many line-level
strategies I usually associate with poems.  Alliteration, rhyme, rhythmic
repetitions: all of these strategies have traditionally been associated with
poetry, and therefore to some extent "invite" readers to pay extra attention to
its diction.  As pointed out above (during my reading of Rich's "Our Whole Life"),
one of the most common lectical conventions for reading poetry is to recognize
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that its language is meant to be patently evocative.  Although poetry may
deliver a narrative, it is - or should be - understood that poems often use very
different strategies for communicating meaning than prose narrative.  The
further implication of this lectical convention is that poetry should be read
carefully since it is often difficult to understand all or even part of what it might
mean, particularly on a first reading.  In other words, poetry is tricky to read, so
one should pay close attention to its words.  At some point (I'm not sure exactly
when, but it was before I turned the page at the line "the kiss of his
memory..."), I recognized the "poetic" quality of the diction.  I remember doing
two things in response to this recognition: 1. I laughed quietly and shook my
head in admiration, I believe it was in response to the line "Tea Cake, with the
sun for a shawl."  2. I re-read the paragraph up to that point and, turning the
page, to the end as poetry.    
Upon doing so, I remarked certain phrases more closely, paying particular
attention to the way they "sounded" to me as opposed to what they meant.  I
noticed that the opening lines were particularly rhythmic (looking back now, I
would scan it as dimeter), and that they are fraught with assonance and
alliteration.  The repetition of certain words ("commenced," "sing," "sobbing,"
"sighing") seemed "incantatory" to me, like a prayer.  I also remarked the
evocative complexity of a particular line which I read at least two times in a row
before I felt ready to move forward: "Then Tea Cake came prancing around her
where she was and the song of the sigh flew out of the window and lit in the top
of the pine trees."  This line, it occurred to me, was very powerful both as an
image and a symbol.  I had already associated Tea Cake with the "flowering pear
tree" analogical motif earlier in my reading, so I understood this sentence as a
continuation of that symbolic pattern, an idea come back from the dead to
dispel the sighing and sobbing of Janie's memories of his death and her trial.
Imagistically, the "sight" of Tea Cake "prancing around" stood in sharp contrast
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to "the song of the sigh" skulking in the corners.  That the "song of the sigh" is
banished from the house out into the already sighing pine trees seemed to be
particularly imagistically evocative; that is, I quite easily was able to pretend to
hear a pine tree's sigh.  I continued reading in this manner, playing with the
possibilities of the words, though when I turned the page and realized I was
reading the last words of the novel, I played with them less and valued them
more.  I have a hard time accounting for this last artifact, except to say that I
believe I was responding - rather passively - to the last lines as a peroration, a
stylistic flourish that also repeated what I already believed was the main theme
of the novel.  In other words, my heightened value assessment of the last lines
might be accounted for by my anticipation of my "final" reading-act, which I was
already sure was going to be positive.  Like a fool in love, I rushed headlong into
the arms of my appreciation for the novel as a whole.
I am pretty confident the above account is accurate, but through a
retrospective comparison of my reading-text with lectical conventions it is
possible to make a few further - and more qualified - speculations about what
may have caused me to respond as I did.  To begin with, this paragraph does not
appear in a poem, even though I read it as one.  It stands to reason, therefore,
that on some level treating prose as poetry created a lectical aporia for me, or
rather than it sharpened the distinction between the way I had been reading and
the way I was currently reading.   
Another possibility is that I was responding to a very
traditional criterion for stylistic value: that is, that words should be well-suited
to the meaning that is expressed through them.  I have already pointed out how
the "sound" of the first lines of the paragraph impressed me, although I do not
recall at the time specifically noticing the harmony between their sonics and the
semantic attributions I had made and was making.  Specifically, the sibilance of
the words "commenced," "sing," "sobbing," and "sighing" sound like a "song of
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the sigh" to me, which in turn sounds like wind in pine trees.  With Tea Cake's
entrance, these sibilant words are virtually banished from the passage.  Did this
element of the textual pattern invite me to mobilize a traditional lectical value
and therefore "appreciate" the paragraph more?  I can't recall for certain, so this
might mark the admittedly vague boundary I have been treading between
analytical speculation and pure guesswork.
As with all of the lectical "tasks" discussed in earlier chapters, the three
modes of reading are deployed interdependently during actual lectical
assessments.  The foregoing discussion of the Subjectivist assessments I made
during my last reading of the last paragraph of Their Eyes Were Watching God,
for instance, cannot be isolated from the Materialist or the Idealist assessments I
had already made which to some extent laid the foundation for my recognition
of "Zora's" distinctive verbal style.  To mention just one of these
interdependencies, my strategy of attributing those words to a fictional
character - "Zora" - and subsequently positively valuing my personal, imaginary
relationship with her is a patently Materialist gesture.  There is simply no way for
me to know how much of my (pretended) regard for "Zora" is due to my
perception that "she" is a gifted storyteller, anymore than I can tell to what
extent I am positively affected by the style of that paragraph because it comes
from someone whom I (pretend to) like.  
By tracking these various interdependencies as thoroughly as possible,
however, students are at least shown a representation of the complexity of
reading-acts, and therefore tend to take their own mediatory gestures into
greater consideration as well as have greater insight into the reading-texts of
others.  Moreover, the process of examining lectical assessments tends to give
them a way to determine which mediatory gestures are thoroughly idiosyncratic
and which clearly respond to widely held beliefs about the value of literature:
that is, those beliefs compiled at the beginning of this chapter in my list of
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"lectical values."  In other words, students learn how to winnow out their
personal affection for a fiction from those assessments which might be used to
make a public, academically "responsible" argument of value, such as in a term
paper or essay test.  The appreciation of fiction in both the private and public
realms is thereby demystified and legitimized, and the gap between those
students who already "get it" and those who don't is at least narrowed, if not
completely closed. In the last section of this dissertation, I will outline one of
many possible classroom methods one can use to teach students not only how
they think about fiction already, but also how they can speak and write about
those thoughts in ways which more closely adhere to current criteria for
academic "responsibility."  Teaching them such skills may not change their lives,
but it at least challenges their all too often unconscious lectical habits, and in
the process often teaches them how to earn better grades in any coursework
where the analysis of cultural artifacts is relevant.  
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Chapter Five:  Lectical Analysis in the Classroom
Good reading and good writing are first and last, lots of work.
Richard Poirier
It is better to fail in teaching what should not be taught than to succeed
in teaching what is not true.
Paul de Man
In the Introduction to this dissertation, I asserted that the best
pedagogical method is one that overtly grounds its materials in a body of
theory.  In other words, how and what we teach in the literary classroom should
be justified as explicitly as possible by an account of why literature is "taught"
at all, rather than merely read.  Accordingly, the preceding chapters offer a
model of reading which is meant to serve as the foundation for the general
pedagogical approach I have called above "neo-appreciation" pedagogy; that
approach is pursued in my literature courses through "lectical analysis," the
terminology of which is articulated by the lectical triangle.  My goal in those
chapters was to justify my classroom practice to other scholars by fleshing out
some of its theoretical implications.  The rhetorical triangle operates as a
heuristic for traditional theories about rhetorical context, and therefore is
warranted by an ancient, vast, and often quite divergent body of thought.  The
theoretical formulations that warrant the lectical triangle, however, do not enjoy
the same prestige or coherence as those that warrant the rhetorical triangle.
Consequently, I have had to yoke together a number of themes that recur in
contemporary theories of reading, ethics, and aesthetics with a constant eye
upon the appearance of reading; that is, I have tried to accommodate what is
often said about reading on the theoretical level to ubiquitous lectical
experience.  
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Needless to say, additional accommodations have to be made in the
classroom so that both the underlying theory and the practice of lectical
analysis are intelligible to undergraduate students.  Every sound teaching
method I have encountered - at least in the human sciences - operates through
the repetition of simple and concrete concepts that are gradually elaborated in
order to account for the abstract and complex nature of phenomena.  One must
be conversant with Freud's basic stages of human development, for instance,
before one has a chance of understanding Lacanian cultural analysis.  Freud's
categories of "normal" development may be overly prescriptive and patently
sexist, but they are elegantly simple and therefore teachable.  After learning the
necessarily reductive general theories of Freud, Piaget, and Maslow, to name a
few, apprentice psychologists have a theoretical and terminological foundation
from which they can more closely - and accurately - examine human behavior.  In
other words, the principle pedagogical value of such broad, theoretical brush
strokes is not their historical influence or truth-value; they are most valuable to
young scholars as coherent ways to begin thinking and talking about very tricky
subjects.
The way I approach neo-literary appreciation follows this same basic
trajectory.  From the first class meeting I begin to teach students relatively
simple concepts which are applied in increasingly complex ways throughout the
course.  My goal is to finish teaching my students the basics of lectical analysis
while there are still three to four weeks left in the course.  Although they do not
have all of the tools to perform lectical analysis (as it is laid out in the preceding
chapters) until the last third of the course, they begin practicing elements of
lectical analysis almost immediately.  Although I am sure there are many ways to
teach neo-literary appreciation, below I will outline the basic methods and
materials I have developed over the last few years in the hope that my readers
will better understand how easy it is to include such curriculum in an
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undergraduate class.  My further hope is that my efforts so far will instigate the
creation of other - undoubtedly better - ways to teach our students how to be
more conscious about what they do to and with cultural artifacts.
So: this is how I go about it.  In the first class meeting, I give my students
a packet of information about neo-literary appreciation (see appendix A), and
begin discussing the theoretical assumptions about literature which are compiled
there.  Before I do so, however, I typically have them read something: I have
used selections from William Bradford's Of Plymouth Plantation in recent
American literature surveys, but the opening lines of Beowulf work equally well
when I teach British literature.  By having them read before I lecture, or even
give them a syllabus, I hope to highlight from the outset that their lectical
experiences will be both the principle focus of and inspiration for their class
work.  Once I do begin to lecture my rationale for teaching literature, I regularly
turn to that initial lectical experience for demonstrative examples, asking them
to compare their aesthetic objects with the text at hand.   
In my class notes, I refer to this opening lecture as "Subjectivism 101,"
although the handout with which I have them follow along is entitled "The Basic
Assumptions of Neo-Literary Appreciation" and reads as follows:
1. A fiction can only be understood by a reader according to his or her
unique understanding of world and culture; therefore, fictions do not have
objectively determined meaning or value before they are read.
2.  A fiction is encountered sequentially as fragments of language, or
"textual features," which readers translate into a coherent and unified
understanding about the fiction; this "understanding" is called the
"aesthetic object," and it exists only in the individual reader's mind.  
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3.  Readers attribute meaning and value to fictional texts according to
interpretive strategies they have learned in order to "close" the inherent
"openness" of textuality.
4.  The current literary "canon" is a reflection of the values and
interpretive strategies embraced by academic culture at this time.  At any
given point in history the interpretive strategies of academic culture are
usually more varied and complex than those of the general populace.
Many "canonical" fictions, therefore, are difficult to understand and/or
"appreciate" if one's repertoire of interpretive strategies is relatively
limited.
5.  Analyzing the received heritage of literary value as a reflection of
certain strategies of interpretation gives one insight into both past and
current cultural stereotypes.
6.  Broadening your own interpretive strategies helps you to understand
how and why a greater variety of literary works are or might be valued,
and thereby improves your ability to discuss culture both casually and
academically.
7.  Reading literature can be personally transformational, and therefore
should be examined as closely as possible.
As I proceed through this system of assumptions, I ask my students questions
about their lectical experiences to provide demonstrative examples. In an earlier
chapter, I discussed the dependence of this dissertation upon the rhetorical
appeal to praxis.  This time-honored strategy of moving an audience through the
deployment of persuasive, anecdotal evidence is particularly important to my
classroom method.  Facing a room full of undergraduates, I can't appeal to
intertextual, scholarly support for my claims - like positioning myself within the
Pragmatist philosophical tradition - because such data is foreign and therefore
counter-persuasive to them.  Similarly, my justifications above for neo-literary
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appreciation in general and lectical analysis in particular as ways of "being
practical" about what can and should be taught about literature are counter-
intuitive to most undergraduate students.  Firmly entrenched in an archaic, text-
immanent understanding of literary meaning, their first reaction to "Subjectivism
101" is disbelief; it seems patently impractical to them, another case of
eggheaded over-intellectualization of simple, everyday matters.  Anecdotal
appeals to praxis may not rise to the level of responsible science, but they do
persuade students to entertain concepts that I believe can at least nominally be
justified through formal theory.  I don't feel too bad, therefore, about applying a
little spin while pitching my reductive account of the theoretical basis for lectical
analysis.
Most recently, for instance, I had asked my students to read a page from
Bradford's history, subtitled in my anthology as "The Starving Time" (qtd. in
McMichael 63-64).  After elaborating somewhat upon item number one above, I
asked them what they thought Bradford looked like.  Many of their responses
were very similar; all of them reported he was dressed in black (like a pilgrim,
duh), and most of them believed he was elderly.  Next, I asked them to find
textual features which may have encouraged such similar interpolations of
Bradford's writing despite the fact that he does not describe himself or reveal
his age in the passage.  My students quite quickly saw that their images of
Bradford and their aesthetic objects as a whole had been affected by similar
cultural conventions of "Pilgrim" life.  They also were able to recognize that their
perceptions of Bradford's age were attributable to the diction of the passage.
They felt like he spoke with authority, like a preacher or teacher; moreover, they
were able to recognize that the archaic, patently biblical style which Bradford
uses probably influenced their attribution of age.
A few students, however, did not see Bradford as an elderly man but in
the prime of life.  They were able to trace this interpolation to assumptions they
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held about what kind of man could survive the Colonial wilderness.  Moreover,
they attributed a "pitiless" quality to the tone of the passage, which they had
associated with the vigorousness of youth.  At one point, Bradford relates the
miserable sickness and death of some of the sailors who in the past "would
often curse and scoff" at their Puritan passengers, apparently as an exemplum
of God's vengeance upon the wicked.   One student identified the self-
righteousness of this exemplum as the contempt of the strong for the weak, and
was able to retrace this attribution to her perception that Bradford was in the
prime of life when he wrote his narrative.    
As I proceed through the seven assumptions listed above, I continue to
oscillate between lecturing the material and asking students to generate
examples from their reading-acts.  I move through the material as quickly as
possible - since we will be revisiting it in virtually every class meeting - although I
make sure they have a minimal grasp on the key terms they will need for the
next batch of terminology they will encounter.  Course-specific denotations for
the terms "lectical," "appreciation," "textual feature," "aesthetic object,"
"canon," and "aporia," therefore, are given significantly more attention in these
first class discussions than they are in the handout.  For instance, I give multiple
examples of what a "textual feature" is or can be, making sure to distinguish
between that term and "textual pattern."  Moreover, not only do I use the
terminology, but I encourage and eventually insist my students do so as well.
Although some terminological confusion typically persists throughout the
course, I contend that any lexicon is learned and deployed imperfectly by those
unfamiliar with it, and such terminological confusion can be incorporated into the
modified "Socratic" classroom method I tend to use.  For example, if a student
says, "There are many water motifs in this text," I might respond, "Are you
saying these motifs are a 'textual feature' of your reading-act or a part of the
'textual pattern' of The Waste Land?"  Although I employ other general
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pedagogical methods as well, the "Socratic" method of requiring students to
make claims which they subsequently must defend is particularly well-suited to
teaching the skill of lectical analysis because it dramatizes its fundamental, self-
reflexive process.  By questioning - and correcting - their responses, I model the
behaviors I will require them to perform in class, in their journals, and on tests.
The fact that the Socratic method is far from being a revolutionary teaching
method is to my mind one of its strong points.  I am asking students to think
and speak about literature in radically new ways (at least to them), so I feel
good about teaching them to do so through a process that should feel familiar,
if not comfortable.
The most ideologically biased - and least "scientifically"
justifiable - assumption I deliver to my students is number seven on the list
above: "Reading literature can be personally transformational and therefore
should be examined as closely as possible."  I try to be forthright about the
cultural biases inherent to the assumption that literature "transforms" people,
and I do so as an opening critique of literary study as a form of - potentially -
unconscious cultural transmission.  If Bartholomae is correct about the
correlation between a student's success in the humanities and his or her ability
to "appropriate" a scholarly identity, as I think he is, then revealing the bases of
our cultural biases, no matter how subjective, helps demystify the apparent gulf
between professional, academic lectical experience and that of "normal" people.
Let's face it; we're nerds.  Our students know it, and pretending that we
approach William Bradford or Willa Cather with the same set of beliefs about
literature as most people only confirms how far down the bell curve of normalcy
we have strayed.  By admitting up front that I am an unrepentant, literary nerd -
and that they will not be required to become one to get an "A" in the course - I
am able to open up the discussion of how one's beliefs about culture deeply
affect one's lectical strategies.  The canon, therefore, becomes a subject for
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critique rather than a tradition which should be swallowed whole and presumably
savored.  Since the kinds of texts that usually are assigned to students in
literature surveys initially tend to leave a bad taste in their mouths (How many
of your students expound upon the pleasures of reading Jonathan Edwards or
Ezra Pound, unless they are shamelessly sucking up.  Five percent?  Less?), I
begin the process of teaching them a way to access such texts by admitting
that "taste" is governed by patently subjective biases, many of which they do
not share with me or most literary professionals.  
Disclosing my belief in the potentially transformational power of reading
also opens a discussion of what kinds of cultural artifacts have already
transformed my students' lives.  With very little prompting, those students that
do not already share my assumptions about reading are eager to discuss the
way movies, television, music, and video games have changed the way they
think about themselves and the world.  Calling attention to the aesthetic value
they already attribute to such cultural artifacts - as long as one does not
denigrate their experiences out of hand - tends to demystify why and how nerds
like us value texts which sometimes confuse, irritate, or bore students.  
Openly recognizing the issue of "taste" in literature also provides a
transition to the first analytical skill I teach students: identifying aporias.  I have
tried a variety of ways of communicating to my students what aporias are or can
be without completely ignoring the complex and highly qualified theoretical
material detailed in the preceding chapters of this dissertation.  Ultimately, my
goal during the first class meeting is to give students terminology and concepts
which can be built upon as the course progresses, therefore I outline only the
basic architecture of lectical analysis and how the recognition of aporias relates
to that analytical activity.  My lecture notes for this initial outline are as follows:
1. Lectical analysis is performed by tracing backwards from the
elements of a reading-text to determine the lectical strategies
286
used to create it.  This is done by identifying relationships between
the attributions of semantic reference and function in a reading-
text and the aporias those attributions apparently are meant to
resolve.  By doing so one can speculate with varying degrees of
certainty about the structure of a particular reading-act, with the
ultimate goal of determining what was gained - or lost - by
applying certain lectical strategies to certain textual features.  
2. The lectical triangle lists out various, common lectical strategies
for attributing meaning and value to fictions; however, one must
also be familiar with the general types of aporias which instigate
readers to employ those strategies so one can compare the lectical
"solutions" represented in a reading-text to the apparent
"problems," "issues," "questions," "distinctions," "conflicts," or
"highlights" the reader identified in the fiction.  
3. There are two basic types of aporias: textual aporias and lectical
aporias.  Textual aporias are those aporias included within a textual
pattern that can be identified with a great deal of certainty
according to "common" cultural conventions.  Lectical aporias are
those aporias that are identified by a particular reader during a
particular reading-act, whether those aporias are recognized
according to identifiable cultural conventions or not.
I use a number of pedagogical commonplaces to deliver this material.  For
instance, I typically draw a diagram on the chalkboard to represent the temporal
relationships between texts, reading-acts, reading-texts, and lectical analysis in a
spatial/visual format.  Having a "picture" up on the board to point to seems to
ground both my students and myself.  Students seem to be able to digest the
material in this initial lecture as long as I resist the temptation to digress or
overly qualify it.  The term "cultural convention" for instance, can easily devolve
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into a lecture (i.e. digression) about the difficulty of distinguishing between the
idiosyncratic and the conventional in lectical activity.  Such discussions are
important, but before students can participate in them in any meaningful way,
they need to practice working with larger brush strokes.  
Another pedagogical commonplace I employ is direct and consistent
repetition of the key terms, both verbally and graphically.  In other words, I say
and write the same definitions in the same way, and on the same portion of the
blackboard, until I feel confident that most of the class has grasped the material.
Since much of the lexicon of lectical analysis is reworked from traditional literary
and philosophical terminology, and therefore subject to some confusion, during
the first part of the course I rigorously repeat myself, so much so that it
becomes a standing joke.  The tedium of drilling terminology may be
unavoidable, but it can be ameliorated somewhat with practical application to
the reading at hand and a healthy dose of self-depreciation.
Surprisingly enough, students have few problems understanding the
denotations for the word "aporia."  Perhaps this is because on some level they
already know that reading-acts are acts of creation where they "fill in the gaps"
left by an author; giving those "gaps" a name, therefore, allows them to speak
about experiences they have been having for some time.  Their prior contact
with aporias, however, has almost always been negative; by characterizing
aporias as the stimulus for creation, rather than its impediment, from the first
class I try to loosen their death-grip on their belief that the only good reading is
one that proceeds seamlessly, one during which understanding comes
"naturally."  Instead, I teach them that all fictional reading-acts are dependent
upon the inherent fragmentation of texts in combination with the mandate to
establish lectical coherence.  In other words, I show them all their prior
attributions of "seamlessness" were created - unconsciously - by pretense.  I
immediately follow my delivery of these ideas with a practical application to the
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text at hand.  Specifically, I refer my students to the following printed material
regarding the two "types" of aporias handed out at the beginning of class:          
 Textual  Aporias:
1. Boundaries of grammatical units (phrases, clauses, sentences,
etc.)
2. Graphic breaks (lines, paragraphs, stanzas, white space,
chapters, illustrations, font changes, the last word of a fiction etc.)
3. Shifts in or violations of generic textual patterns (i.e. dialogue,
character, narration, description, narrative chronology, non-
standard syntax, etc)
4. Shifts in diction.
5. The repetition of textual patterns.
6. The manipulation of cultural stereotypes.
Lectical Aporias:
1. Perceived limits of a textual feature.
2. Perceived conflicts in semantic reference or function.
3. Perceived correspondence between textual features or motifs.
4. Perceived conflicts with the reader's pre-understanding of "the
world."
5. Commencing or stopping a reading in progress (its time to go to
work so I mark my place and close the book; later, I open the book
and start reading where I left off).
6. The perceived resistance of a textual feature to one's lectical
strategies.
7. Pauses during a reading-act to "appreciate" it.
If I can avoid it, I do not directly address the equivocal nature of these
distinctions between "textual" and "lectical" aporias in the first class, although a
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few of my sharper students have caught it right off.  "Yes, Virginia," I might
admit, "to recognize a 'manipulation of cultural stereotypes' in a textual pattern
a reader must first notice a 'perceived conflict with a pre-understanding of 'the
world,' and perceptions of the world are inherently subjective."  However,
whether you call him Father Christmas, Papa Noel, or Santy Claus, people raised
in a Western culture share certain beliefs about the mythological creature who
visits good children on Christmas eve.  Although his traditional costume varies
from country to country, he is generally considered benevolent (unless you are a
four-year old being thrust onto the lap of some huge, ho-hoing stranger in a
shopping mall).  A fictional representation of Santa Claus as a cannibalistic
monster, therefore, can fairly confidently be identified as a "manipulation" of the
cultural tradition to which it refers.  My hope is that eventually my students will
understand that such equivocations are inevitable during any systematized
analysis of culture, but I try to avoid diving too deeply into gray areas until they
have a firmer grasp on the particular analytical system I am teaching them.
As with my list of assumptions for neo-literary appreciation, I draw
demonstrative examples of aporias from the reading my students completed at
the beginning of class.  Most of the "textual" aporias are easy for them to
identify although I usually give a good deal of attention to the terms "diction"
and "cultural stereotypes."  Many students do not know what "diction" is,
neither are they familiar with some of the common cultural identities associated
with various textual patterns, particularly regarding pre-twentieth century texts.
As pointed out in an earlier chapter, Shakespeare, Bradford, Milton, Swift, and
Emerson all sound alike to them.  The fact that they are ignorant of the vast
stylistic differences between such writers is not a problem or a point of shame, I
tell them, but it does indicate the kind of cultural information they need to learn
if they are to read such works in an academic setting.   I let them know that
they will be required to learn certain details about the linguistic, historical, and
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cultural conventions of earlier eras as a step towards distinguishing between
idiosyncratic and conventional attributions during lectical analyses.  Much of the
traditional subject matter of literature courses ("facts" about the time period,
the author's life, genre criteria, the definition of "zeugma," etc.), therefore, is
included in my course, but as a means not an end.   
Next, I direct my students' attention to the list of "lectical" aporias,
pointing out that most of the items begin with the word "perceived."
Perception, I tell them, does not necessarily include conscious awareness, and
lectical analysis seeks to focus attention on the subjective perceptions that
constitute reading-acts, perceptions which often are not attended to during
"casual" or "recreational" reading.  After having them read again a portion of the
text at hand, so they will have fresh lectical experiences, I ask them to identify
the different kinds of "lectical" aporias listed above.  If up to that point I have
done my job well, my students can usually come up with some rudimentary
reading-texts.  When forced to do so, they can remember the general limits of
the textual features they recognized while reading, and upon further
investigation can see possible reasons for their choices.  Invariably, different
students report different aporias, which occasions a brief discussion of
conventional and idiosyncratic lectical responses and those responses that are a
function of ignorance or apathy.  If I'm lucky, at least one of my students will
respond to my questions with a mulish "I don't know" or "I don't understand
what you want," and thereby provide an object lesson for the others.  Since - at
least at first - all I'm asking them to do is identify how they parsed the passage
into textual features, students who want to abstain from the discussion have
little grounds for sticking with "I don't know."  The fact that I am quite willing to
leave such students on the hook until they give me some sort of answer tends
to loosen the tongues of the rest of the class.   
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I am careful, however, not to ridicule or even outwardly show surprise at a
student's ignorance of cultural conventions.  After all, they have come to learn,
or at least get credit for learning.  Sometimes this level of acceptance is easier
to imagine and commit to than it is to practice.  The depth of my students'
ignorance occasionally takes my breath away.  This last semester, for instance,
in the process of discussing Flaubert's Parrot by Julian Barnes, one student had
the guts to ask if Gustave Flaubert was "a real person"; apparently, he was the
mouthpiece of a whole cadre of students sitting nearby.  I was so stunned that
it took me a few moments to respond, and before I could compose my game-
face enough to speak, the student said, "He is, isn't he.  Sorry, stupid question."  
There are such things as stupid questions ("Did we do anything on
Monday?" springs to mind), but my student's disclosure of his ignorance was not
one of them.  His question and my involuntary reaction, however, served to
illuminate the great disparity between the cultural knowledge absorbed by the
sort of people who become collegiate instructors and that absorbed by most
people, even most "educated" people.  Judgments regarding whether or not
someone should know Flaubert was a "real" person by the time they reach
college are best directed at the status of high-school education, or the
deleterious effects of television, video games, or some other agent of cultural
transmission.  Although I design course curricula with certain presumptions
about what students do and do not know about Western culture, my general
pedagogical method does not depend on any particular pre-understanding apart
from having some experience reading fiction (c.f. "minimum standards" Ch. 1).
Whenever my jaw drops at the distance between the cultural milieu I live in and
that inhabited by my students, therefore, I point out that my astonishment is a
product of my ignorance, not theirs.  As the instructor, it is my job to know
what cultural information needs to be lectured: that is, to know what they do
not yet know.  
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Similarly, it is my job to know when abstract concepts - like "pauses
during a reading-act to 'appreciate' it" - need to be demonstrated by reference
to textual patterns with which my students are familiar.  In other words, if I
believe they will have difficulty appreciating or at least understanding the value
of Bradford's History, I need to draw examples from Hollywood, sit-coms, or
some other cultural artifact to which my students already attach aesthetic
value, or at least have the interpretive resources to do so.  Drawing
demonstrative examples from "popular" culture also dramatizes the fact that
reading canonical - or at least anthologized - fiction is not a completely different
activity than watching a formulaic sit-com, although the different textual
patterns common to those genres may require different cultural information and
interpretive strategies in order to be "appreciated."
As stated above, my goal in the first few class periods are to give my
students the fundamental terms and analytical tools necessary for performing
rudimentary lectical analyses.  I do not, for instance, discuss in detail the
complex relationship between literary "appreciation" and what I called lectical
assessment above.  Instead, I merely tell them that moments when they notice
themselves appreciating or (even more casually) "feeling" something during a
reading-act constitute a possible lectical aporia.  Such moments, I tell them, can
be used as clues, as smoke for a lectical fire.  At some point in the course I
discuss in greater depth the range of lectical assessments described by the
lectical triangle, but at first I merely want them to get in the habit of linking
their "emotions" to possible lectical strategies.  The first homework assignment
does just that; I ask them to note in their journals at least five lectical aporias
during their reading of the assigned text, then to speculate in writing why those
moments "stand out," that is, why they think they are able to remember them.
In the subsequent class meeting, these journal entries are treated by them as
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reading-texts available for group analysis and by me as tools for elaborating the
conceptual foundation I delivered in the first class.
As should be clear from the foregoing, one of the main distinguishing
characteristics of my method of teaching literature  - besides the vocabulary of
lectical analysis - is that I overtly include the issue of "casual" versus scholarly
consumption of literature as a central part of the course curriculum.  Just as the
scholarly discipline of astronomy is more than stargazing and botany is more
than stopping to smell the roses, I tell my students literary study is more than
just reading and talking about books.  However, as pointed out in the
introduction to this dissertation, undergraduate students recognize the
legitimacy of thinking "scientifically" about stars and flowers but generally have
little experience thinking scientifically about literature. This is the case because
even those students who have read a lot of fiction, and therefore are "good at
English," usually have not been exposed to the theories of interpretation, and
hence analytical methods, which ground most contemporary literary scholarship.  
They have been taught the fundamental assumptions of the physical sciences
since elementary school, but literary curriculum up through the secondary level
consists chiefly of memorizing literary heritage in combination with "sharing"
one's interpretations, most often unwillingly.  Unlike most scholarly disciplines,
therefore, the legitimacy and basic methodology of literary "science" - or
scholarship, if you prefer - must be taught to college students before they can
hope to engage the subject matter as novice scholars.  
I have alluded to this element of my classroom curriculum since the
beginning of this dissertation, first discussing it vis a vis the work of David
Bartholomae.  Bartholomae's contention that students need to appropriate or be
appropriated by a scholarly discourse resonates well here with Wayne Booth's
notion of "coduction," the theoretical fulcrum of his The Company We Keep.
Briefly, Booth uses his neologism "coduction" to denote the process by which
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readers negotiate literary value within a plurality of selves and others (70ff).
Moreover, he extends the analogy between reading literary texts and meeting
people to the point where reading a book is tantamount to attending a very
interesting cocktail party attended by authors (living or otherwise), characters,
and entire fictions as well as "real" people we have met or merely heard about.
"Hey, Ken," one of my literary intimates, Julian Barnes, says to me, "have you
met my dear friend Gustave Flaubert?  I believe you know his character Emma
Bovary, over there by the mirror, but I think you and Gustave will get along
famously!  Gustave!  May I present...."
It is easy to lampoon Booth's analogy, but it is very difficult to come up
with a clearer, more teachable way to explain lectical context to undergraduates,
particularly the lectical context of reading fiction within the scholarly
community.  According to Booth's formulation, reading is always a "social"
activity.  For students, engaging literature within the bounds of a college course
is like being escorted by a blind date (the instructor) to a long-running, movable
feast of close friends who share a common history, favorite anecdotes, and even
a private lingo.  Students may be very gregarious within their own circle of
friends, but the styles, tastes, demeanor, and conversational topics at this
scholarly soirée seem foreign, almost absurdly sophisticated, and not a little
incestuous.  Everyone knows everything about everyone else, or at least they
seem to.  At such a gathering it takes a lot of courage to weigh in on such
topics as how deeply indebted Virginia is to Gertrude, or whether or not Walt
and Allen are "just friends."
For Booth, therefore, reading literature, and particularly the evaluative,
"ethical" quality that he believes is inherent to that act, is always performed
within a complex rhetorical context:
Coduction will be what we do whenever we say to the world (or
prepare to say):  "Of the works of this general kind that I have
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experienced, comparing my experience with other more or less
qualified observers, this one seems to me among the better (or
weaker) ones, or the best (or worst).  Here are my reasons."
Every such statement implicitly calls for continuing conversation:
"How does my coduction compare with yours?"  (72-73)
Although I have no quarrel with this rhetorized account of reading-acts (much of
the preceding chapter could be read as a gloss on it), a few issues should be
pointed out.  First, whether or not he believes it is true for all reading-acts,
Booth characterizes the coduction of fiction as an overtly self-conscious,
compositional process; most non-scholarly reading, however, is performed
unconsciously, so utterly immersed in pretense that the right hemisphere does
not know what the left is doing or has done.  As both Booth and I maintain
repeatedly, there is no reliable way to unravel completely the various selves,
conventions, beliefs, and remembered experiences that make up what I have
been calling the reader's "pre-understanding of the world," even if one reads and
teaches fiction professionally.  The best one can do, and Booth does it as well as
any I have read, is to analyze carefully what one thinks one thought after the
fact.  His extended demonstrative examples of "ethical criticism" at the end of
The Company We Keep do just that, and essentially perform what I have been
calling lectical analysis throughout this dissertation.  One of the inherent
problems with both of our analytical methods, therefore, is that by their very
structure they run the risk of perpetuating the false notion that all "good"
reading-acts are as self-conscious as the reading-texts created by professional
scholars.  The only curative for this potential misrepresentation is vigilance, and
a willingness to valorize other - less "conscious" - ways of reading.  On the other
hand, the fact that Booth's ethical criticism and my lectical analysis reflect the
lectical habits of the scholarly community can be a great benefit to students
who have to "appropriate" those habits to some extent to get good grades.
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Another potential issue made explicit by the excerpt quoted above is the
question of what Booth means by "qualified" readers.  Perhaps, Booth means
nothing more - or less - than readers like himself.  Both in form and content,
Booth implies that he imagines a scholarly reader for The Company We Keep, if
not a professional scholar then at least a skilled amateur.  Moreover, his
demonstrative performances of ethical criticism are structured as reevaluations
of a prior coduction he has come to distrust due to some critique by a colleague.
For instance, his earlier readings of Rabelais did not take into account feminist
critiques, and therefore missed some of the sexism that he subsequently has
recognized in Gargantua and Pantagruel (394ff).  Booth asserts that such
gestures of ethical criticism are not utterly subjective because they operate
according to the ethical imperative of respecting alterity, an imperative shared
by all because the human "self" does not exist except as a coduction. Ignoring
difference, therefore, is contrary to the self-interest of everyone involved, and
consequently one has an ethical duty to consider the opinions of others,
whether those others are the implied author of the fiction at hand or one's
colleague across the hall.  In response to radical "subjectivists," Stanley Fish and
Jacques Derrida in particular, Booth claims that the alternative points of view a
thorough reader should consider will always be plural, but they will never be
infinite or arbitrary.  
Of course, this way of thinking and talking about reading works best
within what Fish would call an interpretive community, in particular the
interpretive community of literary scholars.  Whether or not Booth dodges the
"subjectivist" silver bullet with the arch-value of recognizing alterity, it is clear
that all "responsible" literary criticism - at least in the current cultural climate -
takes the form of a coduction overtly articulated in terms of difference.  Self-
consciousness is not only a current virtue of literary scholarship, it is a defining
criteria, even for those scholars who revile critical self-consciousness.  Since, as
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Booth correctly points out, the currently operational beliefs of the scholarly
community are merely plural and can be learned, ethical criticism can make
reasonably certain predictions about the doctrinal beliefs most relevant to a
given textual feature: as long as one reads and writes like a scholar.  In other
words, once I have learned all of the doctrinal beliefs and critical terminology of
scholarly culture, and have read enough canonical literature to make that
cultural inheritance intelligible, it is no big trick to figure out which of those
conventions another "more or less qualified" reader might use to create a
scholarly reading-text, even before the fact.
It is more tricky, however, predicting the range of conventions a non-
scholarly reading-act might employ, for the simple fact that most reading-acts
proceed only through pretenses that require at least temporary
unselfconsciousness.  Can a reader, scholarly or otherwise, experience the
imagistic power of "The Waste Land," for instance, without at least provisionally
adopting the pretense they are "seeing" something?  No, says Booth, and I
agree with him.  Since the range of possible resources drawn upon while
"imagining" or "symbolizing" a textual feature are so vast and subjectively
determined, it is hard to "predict" how a reader might respond to a particular
textual feature.  To do so I must presume a particular semantic horizon for that
textual feature that will recognize the alterity of all people, not just all trained
scholars in the process of creating a reading-text.  After all, even scholars to
some extent must be just folks when they imagine fictional worlds.  
Such presumptions can be made, at times with a great deal of certainty,
but to what purpose in the classroom?  If, as I maintain, the goal of literary
pedagogy is to teach students how to critique what has been done with cultural
artifacts, rather than passively to appreciate the "good" ones, then speculation
about what some hypothetical reader might do with a fiction is beside the point.
As discussed earlier in this essay, lectical analysis can not do without some sort
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of rhetorical analysis of textuality and context, but neither can rhetorical
analysis, in all the forms I have seen it, offer students a coherent and teachable
description of how a text has been closed through lectical mediation.  
Although I do believe there is a substantive difference between neo-
literary appreciation as I have described it and more traditional, solely rhetorico-
historical pedagogical methods, I do not want to imply that focusing upon
lectical issues in the classroom is a panacea.  The only improvement of which I
am completely confident is that by following the methods above I have brought
the curriculum of my courses into better concordance with my theoretical and
scholarly understanding of literature.  Preaching in the classroom what I practice
in the library does more than just "feel" more ethical, more honest; by doing so I
more fully share with my students the particular expertise developed by a
literary scholar.  It takes no special expertise to teach literary heritage or
traditional text-based terminology, other than effective research and study skills
and generic teaching experience.  By the same token, given a few weeks to bone
up, I could probably teach an undergraduate class on American history or
abnormal psychology, as long as all that is required is the transmission of the
canonical "facts" of the subject matter.  The students would not know that I am
at best an amateur historian and/or psychologist, and as long as I brought my
syllabus in line with departmental parameters, I probably wouldn't be exposed to
the administration either.  An expert in either field, however, would quickly
recognize my tentative grasp on the material.  It simply takes more than a
couple of weeks boning up on the "facts" to become a scholar in any discipline
because the stock in trade of a scholar is not information - easily acquired and
taught by anyone with a modicum of persistence - but critical acumen regarding
a particular subject matter.  The training required of a literary scholar develops a
particular critical skill: being a strong reader.  The "strong" reader can juggle
multiple interpretations, link impressions to textual features, and interrogate his
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or her understanding of a fiction with that of colleagues and/or its critical
heritage.  In other words, the strong reader has the resources to create skillful
coductions, using Booth's terminology.
All literary scholars who teach bring these skills into the classroom one
way or another to the benefit of their students.  I have found, however, that
including a neo-appreciation component to my curriculum more fully requires and
shares my training as a "strong" reader.  Since the "primary" works of lectical
analysis are the reading-texts created and subsequently analyzed by students, I
have to stay on my toes, constantly "reading" what they say about their
responses to the fiction under consideration.  As pointed out above, after the
first class they are required at least to attempt lectical analysis in their journals,
so any given class period is partially devoted to discussing what they have
already made of the assigned material.  My training, if I deploy it skillfully, allows
me both to fine tune their critical efforts and to show how much or little their
responses coincide with the fiction's critical heritage.  Such classroom activities
cannot be represented by lecture notes because the analytical objects - student
reading-texts - are not available beforehand.  A good deal of the course
curriculum, therefore, must be delivered extemporaneously.   I lecture the
rhetorico-historical information that I believe students must or should learn, but I
do not know what my students and I will discuss for (ideally) most of the class,
though I do know how we will discuss it.  This type of pedagogy is inherently
dramatic; students learn how to be stronger readers, and what a "strong" reader
acts like, by watching one in action for a few hours a week in combination with
trying out their own developing skills, all in an atmosphere that is not only
friendly to critical speculation but demands it.    
Perhaps I should balance patting my own my back with some
demonstrative examples.  Below I will respond to a series of reading-texts drawn
from student journal entries in response to T. S. Eliot's "The Waste Land" in the
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effort to dramatize how I deploy lectical analysis in the classroom.  Furthermore,
I hope to demonstrate how lectical analysis can be used to address the needs of
different kinds of students, so I have organized this dramatization according to
an informal taxonomy of student behavior.  These categories, of course, are
inherently reductive, but they are not meant to be insulting.  Lumping people
into abstract categories always objectifies them to some extent, but I do so less
to ridicule students than to ground this demonstration in common classroom
dynamics that should be familiar to any experienced teacher.  
There are two categories of students that are not represented below
because neo-literary appreciation pedagogy does not substantively affect their
performance in the classroom.  The first of these is the "Apprentice."  These
students are those who have already "appropriated" to some extent the identity
of a literary scholar a lá Bartholomae.  Not only are their reading and critical
skills relatively well-developed, but they overtly demonstrate an understanding
of the value and relevance of studying the arts in general and fiction in
particular.  In short, they respect our discipline - and usually us by extension -
and therefore willingly follow where we lead.  Such students are often not
content to learn about the fictions on the syllabus.  They also often want to
know details from the instructor's personal history; they come to office hours
not for help but for fellowship.  Although Apprentices have little or no trouble
adopting the vocabulary of lectical analysis, by the same token the shift in
language does not appreciably change the level of their engagement with the
material, anymore than it would a "full-fledged" literary scholar.  This does not
mean that "Apprentices" do not benefit from performing lectical analyses, only
that those benefits are not significantly different from those they would receive
from any responsible literary instruction.  Apprentices already have the
knowledge, experience, and desire to strengthen their reading skills, and so they
do.  The only additional benefit they receive by adopting the vocabulary and
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methodology (and occasionally the hairstyle) of lectical analysis is that it tends
to put them on a more equal - at first unsteady - footing with the rest of the
class, which in turn tends to slow down their domination of open discussions.  If
the instructor is not careful, literature courses can devolve into seminars with a
few eager Apprentices and a score of somnambulant observers.  Because it
takes Apprentices a week or so to re-calibrate their critical lexicon, with a little
effort the instructor can establish a more egalitarian pattern for classroom
discussions before feelings of inadequacy and/or apathy infect their peers.15   
The other category of student that benefits little from a neo-literary
appreciation component in the classroom is the "Abstainer."  For reasons of
their own, Abstainers are not interested in putting forth any effort beyond that
which will get them the grades they want or require.  As any experienced
teacher knows, the Abstainer is (unfortunately) not equivalent with the
"Absentee"; they attend enough not to be dropped and they participate only
when obligated.  To acquire any new skill, however, demands greater motivation
and effort than can be measured "objectively" via written or oral examination.
Appearances can be deceiving, and Abstainers are often quite adept at
maintaining the appearance of adequacy.  As an instructor of adults, however, I
unequivocally support an Abstainer's right to perform only adequately in one of
my courses.  As long as they do not promulgate their apathy (for instance, by
dozing, chatting, or cheating during class), Abstainers are permitted to learn
just as little in one of my classroom as they would in any literary course.  Having
an Abstainer or four in the classroom can even be a great boon because they
become object lessons in the lower limits of acceptable classroom behavior.
Abstainers who ritually abstain from doing homework, for instance, should be
                                                 
15 Although analyzing an "Apprentice" text would profit little, for the reasons given, I offer a few examples
of them in Appendix B;  I do not provide examples of "Abstainer" reading-texts because I assume the
readers of this dissertation will have plenty of these close at hand.
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"corrected" publicly by any of the many traditional and legal means available.  In
a course, like mine, where oral participation is crucial, Abstainers provide the
additional service of demonstrating how easy it is to satisfy the minimum
requirements, as long as they are not allowed to limit their participation to "I
don't know," "I didn't read it," or "ummm."  Since Abstainers clearly identify
themselves by the apathy oozing from every pore, the rest of the class sees
that there is little liability to making an effort, even when one's performance is
less than stellar.  Moreover, a "strong" reader can turn even the most cursory
reading-text into grist for the communal, lectical mill.  For instance, last
semester an inveterate Abstainer (and you can't tell these until the course is
over; there is always hope) begrudgingly offered that he "got lost when Eliot
started writing in different languages."  Although his intention may have been
merely to get me off his back, which he achieved, this rudimentary observation
springboarded the class into a discussion of the aporetic structure of "The
Waste Land."  Throughout the discussion I repeatedly credited its generation to
this particular Abstainer.  Whether this pleased or galled him, I cannot say.   
I exclude reading-texts by Abstainers and their doppelgangers the
Apprentices, therefore, not because such students are unimportant but because
learning to perform lectical analysis does not particularly help them.  Other types
of students and readers, however, do receive particular benefits from neo-
appreciation pedagogy, benefits which redress certain conditions or beliefs which
make "strong" reading difficult for them.   
All of the reading-texts below were created according to the same
assignment: to perform a lectical (self) analysis of Eliot's "The Waste Land" with
a particular focus upon which "lectical values" they attributed or can imagine
being attributed to the poem [see class handouts in Appendix A].  Since this
assignment was given at the beginning of the last of three units, I had already
lectured and applied all the major elements of lectical analysis, including its
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heuristic the lectical triangle, in open class sessions.  Although written reading-
texts are different than spoken ones, I will try to demonstrate my general
classroom method by indicating the kinds of oral responses I would make to
their different categories of response.  Falling back here upon a platonic
compositional strategy is neither accidental nor casual.  I have already discussed
the affinity between neo-appreciation pedagogy and the Socratic method of
classroom dialectics, so it is to some extent appropriate that I play Plato to my
own Socrates. Although I am not particularly honey-tongued, I hope to thereby
approximate the general sense if not the actuality of how I deploy lectical
analysis in the classroom.  Unlike the Platonic dialogues, however, my
dramatizations below are not meant to be the last word on anything, neither are
they meant to be comprehensive in scope.  Leaning once again upon the
rhetorical appeal to praxis, I trust my reader will be able to backfill any gaping
holes I leave with his or her own classroom experiences.
The Good Student
The "Good Student" is distinguished from the Apprentice in that the
former has not yet developed the reading or critical skills that make literary
study relatively effortless and/or enjoyable.  Good Students, however, generally
have excellent study skills - often far superior to Apprentices - and a willingness
to do the intellectual work asked of them.  They come to class, do their
homework, ask questions, and in general take responsibility for their education.
The main difficulty Good Students have with literary study - and the humanities
at large - is that critical "acumen" cannot be memorized from lecture notes; it
must be developed over time through practice.  Since "strong" reading skills can
not be acquired overnight, even with extreme and focused effort, Good Students
often feel frustrated in the literary classroom.  They have no problem learning
heuristics like the lectical triangle, for instance, but applying the terminology
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flexibly - critically - eludes them at first.  By their own report, this situation feels
a bit unfair to them.  Unless they are given the resources to "get" what is
valuable about literary study, Good Students sometimes escape from their
frustration by becoming Abstainers.
The main benefit of lectical analysis to Good Students is that it
demonstrates to them that they already "get it," to some extent, even though
they still feel that they do not.  Armed with their class notes and handouts, they
do their utmost to parrot the language and method of lectical analysis.  Their
attempts to do so are often barely veiled, text-immanent readings and/or barely
coherent.  Take the following reading-text, for instance:
The overall lectical values of "The Wasteland" can most
prominently be seen as intellectually stimulating because the
extreme form and diction evokes thought and emotion which
forces the reader to look at the poem as a puzzle that must be
pieced together to find the image that the poet intends to be
understood.  Also, the style of the poem is extremely unique and
vituosic, which does not compare to most standard poetic styles;
this produces the originality of Eliot's style and portrays his
contrasting thought patterns that place him outside of the taboo.
The first thing an experienced literary instructor will recognize about the
reading-text above is its convoluted diction.  When I teach rhetoric and
composition courses, I call this style of speech "faux formal diction" and warn
my students against it because it is the single most frequent cause of
incoherence at the sentence level.  Quite simply, such writers attempt to
compensate for what they believe are their inadequate writing skills by using
vocabulary and syntactical strategies they think are "formal" but with which
they are unfamiliar and therefore clumsy.  This honest misidentification of
"formality" with "complexity" causes problems even when students understand
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the concepts they are trying to communicate (a sentence like "drinking coffee
can cause sleeplessness" becomes "the overindulgence of certain caffeinated
beverages, statistically speaking most often a form of coffee product, has a
negative correlation type of result in generating normal sleep cycles; also delta
patterns, which deal with certain aspects of usual brain functioning in most
subjects").   When students barely grasp the ideas they are trying to express,
however, the use of "faux formal diction" can make their writing - or speech -
truly daunting to understand.  In the attempt to appropriate the concepts and
dialect of scholarly analysis, they create awkwardly constructed nonsense, a fact
which is not lost on them and tends to increase their anxiety.
This commonplace is only a problem if the instructor does not rise to the
occasion or, alternatively, rebukes students for foundering in the unfamiliar
waters of scholarly diction.  Like those who believe that when they add an "o"
to an English noun they are speaking Spanish, students create convoluted and
incomprehensible sentences in the college classroom because that is what
scholarly speech sounds like to them.  "Good Students," in particular, will try to
mimic the sound of lectical analysis before they grasp its sense because they
want to follow directions, and even though they know they don't really "get it,"
they know that lectical analysis has something to do with speaking a certain way
about literature.  They fall back, therefore, on the jargon and speech patterns
they read in the handouts and hear from my lips in the classroom.  
However, most of their attempts to appropriate the language of lectical
analysis, like the one quoted above, are not complete nonsense, they just
appear to be so.  The instructor's job, as I see it, is to sift through the sound
and fury of such reading-texts in order to separate what was meant from what
was said.  In other words, their attempts at lectical analysis need to be
submitted to an extemporaneous rhetorical analysis.  If this is accomplished
skillfully, nearly all student reading-texts can be used to reinforce the
306
fundamental tenets of lectical analysis and, more importantly, open up the
fiction at hand to more angles of engagement by the class as a whole.  
The reading-text above, for instance, clearly demonstrates both the
utility and danger of using analytical heuristics like the lectical triangle.  The
phrases I italicized, "intellectually stimulating" and "unique and virtuosic," are
drawn directly from the list of "Lectical Values" I handed out to my students,
specifically values 2 and 7 [see Appendix A].  The Good Student who created
this reading-text evidently made an honest attempt to complete the assignment
by filtering her reading of "The Waste Land" through the unfamiliar tools
provided her.  The benefit of this strategy is that it lent a common vocabulary
and an organizational plan to the attributions she (perhaps) made during her
reading(s) of the poem.  The specific claims she makes - that the poem is
"intellectually stimulating" and "unique" - are highlighted by her use of the
jargon of lectical analysis and are immediately followed by her evidence for
those claims.  Even though her claims and evidence are largely tautological, they
indicate she understands that part of her job as a scholar is to link her
claims/attributions to textual features that might have "caused" them.
Throughout her journal entry, only part of which appears here, she attempts to
prove that Eliot intended to represent the "spiritual and moral degeneration" of
"the society he lived in" by linking variations on that theme to specific evidence
from the poem.  In other words, she expressed her text-immanent, apparently
Materialist, understanding of the poem according to the evidentiary rules of
classic, expository prose.  This is a boon to those students who have not yet
learned how to apply those rules when talking about literature.  
My first response to her reading-text, therefore, would be to praise her
strategy of focusing upon specific claims/attributions coupled to specific textual
features.  By doing so I would underline for her - and the rest of the class - that
her reading-text completely satisfied the assignment.  After all, I only require
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that students attempt lectical analysis; I don't require that their reading-texts
indicate an acute understanding of their particular reading-act or the concepts
surrounding lectical analysis as a whole.  This student clearly tried, and that
effort itself would be praiseworthy, even if she hadn't simultaneously
demonstrated how traditional interpretive claims are substantiated.  
The fact remains, however, that her reading-text is very difficult to
understand, and moreover that by all evidence it is warranted by a text-
immanent understanding of fictional meaning. My next response, therefore,
would be to ask her to clarify those highlighted claims by using the terminology
of lectical analysis.  I might ask her, "are you saying that the 'extreme form and
diction' of the poem constituted a lectical aporia for you which you resolved by
creating a character, named 'Eliot,' who speaks to you from and about a fictional
world?  That is, did you perform a primarily Materialist reading-act?"
Paraphrasing a student's reading-text, particularly one created by a Good
Student, back to them in the terminology of lectical analysis is often met with a
jaw drop.  At first they have difficulty recognizing their own statements in the
relatively unfamiliar vocabulary, but once they do, they tend to grasp what
works - and what doesn't - about their reading-text.  If the instructor has
accurately analyzed the reading-text, and with a few well-chosen, directive
questions, the Good Student usually is able to understand "what the teacher
wants" from her, and that to a large extent she has already discharged that
duty.  This usually is a great relief to Good Students, which only encourages
their continued efforts.  Even if they are not yet willing to drop their pretense of
text-immanence, such students at least learn how I want them to qualify their
expressions of that pretense.  
One of the inherent dangers of employing any analytical heuristic is that
the vehicle of application can overwhelm the analytical goal.  There is a very
good chance, for instance, that this Good Student's use of my list of "Lectical
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Values" dictated a reading-text that misrepresents her initial reading-act.  That
is, it is almost certain that to some extent the heuristic determined what the
poem became for her, or at least determined what she wrote down in her
journal.  In classroom discussion, I try to mitigate this danger by gently probing
attributions that do not seem to fit with the rest of the reading-text or seem to
be patently artificial.  I might ask the student above, for instance, whether she
really found "The Waste Land" to be "intellectually stimulating" or did she mean
by that attribution that she felt confused.  Even if she is unable to admit that
her overwhelming, initial response to the poem was confusion (as I suspect from
both the sense and sound of her reading-text), someone else in the class very
likely may.  As I will point out below, there is almost always a "Naysayer" in the
classroom who is willing to place his or her frustration into the public record.
Once they understand their own responses are the "primary" material of
lectical analysis, Good Students generally feel less anxious about giving the
teacher what he or she wants.  Take for example the reading-text of another
Good Student:
The wasteland has a lectical aporia of death/fertility.  This makes
the poem highly ambiguous because it makes the reader stop and
try to sort out what Eliot is really trying to say.  A textual aporia is
Eliot's structure.  The five sections are all different in meaning and
structure, but they are all contained in one poem.
Although it reads somewhat like a telegram, this reading-text demonstrates a
fundamental understanding of the analytical objects of lectical analysis.  Her
journal entry is organized around a particular lectical aporia recalled from her
reading-act: a perceived conflict between two "themes," death and fertility.  
She goes on to describe how this lectical aporia affected her reading-act:
I read it by breaking the five parts up by themselves.  I acted as if
each part was a different story.  It didn't help much in tieing
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everything together but it did help me understand everything
seperately.  
Although she does not use the terminology, what this student describes is a
classic dialogic motif; that is, she used primarily Subjectivist coherence
strategies to yoke together a combination of Materialist (the "stories") and
Idealist (the "themes") attributions.  As with the first example, in class
discussion I would immediately respond to this reading-text by translating it into
the terminology of lectical analysis.  I also would ask her to further discuss what
it feels like to "understand" textual features separately while simultaneously
being aware that they do not tie together.  The last lines of her reading-text
seem to address this feeling: "Personally, I found "The Wasteland" really
confusing at first but after reading it several times, it turned into a work of art."
To some extent, this statement sounds like traditional Good Student rhetoric, a
knee-jerk encomium to the fiction at hand because she thinks that is what is
expected.  I must say, I doubt that Good Students really enjoy "Sinners in the
Hands of an Angry God" or "The Waste Land" as often as they claim to.  This
particular student, however, wrote this reading-text after repeated, apparently
frank, conversations with me regarding how "bad" she was at English and how
little she enjoyed reading literature.  In other words, we had talked enough about
my goals for the class that I believe she knew flattering Eliot was going to get
her nowhere with me.  She also knew, however, that humoring me by trying to
use the analytical concepts I had shown her was all I wanted.  From my history
with her, my guess is that those final lines are less flattery than an attempt to
articulate the performative value she assessed to her "death/fertility" dialogic
motif.  The only way to know, of course, would be to ask her.  The beauty of
performing lectical analyses in open class discussions is that even if the author
of a reading-text runs out of responses to her own response to a fiction that
reading-text is available to further analysis by the rest of us in the room.  In this
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way, an extended exploration of a variety of the lectical strategies invited by a
fiction can grow out of one or two fertile reading-texts.  
The principal benefit of neo-appreciation pedagogy to the Good Student,
then, is that it encourages them to use their significant study skills more
honestly and with less anxiety.  Doing so does not automatically make them
better literary scholars (or scholarly writers, as these excerpts attest), but it at
least lays a groundwork upon which they and their instructor can build. I have
put so much energy into describing how I might respond to the needs of Good
Students because to some extent the methods I use with them are identical to
the ones I use with all types of students.  I paraphrase their responses into the
vocabulary of lectical analysis; I encourage them to explore the implications of
their reading-texts; I correct evident misconceptions they have.  One student
last semester, for instance, was convinced T. S. Eliot was a woman.  Although I
felt obliged to contradict him, I also asked him to consider which textual
features led him to attribute a feminine identity to his author/character
"Thomasina."  Obviously, the more comfortable students are being honest about
their lectical challenges and their cultural ignorance, the easier it is for an
instructor to remove those obstacles.  
The desire to follow directions, of course, is not unique to Good Students,
or rather there are sub-categories of Good Student behavior that are
distinguishable.  Although each student has a unique set of challenges to
overcome in the literary classroom, I want to continue with my straw-man fallacy
a bit further to demonstrate how neo-appreciation pedagogy helps address
certain common misconceptions students have about fiction and literary study,
whether they are "Good" or not.   
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The Book Reporter
This category of student is under the misconception that his or her job in
the literary classroom is to paraphrase the world they observe "in" a fiction.  As
pointed out above, the Materialist pretense of a fictional reality seems to be the
most fundamental and deeply entrenched lectical strategy for most readers.
Not only is this strategy the first one we learn as children, to some extent all
other lectical strategies require that we pretend words at least potentially refer
to "things" we cannot see and may not be "real."  The Book Reporter, however,
is particularly devoted to that early lectical training, training that was further
reinforced by years of writing book reports in elementary school language arts
classes.  Such readers feel fairly comfortable with a fiction as long as its textual
pattern strongly invites Materialist pretense and they have sufficient cultural
knowledge to construct a "realistic" fictional world in response to it.  Remove
one of these ingredients, however, and they feel lost or cheated.  Ask them to
read "Paradise Lost," for instance, and they complain they "don't know what's
happening."  
Traditional literary heritage curriculum can help Book Reporters reduce
their cultural ignorance to some extent.  After all, Milton carefully constructed
his epic to be understood, at least partially, as a coherent account of certain
events; armed with a beefy vocabulary list and a good deal of information about
periodic sentences, epic similes, etc, the Book Reporter can generally create a
fairly accurate plot summary.  However, if the only way they value fiction is
according to how "realistic" it seems to them (that is, how easily and
transparently they can maintain Materialist pretense), Book Reporters still will
not see why "Paradise Lost" is given such weight in the canon.  The action is
constantly being interrupted, the transitions are complex, the dialogue tags are
confusing, and what is it with those lists of names?  I mean, he introduces
characters and then they don't do anything but make speeches.  It's boring.
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  Although I am sure some enterprising Hollywood producer could pare
down Milton's epic into a great summer blockbuster (Brad Pitt as Adam?  Deniro
as Satan?), it has been valued highly in the past for reasons other than it tells an
exciting story.  Without going into details, "Paradise Lost" is considered the
single best epic poem in English not just because it has an interesting plot
(although the centrality of Christianity in Western culture does give it an epic
gravitas), but because of the way it is written.  In other words, to value
"Paradise Lost" very highly, one has to use other indices of value than it is
"realistic" or it provides an "alternative reality," so readers who assess fiction
primarily according to those values think it is abysmally tedious.  From my
experience, trying to convince students that a fiction is not boring after they
have already been bored by it is very difficult.  Neo-appreciation pedagogy,
however, does not attempt to contradict and/or overrule student reading-acts,
even when they are based upon lectical habits that are strongly resisted by the
fiction at hand.  Instead, it attempts to show students how the strategies they
used affected the way they value a particular fiction.  Concurrently, lectical
analysis can be used to introduce them to other, perhaps more effective, lectical
strategies that other readers have used in the past.  
Like Good Students, Book Reporters often can use the language of
lectical analysis before they really understand what they are supposed to be
analyzing.  However, once they have learned the terminology of lectical analysis,
and the analytical framework articulated by the lectical triangle, the instructor
has the tools to focus the Book Reporter's attention upon his or her favorite
misconceptions about literary reading.   The most common and glaring of these
is that Book Reporters tend to recognize little difference between their use of
the Materialist and Idealist lectical modes.  Even though their reading-texts are
often organized around Idealist themes and analogical motifs, Book Reporters
seem to consistently use those attributions primarily to clarify plot features.
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Since they believe the main purpose of fiction is to tell stories, they use their
Idealist gestures as clues to fill in narrative gaps.   The perspective shift from
being an observer of a world to translator/interpreter of an idea about "the"
world is transparent to them, and so textual patterns which resist the efficient
clarification of fictional events often seem like digressions or "wordiness."  Quite
simply, they feel like the author is wasting their time and should get back to the
serious, fictional work of communicating the "facts" of the plot.  
This unconscious blending of Materialist and Idealist gestures is nearly
always made evident in their reading-texts, and therefore can subsequently be
pointed out to Book Reporters.  One of my students last year, for instance,
wrote the following account of her reading of "The Waste Land":
There are several aporias in "The Waste Land."  A major one that I
struggled with was in the textual patterns.  Once I started reading,
I assumed that, at least, the five titled sections would be similar in
subject within themselves but that was not the case.  The
story/plot was not consistent.  Each stanza brought a new "mini-
story" into play.
My student follows this opening complaint with a detailed and carefully
documented list of the "aporias" that had made the "story/plot" so
"inconsistent" for her: shifts in dialogue and language, repeated words, graphic
breaks, and "nonsense" phrases are identified as "textual aporias" which "made
it hard to focus on the story as a whole and also the main idea being tied
together/expressed in so many different schemes."  However, her list of
"textual aporias" also includes a number of "broken motifs," the documentation
of which takes up most of her journal entry.  She identifies two main motifs:
"Death..., with the various mentioning of bones" and "fertility/life, which may be
connected to the repetition of water."  Even though these "textual aporias"
made it "hard to focus on the story," my student reports by the end of her
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reading-text she was able to piece together "an image of a real wasteland" out
of the poorly organized "story/plot" Eliot had offered her.  Like the Good
Student above, she "found that the best way to sort ["The Waste Land"] out
was to take it one stanza at a time, since each stanza was somewhat more
coherent by itself."
 As with any student reading-text, I would begin to respond to this Book
Reporter by pointing out how her reading-text demonstrates, both intentionally
and otherwise, the fundamental concepts of lectical analysis.  Clearly, to some
extent she understands that her reading-act is supposed to be the analytical
object of her reading-text.  In other words, she knows she is supposed to tell us
what happened when she tried to read the poem.  At times, her analysis is quite
detailed and insightful.  For instance, she divulges one of her central
assumptions about fiction, one that deeply affected her reading-act when she
refused to revise it: "I assumed that, at least, the five titled sections would be
similar in subject."  By describing the violation of that expectation as an aporia,
my student puts her finger on one of the most important features of Eliot's
textual pattern: it resists the passive transmission of a single, coherent
"story/plot."  By naming her thwarted expectation, my student - perhaps
unwittingly - dropped her pretense of text-immanence, if only for a moment.  By
first praising the acuity of her analysis and simultaneously tracking the probable
affects her strategies - i.e. the lectical difficulties caused by continuing to
pursue a clear "story/plot" - the class gets a detailed glimpse of the
consequences of "book reporting" in a way that does not indict Materialist
strategies in general or the Book Reporter in particular.
I would also address, however, the unconscious conflation of Materialist
and Idealist strategies that are typical of Book Reporters and evident in the
above reading-text.  Once again, the instructor can accomplish this by
performing an extemporaneous strong reading of the reading-text followed by
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directive paraphrases and leading questions.  The Book Reporter above, for
instance, organizes the subjugation of her Idealist to her Materialist gestures
around a misuse of the term "textual aporia."  This mistake is understandably
common; my distinction between textual and lectical aporias is admittedly a bit
soft, and to some extent theoretically equivocal.  I teach students these two
categories of aporia, however, to mark two distinct stages in the practice of
lectical analysis: 1. The documentation of a particular reading-act 2. The
speculation about which particular textual features stimulated that reading-act.
The fact that my student identifies the repetition of certain words ("bones" and
"water") in "The Waste Land" and her creation of two analogical motifs (the
"death" and "fertility/life" motifs) as both being "textual aporias" marks the
point where she subjugates her Idealist strategies to her Materialist ones.
"Bones" are transparently symbols of death to her, therefore she perceives
them as being objectively "in" the text.  Treating them as "textual aporias" (and
so denying responsibility for them) she simultaneously blames the incoherence
of the "plot/story" of the poem on these two motifs and uses them to unify the
"mini-stories" that are "scattered throughout the work."  In other words, she
elides what she did to the poem - create analogical motifs in response to lectical
aporias - by equating portions of her aesthetic object (her "death" and
"fertility/life" motifs) with the textual patterns that likely stimulated them
(repetitions of the words "bones" and "water").
Guiding Book Reporters toward a clearer understanding of how their
reading-texts apparently misrepresent their reading-acts is easier than it sounds
from the foregoing.   I might, for instance, ask my well-meaning Book Reporter
how she decided the repetition of the word "bones" constituted a motif.  If, like
many students, she got the idea from the editors of the anthology or from
Eliot's footnotes, it is no wonder she perceived those words as a theme, an
organizing symbolic whole, that is "in" the text.  Whether the symbolic
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attribution came from some such "scholarly" source or was drawn from her pre-
understanding of the world, with a little prodding the Book Reporter should be
able to see that it did not come from the poem but in response to it.
Distinguishing between Eliot's pattern of repetition and my student's analogical
motif could also be performed by asking other students what they did with that
same pattern.  This last semester, for instance, I recall a number of students
reporting themes of "damnation" versus "everlasting life," and "light" versus
"dark" in response to the same repetitions of "bones" and "water."  One does
not have to valorize one attribution over the other to demonstrate that the
different reading-texts created by students in response to the same textual
pattern are products of different lectical strategies and resources, not forgone
conclusions passively absorbed from the poem.  On the other hand, the similarity
of their responses highlights how textual patterns can guide the lectical choices
of very different readers without absolutely determining what those responses
will be.
Once I had prised apart those textual patterns that are undeniably in "The
Waste Land" and those patterns of response that were crucial to her reading-
act, I might ask my Book Reporter to reconsider how much of her understanding
of the poem was Materialist and how much was Idealist.  Doing so would
highlight that the bulk of her reading-text was devoted to discussing the "ideas"
and "symbols" that were, from her estimation, so poorly represented as a plot.
Trying to make a plot coherent with an analogical motif is kind of like driving a
nail with a greasy pipe wrench; it can be done, but there's probably going to be
a lot of slippage.  With a little guidance, Book Reporters tend to see that they
are using perfectly valid lectical tools to do the wrong job, and if they do not,
one of their peers is usually willing to see it for her.  It is a small step from that
discussion to a consideration of how the poem resists simple Materialist
coherence.  Once again, whatever the student has already made of a fiction
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becomes the springboard for an exploration of what can be made of it.  As is
evident by the reading-texts above, the process of analyzing student responses
to a fiction generally reproduces its traditional interpretations.  In this way, the
transmission of cultural heritage is accomplished by and appears in the
classroom as a product of their own analyses.  To whatever extent the canonical
readings of a fiction can be produced by rather than imposed upon students, the
more often they feel like they "get it," and therefore the more willing they are
to be forthcoming about their responses to those fictions that they often
believe are culturally irrelevant to them.     
A second characteristic of Book Reporters is that they tend to process
their (largely unconscious) Subjectivist lectical gestures purely as problems, and
generally as evidence that the fiction at hand is either flawed or beyond
comprehension.  As mentioned in an earlier chapter, when a student reports that
a fiction "doesn't mean anything," what he or she is really saying is that it
means too much; it is difficult to cohere a single, clear plot line from a fiction
like "The Waste Land," so Book Reporters experience their incipient Subjectivist
reading-acts as failures.  This is because Subjectivist strategies are defined by
an acceptance of semantic plurality.  A Subjectivist attribution of any kind
requires the reader to tolerate ambiguity, and moreover a willingness to
perpetuate the reading-act.  Since Book Reporters are under the general
misconception that their sole lectical duty - and source of potential pleasure - is
to reproduce a coherent fictional world as unambiguously and efficiently as
possible, they generally do not realize the value of Subjectivist "contemplation"
or those fictions that invite such lectical responses.  
One solution to this ubiquitous problem, particularly at the beginning of
the course, is to remind students how often they use the Subjectivist mode in
situations other than reading fiction.  Popular song lyrics, television ads, puzzles,
games, even their human interactions can be mined for examples of how they
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not only entertain ambiguity but often enjoy it.  Once students have become at
least nominally familiar with the methods of lectical analysis, however, there are
other ways to get them to understand if not embrace the value of Subjectivist
reading strategies.  The Book Reporter above, for instance, detailed the various
aporias that interrupted her reading-act, aporias which she struggled to
overcome because they "made it hard to focus on the story as a whole."  She
did a great job documenting the process of a Subjectivist reading-act minus the
acceptance needed to realize its potential benefits.  Other than documenting her
use of analogical motifs to "sort out" the disorganized "mini-stories" of
individual stanzas into "an image of a real wasteland," she modeled the basic
reading strategies necessary to perform a Subjectivist reading-act:
This was not a piece of poetry that one could just sit down and
read as well as understand in one sitting.  It had to be studied and
read multiple times.  T. S. Eliot did not come out and say his ideas,
his style makes the reader look for meaning.
Besides reconfirming reading strategies any instructor prays his students will
practice, this reading-text underlines that rumination and re-reading are not just
good strategies for poetry in general but are necessary strategies to get
anything coherent, particularly a plot, from "The Waste Land."  That many
students find this necessity distasteful and an imposition on their free time goes
without saying, no matter how tactful this particular Book Reporter is about her
resistance to the demands of the poem.  This sense of being forced to do
strenuous lectical work, and its attendant feelings of resentment, is not
accidental; it is the natural consequence of refusing to accept an invitation to
read in the Subjectivist mode.  By contrast, spontaneously generating a plurality
of possible attributions in response to a patently aporetic textual pattern takes
very little effort and can be accomplished in a single reading.  In other words,
readers who feel they have to find "the" meaning of "The Waste Land" are
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punished for not understanding its textual pattern gives them the freedom to
generate many meanings for the poem and that freedom is restricted only by
their own perceptions of plausibility.  The difference between deploring a
fiction's lack of clarity and enjoying a Subjectivist reading of it is a difference in
lectical attitude, a shift from struggling with aporias to playing with them.
There are many curatives for this misunderstanding of lectical convention,
and they all entail loosening the reader's death grip on monosemic closure.  This
can be done analytically or dramatically.  I might, for instance, point out to the
Book Reporter above that although her account of her "death" versus
"fertility/life" is very thorough, it is not comprehensive, and subsequently invite
her to play with those textual patterns off the top of her head.  With a little
encouragement, you can pretty quickly get bones juggling and water splashing
all over the classroom. This is not to say I teach my students that reading
poetry is mere free-association; attributions in the Subjectivist lectical mode are
not exempt from the lectical convention of coherence.  Subjectivist coherence,
however, is achieved by shifting at least some of ones focus away from the
textual pattern - and the pretense of text-immanence - onto the experience of
consuming that pattern.  Until they get a taste of the pleasure of consciously
playing with fictions, students will not understand Subjectivist, performative
value.  Any number of classroom/parlor games can help students become more
comfortable exercising the wide latitude they are given by convention while
reading patently aporetic fictions like "The Waste Land."  Such dramatizations,
however, should concurrently demonstrate that playing with ambiguity is not
completely arbitrary; during an actual reading-act, interpretive license is
governed by the reader's sense of plausibility and his or her willingness to put
forth effort.  Just as I don't believe that the only correct way to enjoy oneself is
by playing Botticelli or Scrabble, I make sure my students understand there is
nothing inherently shameful about not enjoying lectical play.
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Another strategy Book Reporters commonly use to resolve patently
aporetic textual patterns is to approach them as "realistic" representations of
an author/character's mind.  Everybody knows thoughts are fragmentary,
disjointed, and even crazy at times.  In fact, a favorite attribution of many Book
Reporters is that the author/character is insane, and therefore the very old man
who appears to have a set of wings (according to the narration) is really just a
homeless bum.  Instructors who have assigned fictions that even loosely belong
to the genre of "magical realism" have experience with this phenomena.  A more
subtle variant of this Materialist strategy was offered by a Book Reporter last
semester regarding "The Waste Land."  That student created an elaborate
reading-text that described the poem as the wandering thoughts of a man
contemplating suicide on the banks of the Thames.  Since this variety of Book
Reporting mobilizes some of the same (overly restrictive) beliefs, and therefore
calls for similar pedagogical responses, I will address it in the next category of
student, the Authorist.
The Authorist
The "intentional fallacy" has been much maligned over the last century,
although as best as I can tell this ubiquitous lectical strategy shows no sign of
fading away.  The reading-texts of both undergraduates and full professors are
often full of the pretense that they have read the thoughts of another person
rather than a fiction.  Authorists speak like they can read the minds of people
they have never met, and in some cases do not exist.  When I worked in
psychiatric wards years ago, such claims would get a patient additional and
stronger meds.  Pretending to know the intentions of the author has largely
been rejected from serious literary criticism, but that does not mean doing so is
an invalid way to consume fiction.  Fictional closure requires pretense of some
kind; to tell students - or anyone - that they should not pretend they are
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listening to a person speak when they are "really" reading a book is both
misleading and a waste of time.  Fictions invite Authorist readings; some all but
insist that the author/narrator be regarded as "real" person.  Should one ignore
Walt Whitman's declaration of his name and address?  Am I not allowed to
imagine Samuel Clemens' posture at the helm while he pursues his Life on the
Mississippi?  Moreover, many of the cognitive processes required to assess
fiction are borrowed from our evaluative practices in real life.  Booth is only one
of many theorists who have founded their work on the common analogy
between reading fiction and meeting people.  This analogy is fertile not because
it is the only way we read fictions but because it is one of the most familiar.  It
is not surprising, then, that you can tell students not to be Authorists till you
are blue in the face, but they will keep doing it when you are not looking.  The
strategy is simply too useful and pleasurable.  "Meeting" exciting people and
"hearing" about their lives is all too often the main benefit of reading fiction for
confirmed Authorists, therefore they are unlikely to give it up.
However, once a reader puts down a fiction to create a reading-text,
whether as an assigned journal entry or an article for a scholarly journal, he or
she needs to drop the pretense used in that reading-act long enough to analyze
its costs and benefits.  Authorists often have difficulty recognizing that they
have pretended anything at all.  Since an actual person wrote the fiction,
Authorists believe the author/narrator characters they imagine are more real
than other kinds of characters, even though both are created using the same
Materialist strategies.  One doesn't have to turn to linguistic philosophy to
demonstrate the fallaciousness of this belief because Authorists are seldom
hampered by their ignorance of the author's actual biography.  I have heard
discourses on T. S. Eliot's struggle as a suffragette, Hemingway's trauma from
the American Civil War, and how Willa Cather's experience as a mother and wife
informed her fiction.  As pointed out above, it can be difficult not to snort in
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disbelief at the depth of such cultural ignorance, but such (mis)readings almost
always are justifiable to some extent.  Authorists make up stuff about their
author-characters, but they do so according to how the fictions are written.  By
inviting them to trace their attributions to the textual feature that instigated
them, one can usually help an Authorist see how much he or she has imagined
the words of a fiction into a pretend person.  Merely telling them that Eliot was
male or that Cather never married only embarrasses them and discourages
further open participation.  Furthermore, merely correcting their historical data
(which, of course, should be done) does not familiarize them with other,
occasionally more productive, lectical possibilities.
Exposure to the jargon and practice of lectical analysis does more for
Authorists than just point out the error in their ways of reading.  By learning to
identify their author-characters as Materialist images, or more precisely as
episodic motifs constructed from series of images, Authorists are forced to
explore how much or little those items in their aesthetic object are passive
"observations" of the words of the fiction at hand.  Usually, such explorations
reveal that the reader has turned relatively few words into an attribution of
personhood more elaborated than is strictly justifiable by the textual cues.16  As
with all lectical analyses, an exploration of an Authorist's reading-text should
assess what was gained or lost by the lectical strategies used rather than
whether or not those strategies should have been used in the first place.  
There are two main benefits of Authorist readings, both of which harbor
potential lectical pitfalls.  First, if an author-character is created with sufficient
pretension, the reader will still feel like they "know" their author-character even
after all other lectical pretense is dropped, and therefore the pretend
                                                 
16 There are exceptions, of course; cultural ignorance can make a reader blind to textual "cues" that
apparently invite attributions relevant to an author-character.  Students, for instance, sometimes do not
identify Phillis Wheatley's lines "'Twas not long since I left my native shore / The land of errors, and
Egyptian gloom," as an invitation to create an African author-character.
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relationship is somewhat easier to examine after the fact.  In the last chapter,
for instance, I discussed the author-character "Zora" that I have created from
the biographical information I know about Zora Neale Hurston and my readings of
her fictions.  My sense of personal attachment and gratitude to "Zora" continues
as I write this line, although it is not as strong as when I was last reading Their
Eyes Were Watching God.  By contrast, I feel little or nothing about Hurston's
character "Janie" at this moment, and not because I did not "like" the character
while I was reading or presently.  I think "Janie" is a powerfully drawn, highly
engaging character: one of my favorites in 20th century American literature.
However, even when I was under the deepest Materialist pretense, perhaps
during the hurricane passage, Janie never spoke to me; all of her words and
actions were directed toward the other characters in the novel.  My author-
character "Zora," however, has "personally" given me many hours of pleasure
and contemplation (and not incidentally a damn handy demonstrative example).
Moreover, my guess is that my feelings for "Zora" are more real to me than what
I feel for "Janie" precisely because I had less information to work with as I
created "Zora."  Having less to go on, I had to project more of my own beliefs
and desires about novelists, women, African Americans, Florida, racism, 20th
century history, and just people in general into my imaginary playmate "Zora"
than I did into the character Hurston created.  This pretense of "personal" give
and take between an Authorist and his or her author-character often continues
to be productive of meaning after the fiction has been closed and put back up
on the shelf.  If an Authorist is subsequently motivated - or forced - to create a
reading-text, this current, ongoing pretense is easier to examine than a past
reading-act, quite simply because I have greater access to what I am thinking
right now than what I was thinking ten minutes, days, or years ago.   
One main benefit of Authorist reading, then, is that it keeps some
pretense of emotional engagement alive, a pretense which can motivate and
324
generate material for reading-texts about the fiction under consideration.  On
the other hand, an Authorist who does not recognize that an author-character is
a product of make-believe does not have (self-)analytical access to the beliefs
and biases that give the author-character its "realistic" quality.  Readers who
have adopted the role of disciple, secret admirer, judge, best friend, therapist,
etc. in relation to their author-characters may be reluctant to release those roles
to adopt the less appealing and viscerally engaging role of lectical analyst.
Asking them to follow the process of their pretense generally makes Authorists
less able, if not less willing, to ignore that pretense.
Another benefit of Authorist reading is that it is always invited by the
text on some level.  Even the words "by Anonymous" encourage the reader to
imagine what kind of person could have created the fiction in hand.  Book
marketers often manipulate this phenomenon even when authors do not.  The
novel I am currently reading, Prague by Arthur Phillips, tells me on the jacket
that the author "was educated at Harvard.  He has been a child actor, a jazz
musician, a speechwriter, a dismally failed entrepreneur, and a five-time
Jeopardy! Champion."  In a grainy, black and white photo above this mini-
narrative, an attractive young man in jeans, white t-shirt, and a sport coat leans
against the stone railing of an old bridge, perhaps Paris.  He looks precisely
disheveled, like Calvin Klein's much younger, better-looking brother.  Readers like
myself who use dust covers as bookmarks will conclude virtually every reading-
act with a flash of the enigmatic gaze of this intriguing author-character.  I am
not forced to think about Arthur Phillips while I read his very well written first
novel, but certainly I am invited to, so much so that excluding him (as an author-
character) from my reading requires an exertion of critical detachment.
Publishers, of course, are not the only ones who invite readers to be Authorists;
it happens every day in the literary classroom.  We tell our students stories
about the mysterious Bill Shakespeare, blind Milton, and the proto-hippies
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Shelley, Thoreau, and Whitman in the attempt - whether conscious or not - to
share our regard for such author-characters.
Since the strategy is always available, Authorists often fall back on the
pretense of an author-character while responding to textual patterns that might
elude them otherwise.  I demonstrated this phenomenon in an earlier chapter
with a student reading-text about Williams' "The Red Wheel Barrow."  In that
reading-text, my student made the poem lectically coherent by treating it as an
image of speech; that is, he pretended the words of the poem were uttered by a
fictional person, and he completed his lectical duty by using those words as
clues to the speaker's personality and life.  Although that reader did not identify
the "speaker" as Williams, the poet, many Authorists do, especially while reading
poetry with abstract or spare narrative structure.  Attributing an image of
speech to a "speaker" rather than an author-character does constitute a
different lectical move; the common pedagogical strategy of reminding students
that speakers are created by - not equivalent to - their authors can in fact make
students more aware of their Authorist tendencies, and in the process steer
them away from specious biographical attributions.  Doing so, however, doesn't
broaden their lectical resources; it merely reduces the chance they will
embarrass themselves with a biographically inaccurate author-character, like
claiming Williams must have been an unsuccessful farmer.  Shifting from an
author-character to a "speaker" does not broaden a reader's lectical repertoire
because "listening" to the speech of either is made possible by the same basic
Materialist pretense.  Although some textual patterns respond very well to this
strategy - those with traditional narrative cues - some do not.  Emerson's poem
"Each and All," for instance, is easy to cohere as an account of events narrated
either by a nameless speaker or an author-character "Ralph"; actions and events
are related in first person, concrete details of the fictional world are offered,
transitions are provided (e.g. "When I returned home...").  Even "The Red
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Wheelbarrow" does not actively resist the attribution of an image of speech,
except in the dearth of descriptive cues it includes.  
"The Waste Land," however, is overtly constructed to interrupt Authorist
and like-minded Materialist strategies.  It, too, uses first person narrative cues
and descriptive details, but they often conflict from one passage to another.  As
the reading-texts above attest, no sooner does a reader get used to "listening"
to an Austrian countess than a new voice, perhaps male, perhaps not, interrupts
the plot/speech without any transitional cues.  Such aporias can by highlighted
in the classroom as invitations to do something else with the poem than
continue to "observe" a speech passively.  Authorists who have been trained to
perform lectical analysis (and are armed with their handy lectical triangle
heuristic) can be encouraged to explore whether a particular textual pattern
responds better to one or a combination of the other lectical modes.  What if, I
might ask them, the "Austrian Countess" is not read as a fictional person but as
an idea?  What, in other words, might Austrian "countessness" symbolize, and
how might that bring other information to bear upon the apparent lectical
aporias that confront them?  Alternatively, what does the fact that the textual
pattern of "The Waste Land" makes Materialist coherence difficult mean?  That
is (using their Authorist habits against them), what does Eliot "say" to you by
thwarting your favorite reading strategy, and how did that affect your reading-
act?  You feel gypped?  You don't like him?
Such prodding can sometimes show Authorists specific lectical tools they
might have used to traverse specific lectical aporias, tools which certainly will
broaden their experience of a poem, and perhaps even make reading it, or a
similar textual pattern, that much easier.  In effect, I offer the lectical triangle as
a procedural flow chart: "Did imagining an author-character work?  Not very
well?  Okay, then, how about adopting the Subjectivist perspective a little.
Ponder the possibilities, grasshopper."  
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A third benefit of Authorist reading is that it often instigates "historical"
understandings of a fiction.  Authorists often use whatever cultural, social, or
political data they already know about relevant eras (or what they learn from
course materials) to reach their goal of crafting a coherent author-character,
which in turn is used to cohere the reading-act as a whole.  Take, for instance,
the following reading-text:
Considering Eliot just lived through WWI and had lived his life on
both sides of the Atlantic, his view would be very broad.  The land
had been devastated, world economies shattered, thousands dead,
isolationism abroad, and the specter of the next war ahead.
Inherently, the title reflects this, as well as the imagery in the
entire poem.  So Eliot is using his poem as a mirror image of his
world, searching for his own answers.
Although I have not checked, I am fairly certain that the above paraphrases (or
rankly plagiarizes) the commentary of some other historicist.  Since it is a
journal entry, however, phrases like "isolationism abroad, and the specter of the
next war ahead," which are almost certainly "borrowed" directly from some
other source (the internet? Cliff?), do not mark this student as a cheater.
Students are usually encouraged and sometimes required to learn stock
historicist interpretations of canonical fictions, so the Authorist above merely
did what he thought was expected of him.  My son, for example, is a high school
sophomore, and on his English final last year he was required to match certain
historical events to the fictions they had read in class.  The graphic exercise of
drawing a line from "The French Revolution" to Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey"
reinforces for students like my son that the two belong together; when you
think of one, you should think about the other.  This kind of interdisciplinary
training is the meat and potatoes of cultural transmission in the humanities at
large, and therefore is a pedagogical practice appropriate to the literary
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classroom.  Students should learn how to regurgitate the historical "facts"
traditionally associated with a fiction because such cultural data is likely to show
up on standardized tests.  It is part of our job to teach canonical, cultural data
to students, if for no other reason than to offer them objective proof - other
than their transcripts - that they sat through a college-level course in the
humanities.  In that context, the Authorist's comments above about "The Waste
Land" are a pretty good repetition of traditional historicist readings of the poem,
and therefore demonstrate he has brought something back from his sojourn into
the world of literary scholarship.  Been there, done that, got the class notes.
However, if the only souvenir a student takes from a collegiate, literature
course is the (usually reductive) "historical context" traditionally associated with
it, then we have failed them to some extent.  The transmission of cultural
"facts" in the humanities is justifiable, it seems to me, mostly because such data
is useful for performing certain types of cultural analysis.  Being able to draw a
line from "The Waste Land" to "WWI" might get you a point on the GRE literary
supplemental test, but it will not appreciably change the way you understand
the poem, the period, or fiction as a whole.  Furthermore, claiming that "The
Waste Land" is a reflection of specific socio-cultural events in the past most
often distorts the actual lectical value attributed to the poem, both by literary
scholars over the last century and by students currently enrolled in our courses.
Certainly, one way to appreciate "The Waste Land" is to use it as an historical
account of common - or at least Eliot's - emotional reactions to the period in
which it was written, but that it is not why it is considered such a great work of
art.  The Encyclopedia Britannica does a much better job of articulating such
material.  Moreover, Eliot's opinions and feelings are important historically only
because his poetry has been widely valued in the past; the most detestable
doggerel from Woodrow Wilson would have more historical value.  In short, "The
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Waste Land" is and has been valued not as historiography - except, perhaps, by
Eliot biographers - but as a cultural artifact.
 To illuminate these limitations of Authorist reading, students need to
examine how their pretense of channeling an author's thoughts both limits and
misrepresents what they have done during their reading-acts.  The Authorist
above, for instance, ignores his lectical mediations by projecting them upon his
author-character Eliot; it is he, not Eliot, who treats the poem as a "mirror" of
Eliot's world.  It is he, not Eliot, who believes the title and "the imagery of the
entire poem" reflects post-war society.  This is not hairsplitting.  In this case,
the object of Authorist pretense is Eliot's mind; the object of a lectical analysis
of that pretense would be the presumptions, guesses, beliefs, and biases this
particular reader used to create lectical coherence.  What is at stake in
distinguishing between these two actions is the student being able to distinguish
between what Eliot is responsible for - the poem - and what was created during
his reading-act - a specific aesthetic object.  In other words, this Authorist has
lost track of how he chose to link certain ideas about the world to certain
textual features, and subsequently attributed them to an author-character, or in
the terms of the lectical triangle, how he disguised an Idealist gesture within a
Materialist one.
Before questioning this particular Authorist about his sublimated Idealist
attributions, however, I would try to help him unpack how much of his reading-
text represents his reading of "The Waste Land" and how much is the product of
reading other texts, like editorial headnotes, encyclopedia articles, etc.  Not that
it is wrong for students to use such materials.  I often assign or provide
information about the traditional "cultural context" of assigned fictions when I
think it is useful or needed.  When I am pursuing lectical analysis rather than
direct cultural transmission, however, I want students to recognize how much or
little such information really affected their reading-acts.  Without asking, there is
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no way to tell from the reading-text above whether it accurately represents
anything that happened while my student read the poem.  In fact, it is quite
possible that he did not read the poem at all, but created a faux-reading text
out of its critical heritage in order to complete the assignment.  So I would ask
him: "When you were reading the poem, did you actually think about WWI and
the social turmoil that followed?" or "How many of these ideas came from the
headnote?" or "Do you like history?"  Since using the information and ideas of
others is a perfectly valid way to consume fiction, such questions are not
designed to "catch" students but to get them to explore their attributions more
carefully, clearly, and comprehensively.  Anything said in response to such
questions, therefore, furthers my classroom agenda except, of course, further
evasions of lectical responsibility.  Even if the reading-text above turned out to
be a smoke screen to cover the fact that the student had not read the poem
(and this would be almost immediately evident), his reading-text would become
an object lesson in how coherent and traditionally valid even a bogus Authorist
reading can sound.  Instead of castigating the faux-Authorist, therefore, I would
use his reading-text as an example of a traditionally effective way of writing
adequate responses to assigned literature, with the exception that it is too
vague because he neglected to read the poem itself.  I would also, of course,
privately give him an extra assignment to replace his faked reading-text.  
Most "historical" Authorists, however, have actually read the fiction under
consideration and have merely lost touch with their reading-acts or have
misunderstood what the object of lectical analysis is.  With a little directive
questioning, therefore, Authorists usually can disentangle the words of the
fiction before them from the ideas they attributed to an author-character,
whether or not those ideas came from a third source.  Since "WWI" does not
appear in the poem, for instance, I might ask the above Authorist to name
specific "images" in "The Waste Land" which he believes led to that attribution.
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If he has difficulty doing so, I might remind him of the earlier, Book Reporter
reading-text that organized the poem around the analogical motifs "bones" and
"water/fertility."  If he assents that such motifs, or something like them,
instigated his historicist understanding of the poem, the next step of identifying
that understanding as an Idealist understanding almost directly follows.  Once
the responsibility for such "ideas" is shifted from the author-character to the
reader, students have little trouble speculating about where those ideas came
from because they have to look no further than their own thoughts and beliefs.
It is not lost on them that it is less difficult to read one's own mind than that of
a long dead poet.    
Not all Authorists, however, use their pretense of an author-character to
bundle Idealist strategies into a more familiar Materialist one.  Another Authorist
in my class, for instance, created a reading-text similar to the one above, but in
it he elides apparent Subjectivist reading strategies by attributing them to the
poet.  After repeating some of the traditional "historicist" interpretations of the
poem, this Authorist says:
The "Fictional World" that Eliot targets as reality is skewed, in the
fact that he describes it as it first leaves his brain pattern.  There
is a structure but it is partly random.  Each book is a new strain of
thought that is wholly different from the others.  Each book
contains subcategories that each have an underlining agreement
with each other.  The format must not be observed, but absorbed.
In this passage the student seems to be trying to explain the relationship
between the patently Materialist reading he had asserted earlier his the reading-
text and the textual pattern of "The Waste Land."   The incoherence of this
attempt likely has as much to do with the lectical strategies he (thinks he) used
as it does with his communication skills.  He claims to know what "The Waste
Land" is about - i.e. Eliot's impressions of post-war society - but he has difficulty
332
rectifying that attribution to the "structure" of the poem.  He has paid enough
attention in class to know that he is supposed to account for his lectical
mediations, so he tries a classic "stream-of-consciousness" explanation to glue
his coherent Materialist attribution to his apparently very conflicted experience
of the poem.  The stream-of-consciousness strategy works quite well with some
fictions - Woolf's To the Lighthouse, for instance, or even Joyce's Ullyses - but it
is less successful with "The Waste Land."  As the above Authorist points out,
series of thoughts often do appear to be "random," a phenomena that perhaps
suggested the strategy to him.  However, his attempt to describe the
"structure" of the poem thusly quickly dissolves into contradictions: each
"book" (section?) is "wholly different from the others" and yet they "have an
underlining agreement"; this structure is and is not "observed" as the author's
"brain pattern," although it clearly is "absorbed" somehow.  By asking him to
clarify his abstract and confusing vocabulary, one might be able to get a better
sense of what he is trying to communicate about the "format" of "The Waste
Land."   
However, my guess is that a little probing would reveal that his
historicist/Authorist reading of the poem is less representative of his actual
reading experience than an afterthought.  The passage above seems to
document a patently Subjectivist (lack of) coherence; unfamiliar with the
strategy of establishing lectical coherence through dialogic motifs, he merely
notices a textual pattern that is and is not unified.  He recognizes the aporetic
relationships between different sections of the poem and feels those aporias
constitute a pattern, but he has no justification for that feeling other than he
"absorbed" the author's "format."  His problem is that he has mistaken his
experience of the poem for its "format"; since his lectical experience is not in
the poem, he has great difficulty finding it there.  A more thorough - and likely
sincere - analysis of his aesthetic abject would provide better information about
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what he really did with the lectical aporias he recognized.  At the very least, by
doing so he would be looking in the right place.  Such mystification of
Subjectivist reading-acts is both common and forgivable, and easily rectified
with a little guidance and praise.  "Congratulations," I might exclaim to such a
student, "you've built a beautiful dialogic motif!  Now, let's explore it a bit...."  If,
as I suspect, his Authorist attribution was a form of lectical straw-grabbing, the
student and the rest of the class can discuss other, perhaps less conflicted ways
to respond to the dialogic motif he knows was an important part of his lectical
experience.  Such a discussion, if guided well, should reinforce that readers are
always allowed to act to some extent upon their incoherent "feelings" about a
fiction, and further that a poem like "The Waste Land" all but requires doing so.   
This is not to say that the goal of neo-appreciation pedagogy in general
or lectical analysis in particular is to encourage students "to go with their
feelings."  On the contrary, lectical analysis asks students to treat their
"feelings" and all other artifacts of a reading-act as dispassionately as possible
after it has been completed.  Even though the attempt to treat one's past
thoughts as objects does not make lectical analysis a reliably objective science,
at least it teaches students the habit of being self-critical in an atmosphere that
is non-judgmental.  In this light, the pretense of an author-character - aka the
intentional fallacy - is not an inherently sub-standard or naive lectical strategy;
lectical closure requires pretense, and a reading-act must be completed before it
can be analyzed, whether by the reader or someone else.  The goal of such
analysis is to determine the effectiveness of the strategies used in a particular
reading-act by a particular reader, not to promote one mode of reading over
another.  However, some fictions, such as "The Waste Land," are very
demanding to read in that they at the same time invite and resist lectical
conventions.  Other than errors due to cultural ignorance, the only mistakes a
reader can make in response to such fictions is to be inflexible.  Aporias -
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whether "intended" by the author or not - must be resolved, and to do that well,
readers are sometimes required to be more actively "creative" than the
Materialist pretense of passive observation comfortably allows.  Moreover, the
fictional worlds created in response to texts that resist seamless Materialist
closure often are not very "pleasurable" to observe.  Readers who expect to be
entertained by an orderly procession of interesting fictional events and people
are usually frustrated and/or bored when they are "asked" by a fiction to
entertain themselves.  Although such readers rarely embrace alternative lectical
modes quickly, they can fairly quickly understand that their (negative)
experiences with fictions like "The Waste Land" were produced by the lectical
strategies they used during a particular reading-act, not inherent to the fiction
or themselves.  Of course, a reader's willingness to let his or her imagination run
wild in response to a text can also create difficulties, particularly within the
context of a literature course, which brings me to my next category of student.
The Solipsist
Students who fall in this category are acutely aware of the freedoms
afforded readers of fiction, so much so that they sometimes ignore the words of
a text which conflict with how they are exercising those freedoms.  This is not
just "bad" reading, although reading "all of the words of a fiction" is one of the
criteria I set for completing a reading-act.  Solipsist reading, rather, is
characterized by a misunderstanding of the balance between lectical freedom
and responsibility dictated by lectical convention.  In the undergraduate
classroom, teaching students how to strike a balance between duty and play
while reading is particularly tricky because that balance shifts when one turns
from being a strong reader to being a strong scholarly reader/writer.  Ideally, I
want students to learn how to enrich both their public and private engagements
with literature in my course, but learning how to perform comfortably within
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both these two, often very different, lectical contexts is sometimes quite
difficult for them.  Simultaneously learning how to broaden their lectical
strategies while consuming fiction and how to apply the products of those
strategies judiciously while writing about fiction can be very confusing and often
takes a while.
Solipsists have difficulty analyzing their "impressions" of a fiction because
they tend to take reading very personally, sometimes almost mystically.  It
makes sense that such students - and writers - tend to understand the verb "to
criticize" pejoratively.  Since they understand aesthetic experience in pop-
romantic terms, to them the activity of questioning their lectical experiences
seems impertinent and even hostile.  Furthermore, such students often want to
share their revelations with the class, but they generally are not prepared for
those revelations to be treated as objects of analysis.  When their reading texts
are interrogated in open session - because that's what we do in my class -
Solipsists often therefore become either defensive or withdrawn.  Since I have
told them that reading-acts are not right or wrong they simply "were," they feel
like the process of criticizing their reading-texts is arbitrary and hypocritical,
especially when they are (eventually) obliged to create "scholarly" reading-texts
like essay tests and term papers.  
Solipsists, however, can be some of the most engaged and productive
participants in class discussions if they can be induced to treat their
"impressions" as reading-texts to analyze rather than reading-polemics to
defend.  The following reading-text, for instance, was created by a student
whose efforts both in and out of the classroom were consistent and spirited,
even though she claimed she did not like English classes very much.  In this
reading-text, she claims that 'The Waste Land" evidences "Eliot's ability to
evoke emotion," although "the emotion is not a positive one."  She elaborates
this claim with the following:
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Irritation is the main emotion the reader feels when reading this
work.  Eliot's style is one that offers many aporias while reading.
For example, his randomness makes the work hard to follow.  He
seems to jump from one thought to the next, never missing a
beat.  The speakers and their locations seem to change so rapidly
that it makes it difficult to understand exactly what is taking place.
However, Eliot appears to be aware that he is doing this because
he provides footnotes for many of the references he makes in the
poem.  The footnotes, themselves, are irritating simply because
they are so frequent and in such great length.
This passage appears to report a historicist/Authorist reading of the poem, an
appearance that is even more explicit in the rest of the reading-text.  Like the
Authorist students above, this student claims the poem shows us that "Eliot
viewed the culture as decayed and withered..., and virtually became a
'wasteland' itself."  In other words, this student clearly has created an author-
character whose "vision" of his era she pretends to observe.  This
historicist/Authorist move is clear, cogent, and relatively well written.  That is, it
is a pretty good answer to a test question like: "Discuss how 'The Waste Land'
reflects the social, cultural, and/or political climate of the era during which it was
written.  Provide examples from the text."  However, her skillful regurgitation of
critical commonplaces brackets the paragraph quoted above which asserts the
irritating effect of the poem's "aporias" upon "the reader."  Surrounded by
"objectively" voiced and evidenced claims, her account of "Eliot's ability to
evoke emotion" sounds a bit like a rant, but it also sounds significantly more
sincere.  I would first respond to this student, therefore, by trying to winnow
what she really remembers about her reading experience from what she decided
(after the fact) would make her reading-text sound like a plausible scholarly
essay.  The fact that she knows how to create a traditional historicist critique is,
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of course, marvelous and worth holding up to the rest of the class (I would
probably take a pay cut if all my students could do as much when they arrive in
my classroom).  I also, however, would seek to sharpen the distinction between
writing critical essays and performing lectical analysis by unpacking this
student's apparently honest account of how irritating it was to read "The Waste
Land."
To demonstrate more fully how I might respond to this student I will dive
a little further into the pretense of a verbal exchange than I have so far.  So,
let's pretend: 1. I know this student likes to express her "true" feelings in class
(in past discussions she had been very forthcoming about her opinions), 2. I
know this student has a fundamental understanding of lectical analysis and its
terminology (evidenced by her class work and the reading-text before us), 3.
The reading-texts previously quoted in this dissertation had been analyzed in
open discussion by the time she offers hers.  Given these conditions, I am
certain it would take very little goading to get this (now hypothetical) student
to release a wealth of information about what she really did with the poem.  I
might say, for instance, "So, you didn't enjoy reading it very much, did you?"   
"No!" she exclaims, "what's fun about trying to figure out what he's
trying to say when all the time he keeps interrupting himself.  It's like he's trying
to make it hard."
"And that is irritating."
"Yes, it's like a cheap trick."
"Did anyone else feel irritated?" I might then ask the rest of the room.
Hands go up all over the place.  I turn back to my Solipsist and say, "It looks like
your lectical experience is pretty common."
"Well, yeah, nobody likes a smart aleck," she responds with gratification.
"And yet," I feel compelled to observe, "for almost a century readers
have claimed "The Waste Land" is a great poem.  If we reject the possibility that
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all of those readers enjoy being irritated by smart alecks, or that they just have
bad taste, then why do you think Eliot's work is so thoroughly valued, even
loved? I'm not being a smart aleck, I'm really asking your opinion."
"I don't know, maybe because it shows how he saw his world, like I said."
"But you didn't like learning about his world."
"No, but if he had written it differently I might have.  It was too much
work going back and forth from the footnotes and everything.  I kept getting
lost.  I mean I can tell that he thinks the world is depressing and hopeless or
whatever, that whole 'death' versus 'fertility' thing Julie was talking about...."
"The analogical motif?" I ask, inserting the terminology into her new,
developing reading-text.
"Yeah, but, I don't know, he just seems like such a whiner.  'Woe is me,
the world is a wasteland.'  I mean, get over yourself and do something about it."  
"You don't like whiners, do you?"
"Well not when they have nothing to whine about.  Life is hard, what a
news-flash!  Sitting around complaining doesn't do anything but make you feel
worse."
"So, would you like the poem better if Eliot did something or tried to
improve his world somehow?"
"Yeah, I guess, but nothing happens, or nothing you can really
understand."
"Can you think of some other work - a poem, novel, movie, whatever -
that taught you something about the world but that you also found interesting,
or at least not irritating?" I probe, looking for a contrasting textual pattern.
"Sure.  How about Wuthering Heights?  I mean, I didn't love it, but at
least you know what is going on and pretty much why.  I didn't understand some
of the words and stuff at first, but after we talked about it, I could see what she
was trying to say."
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"Was that because of what the novel is about or the way it was written?
I ask because Wuthering Heights doesn't seem like an inherently 'happy' or
'positive' novel to me."
"Yeah," she muses, "I don't know, I guess I just like it better.  It was
depressing, sort of, but it ends kind of happy.  "The Waste Land" just stops.
You don't know what happened, what it is supposed to mean, nothing."
"I think I know what you mean.  Thanks," I say. Turning to the rest of the
class, I suggest, "Why don't we turn to the end of the poem and take a look?"
Such fishing expeditions do not always produce a catch as big as the
hypothetical dialogue above, but neither would I allow a student, once on the
line, to slip away with non-answers like "I don't know" or "Like I said...".  By
insisting that she elaborate her original reading-text I can explore the apparent
conflict between her historicist claims of coherence and her apparent frustration
with the "aporias" of the poem.  Quite simply, if those strategies had worked for
her, she wouldn't have been so frustrated and angry; she may have been bored,
but she would know what the poem was "about."  Liberated from the
restrictions of creating responsible scholarship, she divulged several of the
beliefs and biases she employed while assessing her author-character Eliot, the
whiner.  Further, she supplied a contrasting textual pattern that appealed to her
more, or at least was easier for her to consume, than one like "The Waste Land"
that just "ends."  Assuming that a number of students share my Solipsist's
irritation with Eliot, we can collectively explore to what extent the poem really
does just "end" or whether its conclusion is merely ambiguous.  Doing so would
almost certainly pinpoint textual features that likely precipitated the lectical
experience of irritation she shared with many in the class.  
On the one hand, this exercise should confirm the Solipsist's belief that
her lectical experience was grounded in the poem.  On the other, if I can find one
student in the crowd who believes "What the Thunder Said" constitutes an
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"answer" or conclusion to the lectical aporias of the poem taken as a whole,
then I have the foundation to return to the Solipsist's reading-text with fresh,
non-lethal pedagogical ammo.17  No matter how many people agree with her, the
existence of even a single, dissenting lectical experience challenges her pretense
that her lectical experience was text-immanent.  In other words, the fulcrum of
her Solipsist reading-act was a projection of personal experience upon "the
reader," an abstract and imaginary entity whose responses are determined and
consistent.  Unable to recognize a coherent plot or a palatable author-character,
the Solipsist attributes her feelings of frustration to "the reader," and thereby
sidesteps her responsibility for failing to achieve lectical closure. This is not
just a rhetorical ploy; Solipsists sometimes have great difficulty recognizing any
lectical response but their own.   
However, a reconsideration of the last hundred lines or so of "The Waste
Land" should generate a number of possible attributions contrary to the
Solipsist's thesis that "the reader" does not know what the poem is about.  The
problem most readers have with "The Waste Land," of course, is that it offers
too many referential possibilities; even the briefest of open discussions should
bear this out.  The only way to choose unequivocally between even the two
most common interpretations - there is or is not any hope of
redemption/rebirth/rain - is either to ignore some element of the poem or to
use a Subjectivist form of closure.  A closer look at my student's expanded
(fictional) reading-text indicates that she tried both of these strategies to some
extent, but her attempts were ultimately thwarted by her overly restrictive
beliefs about who is responsible for the "meaning" of a poem.   
                                                 
17  If I am unable to elicit a contrasting reading-text from the other students, I would have to offer one from
the critical heritage of the poem.  I prefer using the assessments of students in the room, however, because
there is a better chance they will not be discounted as scholarly over-interpretation, particularly by a
Solipsist.
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First, claiming that "The Waste Land" does not come to a conclusion is
demonstrably incorrect.  The multiple concluding gestures in the last section
may be sincere, ironic, or ambiguous (or some complex melange of all three) but
they most certainly are there.  To take just one obvious example, Eliot indicates
in a footnote that the last lines of the poem - "Shantih shantih shantih" - should
(more or less) be translated as "the peace which passeth all understanding,"
words drawn from the closing benediction of the Anglican service; even more
explicit is Eliot's comment that the word "shanti" is the "formal ending of an
Upanishad."  How this phrase should be understood, of course, is up for debate,
but the fact that it directly denotes an ending of some sort is not.  A reader
who claims to want to know what the author is "trying to say" should latch on
to such an invitation to conclude, but my Solipsist did not, perhaps because she
is ignorant of lectical and/or cultural conventions that would allow her to
recognize the invitation.  Although I would ask her directly why she ignored
Eliot's directions and attributed a non-ending to the poem, my suspicion is that
she did so because her (negative) lectical experience overwhelmed her
willingness to close all the lectical aporias she encountered, a convention which I
know she knew.  In other words, she was so attached to her irritation at "Eliot,"
her incoherent, whining author-character, that by the end of the poem she was
unwilling to entertain the possibly that that it might have a definitive conclusion.
In yet other words, she loves to hate Eliot so much that she refuses to let
anything - even the words of the poem - get in the way of savoring her
antipathy.  Getting students to admit as much is not as difficult as it might
seem, particularly if they know they will not be penalized for being honest.  Once
again, the goal of such interrogations is not to humiliate students or even to
make them change their assessment of the fiction under consideration.  As long
as they at least try to self-analyze their reading-texts, I am content.  
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A closer examination of my student's reading-text would also reveal how
close she was to achieving Subjectivist coherence.  The main "target reality" of
her reading-text (both actual and hypothetical) is her own lectical experience.
Everything else about her reading-act is either informed by or subjugated to her
irritation at the demands of Eliot's textual pattern.  Moreover, this visceral
artifact of her reading-act effectively organizes it.  For her, the poem is about
how she felt while reading it, so she created a dialogic motif: that series of
aporias that "jump from one thought to the next, never missing a beat."  Finally,
she assessed a very strong "performative value" to the poem, appreciating her
distaste for its textual pattern and author above all other possible lectical
values.   
Where her Subjectivist gestures are inadequate or misconceived is at the
line level.  Instead of closing lectical aporias by deferring resolution, she bristles
at the sheer number and magnitude of them.  Emoting at the fact of a lectical
aporia is not the same as recognizing and contemplating a limited number of
specific possible references for it.  As pointed out in earlier chapters, only a
finite number of aporias can remain unresolved before a reading-act is
effectively aborted; this student apparently exceeded her threshold for juggling
ambiguity.  Again, I would have to ask to be sure, but her totalizing historicist
interpretation of the poem seems way too coherent to come out of the
apparently sincere lectical confusion she reports.  Methinks the lady protests
just enough to let us know she did not complete her lectical task; she merely
wrote a plausible paraphrase of someone else's (historicist) reading-text, and I
certainly would not browbeat her for doing so. She is not the first reader whose
lectical resources were exhausted by the textual pattern of "The Waste Land."
On the contrary, I would praise her for trying to augment her aborted reading-
act with the interpretations of others, even though those approaches did not
ultimately help her.  Turning to other readers for help is a valid and
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archetypically scholarly strategy, one that warrants the very existence of literary
courses.  During lectical analysis, however, it is important to notice when that or
any lectical strategy works and when they do not.  In this case, her Subjectivist
methods of coherence did a great job of organizing her aesthetic object, but her
historicist/Materialist strategy of reading the entire poem as an image of Eliot's
world was inadequate to the task of turning her confusion into a contemplation
of ambiguity.  
Besides pointing out where her lectical strategies failed her, I would also
try to offer alternative lectical resources she could have used.  Although her
actual reading-text doesn't indicate how she might have tried to close the
gaping aporias she encountered, the hypothetical words I put into her fictional
mouth suggest she could have flirted with some of the Idealist strategies used
by other students.  Subjectivist coherence only works if the reader is able to
establish a tolerable level of ambiguity (which is different for every reader)
balanced against "unambiguous" or at least confident attributions.  If she will
assent to the lectical convention that fictional meaning is allowed to be
ambiguous, hopefully my Solipsist will see that her Subjectivist approach would
have worked if she had rejected fewer of the referential possibilities that
occurred to her.  The feelings of confusion and irritation she felt while reading
can thereby be marked for her and the rest of the class as lectical "signposts"
of sorts, moments during a reading-act that should not be passed over without
some sort of lectical mediation.  We can teach students that such moments
should be treated like lectical stop signs; proceeding to the next textual feature
before somehow consolidating ones developing aesthetic object will only create
more confusion and irritation.  Ignoring such signs, moreover, constitutes a
decision to abort the reading-act, a decision which is often blamed upon an
author-character.  By elaborating upon referential possibilities that had briefly
occurred to her while reading, and comparing them to the attributions made by
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other students, the instructor can further clarify for the whole class the
difference between acceptable ambiguity and aborted reading.  
By the same process, of course, you can show students who were
dissatisfied with their totalizing Materialist and Idealist gestures the benefits of
Subjectivist coherence.  In other words, by taking bits and pieces from a number
of aborted reading-acts, the instructor can demonstrate to the class how some
textual patterns are more easily comprehended if the reader uses a variety of
lectical strategies.  If your dialogic motif seems nonsensical, then bolster it with
an Idealist attribution, no matter how far-fetched it may seem to you; if you can
not link the symbolic "content" of the poem to a textual pattern, then focus
upon patterns in your lectical experience.  In other words, I use the comparison
and combination of my students' reading-texts to demonstrate that lectical
strategies are not mutually exclusive, and some textual patterns, like "The
Waste Land," are very difficult to read without the deployment of all three
lectical modes.   
Another variety of Solipsist reading misconstrues lectical analysis for
artistic expression.  For clarity, I will call this type of Solipsist "The Poet,"
because his or her efforts to account for a reading-act become occluded by the
desire to create an eloquent reading-text.  Take, for instance, the following
journal entry:
Some works are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some
few are to be chewed and digested.  The Waste Land is fed to us
in small teaspoons...Sweet.  Sour.  Tasteless....  In an all-out
Joycean (James) manner, Eliot provides a deliberately difficult read
and does so with the most obscure references possible....  Eliot
plays upon the strange acts of depravity that only the troubled
subconscious is suited to grasp and reckon with.  The poem is "a
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heap of broken images" and the reader sees the intensity of Eliot's
"handful of dust."
I whole-heartedly encourage my students to practice their communication skills,
but I also want to teach them that some scholarly writing tasks by convention
value clarity over eloquence.  Scholarly convention permits and even lauds
writers who punctuate analysis with abstract, overtly figurative gestures (like
the Poet's first sentence above), but such gestures do not count as analysis in
themselves.  After making sure that the above discourse is not plagiarized,
therefore, I would try to get this Poet to rephrase her reading-text into the
terminology of lectical analysis.  By "small teaspoons" does she mean "aporias,"
or is she talking about certain motifs ("Sweet. Sour. Tasteless."?) that she
attributed to the poem?  Do her metaphors for lectical mediation - tasting,
swallowing, chewing - correspond to the three lectical modes in any way, and if
so which combinations of those strategies did she use while reading?  Whose
"troubled subconscious" is she talking about?  The one she attributes to her
author-character Eliot or "the Reader"?  Who is that "reader," and how did she
"grasp and reckon with" specific textual features, such as the ones quoted from
the poem?
Like most Solipsists, Poets want to express their feelings about the
fiction at hand, so they usually respond freely to directive questions like the
ones above.  I want to remind them that the task at hand is reporting what they
did during a reading-act, not gaining assent that the reading-act was a "good
one" by expressing it with rhetorical flourishes.  Poets often take so much
"artistic license" regarding fiction that they conflate the very different activities
of reading, writing, and analyzing it.  The fact that they are willing to play freely
with language can be a good example to their classmates who are reluctant to
do so, but the Poet herself needs to learn when to give free reign to her
interpretive skills (i.e. during a reading-act) and when to reign them in to
346
promote clearer communication to others (i.e. during analysis of any kind).   
Some Poets have become so attached to the eloquence of their reading-texts
that they perceive almost any criticism as a personal attack.  This, of course,
makes perfect sense; after all, it is their reading-act under consideration and no
one can tell them what they were "really" thinking about while reading.
However, with a little sensitivity to the Poet's (partially correct) jealous
ownership of her aesthetic object, the instructor can usually guide her toward a
better understanding of how that cognitive event was created.  
Being sensitive to my students' "personal" challenges may sound more
like psychotherapy than literary pedagogy, but I maintain that strong reading,
like strong writing, requires the internalization of skills that can not be learned
from lecture notes; one becomes a better reader and/or writer by trying, failing,
receiving feedback, then trying again.  Although improvement in both skills is
accelerated by having a common critical vocabulary with other readers and
writers, critical language is itself only valuable as a tool for facilitating honest
and clear critical feedback to the individual student's particular and idiosyncratic
efforts.  You can lecture to students that they need to read all the words of a
fiction and resolve all the aporias they recognize (just as you can make them
memorize the five-paragraph essay formula), but doing so will not help them
when they are stumped by an actual lectical aporia.  Whatever theoretical
abstractions they are taught will not seem "real" to students until they use
them, so the instructor needs to diagnose and address the unique challenges of
as many students as possible in open discussion.   Although I am a pretty strong
reader, it is often difficult for me to be "sensitive" to the lectical challenges of
some readers, particularly when they seem to resist the entire project of
improving their reading skills and cultural awareness.  Solipsists often fall into
this category because their reading-acts are validated by their impressions,
which seem infinitely more real to them than the abstract theories of reading I
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offer.  Solipsists are not the only students resistive to direction; the final type of
student I will discuss almost delights in thwarting efforts to help them,
seemingly out of a fundamental lack of respect for the entire proposition of
studying literature.  Being sensitive to the lectical challenges of such students
often requires the analytical acuity of Freud and the compassion of Mother
Theresa.
The Naysayer
Spotting a "Naysayer" is easier than helping one broaden his or her
lectical and critical skills; their active distaste for literary study usually
permeates everything they do in the classroom.  Although some Naysayers
demonstrate their contempt by posing as Abstainers, the two types are easily
distinguished because the Abstainer does not care about literary study one way
or the other; Naysayers have a personal grudge against it and the fact that they
have been "forced" into taking yet another irrelevant English course.  Pointing
out that they are adult students and therefore responsible for their course
selection does not help them; it just tends to deepen their resentment.  This
strong antipathy for literary study, however, is not always motivated by an
antipathy for reading literature.  Some of my most critically acute and
dialogically responsive students have been inveterate Naysayers.  Since neo-
appreciation pedagogy is grounded in their own responses to fiction, Naysayers
get uncensored air time to vent their grievances in my classroom, and this often
sharpens their critical skills to a fine point - in spite of their conviction that
literary study is a waste of time.
The main pedagogical resource an instructor needs to call upon with
Naysayers is patience.  If given the floor, they often will argue themselves into
being strong readers.  I offer the following reading-text as evidence.  The
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Naysayer below opens his journal entry with an account of the lectical aporias he
recognized, writing that "the aporias I came up with for ["The Waste Land"]
could be endless, but this paper, thankfully, must have an end."  In the lengthy
reading-text that followed this comment, he goes on to discuss in turn the
Subjectivist, Materialist, and Idealist strategies he used while reading:
My reading experience was very unenjoyable.  When I have to read,
re-read, and then read again just to get a basic understanding of
the poem I get very tired, very fast.  Reading should be enjoyable,
and I know some work by the reader is necessary, but Eliot takes
this to the extreme.  He refers to hundreds of classical works that
only the English major would recognize, and most of the story
simply flew over my head.  Besides the depth of material, the
textual and grammatical structure was confusing too.  The
language he uses is very foreign to the modern reader.  This was
the main problem I had with "The Waste Land."
This Naysayer went on to attack Eliot's "Materialist strategies":
He uses linguistic styles to represent popular people and events.
However, the people and events he talks about are not familiar to
me....  His writing style does not interest me and I can only
attempt to analyze his writings for so long before I get mad.
And finally, he takes on the Idealist mode:
"The Waste Land" appeared an insane maze of themes and
paradoxes and not much plot or story. Everything is symbolic and
ironic while nothing seems to construct an actual story.
In a concluding paragraph, he delivers the following coup de grace:
Complaining about this story is easy, but trying to interpret it was
very difficult.  His writing does not relate to me and Eliot does not
make me want to read his story.  The aporias seem too great to
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get past and achieve an enjoyable level of reading any of Eliot's
work.
Although it is voiced as an attack, this Naysayer delivers a very in-depth account
of his reading-act, an act that was apparently seriously and rigorously pursued.
He demonstrates a fundamental understanding of the lectical triangle and how
the three lectical modes can be used interdependently in a single reading-act.
As with the other reading-texts above, I would first ask this Naysayer to clarify
some of his terminology and link his claims more directly to specific textual
features.  What, for instance, are the "linguistic styles" that Eliot uses to
represent "people" and "events"?  Recognizing that different stylistic features
can be read as "voice" (that is, as images of fictional speech) is a fairly
sophisticated Materialist move; whether or not my Naysayer recognized this
strategy in his reading-act, clearly he is aware that he had to go to some
extraordinary lengths to "imagine" the unfamiliar fictional world he encountered
in the poem.  I would also ask him to talk more about the "insane maze of
themes and paradoxes" that led him to believe that "everything is symbolic and
ironic."  Does he mean that "everything" (The entire poem? The most important
themes? Certain analogical motifs?) is either symbolic or ironic, or does he
believe the poem both evokes and ironizes certain symbolic gestures?  The
critical heritage of "The Waste Land" is full of commentary on Eliot's complex
use of irony, and although it is quite possible that this student borrowed
substantially from another source, the fact that he considered the issue
significant enough to mention indicates that he is operating at a more
sophisticated critical level than most of his peers.    
More importantly, however, this student offers us an explicit outline of his
reading-act, even though his analysis is dedicated to proving why he did not
enjoy "The Waste Land."  Although I would dig for more details about specific
textual features, he is very forthright about the general causes of his distaste
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for the poem: 1. Eliot's irrelevance to the "modern reader" 2. The fact that the
poem is not a "story" 3. The aporias he recognized were "too great" for the
poem to be "enjoyable," as all reading should be.  These three "causes" of his
low opinion of the poem are direct applications of three very common and valid
indices of value for fiction.  His first criticism of Eliot is that the modern reader -
presumably himself, but he goes to some length to include other readers - can
not relate to Eliot's characters, ideas, or style.  This point of contention, which is
shared by most undergraduates, is motivated by a pretense so ubiquitous that
I'm sure Wimsatt and Beardsley would have eventually gotten around to naming
it, perhaps something like "the empathetic fallacy."  Many readers believe that
the purpose of fiction is to provide characters and situations with which they
can "identify."  By extension, the reader's job is to recognize themselves or their
lives in the fictional world they are pretending to observe, and thereby learn
and/or feel something.  Readers laboring under this pretense who do not
empathize with anybody or thing they meet in a fiction, however, feel left out;
they can't relate, therefore the work serves no purpose.  This pretense is
problematic only if it is given an imperative status.  There is nothing wrong with
preferring fictional people and worlds to which you can relate, but believing all
fictions must meet that criterion to be valuable is a misunderstanding of lectical
convention.  
Related to this cause of his dislike is his repeated claim that "The Waste
Land" is not a very good "story."  I do not believe this motif in his reading-text
is merely sloppy terminology.  He uses the word "story" to denote literature in
its most abstract sense, as I have used "fiction" throughout this dissertation.
He knows he read a poem, but the textual pattern of this particular poem stops
him from accessing the only source of literary value that he recognizes: i.e. its
"plot and story."  Are "plot" and "story" synonymous for him, or does "story"
denote something more broad, like literary value?  I would have to ask to be
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sure, but whatever his answer, clearly he shares this assumption about what
fiction should and should not do with most of his peers.  What most students do
not do, however, is so overtly assert their beliefs and biases in their reading-
texts.  This Naysayer knows what he likes and likes what he knows; he claims his
right to read according to his beliefs, even if those beliefs are overly restrictive
according to scholarly convention.  
His third reason for disliking "The Waste Land" is also related to an overly
restrictive application of an otherwise perfectly valid index of literary value: i.e.
that fictions should be "enjoyable" to read.  In many ways, this Naysayer invokes
the ur-value of literary appreciation.  Readers who do not in some way "enjoy"
their interactions with a fiction do not value it highly, no matter how
sophisticated and flexible their lectical repertoire is.  Moreover, unlike the
Solipsist above, my Naysayer recognizes that he is responsible for his lack of
enjoyment of the poem.  He knows that it is his duty to do "some work" as a
reader; he knows that the poem requires he read and re-read the poem until he
has at least a "basic understanding" of it; he even knows that the creation of a
"maze of themes" - all of which may or may not be ironic - is a valid alternative
to his favorite reading strategies when they fail him. Although he still strongly
prefers to read "stories" that "contain" characters and events which seem
familiar to him, he demonstrates a deeper critical understanding of how his
lectical habits interacted with the textual pattern of "The Waste Land" than
most students do, and used that understanding to justify his negative
evaluation.  In other words, he both met and exceeded my expectations for the
assignment, and with a little additional experience is poised to create perfectly
acceptable scholarly criticism, should he ever be required to.  
Although I would love for him to love the poem, my Naysayer's distaste
for it does not constitute a lectical, scholarly, or pedagogical failure.  On the
contrary, I believe his willingness and ability to engage a fiction like "The Waste
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Land" as thoroughly as he did shows that making lectical response - whatever it
may be - a core focus of the literary classroom allows students who would
otherwise mutely reject the entire project of literary study a chance to hone
their critical skills expressing that rejection.  Although neo-appreciation
pedagogy does not concern itself with the transmission of literary enjoyment, I
have found that Naysayers like the one above often find that they enjoy proving
how stupid "English majors" like us are to enjoy canonical texts like "The Waste
Land."  Not infrequently, I have noticed that somewhere along the line
Naysayers start actually enjoying their reading-acts, and sometimes even
become Apprentices, albeit surly ones.
As much as the above reading-texts demonstrate that lectical analysis
can open up new avenues of lectical engagement for students, they also
demonstrate that sometimes students are not by themselves able to fully
understand why the scholarly world values certain fictions.  In those cases, I
believe it is our job to share freely our own lectical experiences and attributions
of value.  As I asserted in the beginning and throughout this dissertation, I
believe one of our most important responsibilities as literary instructors is to
teach our students why we think reading fiction is worthy of study; to
understand our experience, they must be able to relate it somehow to their own
experience.  Teaching them conventional lectical strategies that they already
use in their lives sets the stage for them to comprehend positive experiences
with fiction that they may not (yet) share.  Pursuing my pretense of a class
discussion just a bit further, one would have to notice that the above reading-
texts reproduce much of the critical heritage of "The Waste Land" (without that
heritage being lectured, I might add), but some very important ways of valuing
that poem are not broached.  If such was the case toward the end of a class
period, I would feel compelled to let my students know what I, and perhaps other
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commentators, feel and think about the poem.  I would, in other words, embark
upon an analysis of my appreciation of it.
Having just read the poem aloud again, I am clear about what I might
want to say to a group of undergraduate students:
"Although I understand your feelings of irritation at the author-character
Eliot - for I have felt it myself in the past - my most recent reading-act of "The
Waste Last" is dominated by other emotions, primarily sadness and pity.  My
author-character also has difficulty expressing himself clearly, but not because
he doesn't want to, it seems to me, but because his words fail him.  Other
readers have claimed that this should be understood as a failure of language and
culture in the abstract, but the voice I heard in my last reading sounds like a
personal and private failure to me.  As I listened to Eliot's words coming out of
my mouth, I felt like I was listening to a man grasping at straws, or as he writes
at the end, 'shoring up his ruins' with little scraps of art.  The ambivalence that
many of you attributed to the 'life' versus 'death' motifs is apparent to me as
well, but whether or not the poem communicates something specific about the
possibility of regeneration, or some such, seems secondary to or rather a vehicle
for the author-character's failure to heal himself by himself.  Trapped alone with
his feelings and vast knowledge of culture (which everyone says is supposed to
enrich our lives), this voice tries to connect with me, perhaps in the hope that
real communication with another human being will bring him some relief.
Although I believe talking to others can sometimes make us feel better when
we're hopeless, my author-character ultimately does not seem to have gained
much by having spoken to me. In fact, the ambiguously hopeful gestures toward
the end of the poem might be for my benefit, his courteous attempt to avoid
bumming me out.
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"I believe I constructed this fictional relationship with 'Eliot' out of my
recollections of many such conversations with  real friends.  As an academic, I
come in contact on a daily basis with people whose impressive intellectual
resources do not immunize them from the pain of everyday life.  Sometimes
feelings can not be eliminated by thinking about them; sometimes immersing
yourself in art does not solve your problems, or provide even temporary escape
from the disillusionment most of us feel from time to time.  As someone who
sometimes thinks too much for my own good, I think I recognize in 'The Waste
Land' a speaker who clings to moments of remembered joy to try to reduce his
current despair.  In other words, unlike many of you, I found myself identifying
with my 'Eliot's' failed efforts to 'shore up his ruins.' All of us try to escape
current pain with remembered pleasure to some extent, but I find it particularly
pitiful that my author-character 'Eliot' has little to comfort him but literary
fragments.  If by reaching back to Dante, Shakespeare, the Bible, and the
Upanishads my 'Eliot' felt better, perhaps I wouldn't feel so sorry for him; I might
instead feel greater irritation at the lectical work his textual pattern requires of
me.  However, since my Eliot's maze of literary references ultimately does not
alleviate his despair, I don't feel like he means to be condescending.  My Eliot
does not imply that I should have seven languages or that I am the lesser man
for never having read some obscure, anonymous poem.  He simply has no other
resources at the moment to communicate to me how he feels about his inner
wasteland, and I find the fact pitiful, and not a little touching.
"This central Materialist strategy of creating a pitiful author-character out
of my past experiences with real friends deeply affected the way my aesthetic
object felt to me.  For one, I assessed a strong mimetic value to the poem in
that I was able to pretend I was watching a real human being struggle with his
feelings of hopelessness, a struggle that ultimately ends in failure.  The specific
attributions I made while under this Materialist pretense (which led to my
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feelings of compassion) were influenced by certain beliefs I hold true: some
problems/feelings can not be intellectualized; sometimes everyone loses faith,
both in themselves and in life in general; depressed people can not express the
depth of their sadness in words; perseverance in the face of despair is noble.
These beliefs do not constitute my entire world view; they are just some of the
ones I used during my most recent reading-act.  For instance, I also believe that
wallowing in ones despair can be destructive at times, and people who spend a
lot of time doing so are self-indulgent.  Some of you admit to deploying some
such belief while creating your author-characters for this poem, which might
have led to your feelings of irritation at Eliot's whining.  
"I'm not positive why I gave my 'Eliot' the benefit of the doubt - that is,
why I attributed 'nobility' rather than "self-indulgence" to him - but I think it has
something to do with my appreciation of his skill as a poet.  In other words,
although my emotional response was predominately generated by a Materialist
pretense of listening to a person struggle with his despair, that pretense was
deeply affected, and perhaps instigated, by the high value I place upon poetic
virtuosity in general.  Eliot's skill with language is valuable to me apart from the
images and symbols I create out of it.  In more technical terms, there were
several times during this last reading that the diction of the poem became an
aporia of "distinction" for me.  Quite simply, I stopped reading for a moment or
two to savor his language.  The "nobility" that I attributed to my Eliot's efforts,
therefore, very well may have come from my admiration for poetic virtuosity,
both in general and T. S. Eliot's in particular.  The fact that my perception of my
Eliot's emotional failure is articulated in language that I perceived to be beautiful
made me biased toward my author-character, and less likely to think ill of him.
Since I enjoy reading poetry that I think is beautiful, and I had already had many
such moments while reading a variety of Eliot's poems, I was predisposed to
reproducing such pleasures during this last reading by focusing on the diction of
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'The Waste Land.'  This constituted a lectical habit for me, and likely led to my
feelings of compassion for a 'man' who had already given me a number of
valuable lectical experiences.    
"Identifying moments when I attributed 'beauty' to certain textual
features of 'The Waste Land' is easier than explaining why I perceived those
words as being beautiful, or to what extent my perceptions were conventionally
or idiosyncratically motivated.  For instance, I attributed an aporia of 'distinction'
during this last reading-act to a passage at the beginning of section two which
describes a lavishly decorated room.  Let me see if I can find it... here we go,
beginning on line 84:
In vials of ivory and coloured glass
Unstoppered, lurking her strange synthetic perfumes,
Unguent, powdered, or liquid - troubled, confused
And drowned the sense in odours, stirred by the air
That freshened from the window, these ascended
In fattening the prolonged candle-flames,
Flung their smoke into the lacquearia,
Stirring the pattern on the coffered ceiling.
I believe I became aware of my appreciation for the diction of this passage soon
after reading the word 'lacquearia,' partially because I stopped to look at the
footnote, as in previous readings.  Upon looking back at this textual feature, I
see that Eliot alternates between sounds of sighing (the i's, a's, and sibilance of
'vials,' 'glass,' 'strange,' 'air,' 'ascended,' 'flames,' etc.) and groaning (the o's,
u's, and hard consonants of 'coloured,' 'unstoppered,' 'unguent,' 'troubled,'
'drowned,' 'flung,' etc.).  Is it a coincidence that the word 'lacquearia' contains
both these sonic patterns?  Which lectical aporia caught my attention first, my
ignorance of the word's denotation or its sonic quality?  I'm not sure, but I do
know that I paused and re-read the passage a couple of times aloud, enjoying
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the sound of it more and more as I progressed, and attending to its 'meaning'
less.  I felt like I was singing along with a favorite song, albeit a very sad one,
maybe a Radiohead or Leonard Cohen tune.  The softly sighing and moaning
sound of this passage laid a pall of bored despair over the opulent surroundings
it describes.  
"Although I did create a setting-image in response to the passage, that
image was both affected by and subordinated to my semantic focus on the
diction Eliot used and on how skillfully and subtly the poet manipulated meaning
with sound.  Moreover, my attention upon Eliot's diction induced me to treat this
textual feature as a symbol more than an image; as I resumed my reading of the
poem, I thought of it as a representation of the idea of 'ennui,' or some such
concept, rather than the representation of a place in a fictional world.  The
dominant strategy of this particular reading-act, then, was Subjectivist although
it was supported by Idealist and Materialist gestures.  The combined emotional
affect of several such aporias of 'distinction' peppered throughout my most
recent reading of the poem constituted a dialogic motif: a perception that the
poem contains many examples of poetic virtuosity.  This perception, along with
my belief that poetic virtuosity is admirable, probably accounts for my sympathy
for my author-character, and perhaps induced me to attribute noble rather
irritating qualities to him."
The hypothetical and idealized soliloquy above is meant to demonstrate
the kind of information I seek to give my students about my reading-acts.  Such
classroom demonstrations are not completely extemporaneous because I always
do my homework; I read the assigned fiction and create a reading-text in my
journal, so I am prepared to share my experience - and skill as a strong reader -
with the class if I feel it is useful to do so.  I do not want to lecture my
idiosyncratic responses to students, but neither do I want to be coy about them.
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I rhapsodize when it is called for because I want them to see what can and has
been done with fictions like "The Waste Land" even if they are unlikely to
respond in fashion.  By doing so, I risk highlighting the cultural differences
between them and me, but the risk is worth the potential gain.  For instance, my
appreciation of the "sound" of "The Waste Land" is only qualitatively different
from aesthetic experiences they have almost certainly had, with pop music if
nowhere else.  If I do a good job describing, analyzing, and performing my
lectical experience, there is a good chance they will understand it even if they do
not share it.   
I believe that sharing the fruit of our lectical labor with undergraduates
has the additional value of modeling the communal nature of scholarly discourse,
particularly regarding the liberal arts. Professional scholars do not approach their
subject matter in an intellectual vacuum; we are interlocutors in ongoing and
usually quite ancient critical discussions.  Even those scholars who appear to
break away from tradition always do so by referring to the ideas of peers, past
and present.  There is no such thing as scholarly discourse that is not positioned
somehow within and/or against the publicly expressed thoughts of other
scholars.  Scholarship, therefore, is overtly and fundamentally dialogic, and the
traditional concept of "scholarly responsibility" merely articulates abstract rules
of dialogic engagement between equals in an intellectual community.  
"Scholarly responsibility," however, is an unfamiliar concept to most
students because most of their pre-collegiate, academic labor has been crafted
to match the agenda and sensibilities of a series of individual scholars: their
instructors.  Students know how to give teachers "what they want," but they
have much less experience communicating what they really think within and
against a scholarly community.  Neo-appreciation pedagogy requires college-
level students take responsibility for their current engagements with culture,
both as a way to identify their areas of ignorance and as a way to enter into an
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ongoing conversation with other scholars.  By modeling "responsible"
scholarship, combined with skillful textual and self-analyses, and by requiring
that they respond in kind, I believe my classroom becomes a type of scholarly
boot-camp.  Turning students into literary critics is not a pedagogical goal of my
course, but teaching them the fundamental concepts and methods of literary
scholarship is.  In other words, if all I do for my students is reduce their cultural
ignorance somewhat while allowing them to consume literature as they already
do, then my classroom is little more than a book club which affects their G. P.
A's.  They may know a little more about sexual politics in medieval England and
social unrest in early Twentieth century America, but they will not have become
significantly stronger readers or critical thinkers.  Teaching them what literary
scholars do, and then doing it in front of them, increases the chances that they
will leave my classroom with scholarly skills tools they can use on fictions - and
other cultural artifacts - that cross their paths in the future.
At the risk of sounding grandiose, I also believe that teaching our
students how and why they should approach culture with a sense of
responsibility to a community performs a valuable social function.  The practical
value of taking responsibility for our public evaluative gestures is that doing so
goads us towards critical rigor. In other words, the process of exposing
ourselves out loud and in print by saying what we already believe about art
brings the deeply ethical nature of our profession into sharp relief, hopefully
making us better teachers, scholars, and ultimately people. I also believe that to
whatever extent our students learn how to be thorough, careful, and conscious
about what they make out of cultural artifacts, to that extent they become not
only better readers, they become better citizens.  Because of this belief, I am
happy to share details of T. S. Eliot's biography with them, but I am much
happier to teach them how thinking, talking, and writing like a scholar has
enriched my life and given me a greater, and more humane, understanding of the
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lives of others.  Neo-appreciation pedagogy, of course, is not the only way to
pursue this social boon, but it is a relatively simple and forthright way to do so
in the classroom.  
Making literary culture more accessible to our students is particularly
important in a field like ours that is in rapid transition.  Although print may not
be dead yet, it ain't feeling so hot just lately.  It don't hear as well as it use' to,
and on some mornings it's tough just gettin' up and gettin' around.  They sure
don't make books like they did back when, and what is it with kids these days?   
I'd like to think that there will be a resurgence in the popularity of
reading, but I'm afraid print is destined to become an increasingly rare form of
cultural transmission.  Books may never completely disappear, but there is a
good chance they will go the way of other obsolete communication
technologies, like phonograph records and smoke signals, used only by nerds and
history buffs.  Fiction, of course, is here to stay.  Our capacity and need to
pretend is hardwired into human consciousness, so each fall will bring us a new
crop of students ready to learn about the value, meaning, and use of fiction.  If
current trends progress, however, each year will also bring us students less and
less experienced with the kinds of reading skills required by some of the best
fictions in our literary heritage.  We can either bemoan the slow decline of the
relevance of reading to the general public, or we can come up with ways to
explain its relevance to students who otherwise would not understand.  In some
ways, then, my efforts in the classroom and this dissertation are attempts to
address the decrepitude of our discipline, so the human value of works like The
Canterbury Tales, Paradise Lost, Leaves of Grass, and The Waste Land is not
lost merely because such fictions require strong readers.  Since I believe that the
formal study of literature can be both socially and personally beneficial, I offer
my version of neo-appreciation pedagogy as one way of being more explicit,
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consistent, and accessible in our efforts to help good students become better
people.
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Appendix A: Classroom Materials
Handout #1:The Basic Assumptions of Neo-Literary Appreciation
1. A fiction can only be understood by a reader according to his or her unique
understanding of world and culture; therefore, fictions do not have objectively
determined meaning or value before they are read.
2.  A fiction is encountered sequentially as fragments of language, or "textual
features," which readers translate into a coherent and unified understanding
about the fiction; this "understanding" is called the "aesthetic object," and it
exists only in the individual reader's mind.   
3.  Readers attribute meaning and value to fictional texts according to
interpretive strategies they have learned in order to "close" the inherent
"openness" of textuality.
4.  The current literary "canon" is a reflection of the values and interpretive
strategies embraced by academic culture at this time.  At any given point in
history the interpretive strategies of academic culture are usually more varied
and complex than those of the general populace.  Many "canonical" fictions,
therefore, are difficult to understand and/or "appreciate" if one's repertoire of
interpretive strategies is relatively limited.
5.  Analyzing the received heritage of literary value as a reflection of certain
strategies of interpretation gives one insight into both past and current cultural
stereotypes.
6.  Broadening your own interpretive strategies helps you to understand how
and why a greater variety of literary works are or might be valued, and thereby
improves your ability to discuss culture both casually and academically.
7.  Reading literature can be personally transformational, and therefore should
be examined as closely as possible.
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Handout #2: Lectical Analysis
Lectical strategies are organized into the following three categories: 1.
Idealist strategies, which are warranted by "ideas" 2. Materialist strategies,
which are warranted by a material "reality" 3. Subjectivist strategies, which are
warranted by a lectical performance, that is, by referring to the reading-act itself
as a subjectively determined phenomenon.  
Beyond having different referential warrants, these three lectical modes
are further distinguished below according to how they accomplish five general
tasks attending the assessment of lectical "realism": 1. Choosing a "target
reality" 2. Choosing a "textual focus" 3. Developing a "semantic context" 4.
Achieving "lectical coherence" 5. Performing a lectical assessment.  The general
categorization of these strategies for establishing lectical "realism" is as follows:
Materialist strategies: these strategies close textual elements by constructing
referential "contexts" out of linguistic representations of "things" "people" or
"events."  Fictional "reality," therefore, is created by emphasizing the mimetic
function of fictional "images" and by subordinating other textual elements to
that function. Some of these strategies are:
1. Treating a fictional "world" as the target "reality" of the text;
2. Focusing upon and valuing narrative progression or "plot" over its "diction" or
"theme";
3. Extrapolating a semantic context by reading textual features as images; i.e.
treating fiction as a mimetic representation of a phenomenal milieu;
4. Achieving lectical coherence by developing "episodic" motifs between
fictional “events” and textual features;
5. Reifying fictional characters/narrators/events/things to attribute motive and
agency as the basis for an assessment of their mimetic value.  
Idealist strategies: these strategies close textual elements by constructing a
fictional "reality" according to the "ideas" the reader decides are referred to by
the text.  Some of these strategies are:
1. Treating symbolic "meaning" as the target "reality" of the text
2. Focusing upon thematic unity over the plot or diction of a text;   
3. Establishing a semantic context by reading textual features as symbols; i.e.
through  allusive reference to a pre-existing symbolic system (legend, religious
dogma, literary tradition, cultural archetypes, symbolic paradigms, etc.);
4. Achieving lectical coherence by establishing analogical and/or symbolic motifs
between textual features;
5. Identifying fictional characters/narrators/events/things with culturally
determined archetypes to interpret motive and agency in order to assess their
symbolic value.
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Subjectivist strategies: These strategies close textual elements through a focus
on the performance of a reading-act.  These strategies treat the unique lectical
experience of a particular reading-act as the fictional "reality" of that reading-
act.  Fictional "reality" in the Subjectivist mode, therefore, is valued as an
artifact of a reading as opposed to an artifact of some independent "reality.""
Subjectivist readings employ lectical strategies of the other two categories in
the process of constructing their own (self) referential gestures.  Some of these
gestures are:
1. Treating lectical experience as the target reality of the text;
2. Focusing upon and valuing a text's diction over its "theme" or "plot";
3. Elaboration of semantic context and/or cultural connotations of textual
features by treating them as aporias; i.e. resisting simple referential closure;
4. Interrogating lectical coherence by emphasizing aporetic relationships
between textual features; hence, Subjectivist reading-acts are consolidated
dialogically.
5. Assessing value to the performance of a reading-act as opposed to the
potential mimetic or symbolic value of the text.
The Lectical Triangle
Reading
   Act
Idealist Mode
1. Idea as target reality
2. Focus on theme
3. Features as symbols
4. Analogical motifs
5. Symbolic  value
Materialist   Mode
1. World  as target reality
2. Focus on plot
3. Features as images
4. Episodic motifs
5. Mimetic  value
Subjectivist  Mode
1. Lectical experience as target reality
2. Focus on diction




Handout #3: Recognizing Aporias
There are two basic types of aporias: textual aporias and lectical aporias.
Textual aporias are those aporias included within a textual pattern which can be
identified with a great deal of certainty according to "common" cultural
conventions.  Lectical aporias are those aporias which are identified by a
particular reader during a particular reading-act, whether those aporias are
recognized according to identifiable cultural conventions or not.
Textual  Aporias:
1. Boundaries of grammatical units (phrases, clauses, sentences, etc.)
2. Graphic breaks (lines, paragraphs, stanzas, white space, chapters,
illustrations, font changes, the last word of a fiction etc.)
3. Shifts in or violations of generic textual patterns (i.e. dialogue,
character, narration, description, narrative chronology, non-standard
syntax, etc)
4. Shifts in diction.
5. Repetition of textual patterns.
6. Manipulation of cultural stereotypes.
Lectical Aporias:
1. Perceived limits of a textual feature.
2. Perceived conflicts in semantic reference or function.
3. Perceived correspondence between textual features or motifs.
4. Perceived conflict with the reader's pre-understanding of "the world."
5. Commencing or stopping a reading in progress (its time to go to work
so I mark my place and close the book; later, I open the book and start
reading where I left off).
6. The perceived resistance of a textual feature to ones lectical
strategies.
7. Pauses during a reading-act to "appreciate" it.
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Handout #4: Lectical Values
1. It is realistic; it accurately represents something
about or in "the" world.
2. It is intellectually stimulating; it makes one think about
its subject.
3. It is instructive; it provides one with information about
"the" world.
4. It evokes emotion; one can experience it as being humorous,
frightening, erotic, exciting, sad, irritating, suspenseful, etc.
5. It is true; it represents a correct understanding of its subject matter.
6. It is stylistically virtuosic or unique; its form is remarkable in
comparison to other fictions.
7. It is socially, politically, culturally, intellectually or spiritually liberating;
one feels more comfortable in some way as a person in the world  having
read it.
8. It is structurally coherent; one can recognize it as a particular, unified
fictional work.
9. It is indicative of the cultural context within which it is written and/or
read; it makes certain elements of that culture intelligible in some unique
way.
10. It is a commodity; one can use it to pursue ones quotidian interests.
11. It confirms ones identity; either through similarity or contrast, your
beliefs about "who you are" are strengthened by reading it.
12. It provides an alternative "reality"; ones attention is
focused away from ones quotidian existence while reading it.
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Handout #5: Glossary for Lectical Analysis
Aesthetics:  Traditionally the study of art or beauty.  Currently, aesthetics
addresses the problem of studying subjective experience in general with a
particular focus upon how all perceptions are to some extent "artistic."  The
inherent subjectivity of aesthetics is reflected by the common use of the word
to denote a stereotypical style or set of preferences: e.g. a punk aesthetic.
Aesthetic object: the thoughts one has about a fiction, therefore the only
"complete" manifestation of a fiction's meaning and value.   
Aporia: a textual element which has or is attributed ambiguous reference and/or
coherence.  Theoretically, all words constitute aporias, but in practice readers
usually recognize only a few of the words of a fiction as aporias.  You can think
of aporias as questions, problems, or issues, encountered during a reading which
instigate some sort of response from the reader.  Therefore, texts are
structured as a series of aporias, and the goal of a reading-act is to resolve all
the aporias recognized.  Moreover, the limits of textual features are established
by aporias.  Since readers do not usually recognize all of the aporias included in a
textual pattern, in lectical analysis one uses the term "textual aporia" to denote
an aporia which is an integral part of a textual pattern and the term "lectical
aporia" to denote an aporia that a particular reader recognizes during a
particular reading-act.
Attribution: A decision or judgment made by a reader regarding the meaning,
function, or value of a textual feature.  Attributions are affected by the pattern
of a text, the reader's unique understanding of literature, lectical strategies, the
lectical milieu, and prior attributions already accumulated into a developing
aesthetic object.   
Coherence: A quality attributed to a text when the reader believes he or she
knows how its constituent parts interrelate.  Coherence is roughly synonymous
with the traditional literary term "unity."  "Lectical coherence" is established
during a reading-act by creating "motifs" which link individual images, symbols,
aporias, and other motifs together as groups of semantic reference and/or
function.
Culture: Expressions about human life and experience which can be transmitted
in any form (verbal, graphic, behavioral, etc.).  Every person has a unique
understanding of culture determined by the particular social, familial, economic,
and historical conditions within which they receive it.
368
Diction: a general term for the unique vocabulary and syntax of a fiction.  Diction
is roughly synonymous with the "style" of language used within a fiction.
Cultural stereotypes about linguistic "style" can affect how a reader responds to
the diction of a fiction.  This is one reason why the unique diction or style of a
fiction cannot be completely separated from its ultimate meaning.
Fiction:  A text that is consciously read with pretense.  This definition shifts the
distinction between fiction and non-fiction from the textual to the lectical realm.
This shift accounts for texts which employ textual patterns usually associated
with fiction while recounting "real" events and texts which employ textual
patterns associated with non-fiction while recounting events which didn't
"really" happen.
Image: traditional literary term denoting a word or group of words which
represents a person, thing, or event: something that exists in a world.  While
performing lectical analysis, no textual feature is inherently an "image"; a lectical
"image" is the thought a particular reader references to a textual feature.
Certain textual patterns invite imagistic reference according to received cultural
stereotypes, although such cues can always be ignored or rejected in favor of
some other lectical strategy.  Regarding the lectical triangle, in the Materialist
mode words are understood as images; the reader pretends a textual feature
represents something that exists in a fictional world.
Lectical: having to do with the process of reading.
Lectical analysis: A method for exploring the mental processes which constitute
a particular reading-act by comparing the textual pattern of the fiction which
instigated that reading-act to a specific reading-text that is meant to represent
it.  In this class, we will come to conclusions about the apparent causes of a
reading-text according to the general assumptions about literary reading
represented by the lectical triangle.
Lectical aporia: see "Aporia"
Lectical horizon: the range of meanings which occur to a particular reader in
response to a particular textual feature.  
Lectical triangle: a heuristic for some of the most common lectical strategies for
reading fiction.
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Meaning: one's understanding of a phenomenon, whether that phenomenon is a
person, book, event, thought, or physical sensation.  Meanings are always
thoughts, and therefore subjective.
Phenomena: Perceptions we have about the people, events, and things in the
world as accessed though sense data.  They are what the world appears to be to
us before meaning and value are determined.
Quotidian: Everyday, "normal," non-theoretical, practical experience.  Although
the distinction between "quotidian" and fictional reality is theoretically
problematic, we typically recognize a difference between our actions in relation
to and within "real" and "pretend" worlds, even though our knowledge of both is
always created through some degree of subjective and idiosyncratic reference.  
Reading-act: the process of interpreting the words of a fiction into an aesthetic
object.  Reading-acts are cognitive events and therefore exist only in the mind
of an individual reader at a given moment in time.  Reading-acts are always
unique and cannot be reproduced, even if a reader re-reads a fiction or two
readers create identical reading-texts.
Reading-text: a representation of an aesthetic object.  Reading-texts can be
mental, verbal, written, or behavioral. Reading-texts - not reading-acts - are the
objects of lectical analysis.  The assumption that justifies lectical analysis,
therefore, is that there are some similarities between reading-texts and reading-
acts even though they are never identical.
Reference:  The event of attributing a meaning or a function to a word or group
of words.  Reference establishes a pretense of equivalence between words and
ideas/things/experiences.  Reference is always performed by the reader by
comparing the words of the text to his or her unique understanding of the world
and language.
Semantic: having to do with meaning.
Symbol: A traditional literary term which denotes a word or group of words
which are understood to have both a literal and figurative meaning.  In other
words, symbols are understood to "be" something (e.g. a ring on my finger) and
represent something (e.g. my marriage vows) at the same time. In the
terminology of lectical analysis, no textual feature is inherently symbolic; readers
attribute symbolic meaning or function as a response to a particular textual
pattern in comparison to their unique understandings of world and language.
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Text: The words of a fiction.
Textual aporia: see "Aporia"
Textual feature: the term in lectical analysis for any number of words which are
understood together by a reader during a particular reading-act.
Textual Pattern: The unique arrangement of words that constitute a particular
text.  In addition, there are lectical conventions regarding certain generic textual
patterns; in other words, certain general ways of organizing texts have been
historically read in certain ways.  For example, the textual pattern of following
the words "He said" with some quoted words is usually read as dialogue.  
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Appendix B
In this appendix I reproduce three "Apprentice" reading-texts.  The first
student does the critical work of lectical analysis without using the terminology I
delivered in class.  I do not know whether or not she would have approached The
Waste Land differently without my instruction, but I offer her efforts as an
example of the strong analytical skills some students have independent of our
teaching methods.  This student did not need neo-appreciation pedagogy to
generate insightful commentary, although I assume giving her the opportunity to
hone her skills did not hurt them either.  The second reading-text is an example
of how at first the terminology of lectical analysis sometimes interferes with a
student's ability to write a clear account of her reading-act.  As with other
analytical heuristics, there is a learning curve even for excellent students, like
Apprentice #2.  The last "Apprentice" reading-text, however, shows that
students who are given the opportunity to practice can eventually integrate the
lectical triangle into their critical repertoire, often with excellent results.  Like
the reading-texts analyzed in Chapter 5, all three of these were first draft,
journal entries.   
Apprentice #1
Just like everyone else has expressed I'm sure, I didn't know what to
make of this poem.  I found it to be complex and full of symbolism as well as
interesting to read.  I guess I didn't really let the fragmentation of the work
bother me.  I just read it as I went along and shifted scenes with it.  I tried as I
read to look at the broad picture that Eliot was creating with each shift of
subject and voice.  I also tried to trace different themes or recurring symbols
throughout the work but I'm not really sure what they all mean.  I saw water
mentioned multiple times, including streams and death by water with King
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Ludwig II and Ophelia.  I thought the footnotes were really helpful and
interesting.  It makes me appreciate just how well read and culturally intelligent
Eliot was to employ the abundant allusions found in The Waste Land.  Like the
headnote said there were juxtapositions of water and dryness as well as many
pictures of unfruitfulness, in marriage, nature, etc.  Christian theology is strung
throughout the poem displayed through different shifts.  There were several
different mentions of dogs and bones, not necessarily together.  I think several
of the sections were about relationships.  Human interaction seemed to be a
good deal of what was being commented on, which makes sense since
relationships are what compose human life.  The nightingale and the story
behind it were a little hard for me to follow.  Some of the images his words
created were easier to picture than others.  I think this poem is a commentary
on the human experience of life and a search for meaning.  I'm not sure what
Eliot's conclusion is in this poem.  There were many mentions of death, which s
also intrinsic to human life and something everyone must face.  I have some
questions about what Eliot was trying to say with his recurring themes of other
deities dying and being resurrected such as the Fisher King.  The ancient
mystery religions were also tied throughout the poem.  I saw threads of unity in
the work but I'm not sure I have a broad understanding of Eliot's purpose.
Apprentice #2
T. S. Eliot's "The Waste Land" has been referred to as one of the
definitive works of Modernist literature.  Authors of Modernist literature
employed various combinations of several devices common in all Modernist
literature.  One of these devices was the experimentation with literary form in an
effort to disrupt traditional (coherent) ways of understanding literature.  T. S.
Eliot utilized this device in writing "The Waste Land".  Due to the elliptical form
of this poem it is almost impossible to evaluate the poem from a materialist
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and/or idealist point of view.  "The Waste Land" is best evaluated by using
subjectivist strategies.  Focusing on the diction and textual patterns in the poem
is the most effective way of finding meaning in "The Waste Land."
Diction, the words that make up a work of literature, carries different
connotations.  Words can have multiple meanings.  For instance, in line 87 of
"The Waste Land" the narrator describes, "vials of ivory and coloured glass
unstoppered, (in which) lurked her strange synthetic perfumes."  The word
strange can have meaning meanings, such as weird or creepy or exciting and
provocative.  The way in which a reader chooses to define the word strange, and
others like it, affects the meaning that a reader finds in the poem.
Textual patterns are helpful in determining shifts between characters and
also in distinguishing between different parts of the poem.  Being able top
differentiate between characters is useful to the reader because it allows them
to separate the poem into various bits and pieces so that they can be evaluated
and analyzed so as to find their meaning.  Together textual patterns and diction
can help the reader figure out the age, sex, and social class of the character who
is speaking.  Knowing these things can help a reader take what the character
tells them and decide what is its significance.  For a piece of literature like "The
Waste Land" evaluating and analyzing the diction and textual patterns of the
poem are instrumental in finding the overall meaning(s) of the work.
Apprentice #3
Realizing that the disjointed nature of Eliot's The Wasteland is in large
part due to Ezra Pound's editing and Eliot's decision not to add other transitions
back in the work, I am nonetheless choosing as my method of interpretation the
subjectivist viewpoint from the lectical triangle.  For me, this method allows for
the greatest ability to thoughtfully analyze the structure and meaning of Eliot's
work.   
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As with any poetic piece, The Wasteland is chock-full of dense meaning
and descriptive language.  The diction employed by Eliot finds its rots in many
dialects around the world, most notably Geek, medieval Italian and modern
German.  In fact, many of these languages are woven directly into the fabric of
the poem causing a sense of immediate disconnect for the reader and sends him
scrambling for the accompanying footnotes or the nearest friendly eared native
speaker for an interpretation.
Unlike many of the [poems discussed in class over the course of the
semester, Eliot's piece presents the unique problem of being so dense in content
that it makes its comprehension difficult to determine.  This is especially true in
regards to following coherent themes throughout the poem.  It is sometimes
difficult to make a controlling connection between lines in the same stanza, let
alone attempting to do so throughout the entire work.
The aberrational aporias that define the poem lend themselves to this
type of difficulty, but perhaps they offer a more subliminal cohesion not readily
apparent at first glance.  After reading the headnote that precedes the poem,
my mind was led to the tentative conclusion hat a quick scanning of the stanza
headings might prove fruitful in determining if indeed there are any controlling
chains of thought to link the poem's seemingly disconnected ramblings.  Once I
did this, I discovered that a constant theme of declining worth permeated the
poem.  Whether line 173 is relating that "the river's tent is broken: the last
fingers of leaf / clutch and sink into the wet bank" or line 323 is making the
painful statement "after the frosty silence in the garden / after the agony in
stony places ? the shouting and crying," Eliot's presentation of a broken world
becomes more apparent by the minute.
As with any subjectivist reading, I have found that it is helpful to consider
the poem in its most basic form, words.  Taken either together or separately,
the words that compose Eliot's The Wasteland have much to offer in the realm
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of interpretation.  The spiraling hopelessness that pervades the piece gives the
reader the idea that Eliot's view of the world at this time was rather doubtful
and definitely depressed.  In the final analysis, Eliot appears to give no solution
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